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C H A P T E R  I.
Jeneology -  Arab or non-Arab ? - >Abu 3ufra. 
Geneology ( l ) .
—  f <>\> Jrl> —  <_> — .— c^Yr
<_> U  ) c> cV V? <> <-£*-> <> ^ C s  (JsS^ C r i s  \
CsA&ysjtcs * ^ y j / ^ v y j u  vJl>^uj) 
c > ^ ^  < _ > ^ > ^  ^ V ^ t >  A - ^ ^ V . ^ . ’U
>  y  V   ^ ^  ^ •> \ /  ^ 4^X »j> <_> J
( i )  For gsneology see Agh. 18/8; ID ,283; IKh. V l4 5 ;  
I s a ,4/108; la t.4/109J TT. 10/329; TI. 320;Uad.
*}* Thus also in B&L.417; I q d .  Z /2 1 3 ', K t m . z + s A -
+ Agh, adds ‘ q ^ ^ C r  ’_
aAl-l’uhallab o r ig in a lly  belonged to Daba ( 1 ) ,  the 
old principal town of %man which had been the home of 
h is  father and forefathers for many a century. He was 
descended from a l-*A tik , progenitor of a branch of *Azti­
nman which name was applied to one of the four principal 
groups (2) into which the descendants of al-Azd became 
divided a f te r  their  emigration from their  orig inal home 
in Yaman(3).The ^zd-^Uman were so ca lled  a f te r  the name 
o f  th e ir  new home in order to d istin gu ish  them from the 
other co lla tera l  groups, e .g .  , >Azd Sarat* which, though 
tracing th e ir  descent from one and the same ancestor, 
al-^Azd, had d r ifted  to d ifferen t  fa r -o f f  lands and had 
likew ise  some d is t in c t iv e  s u f f ix  added to the ir  common 
tr ibal name(4).
We come across a few references insinuating  that  
al-Mahal lab was not of the Arab stock and that h is  father  
was r ea lly  a non-Arab, belonging to Khuzistan (5) or the
(1 ) .  Tab. j Tag. 2/543 and IKh. 2/148 1 ’ f
Bal.76 ’Dabba* ( \S>). Al^Asma*! has described Daba 
as a market p la ce ' in  <Uman’whieh probably i s  
id en tica l with the town o f  Daba. (Yaa. 2/543; cf#
Tab. j/19 T i ^ ^ V  W T*
( 2 ) .  Sncy. 1/529.
( 3 ) .  The ©migration of al-^zd, connected with the bursting  
of the Dam of Ma>r ib ,  i s  well-known.
(4 ) .  IKh. 2 /148.
(5 ) .  A$i. 13/61.
Iisland o f  Kharak(l), who migrated to <Uraan, s e t t le d  
amongst the ykzd and then in course o f  time spuriously  
claimed hi3 descent from them. Such references are 
mostly to be found in the verses of the content orary 
poets , 2iyad a l -  ^ j a m ,  Ka<b al-'Xshqari and a l-  
Farazdaq(2). ^bn Ha jar also mentions that such  ^view was a  / 
held by * a few p e o p le * ^ ) .
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(1 ) ,  ^bu Ubaida in Yi
Persian Gulf opposite ine raoutiii c ( Le Str. 261). len tion  of Kharak 
al-farazdaqJ- .> U U O ?  u
*^\jr
(D iw.253)
(2 ) .  Ziyad a l - >A<jam says;-
Aj>V^  <J
^  aX^> VjLA"! b> \
(Agh. 13/56). The second verse i s  also to be found 
In Ida.4/109 where i t  i s  sta ted  that the_reference  
in  the third l in e  was p articu lar ly  to >Abu Suf'ra# 
father of al-Muhallab* who had remained uncircumcised 
t i l l  he was far advanced in age.
Ka*b al-^A^hqari 3ays, eu lo g is in g  Qutaiba b. 
Mislim, the avowed enemy o f  a i-m h a lla b id s ,  and 
s a t i r i s in g  Yazid b. al-M ihallabj-
^ \  A>Vks?^  \ < - ^ r*
>U W o  cTXTd- g
(Agh. 13/61). The three proper nouns occurring in  
the third verse- are saia to be the former names o f  
’Abu §ufra, hia father and h is  grand-father respec­
t iv e ly  which were discarded in favour of Arab names 
a fter  th e ir  fusion with the ^zd. According to *Abu 
<Ubaida in Yaq.2/387 where verses 3 and 4 are given 
with var ia tion ,the  formBr name of Abu Sufra wa3 t> j^ i 
The verses,w ith variation and along with many others* 
are also preserved in Tab.2/1239-40.
Al-Farazdaq, in h is  sa t ir e s  ,frequently  refers to 
the non-Arab origin  of al-lfiinallab.A few verses are 
quoted on in fra  p. 7 noteiD. C3; is«..4/io9.
There is  no room for the l e a s t  doubt about the 
Arab descent o f  a l-m h a llab . His geneology as given 
above i s  preserved by sush eminent au th or it ies  as^bn  
*Abd al -3arr, >Ibn al^Athlr, al^Isfahan! » ^bn iruraid and 
>Ibn Khallikan. >Ibn Ha jar too recognises i t  as the 
authoritative version which i s  also corroborated by 
>Ibn al -Kal b i ,
Now the references to the contrary can only be 
explained a3 the irresponsible utterances of unscrupulous 
poets who* in accordance with the s p ir i t  of the tims, 
were moved by tr ib a l jea lousies  and s t i l l  more were 
motivated by s e l f i s h  considerations of monetary gain.
I t  was an age when tr iba l r iv a lr ie s  and old prejudices  
had revived with fu l l  force and particu lar ly  the trad i­
t ional animosity between the Northern and the Southern 
Arabs was raging vehemently. The poets traded fr e e ly  in 
s a t i r e s ,  lampoons and encomiums and seldom did they 
allow the fa l l  o f  a patron to a f fe c t  th e ir  own fortunes. 
Often and without any compunction they sh if ted  their  
alleg iance from th e ir  erstwhile patron to h is  supplanter 
and the praise o f  the l a t t e r  invariably involved a 
sa t ir e  on the forser.
Ouriously enough, the case o f  al-Mihallab forms 
a typical i l lu s tr a t io n  of the p oets1 ir r e sp o n s ib i l i ty  
and disregard for  truth and consistency. Of the three 
poets whose assertion of a l-m hallab*s  foreign descent 
has been referred to above, 2iyad a l - >A<jam was devoted 
to him since an ear ly  date and continued to be h is
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panegyrist throughout h is  l i f e .  The fu l l  report in Agh. ( i )  
leaves no doubt that the verse containing a jibe on ^bu
WAS
Sufra who 'circumcised la te  in l i f e * ,  was coc^osed by him 
only in a f i t  o f  tr iba l jealousy just  with a view to 
es ta b lish in g  the superior ity  of h is  om  tr ib e ,  <Abd a l -  
Qais, over that o f  the rival poet, Ka4 b a lA sjiq ar i,  who 
happened to belong to the 3ame tribe as a l-;uha llab .  
Similarly Ka<b long remained the family poet of a l -  
Mahaliba (2) and his derogatory verses are themselves a 
proof that they were meant just  to f l a t t e r  the vanity  
o f  the powerful Qaisite to whom he had gone over a fter  
the trag ic  f a l l  o f  hi3 Yemenite patrons notwithstanding  
the fact  that he h im self was an Aadite. The sa t ir e s  o f  
al-Farazdaq against a l-B ihallab ids are numerous indeed, 
yet  his dlwan too contains a Qasida in honour of the 
sons o f  al-Mohallab (3) with many a laudatory verse in 
eulogy of their  i l lu s tr io u s  father. During the heyday 
of th e ir  ascendancy, al-Farazdaq had no scruples to 
la v ish  praises on the Bihallabids who had long been the 
target of his most vehement sa t ir e s  and whom he again 
sa t ir ized  after  th e ir  trag ic  end when he had no tiling to 
hope fo r  or fear from them.
(1)* 12/56; See also Supra p .3 note 2.
(2 ) .  Al-Muhallab and h is  descendants are c o l le c t iv e ly  
called  al-Mailaliba* ( Kam. 96).
(3 ) .  Div. 374*
a lso  cut o f f  from any deep and intimate contact with 
th e ir  Arab brethren inland . This could not but oonduoe 
to th e ir  g iv ing  up many Arab notions and habits and 
developing un-Arab ones in th e ir  place. Thus i f  we 
scru tin ise  c lo se ly  the sa t ir e s  and invectives against  
the ^zd <Uman» we w i l l  find that they s tre ss  not so much 
th e ir  non-Arab orig in  as the un-Arab way o f  l i f  practised  
by them. The assertion  of th e ir  non-Arab origin  is  made 
ju st  by way o f  a hyperbole for th e ir  un-Arab ca ll in g  
and re lig iou s  and soc ia l  p ractices .  The same is exactly  
the case with the sa t ire s  of al-Farazdaq, for  instance,  
against al-Mihallab. The main theme on v/hi oh the poet  
d ila te s  i s  that the ancestors and tribesmen of a l -  
ifohallab practised seamanship; that they did not worship 
Yagfruth or go round al-Dawar as the Arabs did; that they 
did not indulge in gambling and drinking bouts which 
were the proud boast of a pure Arab; that they knew not  
circumcision which was one of the observances of F it  rah 
dating from the time o f  Abraham; e t c . e t c . ( i ) .  Su re ly ,a ll  
th is  may be true but the Arab origin  s t i l l  remains 
unquestioned,
\ 3 ) Y a q .4 / 0^ 2 ; f s j  u n d e r  O y  ; a l  so  an cy, under ^Azd.
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Gf. the following two quotations from the sati 
of al-Farazdaq al^Muhallabs-
JL#
^ 3^  f  f-bi i
Lc> (jV} Vj ^  > . 'os\ i
Thus i t  i s  d e a r  that the utterances of such 
opportunist and unscrupulous poets can have no 
authoritative  value. However, i t  must be admitted that 
they se ized  upon a conraon prejudice prevalent among the 
Arabs o f  'Jentral Arabia not p articu lar ly  against a l -  
iS$haLiba alone but against the whole of ^zd-*Uman in 
g e n e r a l( l) .  The >A.zd<Uman were often  jeered at for th e ir  
c a l l in g ,  customs and soc ia l  habits which, according to 
the standard n otion s, were in con sisten t with the d ig i i t y  
amd honour o f  a pure Arab. They were al3o called  1 Mazun*
( o r  ’luzun1) w h ic h  name c o n t a i n e d  a  d i s p a r a g i n g  
r e f e r e n c e  to  t h e i r  c a l l i n g  o f  se a m a n 3 h ip (  2).
The truth is  that the ^zd^man had s e t t le d  in the 
fa r -o f f  maritime region of *11man, then under Persian 
suzerainty, a3 far back as during the time of ^rdashir I 
b, Babak ( 226-241 A.D.) who, i t  i s  reported, made them 
boatmen and f ish ers  (3 ) .  No doubt, i t  wa3 but natural 
for  the dwellers in a coastal region to be attracted to 
the sea and taJce to seamanship and f ish in g , these two 
ca ll in g s  were considered highly derogatory to the honour 
o f  a pure /irab and hence they form the main burden of  
the sa t ir e s  against them. Moreover, the^zd  in U^man 
l iv e d  amidst a large non-Arab population and were
(1 ) .  The "uraisnites were unw illing to recog iise  the 
>Azd nJman aa Arabs (Sncy.under^Azd).
(2 ) .  1 Mazun* i s  variously explained as (a) the Persian 
name of <Uman, aa (o) Gonnoting ’mall ah in (seamen) * 
and as (c)  a small tom  in <Uffiah which was inhabited 
ex c lu s iv e ly  by Jews and seamen. In any case i t  
contained a reference to seamanship. Al-Kumait s
6
Further, i t  i s  quite understandable that the 
c a ll in g  of  seamanship brought the people o f  liman into  
frequent contact with the island of Kharak and the main­
land o f  Khuzistan. These navigational re la tion s  were 
exploited by the s a t i r i s t s  to a llege  that^bu Sufra was 
a non-Arab from the above two p laces . The words ascribed  
to ^bu <Ubaida purporting to asser t  a l-m h al la b 's  non- 
Arab origin (1) may very well be regarded as a mere 
exposition of a popular jibe rather than a considered 
testimony on h is  own behalf. S im ilarly , the Pe s i  an nataes 
variously attributed  to al-iiuhallab’s ancestors (2) seem 
only to be an offshoot o f  the conmon prejudice.
* ^ ^  > \ ^  A*
v?




</ \> Jo) ^  J .
v / \y ?  O sjK jrl < jC  c{/>>'j>J\ 41X3 W
[Diwo. 254-3 -
(1) Yaq. ^387 .
(2 ) .  Ibid; see also supra p . 3 note 2.
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The >Azd-<l)man entered the fold of Islam in the 
year 8 ( or 7 ) A.H. in response to an appeal from the 
Prophet addressed to their  chiefs Jaifar and <Abbad (1 ) ,  
sons of al-Julanda the Azdite. Following the death o f  
the Prophet, however, they turned apostates, withholding  
the payment o f  a l-z sk a t ,  under the leadership o f  a high 
d i^ iitary  called  Laqit b. i’a lik  a lA a d i Dhu ' t - t a j  who, 
l ik e  so many other pretenders that cropped up at the 
time, arrogated to him self the p r iv ileg es  o f  prophethood 
and estab lished  his sway over <IJman. This n ecess ita ted  
the despatch of a punitive expedition by ^bu 3akr on the 
arrival of which the rebels entrenched themselves in 
Daba but a fter  a f ierce  f ig h t  ( year 11 A.H.) surrendered 
with heavy lo s se s  to themselves and again returned to 
the path o f  Islam. A number o f  them were also captured 
as prisoners and sent to ^bu Bakr (2 ) .
I t  is  d e f in ite ly  known that ^bu 3u frs ,  father of  
al-Mihail ab, followed the general mass o f  h is  tribesmen 
in th e ir  acceptance of and revolt  from Islam. He was, 
no doubt, one o f  the followers o f  Laqit in apostasy and 
re-entered the fold o f Islam on the crashing of the 
revo lt  (3 ) .
There is a report, related on the authority of 
al-'-7aqidi, to the e f f e c t  that Sufra was one o f  those
(1 ) .  Thus in tab. 1/1561; Yqb. •
Bal. 76 Ju-.
(2 ) .  Bair 76; Tab. 1/1977-79.
(3 ) .  Isa#3/535 on the authority o f  ’Ibn 3a<d.
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men of Daba who were turned prisoners a f te r  the v ictory  
over Laqit and sent to ^bu Bakr, as mentioned above.
^bu Bakr, i t  continues, s e t  a l l  those prisoners free (1)  
and allowed them to go wherever they lilted  whereupon 
^bu Sufra s e t t le d  in al-Basra. The report i s  mentiuned 
in IKh. (2/145-6) and also in Isa. where a few more 
d eta ils  are added. But in e ith er  p lace , ^ibu Jui'ra is  
described as ' a boy not yet  of age’ which is  wron^ and 
renders the whole report unreliab le . As pointed out in 
Isa. * thi3 description of^lbu i s  un tenaole in
view o f  the assertion  of al-Hakim, which, no doubt, is  
indisputable , that al-Luhallab was bom durin , the l i f e ­
time of the Prophet, ^bn Qutaiba rejects  i t  s t i l l  more 
p o s i t iv e ly .  He says, * This report is  untrue and a l -  
Taqidi has erred in it" because-^bu Sufra was not among 
those prisoners nor did^bu Bakr see him at a l l .  I t  was 
only to ^Umar, the second Caliph, that^ bu  Sufra paid a 
v i s i t  and at that time he wa3 an old man with hoary head 
and grey beard which he dyed at the former’s su ^ e s t io n .  
How then, asks >Ibn u ta ib a , can ^bu Sufra be a mere lad  
during the time of ^bu Bakr while al-Muhallab, who was
(1 ) .  According to Isa. (4 /1 0 8 -9 ) ,  the prisoners were 
released by >Abu Bakr on the intervention of  
■^Umar; Yaq. 2/544 mentions that they were released  
by ^Umar only a f te r  the death of ^bu Bakr.
1°
one of nis comparatively youngar children, was bom many 
years before the death of the Prophet ? ivereover, some 
of his children were bom th ir ty  or even more years 
before the death of the Prophet(i).
toother incongruity in th is  report is  that i t  
suggests that ^bu Sufra s e t t le d  in al-Basra shortly  
after  h is  supposed release by ^bu Baler which, o f  course, 
i s  not proved by l a t e r  events.
According to I s a . , i t  i s  a disputed point whether 
^bu Sufra ever saw the Prophet. But the evidence i s  
»
a l m o s t  d e c i s i v e l y  on the n e g a t i v e  3 i d e .  Uo d o u b t ,  >1 bn 
a l - 3 a k a n  h a3  c o u n ted  him as one o f  ' al-3ahaba* b u t  he
• •
has only re lied  on a tradition which h e .3  as i t s  source 
>\bu 3ufra himself and is  handed down to us through numerous 
successive generations of al-HMhallabids and which, on 
the face of i t ,  is  somewhat fa n ta s t ic .  I t  purports to 
say that the Prophet was highly impressed by the t a l l  
and s ta te ly  figure of ^bu Sufra mo v is i te d  him in 1 a 
yellow robe which he tra iled  two yards behind him*. On 
an inquiry from the Prophet, ^bu Sufra gave a f i c t i t i o u s  
pedigree o f  himself which he linked up with the famous 
al-Jalanda who, i t  is  supposed, i s  referred to in the
qur>an(2). the Prophet thereupon called  him °&bu Sufra*
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(1 ) .  IKh. 2/146.
(2 ) .  Al-Jalanda, a scion of the ^zd o f  al-Yaman, i s  said
to have established himself on the coast of i/’ars as
early  as before the time of Moses and i t  i s  claimed^
that i t  i s  he,who is  meant in the verse o f  the Qur>ans
t 9 *His descendants known
as i&ibnjTor * /\£)W re very in f lu e n t ia l  in that 
region long a f te r  the advent o f  Islam.(Yaq. 2/711).
by which name he i s  commonly known, ^bu Sufra i 3 also  
reported to have said that he h?d a daughter called  
Sufra who i3 unheard o f  anywhere e lse  (1 ) .
Now thi3 report i s  u t te r ly  unreliable*^ bn Ha jar  
t e s t i f i e s  that i t s  veracity was questioned and >Ibn 
*Abd al-Barr categor ica lly  denies i^bu Surra’ s v i s i t  to 
the Prophet which denial i s  also corroborated by the 
account in TJsd. Evidently the above report was fabricated  
the la t e r  al-I&ihallabids just  to add to the honour 
of  th e ir  faraily(2).
Similarly* ^bu Sufra*s v i s i t  to ><bu 3akr, which 
is  asserted in a few reports though not with c e r ta in ty (3 ) , 
lacks confirmation and proof. >Ibn qutaiba has d e f in i te ly  
denied i t  and most probably the name of ^bu Bakr occurring  
in the report of al-Hakim (4) has by an oversight been 
put in place o f  <Umar because i t  i s  s tr ik in g ly  sim ilar  
to the report of ^bu Sufra’ s v i s i t  to the second Oaliph, 
which, of course, is  beyond a l l  doubt.
As the v i s i t  to the seoond Oaliph came o f f  only 
a f te r  ^bu Sufra had s e t t le d  in al-Basra, we now turn to 
his emigration from <Umah and will next refer to the 
former event in accordance with chronological order.
>Abu Sufra l e f t  <UaS& in the capacity of a warrior.
He was one of the members of the expedition organised by
(1 ) .Ia a . 4/108.
(2 ) .  S im if io a n t ly  enourii, al-31)ari&fi. introduces the 
above report with feie words that i t  was an assertion
o f  al -L*unal 1 abi fk ,  *
(3 ) . I s t .4 /1 0 9  and Usd. 5/231.
(4 ) .  I s a . 3/353.
12,
^Uthman b. ^bi , l - <A3i al-Thaqafl, the governor o f
al-Bahrain and <Uman, and sent abroad under the command
of h is  brother al-iiakam b* ^bi a l - <As! to cross the seat •
and seek new conquests i n  the l a n a  of F a r s .  T h is  
expedition which is  described a s  a  very large one (2000 
strong ) consist in g  of men draw n from the various t r i b e s  
of  *Abd a l-Q ais , al-^Azd and others, f i r s t  conquered the 
island of ^br&avan (1)» nowadays called ilishm near the 
Strait3 of the Persian Gull* and then, disembarking on 
the mainland of fa r s ,  cap lured fawwaj(2)» a c ity  situated  
a  short distance up the mouth o f  the r iver  3hapur in  
the d i s t r i c t  of ^rdshir  Xhurra, where a number o f Muslims 
were s e t t le d  i n  the year 19 A.H.
,Ve do not hear anything about the part played by 
^bu 3ufra in the conquest of ^Abrkavan or the captfcure of  
Tawwaj(3) but in the following year ( 20 A.H. * ) we 
find him enjoying a hi^ i m ilitary  rank in the army of  
al-Hakam. I t  30 happened that the p lanting of the Muslims 
on the 30i l  of Fars greatly  perturbed i t s  Marzuban, 
Shahrak (4) and th e ir  growing strength at l a s t  moved him
13
( 1 ) .  A lso w r i t t e n >Ib n  Kavan o r  Ban! Kavan and a l s o  
c a l l e d  L a f i t  ( Le 3 t r a .  261).
(2 ) .  Also Tawwaz ( Le Stra. 259-60).
(3 ) .  Tab.(i/2698 s e q .) represents as i f  i t  were a battle
for Tawwaj what Bal.aescribes as the Battle of  
Ra^jjahr.'fne la t t e r  account is  more deta iled  on th is  
point and,hence, more credible.
* >Ibn Sa<it '£abaqat 5/409. the account in Da in. 
141-142 makes i t  clear that the battle  at Haaftahr 
took place one year a f te r  the lending of the m slim
army bn the s o i l  of Fars.'.’he seauence of events as
related in the book also con f irms that the year 
should be 20 A, H. ^
( 4 ) .  Thus in Sal. and Tab.| also written §-a in Yaq.
In a verse in Yaq. 3/494 we also have t •
to put up resistan ce . 3o, he himself headed an arny which 
crossed swords with the ’Muslim army under al-'Iakam at 
Kashahr (1 ) ,  a place near Tawwaj in the land o f  3 a bur.
In the Battle o f  Kashahr, Sufra commanded the l e f t  
wing of al-Hakam*s army while the right wing and the 
vanguard were comnanded by al-.Jarud al-^Vodi andt Sawwar b. 
H&mmSm a l - ^ b d l  resp ect ive ly , The b attle  proved a f ierce  
one j i t  i s  said to have been as hard and to have brought 
as much advantage to the iaislims as the famou3 Battle of  
Qadisiyya. th* resu lt  was a decisive victory for the 
i/uslims; 3hahrak was k i l le d  (3) and Kashahr was captured 
by force (3 ) .
This is the f i r s t  time that we meet^bu 3ufra in the
%
capacity of a so ld ier .  We do not know what walk of l i f e  he 
belonged to in the days before. But i t  i s  l ik e l y  that he 
may have been a seaman or a f ish e r  l ik e  most of h is  country­
men and that he was attracted to the army during the wave 
of m ilitary adventure which swept the 'Jnliphate in the 
second decade of the i&islim era. The i i  :;h rank of rJom ander 
of the l e f t  wing i s  suggestive of soma previous services
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(1 ) .  Al30 written HI shah r._ This should not be confused 
with iTiahahr in Hr raj an.
(2 ) .  Tab, also records (1/2691) another b attle  between 
MJtbnSn b. ^Abl a l -  M si and Sjiahrak towards the end
o f  the caliphate o f  <11mar and the b e g i n n i n g  o f  the 
calipha/oe of <TJthm an (23-24 A.H. )• T h is  can only be a 
d i s t o r t e d  version of w hat i3  c ® n t io n e d  in Bal.388 
a s  an expedition against ' the Brother of O&ahrak1 in 
the saras year3> 23 or 24. Shahrak was decidedly k i l le d  
at Rasliahr. Of course* Lis ?on, whc i s  mentioned in 
Tab.’ s annals o f  the la te r  bat t i e ,  survived him.
( 3 ) .  BaJL. 386-87,
o f  which, 01 course, we p o s s e s  no record but i t  i s  just  
p ossib le  that he may have served in some of the various 
e a r l ie r  naval expeditions that were sent out i'rom the coast  
of <TJinan and al-Bahrain across the Persian Irulf by a l - <_'\la>b* 
al -Kadrami, a foriser go ve rno r » a jo the far dis tan t 
coasts of Karachi and Bombay by <i thman and h is  brother 
al-Hakam (1 ) .  Anyhow, the command of the l e f t  win.; i s  a 
s u f f ic ie n t  proof of the outstanding m ilitary  q u a lit ie s  
o f^ b u  Sufra.
At the instance of <Uaart *UtM?n also joined hi3  
brother al-Hakam when the l a t t e r  had won the victory at  
R ash ail r? Soon after  h is arrival at Tawwaj, ^Utijniah under­
took a number ol campaigns in the neighbourm country; 
Kazarun and al-Hubandjan are mentioned as two of the places  
attacked by him (2 ) .  >Abu 3ufra, a3 a prominent member of 
the army, may have taken part in these campai gns but 
henceforth we cease to hear anything about h is m ilitary  
ex p lo it s .
4 Umar also wrote to >Abu Bisa al A sh  <ari, the governor 
of al-Basra, to extend every help to <Uthmah who, i t  seems# 
fixed the base cf  h is  m ilitary  operations at al-Basra,the  
nearest garrison town, shortly  a fter  his arrival in Fara 
because during the l a s t  two or three years o f  the daliphate 
of <11mar there was very close collaboration between the 
two. >^ bu lusa himself accompanied <Uthman in many a campaigi 
in FErs and often helped him with mn* virusAbu 3ufra
(1 ) .  Bal. 431-32. '
(2 ) .  Bal. 388.
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mast have s e t t le d  in al-Basra along with the army o f  
<Uthniin about the year 21 A.H. in which, as w i l l  be seen 
in the next chapter, al-iauhallab i s  noticed with the 
Basran army.
I t  was from al-Basra that <Uthman (1) despatched 
^bu Sufra along with a number of Azdite men to v i s i t  ‘ Umar. 
<Umar asked ^bu Sufra as to h is  name which he gave as 
Zalim b. Sariq ( l i t . ,  unjust b . . t h ie f ) .  Perhaps the 
undesirable import o f  these names se t  <SJmar to think of  
a better nanfi for him. Seeing that A^bu Sufra had dyed his  
head and beard, which had grown white, he observed, "You 
are >K\m  Sufra ( l i t . ,  father o f  yellow colour),,* and thence­
forth the *Kunya* was adopted.
On th is  v i s i t ,  ^bu Sufra wa3 also accompanied by ten 
of h is  sons of whom al-Mihailab was the youngest, ^mar 
looked a t them a l l  and then, pointing out to al-Muhallab 
in whom he saw sigps of early  promise, said to >Abu Sufra, 
"this i s  the chief o f  a l l  your sons."
I t  i s  said  that ^bu Sufra also applied to *11 mar for  
some job which request the Caliph dismissed with a jocular  
reference to h is  and his fa th er ’ s unhappy names, aayin ♦
"Tou are * unjust1 and your father is  a ' t h i e f ’ "(2).
(1 ) .  At_ this time <U1ihman i s  said to be the ^AnSr1 of al - 
Basra which should not be taken to mean ’governor. ’I t  
mist,however, be renumbered that the administration of  
al-Ba^ra was not vet centralised into the "hands of the 
governor. Various troops were stationed  under independent 
commanders who collaborated with each o th e r a s  the 
occasion demanded ( Tab. 1 /2713,8-10). The armies o f^ b u  
Ms a and ‘ TJthman b. ’Abi '1-^IsI are msntioned as 
d is t in c t  from each other so la te  as in the year 29 A.H. 
(Tab. 1/2832).
(2 ) .  Sh. j cf. Iq d .  1/297.
The v i s i t  to U^xaar i s  the l a s t  event recorded of  
>Abu Sufra*s l i f e .  As he was already old  enough,he must 
have died not long afterwards.
>Abu Sufra must have had at l e a s t  ten s o n s ,  ve,however, %
know of only f ive  o f  thems-
1. Qabisa, popularly known as the grand father of
Ha z sir mar d ( l i t . ,  one thousand men), a sobriquet conferred 
on ^Umar b. Hafs b. <Uthiaan b. Qabisa, a famous governor
*  «  —  * 
of Africa, as a recognition o f  his extraordinary bravery. 
Another descendant o f  Qabisa was Judai< b. 3a<Id b. Qabisa 
who served al-Muhallab on many an occasion and i s  also  
mentioned as the *Khal' o f  Yazld b. al-Muhallab. Qabisa 
was the leader of the >kwi in the expedition of Bislim b. 
^Ubais against the ?Azariqa.
2. Al-Mu^hlra. His two sons, iiishr and H&<an were 
distinguished horsemen o f  al-Muhallab!s army. Another s o n  
called  a l-M a^rs^is also knora.
3. Al-Nakhf. He had a son ca lled  S a b ra .( i ) .
4 . Al-Buhturl. He had a son ca lled  3a<Id (2 ) .%1
5. Al-Siihallab. He is  said to have been bom of the 
same mother as Mas^d b. <Amr, the ch ief  of the >Azd who was 
mrdered during the upheaval in al-Basra in the year
64 A.H. (3 ).
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(1 ) .  ID. 283; Tab. Index.
(2 ) .  Agh. 5/167.
(3 ) .  ID. 294.
6. A daughter o f  ^bu 3ufra called  Hind is  also  
mentioned in Iqd. (4 /157).  At one time about the third  
quarter of the f i r s t  century (1)# she was regarded as the 
most respected and in f lu e n t ia l  widow o f  al-Basra,
18
(1 ) .  The anecdote> in Iqds belongs to the period when 
) d A ts -  * / W  wa3 the Qaix o f  al -Bas ra. 
According to Tab.( index) Zurara was appointed 
G&di in 45 and again held the same o f u c e  in 55 
and 75-76 A.H.
C H A P T S R II .
Early Career o f  al-teihallab.
The birth  of al-SSihallab ( i )  has been variously  
placed in the year 7 or 8 A.H. and correspondingly h is  
death in the year 82 or 83 A.H.* i t  being commonly agreed 
among a l l  authorities  that he died at the age of 76. As 
i t  i s  more probable that he died in 82> i t  follows that  
his birth  should be placed in the year 7.
^bu Sufra may or may not have been a so ld ier  in h is  
early  days but i t  i s  clear that a l-ruhallab grew up in 
martial tra d it io n s .  Being the son o f a soldier* i t  i3 no 
surprise that he joined the array at an early  age. we f i r s t  
find h is  mention in the Basran army which advanced from 
i t s  base under the comnand of ^bu Has a al^Ash^ari • the 
governor of a l -Basra* with the object ol. clearing "he 
north-eastern l im its  of the province from Bairudh(2), 
probably to the west o f  the river Karkha near Basinna, to 
Manadhir of the h o s t i le  Kurds and Persians who had assembled
(1 ) .  The derivation of 4 i s  explaind thus ;-
4^, ^rr^  y w ) ) j  ^
—  ^Xe> \ J )
✓ * > 
aX ^  \ ) j v—A ^ ) c > J —  ) ( '-r))
^  1 Cj <—-J^ V* -v  V v  s
( 13 . 225)  -  —^ ai ^ * A >
' • ( 1 /1 4  o- 4 1) d  (& )
+ Aji-vO Aj 1/ 1
( 2 ) .  Yaq. 1/786.
th ith er  in large numbers in the hope of causing harassment 
to or even i n f l i c t in g  a defeat on the Muslims by taking  
advantage of the depletion of th e ir  strength due to the 
diversion o f  a large number of th e ir  forces in a general 
offensive  against the various provinces of Persia which 
came o f f  about that time. This army la id  a s iege  to 
ISanadhir in the month of Hama dan, 21 A. II. at which event 
al-B ihallab  him self aays he was present* h is  age at the 
time being barely fourteen years. I t  i s  not known what 
position  he held but* of oourse* i t  could not be above 
that of a young recru it .  The siege had not yet concluded 
when >Abu ME a a was diverted to >Iafahan and in h is  absence
%
al-Kabl* b. Ziyad, a prominent l ieu tenant upon whom the 
command had devolved* accon^lished the victory (1 ) .
%0
(1 ) .  The reports on th is  point are so very confused and 
c o n f l ic t in g  a3 to require a specia l note ._
K, Iccording to Bal.377' s e a .  * Mbu :!U 3a. advanced 
from al-Ba^ra and la id  a hard ana prolonged siege to 
Manadhir duringwhich al-Mahajir b, Ziyaa. courted death 
and met _ i t  fa st in g . The siege  had not yet concluded when 
>k\iu lusa  l e f t  the_command in the hands of al-tfabl*, 
brother of al-M ihajir, and advanced further for the_ 
conquest of a l-3u s , Ramahurmuz* Tustar and Jund9sabur.On 
h is  return march* ’’Abu Mis a again passed through Man&dhir 
which had been su ccessfu lly  captured by al-Kabi* during 
k l3 o.bssDCQf
B. According to Saif in Tab. j/2708 s e q .  * i  t  was in 
the year 17 A.H. that <Umar agreed to the proposal of a 
general o ffensive  against Persia and for th is  purpose 
constituted  various army detachmsnts a s 3 i g a i n g ‘ a  particular  
region to each. These various detachments could not for  
various reasons carry out th e ir  offensive  t i l l  a  much 
l a t e r  date. Now, a t  the same time that <llmar allowed the 
general offensive* he, with h is  ch aracter is t ic  foresight*  
also wrote to ’“Abu B Isa*  the governor o f  al-Basra, to move 
to the far th est  l im its  of the d i s t r i c t  in order to check 
any possib le  incursion of h o s t i le s  from the north east .
>Abu Musa delaved his move t i l l  the fciids and the Persians 
assembled at Bairudhu At last,how ever, he proceeded in 
the month of Ramacjan towards Bairudh t i l l  he engaged the 
anemy at a place between Nahr Tira and Lanadllir. the *
From 21 up to 36 A.H. we hear nothing about a l -  
Bihallab,which ind icates that he had not yet risen to
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* b a tt le  proved severe and prolonged* a memorable event 
being the courting of martyrdom by a l-f i ih a j ir  b. Ziyad in  
the sta te  o f_ fa st in g .  Victory had not y e t  been achieved 
when ^bu Msa was ordered to proceed to >Isfahan to the 
suocour of the Kufan army which under Abdullah b.
<Abdullah b. <Itban had already opened attack against 
aljjadosafan, the Persian satrap. Accordingly, >km Misa 
l e f t  the operations in the hands o f  al-Habr who completed 
the v ictory before the form ats  return from Isfahan .
These events are recorded in Tab. under the year 
23 but the b attle  of Isfahan to which >Abu Msa i s  reported 
to have turned, occurred in 21 and hence they must be 
taken to belong to the same year. ( Bal. 312 mentions the 
conquest o f^ s ia h in  in 23 by ^Abdullah b« Budail but 
that i s  an e n t ir e ly  d ifferen t  version).
Now a comparison o f  the above two reports a lonj with 
other relevant matter in Tab, leaves no doubt that they 
are but two d if fe r e n t  versions o f  one and the same event. 
The manner in which al-M ihajir met martyrdom is  recorded 
in e ith e r  place in almost exactly  the same terns. S im ilarly  
the fa c t  tiiat ^bu sKsa was diverted before the end of the 
s iege  and that the victory was won by al-Kabi* during h is  
absence are common factors . The main'discrepancy i s  that  
Bal. represents the siege of Mana4hir as i f  i t  were the 
f i r s t  attempt to conquer the place and hence he l in k s  i t  
with the conquest of 'al-Sus, Ramahurmz e tc .  As a matter 
of fa c t ,  Mariadhir* along with Nahr Tira and Suq al-^hwaz* 
had been reduced long before the governorship of ^bu ausa 
and there were already estab lished  two garrisons at  
I’anadhir and Nahr l i r a  in charge of Sulma b. al-Qain and 
H&rmala b. Muraita re sp ec t iv e ly ,  both of whom had taken 
a prominent part in the conquest. (Tab. 1/2534 s e q . ). The 
conquest of Hamahurmuz, Tustar, al-Sus and Jundesabur 
decidedly belon^_to a l a t e r  date ( 17 A.H.) and was 
achieved by >Abu Mis a jo in t ly  with the Kufan army ( Tab. 
l/2551 seq. ; pain. 137-40). Bal. does not mention any 
rebellion  which ndgjbt have n ecess ita ted  a reconquest of  
JUanadhir b y ’Abu Misa along with the conquest o f  Tustar and 
al-3 ils . As against i t ,  the deta iled  report in Tab. c learly  
mentions the p re sen ceo f  julma and Harmala at : anriiiir  
and Nahr Tlra resp ect ive ly  when-d^T*** b. mqarrin passed 
these places on his way to Hamahurmuz in the same year 17. 
This is  indeed more consistent with fa c ts .  *
prominence. In the year 36 al-Basra was the scene of the 
famous Battle o f  the Camel in which the *Azd of the town 
fought on the side of ^ y i ^ a  but were u lt im ate ly  defeated  
and compelled to acknowledge \KLi ( 1 ) .  On the submission 
o f  the A^zd* for  the f i r s t  time conferred a command
on a l -B ih a l la b .(2) Wow, th is  short no tice  is  a sure 
indication o f  the a c t iv i t i e s  of a l-is ihallab  during the 
long gap. He nu3t have continued as a so ld ier  in the 
garrison of a l-3asra sharing the fortunes of his tribe  
and progressing s tea d ily  on the road to gLory t i l l  he 
attracted  the attention  o f  *A1T and received the f i r s t  
contaand at h is  hands a t the age of 29*
Again from 36 up to 43 there is  another gap but h is  
emergence in 43 as one o f  ’ al^ashraf* i . e . ,  prominent 
nobles, shows that al-Muhallab had a l l  the time been winning 
fresh m ilitary  honours and making a name for  himself*
In the year 43 he came to 3 ij is ta n  as a high m ilitary  
o f f i c e r  in the army of ^Aodur Hahman b. Samara# who was
* Thus we see that the version of fab. as regards 
the event in which al-Mzhajir b. Ziyad sought martyrdom, 
i s  more credible, lhat Bal. describes i t  as * a s iege  o f  
lanadhir while according to Tab. i t  took place * between 
liahr l i r a  and Ifenadhir1, i s  o f  l i t t l e  consequence. The 
account in Tab. clearly  suggests that the h o s t i le s  had 
assembled n e a r  B a i ru d b  but moved towards Manadhir in front  
of >Abu f tS sa13 advancing army. I t  i s ,  therefore, safe to 
assume that the siege o f  ManadJair a t  which al-iaihallab  
says he ,vas a r e  sen  t  ( Bal. 378), i s  an event of flamadan#
21 A.H*
(1 ) .  Tab. j/3189.
( 2 ) .  Isa. 3/535*
sent to that province by Abdullah b. <Amir, isai<awiya,3 
governor at al-Basra. Among hi3 colleagues in ^bdur  
lahman * s army were ‘Abbad b. al-Husain al-Habatx , <Umar b.
•  *  *  % %
^Ubaidullah b. laa<mar al-Taiml, Abdullah b. Miazim 
al-3ulaml and Qatari b. s i  fu ja>a, the future leader o f  
the ^Azariqa, - a l l  o f  whom we w i l l  n»et in the follow ing  
pages. <Abdur Kahman led  a victorious march through the 
province via Balkh (1) t i l l  he attacked Xabul and la id  i  
prolonged siege to i t  (2 ) .  At l a s t  the m slim s succeeded 
by mean3 o f  the ball is  ta in e f fe c t in g  a wide breach in 
the defences with the r e su lt  that the next morning the 
besieged townsmen were compelled to coma out o f  th e ir  
stronghold. By a happy chance, an elephant o f  the besieged  
army was struck by^bn Khazim or, according to ?Abu Mikhnaf* 
by a l-m h a lla b  when i t  was just under the gates o f  the 
c ity .  Ifae huge carcass of the fa llen  elephant blocked the 
gate in 3uch a way that the doors could not be closed  
any more and so the Muslims entered the to»m and captured 
i t .  Al-S3uhallab t o o t h e r  with ^Umar b. ^Ubaidullah b.
I2a<mar i3 also  sa id  to have taken the news of victory to 
the capital (3 ) .
In the following year ( A.H. 44 -  0.664 ) a l -
Muhallab detached himself from the main army of <lbdur 
Rahman and advancing from the d irection  o f  Kabul made an
23
(1 ) .  Tqb. 2/258.
(2 ) .  The ruler of Kabul was called Kabul 3jiah. He was lams 
and i3  reported to have turned Mislim when brought
as a captive before ^Abdur Hahmah. ( E l l i o t ,  2/414 note 
1 from Tarjuiaa-i-Futuhat o f  ^mad b. Asmi Kufi).
(3)* Bal. 396; IAth. 2/221.
in ours ion into the t e r r i t o r y  ly in ^  between th a t  c i ty  and
Fail tan on the north-w estern  f r o n t i e r  o f  India* inly two
Harm a (Baanu) and AFahwIr (Lahore) ( i )  «—* are
2 4
( 1 ) . Aooording to Sal. both Janna and.Al>ahwar lay  ‘ between 
B u w i  and KftboOU* The foraer ia desciiOtfd in ia§* aa • a 
o lty  in  ( the country of)  Kabul*1 ilie name 'iarmah sounds 
□  trikin^Ly sim ilar  to Banna# a tein and disfcrict in the 
extreme north-west o f  India ly in g  south of the river l a  tail* 
M  doubt* the present-day town o f  Bannu watt founded so 
la te  as In 1848 by H r  Herbert isdwardes, whence i t  was 
also oalled Kdwaraes^abad ( Safe o f  India Vol. VI» 4 0 2 )» 
bat the oountry around I t  haa from early  timas dome that 
name o f  which Banna seems to be the older or perhaps the 
corrupted form* *a the nan* o f  Kabul or Kabulistan was 
ia those days applied to a vast oountry extending from 
the Indian border to Ihaana ( Yaq.4/220)* Ym . ’a d^acrip- 
tion o f  Bannah quite f i t s  in witn the assumption that i t  
mast have been situated somewhere in the h i l l y  traet  
ly in^  south of the river Kabul eompr is in g  the basin of 
the furram and the mchi rivers*
U  Banna a l-m h a lla b  cust have been ^ubjested to a 
ni ht attack* the msmory of ih ich  U  preserved by m  
/sd ite  in the following verses-
T?al. 433j Yac. 1/747 with a notable variant# 4 
which would moan that tho n ight attack was in f l ic te d  by 
aX*«uhallab. ih ia  verse a lso  suggests that the detachment 
of a l-'U hallab consisted predominantly of the ^adites*
k V AfiVAH, also more oomnonly Lahawur, Lauhar (Yaq. 4/371)  
end even L IH r  ( Yaq. 1/747)* According to lial. (above)* 
i t  w i t  haTe been situated  above suit.an. Yaq* only says 
t | a t  i t  i s  a big well-known c ity  in a l -  ind* < 11 Hahjat ( p. 37). id e n t i f ie s  I t  with Lahore which ia also the 
assumption o f  " i r TI. * E lliot*  Lahore ia  noticed by niuen 
"siang ( A#i3» 630). ( Gazetteer o f  India* Oxford 1900*
Vol. XVI p. 106).
naraBd a3 having been v is i t e d  by him during th is  expedition  
and in the same connection there i s  also a mention of an 
encounter between him and eighteen *Turk’ horsemen, a l l  
of whom were k i l l e d ,  in the country o f  al-Qiqan (3aluchi3-  
tan) (1 ) .  This encounter, though not so very important, i s  
yet remaikable in that i t  led  to the introduction of an 
innovation in the Mislim army. Observing that the Turk 
horsemen, a l l  o f  whom rode crop-tailed  horses, were 
exceptionally  brisk and a c t iv e ,  al*Mihallab f e l t  that 
cropped t a i l s  f a c i l i t a t e d  quick move cents and readily  
adopted the practice for  h is  own army, Thus, he is  
remembered as the f i r s t  M l i m  who docked the t a i l  o f  h is  
horses (2 ) .
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( 1)«_QIQAN or Kaikan, Kaikanan, KTzkanan, Kabarkanan and 
Klrkayan. I t  i s  only possib le  to form a very general idea  
of i t s  p os it ion . Bal. says that * i t  forced a portion o f  
al-Sind in the direction o f  ^uraoan. * ( I t  m s t  be rememb­
ered that in early days ’miurasan* was applicable to a l l  
the land ea s t  of the Iranian Desert ritiht up to the borders 
of  India and the boundaries o f  al~3ind extended so far  as 
to Jn elude Baluchistan and part of the modem State of Qal a t ) .  Further i t  can be gathered from the same source 
that horses from th is  country were mch prized { p. 433) 
and that i t  must have been circumjacent uo al-Buqan (a lso  
called al-Budh and id en tif ied  with the modem Kachhi) and 
also nsist have had very close connection with_]u3dar (p .434) 
Hiuen Tsiang also mentions the country of_Qlqan, * si tuaWi 
to the south of Kabul / I  bn Hauqal ( al-Masai ik wa JL-iSamalik 
p . 232) and a l^ I f ta y ir i  mention Klrkaban, Kabazkanan or  
Kizkonan as a c i ty  which was the seat of the gavemor of  
Qusdar. This can only be taken to mean that there was both 
a town and a province of that name. Marouart connects 
El akanan with Klkan and seeks i t  at Qalat (Ency.4 /878; Le 
Stra 332). As for the province, i t  must have extended so 
far as to include, in general te r m , * the vtfiole of the 
country occupied by the Kakara. The_expedii\on of X.U. 44 
to the country between Multan and Kabul certa in ly  showa 
that i t  mi3t  nave comprised the SulaimanI range to the 
south of the Gunul; and the ce lebrity  of i t s  noraes would 
appear to point to a tract  further to the west, including  
Saharawan and Miahki# where horses . . . ._ a r e  s t i l l  in great  
demand." (See a valuable note on Kaikanan in Sir H.M.
S l l i o t i  Hiat. of India (1867 A.D.), Vol. I ,  381 s e q . ). *
No great battle  i s  reported daring th is  incursion; only  
a few loca l  skirmishes could have taken place as suggested 
by the words, ' the enemy opposed him ( al-Mihallab) and 
fought him and hi3 followers * ( B al.432). Nor does i t  seem 
l ik e ly  that a l- in h a llab  should have brought a large and 
numerous array with him or that the attack was in any way 
well-planned. In a l l  probability  he oould only have been at 
the command of a 3mall detachment* con s is t in g  mostly of  
his own tribesmen, the Azdites. Hence i t  i s  no surprise  
that the inroad l e f t  no la s t in g  e f f e c t s  and that i t  did not 
resu lt  in new annexations to the Caliphate. Farishta adds 
that he returned to the head-quarters o f  the army at Khurasan 
with plunder and many prisoners. This, indeed, i s  a l l  that 
he could have gained. Yet th is  dash into the raountainous 
country on the north-west of India and even as far as Lahore 
inside i t  was but a bold stroke of m ilitary adventure. No 
doubt, the inhospitable country of ' i^qan had been attempted 
even before but the v ic in i ty  o f  Bannu and Lahore had not 
y et  been reached by the Muslim warriors. Farishta is r ight  
in saying of him that f he was the f i r s t  ch iefta in  who spread 
the banners o f  the true fa ith  on the p la ins o f  Hind.’ F.ven 
the Muslim penetration into a l-3ind in la te r  oimss came
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* In th is  connection i t  i s  helpful to note thal in the
words of Dhr(p.22 1 .1 )  the scene of al-Btthallab’ s enoounber 
la y  in the neighbourhood 0f  Qandabil.
(2 ) .  Bal. 432! IAth. 3/225; Yag. 1/747; Notioe o i th is  
expedition i s  also found in i i l l io t*  2/414-15.
through ohe 3outhorn region of Makran; hence, al-Muhallab^  
expedition from the north-west stands out conspicuous.
The above expedition of a l-m h a lla b  could not have 
la s te d  for  long be cause in the very next year ( H. 45) 
the governorship of  a l - <Iraq passed on froia^lbn Hmir to 
2iyad b. ^Abihi who within a few months o f  h is  appointment(l) 
recalled  ^Abdur Hahman from 3 ij is ta n  end some tins  afterwards 
appointed al-Hakara b. ^mr a l-G hifarl to the governorship 
of Khurasan (2) in whose conpany al-Muhallab i s  also  
noticed . Al-Hakam i s  reported to have proceeded to Karat 
Gild thence to al-Juzajan, between lerv  a l-;€dh  and Balkh, 
which he reduced. But in the course of the campaign he was 
overtaken by such hardship and sca rc ity  that the troops 
could only su b s is t  on th e ir  rid ing beasts. At that time 
a l -Hakam was accompanied by al-Mihallab who is  sa id  to have 
'proved h is  strength and bravery1 (3 ) .
Al-ruhallab east have continued in Khurasan under a l-  
Hakam t i l l  the year 50 A»H. in which he took a prominent 
%
part in the expedition against the people of Jabal a l -  
^ s h a l l » a mountain in Khura3ah* The expedition was under taken 
by al-Hakam at the instance of Siyad b/Ablhi who was t&mpted 
to i t  by the prospect of an easy victory and rich booty.
(1 ) .  Bal. 397.
(2)* 4c cor dins to Yqb. 2/264, al-Hakam ente_red Khurasan in
44 but the report in Tab* 2/81 that Ziyad was appointed 
governor of a l - <Iraq in 45  and thatj ie  after  h is  
appointment sent a l i Ha^am Ifa^rasaa# seem  too re 
correct. Farther the account in Tab* 2/79-80 suggests that  
the arrival of el-tfakam in j&urasan should have taken 
place a considerable time a fter  the appointment o f  
2iyad* perhaps in 47 A*H*(cf. Tab.2 /84;. .
Z7
(3 ) .  Tqb. 2/264.
I t  so happened that when the army of al-Hakam had 
penetrated far into the mountains, Lhe natives blocked a l l  
the passes and e x i t s  and encircled  i t  from a l l  side.?. In 
his d is tr e s s ,  al-Hakam turned to al-isuhallab whom he%
entrusted with the d irection  of operations, i l -  uhallab, 
with h is  ch aracter is t ic  resourcefulness, eventually  
captured a prominent man from the enemy side  and asked him 
to help in e f fe c t in g  an escape from the d i f f i c u l t  position  
in which they had been hedged round or, in the el tern  t iv e ,  
to su ffer  death. Thereupon the man advised him to kindle 
f ir e  along one o f  the various routes and to order the 
baggage to be moved in i t s  direction so as to give the 
enemy the impression tJiat i t  was intended to force an e x i t  
that way. '.7hen convinced of i t ,  the enemy would concentrate 
a ll  h is  forces on that one point leaving  the other e x it s  
unguarded throu^i which i t  would be quite possib le  to 
outrun him* Al-Muhallab adopted th is  plan vihich succeeded 
very isell. The besiegers were outwitted and the Muslim 
army returned with rich booty. On the way back, a l -snhallab  
commanded the rear-guard of al-ilakam’s array and there 
was another encounter with the T urks  who t r ie d  to in ter ­
cept him in the narrow mountain passes (1 ) .
Al-Hakam b. A^mr died soon a f te r  h is  return from
*
tho above expedition.Henceforward the name of &l-£uhallab 
^oes not  occur among the high o f f ic e r s  attending on the 
succeeding governors during the years 51-55, and i t  cannot
be said whether he continued in Khurasan or, more 
probably returned to al-Basra.
£8
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/109.
In the year A.H. 56(1), Mi<awiya conferred the governor­
ship of Khurasan on Sa^Id b. thmaii b. \k i fah who proceeded 
th ither attended, among others, by A^us b. Tha^laba a l -  
Taiml, Talha b. Abdullah b. Xhalaf al-Khuza*1 known aa 
Talhat al-Talahat and al-Muhallab. Sa^Td crossed al-Nahr
i . e .  the Oxus, and marched upon Bukhara, on the lower course 
o f  the Zarafs^ah, which town he entered a f ter  Queen Khatun,(2) 
the then ruler o f  the p lace, had capitulated.
From Bukhara Sa^Id advanced towards Samarqand which 
place had not at that time an independent ruler (3 ) .  the 
people o f  al-3ughd ( 4 ) , however, gathered to put up very 
strong resistance and the battle  for  Samarqand raged 
vehemently for three days during which al-Muhallab l o s t  an 
eye. Eventually, the town was forced to surrender whereupon 
Sa/ i^d retired  (Bal. 411; Tab. 2/178-9).
The following two verses are preserved from a l -  
Muhallab on the lo s s  o f  h is  eye:-
^  *\ >\pA \
( IKh. 2/146).
The lo s s  o f  al-Mzhallab*s eye i s  also said to have 
occurred at al-Talaqan (5) instead of Samarqand. I t  ie not
{ lT. 6b according to Yaq. 3/135. ’(2 ) .  The Arabs found Bufhara ruled by a soman, the widow of  
the la te  prince, who acted as regent for  her infant  
son Tugksjjada.(3 ) .  Al-Narshakhi p.48. •](4 ) .  The name of al-Sug£d was_ generally applied to ' land3
ea st  o f  Bukhara'from Dabusiya to Samarqand.' Sometimes, 
however, Bukhara, Xish and Hasaf were also included ,< 
in i t .  (Sncy. 4 /473). , ,(5 ) .  On the roau from Iferv al-Kudh to Balkh. Also there was 
a town in Tu&iaristan east  o? 8alk& properly ca lled  
Tavaoan but so me tin© 3 also referred to as Talaqan 
(Ykq/ 3/491).
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clear what occasion i s  referred to. Sa^Id or perhaps a l -  
Hakam may also have had a battle  at al-Talaqan during the 
course of th e ir  campaigns which, nevertheless , i s  not  
re co rde d.
Al-Muhallab is  again noticed in Khurasan in the 
retinue o f  3alm b. Ziyad who succeeded to the <p vernorship 
o f  that province on behalf o f  Yazid b. Mu<awiya in the year 
A#H»61. Among other co lleag ies  o f  al-Muhallab at that time 
were Talha b. <Abdull'ah al-Khuza^I ( Talhat al-Talahat) ^Umar
•  *  ~1 , r - -  %  % V •
b.^Ubaidullah b. Ma^mar al-Taimi and Abdullah b. Khazim 
al-3ulami. Proceeding to i&urasan, 3alm stayed for  a «hile  
at NisabSr and then embarked on various expeditions into 
Xhvairizra, Samarqand and Bazars,, the l a s t  o f  tfiich oonoerns 
us most for  the part al-Muhallab played in i t .  Then faced 
with the overwhelmingly superior forces o f  Salm, Mia tun, 
the ruler of Bukhara ( i ) ,  in her u t te r  h e lp lessn ess  turned 
to Tarkhun(2), the king o f  a l -S u ^ d , and invited  him to come 
to her to take her in marriage and thereby gain for himself  
the rulership o f  Bukhara. Tarkhun co a l l i e d  with the in v ita t ion  
and advanced towards Bukhara with an army 120,000 strong to 
fo r e s ta l l  which Salm despatched al-Muhallab at the head o f  
the van-jiard followed by other troops. In the b a tt le  that
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(1 ) .  I t  must be remembered that h itherto the penetration of  
Musiims in the country of Tran3oxiana was not systematic  
at a ll*  The successive gave mors o f  Khurasan led  
expeditions into the land from time io time and secured 
the capitulation o f particu lar  towns but no sooner did 
they turn back than the natives re-asserted th e ir  
independence and returned to the ir  or ig ina l s ta te .
(2 ) .  TarknUn, also written Tarkhan, probably a t i t l e  (and 
not a name) of the Turkish rulers of Samarqand.(Sncy. 
4 /129 ).  At the tine o f  the Arab invasion we hear o f  
individual Tartans ruling in d ifferen t  parts o f  
Transoxiana. ( Tab. and a l-M arsha ll
ensued the Mialias worsted the enemy by dint o f  th e ir  
strong archery; Tarkhun was k i l le d  and h is  army was 
annihilated (Yqb, £/300).
We are indebted to al-Narshakhi (1 ) ,  who is  also quoted 
by A.’fambery (2 ) ,  fo r  a very rare and deta iled  account of  
the above battle  which also affords us a proof fea t  a l -  
Muhallab had by now attained the p os it ion  o f  an eminent 
knight whose lo s s  was bound to a f fe c t  the morale o f  the 
troops and uhose gallantry was deeply iroressed in the mind 
o f  the lieu tenants o f  the army. The account o f  al-Narshakhi, 
while i t  confirms Khatun's in v ita t ion  to Tarkhun and his  
response to i t ,  yet d if fer s  from the account in Yqb. in  one 
important respect. According to i t ,  the chief role on the 
opposite side in the encounter with al-Muhallab belonged 
to Bidun mho, along with Tarkhun, had rushed to the 
succour of ghatm from Turkestan* On learning  o f  the arrival  
of Bidun, 3alm deputed al-Muhallab to gp on a reconnoitring  
mission in order to have an estimate o f  the strength o f  
the enemy, Al-Muhallab urged that i t  was inadvisable to 
risk  the l i f e  o f  an eminent man l ik e  him in a task which 
could very well be done by a l e s s  highly placed man whose
(1 ) ,  ^bu Bakr Muhammad b. Ja<far al-Narshakhi (286-348 A,H,) 
An abridged*Persian translation o f l i i s  valuable book
on the h istory  of Bukhara has recently been published  
under the t i t l e : -
L 1 missis
i—)} 4 j  Xif \ f
See pp.49-52 o f  the same for  the account quoted.
(2 ) ,  Arminius Vamberv: History o f  Bukhara, London,
1873 A. D, pp. 22-23.
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lo s s  would cause no disorder among the troops. Salm, however, 
persisted  in h is  request whereupon al-Muhallab agreed to 
comply with i t  provided that he be given one man from each 
regiment and that h is  mission be kept a secret.  Accordingly 
he s e t  out by night without the knowledge o f  the troops.
The next morning Salm l e t  the news be known to the res t  
of  h is  troops who began to murmur and to says "Thou hast  
sent the Emir a l- lu h a llab  on before us, so that he may 
snatch the best o f  the booty from our mouths; i f  a battle  
had been in question, no doubt we should have been the 
foremost, * In fa c t  many o f  them, inspired by mere greed* 
hurried a fter  al-Muhallab and overtook him. As soon as he 
perceived th e ir  approach* he exclaimed: * Ye have done 
wrong; w  have come as far as th is  unperceived} now ye 
have aroused the attention  of the enemy and the a f fa ir  can 
but end ill**  Nevertheless al-Muhallab took courage. He 
numbered the Arabs he had with him and found they were 
900 in number. Scarcely had he s e t  them in battle-array  
when the enemy*s truo^et sounded, arid the Turks in th e ir  
f i r s t  onset cut down 400 o f  the Muslims; the rest  took to 
f l i g h t  in the w ildest confusion* Al-Muhallab with a few 
of h is  followers was surrounded by the enemy. In the 
utmost p er il  he 3houted aloud for 3uc<x>ur. His voice was 
heard in the camp of Salm who, however, was lo th  to move.
But the reproach o f  a l ieu tenant o f  h is ,  ^Abdullah b#.
Khudan (Vambery: Djudan), who urged that al-Muhallab was
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not tne man to cry for help unless faced with the irasBdiate 
danger of death, want horn and ultim ately  the troops -wore 
ordered to go to the r e l i e f  of  al-Muhallab*Seeing their  
countrymen approach, al-Muhallab and his comrades roused 
themselves fo r  one f in a l  e f f o r t  and fee whole Arab army took 
part in the battle* Soon Bldun m s k illed (  1), his army was 
routed and a very large amount o f  booty f e l l  into the hands 
of  the Muslims* The battle  proved decisive; queen iQiatun 
had no alternative  but to submit to the v ic tors ,  with whom 
she made peace.
Al-Mihall&b showed hinaself the s tr a te g is t  that he was 
when he pressed upon h is  ch ief ,  Salm b. Ziyad, h is  own view 
as to how to deal with the noxious problem of  the h o s t i le  
native ch iefs .  Even during those days there s t i l l  lingered  
in Hiurasan a band o f  native chiefs who were continuously 
engaged in fomenting trouble against the Ins lira conquerors.
The successive gpvemors frequently waged war aga ins t them 
but invariably retired to Merv sl-Shahjah on the advent o f  
the winter. The h o s t i le  chiefs during the same time 
assembled together at a town in Khuras an no t far from the 
borders o f  ]&warizm where they availed the kb e l vas of th is  
welcome respite  to concert th e ir  rebelliou s a c t iv i t i e s .
On one such occasion when Salm too aalled a h alt  to military  
operations during the winter al-Muhallab insited  that he 
should be allowed to raid the rendezvous of  the h o s t i le  chiefs,
3 3
(1 ) ,  Cf. also Bal. 413.
3o» he proceeded at the head of four or s ix  thousand 
warriors, l a id  3iege to the c ity  and presented the chiefs  
with a demand for submission. The chiefs sued for peace on 
the terms that they should pay as ransom fo r  the ir  l iv e s  a 
sum exceeding twenty m illion  dirhems. Al-Mihailab agreed and 
received the ransom not in cash but in kind as the agreement 
contained a st ip u la t ion  to that e f f e c t  ( in ser ted  probably 
on bohalf o f  the chiefs themselves because of the ir  in a b i l i ty  
to pay in co ins), ‘faking advantage of t h i s ,  al-Mihail ab i s  
reported to have se t  such a low price a t  the good3 offered  
to him that the real value of the a r t ic le s  received by him 
was estimated at f i f t y  m il l ion s .  3alm was naturally  very 
pleased with al-Mihailab for the successfu l resu lts  achieved 
by him (1 ) .
Al-Bahai lab continued in Khurasan as a lieu ten an t of 
3alm b. 2iyad t i l l ,  a few months a f te r  the death of YazTd b. 
M^awiya ( Habi<a I ,  64 ) ,  the people o f  the province turned 
against 3alm and forced him to r e t ir e ,  — the same fate  that  
his brother ^Ubaidullah b. ziyad met a t  the hands o f  the 
Basrans about the same time. As Salm withdrew from the 
province» he l e f t  a l-m h a llab  behind to act as h is  deputy.
But Salm had only reached Msabuijfohen he was met by 
*Abdullah b. Khazim al-3ulaml who pulled him up for  having 
handed over the province to a Yamanite, and extorted for
himself a writ of appointment as successor over the whole 
o f  Khurasan. As a l-a ih a llab  heard of the advance of
34
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/393-4.
Abdullah b. i&azim towards Merv* he thought i t  f i t  to with­
draw altogether  from the disputed p ost ,  leav in g  in h is  place 
a man of Banu Jusham b. 3a<d ( b. Zaid isanat b. Tamim) who was 
la t e r  on f a t a l ly  wounded in h is struggle against^bn Khazim(l) 
The decision o f  a l -a ih a lla b  to re tire  wa3 indeed based on a 
r e a l i s t i c  estimate of the lo ca l  s itu ation  because the number 
of al**A.zd on whose support he could count, was s t i l l  very 
small in Khurasan.
we have now corns to the end of the early  career o f  a l -  
Jiihallab as a so ld ier  and as a lieu tenant in the array of the 
provincial governors o f  S ij is ta n  and Khurasan. During th is  
period we have had examples o f  h is  bravery, s p i r i t  o f  m ilitary  
adventure, resourcefulness and regard for strategy, one,however 
cannot help fe e l in g  disappointed that the records o f  a l -  
Mihailab‘s early  l i f e  are very meagre and are interspersed  
with long blanks. Surely, the man who* as we w i l l  immediately 
see in the following pages, stood marked out for the leader­
ship of a moat d i f f i c u l t  and hazardous eampaiga,must have 
had a ranch more b r i l l ia n t  and eventful record behind him. 
Curiously enough, every time we mBet al-Mihallab in the 
previous pages we find h is  honour increased and h is  prestige  
enhanced but we are told very l i t t l e  about his deeds. I t  mist 
be rea lised  that al-iaihallab had not yet had an opportunity 
of acting as independent commander in which p osit ion  alone
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/489-90. The man cannot be Bukair "b. .iisaU^iifedDL>» 
as mentioned in NaqVid 372 note 3, because Bukair 
survived long afterwards.
he could bring into fu l l  play h is  d is t in c t iv e  q u a lit ie s  
of leadership and s tr a teg ic  manoeuvring. This position  was 
to be his from now onwards and therefore i t  i s  only in the 
following chapters that we see him at h is  best.
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C H A P T E R  III.
THE BACKGROUND.
One cannot have a fa ir  estimate of the immense 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  involved in the task of crashing the ^zariqa • 
nor, indeed* of the momentous s ign if ican ce  for  the future 
course of h is tory  o f  al-Mihal lab 's  dec is ive  triumph over 
them unless one i s  fam iliar  with the background of major 
events iososdiately preceding the time when a l- i i ih a llab  agreed 
to undertake the hazardous campaigi. Further, in order to be 
able to view the events in the ir  proper perspective , a real 
in s ig h t  into the b e l ie f s  and the tenets prompting the 
a c t iv i t i e s  o f  the indomitable s e c t ,  is  almost indispensable. 
In the present chapter, therefore , we propose to preface  
the account o f  the most eventful as well as the most g lorious  
years of the l i f e  of a l-is iha llab , o f  which fortunately  we 
possess greater and richer d e ta i ls  than the r e s t ,  by a short  
review of the particu lar  circumstances that had a d irect  
bearing on the events with which we are mainly concerned.
I t  would only su ff ic e  for our purpose to pick up the 
threads o f  the h istory  o f  the K harijites at the point of  
the death o f  Yazid b. M^awiya in KabTa I> 64 A.H. ( i )  •
Ms oca, whither the rival Caliph, Abdullah b. al-2ubair* had
sou^it an asylum, was at that time besieged by the Syrian 
exped itionary  force commanded by Husain b. RtM&lr* taifeg
(1 ) .  Tab. 2 /4 2 7 -8 .According to teas. 5/126, Safar.
the defenders of the Holy Oity was a party of the 
K h arij ites ,  including Nafi^ b. al-^Azraq which had gpne 
th ither a l l  the way from al-^Iraq in order to join ^Abdullah 
b. al -  2u bai r for  the s p e c i f ic  object of saving tHe Sanctuary 
from the ravages of the h e r e t ic  tyrants, the Umaiyyids of  
Damascus. As long as the siege  la s te d ,  these Kharijite  
zealots were too preoccupied with defence operations to 
care about a minute and detailed  examination of the views 
of 'Ibn al-3ubair. Only a vague promise on his part that h is  
views were not very d ifferen t  from their3 ( 1 ) ,  was, under 
the storm and s tr e s s  of the impending danger, s u f f ic ie n t  
enough to make them forget a l l  other thoughts except the 
thought of the defence of the c i ty .  But no sooner was the 
threatened calamity at l a s t  averted because o f  the retrea t  
of the besiegers on the receipt of the news o f  Yazid’ s 
death than the band ofK harijite3 in s t itu te d  what they called  
1 al^Imtihan* ( or 1 al-Mihnah*), a sor t  of Inquisition  
into the views of I^bn al-2ubair. They asked him that he 
should acknowledge A^bu Bakr and <Umar, renounce Hi thman 
and ^Ali, and condeur. in unequivocal words i'aliia and a l-  
3ubair, h is  own father (2 ) .  >Ibn al-2ubair*s answers to 
such d irect questions revealed, as they were bound to ,  a 
wide gu lf  between his own views and the cherished doctrines  
of the Kharijite3. This disappointment was the s igaa l for
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/514? Kam. 605.
(2 ) .  Kam. 606.
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the parting of the ways. The Kharijites dispersed from 
'.'ecca in more than one d irection . A number o f  them, in eluding 
Naf’i* b. al-^Azraq* ^Abdullah b, 3affar, Abdullah b. Mbad# 
Banzalah b. Baihas, the three sons o f  al-Mahuz, ( v ia . ,
<Abdullah, ^Ubaidullah and al-2ubair) and others ( 1 ) ,  headed 
towards al-Basra and only added another potent disturbing  
factor in the disorderly conditions that prevailed there 
ever since the death of YazTd.
THE TLUX AT AL-BA3RA ( 64 A.H. ).
Let us now turn to the s ta te  o f  a f fa ir s  a t  al-Basra*
•
On receiv ing the news o f  the death of YazTd, the Basrans 
chose <Ubaidullah b. 3iyadf the erstwhile powerful governor 
of a l-^ ra q *  as the interim JSmir. Very soon, however, i t  
became apparent that a 3torm isss brewing and *1 bn Ziyad had 
no doubts l e f t  that h is  authority was l o s t .  He, the re f  o r e , 
f led  and took cover in the protection o f  iaas<ud  b. ^ m r .  
the then head o f  the tribe of al^Azd. Wow the various 
tribes represented in the garrison town o f  al-Basra were 
divided into two main tr iba l g r o u p s .  The Tamtm and the 
Qais joined by the Persian >As'awira constituted one group 
while the other group consisted of al-^Azd and the Habl<a. 
These two groups were trad it ion a lly  h o s t i le  to each other 
and there was a perpetual rivalry between them for ascendancy 
and predominance in sta te  a f fa ir s .  The overthrow 
o f^ b n  Ziyad» who in h erited  from h i s  father and him self  
s c r u p u l o u s l y  maintained a deep friendsnip with t h e zd ( 2 ) ,
(1 ) .  Kam. 609; Tab. 2/517.
(2 ) .  The friendship of al^Azd with Ziyad and his family began
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was generally taken a3 a victory for the rived group of ramim 
and* therefore, i t  wa3 bat natural that the-^zd should oppose 
it ,T hus, apart from a few provoking incidents characterised  
by a display of tr iba l frenzy which further accentuated the 
tension, >1 bn Ziyad needed very l i t t l e  to do in order to induce 
Has<ud to take up h i 3 cause and thus to assert  h is  om  group 
on oe again,
3o, las^ud went into the mosque and, ascending the 
p u lp it ,  exhorted the people -* according to two d ifferen t  
versions, e ith er  to restore ^bn Uyad to the ~overnor3hip(l) 
or to agree that he himself should occupy the hi ;h oi’f i c e ( 2 ) .  
In any case, i t  was, as fellhausen has conclusively proved,
’ an attempt o f  one tribe ( al-^Azd) and i t s  head to put 
i t s e l f  a t  the head o f  the whole( p.410). The attempt waB 
fo i le d ,  /h ile  Mas<ud had not yet fin ished ni3 speech a number 
of men variously described by some as Persians under Mah 
>\fr ldun(3), the old a l l i e s  o f  the Tamlm and by <kwana as 
uiavvarij in st ig a ted  by Tanum (4 ) ,  broke into the *jsque, 
dragged Mas<ad from the p u lp it  and slew him in the beginning 
o f  Shawwal* 64 A.K.The marder o f  Ma3<ud flared up s t i l l  
further the animosity between the two r ival groups.un behalf 
of al^Azd and the Habi<a, "iyad b. <|par b. al^Ashraf a l -  
^ t a k l  undertook revenge from the other g r o u p .  Consequently
* in the year 38 or 39 A.H. when Ziyad b, >\uihi, hen 3tat - 
holder of al-Basra on behalf o f  ^Ali* was driven to seek 
sh e lte r  with tHat tr ibe .
(1) Tab. 2/450.
( 2 ) .  Tab. 2/461.
(3 ) .  Tab. 2/454.
(4 ) .  Tab. 2/461
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a major war was threatened but averted only through the 
e f fo r ts  o f  a few peace-loving e ld er s ,  p art icu lar ly  al^Ahnaf 
b. Qais, the leader c f  the other group, who acted with 
commendable restra in t  and prudence. At l a s t  a treaty of 
peace was concluded between the two rival groups and 
and cable re lations we re restored.
The above sketch i s  intended to afford an idea of the 
chaotic conditions that favoured the growth o f  the 
Kharijit.es by providing them with a respite in which their  
law less  a c t iv i t i e s  went unchecked. I t  i s  now necessary for  
us to trace the re-establishment o f  the authority o f  State 
in a l - la s r a  because i t  forma the s ta r t in g  point for a l l  
subsequent chronology, fn ile  <Ubaidullah b. Ziy~d was yet  
the nominal emir, one 3alama b. ^ iu>aib o f  Tamim had already 
begun e n l is t in g  the support o f  the people for the Galiphate 
of Tim al-Zubair. "is appeal met with such a ready response 
that only a l i t t l e  la t e r  al^Ahnaf b. Qais f e l t  h e lp less  to 
produce him before >Ibn Ziyad and his a c t iv i t i e s  had to be 
l e f t  unchecked (1) t i l l  al-Basra f in a l ly  went over to *1 bn 
al-3ubair.
As to the succession to *Ibn Ziyad, two differen t  
accounts have come do mi to us. \coording to one, i t  wn.3 
soon a f ter  the f l i g h t  of^Lbn Hiyad that the people placed a 
.u ra ish ite ,  Hbdullah b.aliiari th ( b. Naufal b. al-Harith b. 
<Abdu *1 -SHttallb) ca lled  "Babba", in his place. Babba
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(1 ) .  Tab. 2/437-9.
entered the citadel in the beginning o f  Jumada II , 64(1 ),
To th is  roust be added the statement in Anon.(93) that the 
Basrans la t e r  on had this appointment ooaflroBd by^bn a l -  
2ubair who allowed Babba to oontinue for one year at the 
end of which he was deposed.
The other account i s  by ^wana. Accordin to him i t  
was only a f te r  the death of Mas^ud and the settlem ent of  
the dispute that the Basrans united and cliose as th e ir  #mir, 
f i r s t ,  ^bdu’l- t ta l ik  b. Abdullah b. <Amir, and then Babba 
for  one and two months respective ly . Shen a f te r  three n»nths 
they wrote to ^bn a l - ^ b a i r  who appointed <Umar b. ^ b a id u llah  
b. I2a<mar atattholder for them. ^mar b. HJbaidullah held  
o f f ic e  for  one month only and was succeeded by al-Harith  
b. <Abdullah b. Habl^a called  1 a l -  Ouba0 . (2)
\Vellhau3en has rejected the f i r s t  and adopted the 
second account. His argument i3 that an agreement could 
hardly have la s te d  so long as the tribal t o  up 3 .ere at  
logger heads with each other and that the choice of an 
Umir could only have been made as a resu lt  of the treaty  
o f  peace a fter  the threatened rupture. He further s u p p o r t s  
his  argument by saying: * I t  i s  thus also explained why
Babba in ^Abu^baida ( the narrator o f  the f i r s t  account) 
remains quite passive in face of the intrusion of the ^zd 
into the mosaue and the c itad e l ,  - -  j u 3 t  bacause he was n o t
yet there as Im ir ," (3 ).
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(1 ) .  Tab/Abu ^ b a i  da , 2/446-7 i :ah b ,  2/444.
( 2 ) .  Tab. 2/463-4.
(S ) .  7 /ell. 409.
the arguments advanced by ’Veilhausen cannot stand 
the t e s t  o f  detailed scrutiny. Quite natu ra lly ,  the question 
o f  the appointment o f a successor must be the f i r s t  and 
the foremost concern of a c it izen  ismediately a f te r  the 
governorship has fa llen  vacant. I t  seems ¥e ll-n i.^ i  
impossible that th is  urgent question should not have 
claimed the attention  of the 3asrans in the comparative 
quiet that preceded the storm of tr iba l s t r i f e ,  The appoint­
ment o f  Babba i s  placed sc early  as in the beginning of  
Jumada II* 64, i . e . ,  3oon a fter  the f l ig h t  o f  ^bn 2iyad (1 ) .  
The c ity ,  i t  mist be noted* was not yet tom  asunder by 
open discord; matters cans to s head only -o In.te as 
Shawwal» 64 A.H. The fu l l  account in Tab. both o f  Alii 
^Ubaidah and o f  Wahb i s  so rich in every minute d e ta il  as 
regards the method of choice e tc .  that i t  leaves l i t t l e  
doubt as to i t s  veracity.
No doubt, Babba re maind inactive  throughout the 
period o f turmoil. I t  i s  c learly  sta ted  in the f i r s t  account 
i t s e l f  that he kept himself s t r i c t l y  a loof from the tribal  
feud because he * would not harm himself in an attempt to 
do good to o th ers"(2). 3ut how can th is  m ilita te  against  
the fac t  o f  h is  appointment as Smir a few months back ?
He remained passive just because he had a fu ll  r ea lisa t io n
( l) .D a in .392  confirms that i t  wa3 only within nine days o f  t  ae 
f l i g h t  o f  c Ibaidullah b. Ziyad m a t  tksa Parana cnoae 
Babba as th e ir  Smir.
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(2 ) .  Tab. 2/451.
ol the l i m i t a t i o n s  o i '  his  authority. After a l l  i t  ia agreed 
that i t  was not t i l l  a fter  the restoration o f  peace among 
the tribes that the authority o f  the State and, for that  
matter, o f  Babba was e f f e c t iv e ly  enforced, 1‘ho ihole structure  
of law and order had altogether collapsed and did not allow  
of any useful intervention on the part o f  Babba even 
though he remained the nominal governor of the c ity .
Eoreover, i t  i3 only the f i r s t  account that f i t s  in 
into the chronology of subsequent events. 7e w ill  see in 
the following chapter that an expedition against the 
Azraqites wa3 despatched in the month of Jumada II ,  65 A.H* 
and that i t  was Babba who in h is  capacity of jjvernor  
appointed Muslim b. <Ubais to i t s  command. Babba was d is ­
missed, as w il l  be estab lished  in the next chapter, shortly  
a fte r  the trag ic  end o f  th is  expedition and a l i t t l e  no re 
than forty  day3 before the despatch of another expedition  
under <UUifflan b. <Ubaidul'lah in the month o f  Ltiu , l - ' ]a <da 
in the same year, th is  accords exactly  with the statement 
that 3abba was allowed by^Ibn al-'Jubair to continue as 
governor for one year.
Here i t  must be pointed out that some reporters have  
erred conspicuously in p lacing the governorship o f  <Umar 
b .<Ubaidull^Ii b. laa^mar, who was responsible for the d e s p a t c h  
of the expedition under his brother <TJthmah, in the y e a r  
64(1) instead o f  65 although the month of JJhu ’ l-;a<da is
44
(1 ) ,  Tab. 2/537; 465; NaqVid 742.
almost, undisputed which, fay the way, is  impossible a c c o r d i n g
to the account of c Avan a unless i t  i s  conceded that the 
Sasrans se t  about choosing an interim emir before the o u t ­
break of tr iba l war. The sequence of  events as related in 
the next chapter e n t ir e ly  precludes that the expedition o f  
I^Jthman and that of'^bn <Ubais before i t  should have t a k e n  
place in the year 64. Besides i t  must be noted that the 
outbreak o f  plague known as ’ a l -J a r i f* during ih ich
bai dull'lh b, HJ baidullah i s  said to have been h is  brother’ s 
deputy in the governorship o f  a l -Basra, i s  olaeed in the 
year 65 and not in the year 64 (1 ) ,  Consequently, the terra of  
Babba*s ^ vem orsh ip  should extend over the year 65, and 
the advent o? al-^ubaS the succeasor o f  <Craar b. <U bai dull ah 
should be placed in the year 66 ( as in Anon 99) and not  
in 65.
I t  i s  indeed d i f f i c u l t  to determine m e  the r al-Mihallab  
was present in al-Basra during the days o f  communal s t r i f e ,  
hat i3 certain is  that he was ousted from i&urasah some 
time before the open war between al^Azd and the Ta.mim(2).
As to where he went, the annals speak nothing. But the fact  
that h is  naiae does not occur in the annals o f  tribal s t r i f e
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(1 ) .  Tab. 2/579 -80.
( 2 ) .  I*he a d v a n c e  o f ^ b n  Khazim came soon  a f te r  tbs w i th d r a w a l  
o f  3a im  b .  Z iv aa  and th e  p e o p l e  o f  K huraaan  are s a i d
to  h av e  r e v o l t e d  a g a i n s t  >alm two months a fter  t h e y  had 
3Woin a l l e g i a n c e  to  him as the i n t e r i m  M r  (fab.
2/439 I .2 . J .  Thus Dain. (261) may be r i g h t  i n  s a y i n g  j & a t  
a l - P i h a l l a b  was i n  K hu rasan  a t  uhe tins© o i  a
f l i g h t  i . e . ,  i n  Jun& da, 64. I t  mist h o w e v e r  b e  rem embered 
t h a t  Dain i s  w ro n g  i n  m ailing  a l - r u i i a l l a b  c o n t in u e  i n  
^ u r a s & n  t i l l  his  a s s u m p t io n  o f  t h e  corasand o i  t h e  
campaign a g a i n s t  t h e  ^ z k r i q a .
should cause no surprise* nor should i t  be t a k e n  a s  an 
indication  o f  hi3 absence or even of any lack o f  i n t e r e s t  
on h is  p a r t  in the fortunes o f  h is  tr ibe . I t  mist be 
remembered t h a t  the ch ief  role in  a l l  such tr ib a l  e p i s o d e s  
belonged only to lo ca l  heads o f  the respective tr ibes .
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THE G3N33I3 OF THE ^ZARlQA.
The K harijites  from Mecca entered al-Basra at a time
«
when ^ubaidulXah b. Tiyad was ju st  nearing his f in r l  downfall. 
Here at al-Basra th e ir  ranks were further augmented by a number 
of old iCharijites, estimated a t four hundred* whom ^Ubaidullah, 
in a momeno of weaknesa, ordered to be released from prison  
when h is  authority dwindled a f ter  the death of YazTd(l). 
According to another account ( 2 ) ,  the K harijites themselves 
broke open the door o f  the prison-house when the people rose 
against I^bn Ziyad, and joined I&fiK and h is  p a r ty ,’’owe ver 
that may be, th is  new accession o f strength gave a f i l l i p  to 
th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s *  Tney took fu l l  advantage of the preoccupation 
of  the Baarans with the ir  o^ aa dissensions and went on 
vigorously preaching the ir  own fa i th ,  disseminating sed it ion  
and exhorting the people to r ise  against a l l  ’unjust rulers  
and tyrants’ . In the feud between a lA zd  and the Tamlm, they, 
except a few who participated in i t ,  adopted a p er fec t ly  
neutral end i s o la t io n i s t  attitude and s t r i c t l y  adhered to i t ( 3 )  
Bat the K harijites had been the common enemy of both the 
>Azd and the Tamlm. They vvere looked upon by a l l  the people of
(1 ) .  Xam, 610; Anon. 79.
(2 ) .  Tab. V 517 1. 20).
(3 ) .  Earn. 610.
al-Basra as a common danger not only to t h e i r  peace but 
also  to the prosperity o f th e ir  trade and comnerce which 
had* on many occasions, suffered greatly  as a re su lt  of 
the K harijites rendering the up-country communications 
unsafe. I t  was only th e ir  internal troubles th a t  for a ios 
diverted th e ir  attention  from the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the 
K harijites in th e ir  very midst. As soon as they were 
relieved of their  own a n x ie t ie s ,  they turned a t once and 
without delay to the K harijites and determined that they 
should not be to lerated  any more. This s t i f f  a tt itu de  o f  
the Basrans or , perhaps, even actual threats from them 
made the Kharijites apprehend imminent trouble and soon 
they departed for  al-^Ahwaz in the end of 3hawwal, 64 A*H.(1).
Except for Abdullah b. Saffar, Abdullah b. >Ibad and 
a few others o f  th e ir  way o f  thinking, nearly a l l  of the 
Kharijites made a trek to al^Ahwaz. The number of those 
assembled at al-^Ahwaz reached 350 and iiafi^b. al-^Azraq was 
appointed to th e ir  leadership.
Hitherto the Kharijites had knoisn no differences o f  
a fundamental nature. All of them were united in the b^aic 
p rin c ip les  of th e ir  fa ith .  The creed of A^bu Bilal jsairdas 
b. ^dayya* a veteran chief who had taken part in the battle  
of al-Nahrawan and rose to leadership during the days o f  
^Ubaidullah b. 7Ayad, was s t i l l  the creed o f  them a l l ( 2 ) .
(1 ) .  Anon. 79; IAth. 4 /82 .
(2 ) .  Kam. 6105 Tab. 2/517.
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The creed o f  Birdas was that o f  ’ al^intibagh’ i . e . ,  of  
peaceful i so la t io n .  According to him, i t  was impossible 
to s tay  where the tyrants and the unjust held sway but the 
a lternative  of an armed revolt  was also too hideous to be 
countenanced. H e,therefore, adopted the mid-way o f  ’ f le e in g  
with one's f a i t h ’ in order to escape from,and avoid 
submission to ,  the unjust rule o f  the h e r e t ic  tyrants. At 
the same time Mirdas expressly  and unequivocally declared 
that h is  intentions were quite peaceful. He would not spread 
disorder nor would he terrorise  any one. He w i l l  not draw 
his sword against any one except in defence and he would 
never make the oommanications unsafe. But he and his  
followers would not h es ita te  to take forc ib ly  th e ir  annuities— 
of course, the leg it im ate  amount no more no l e s s  — from the 
State revenue and would, o f  course, c o l le c t  the tax from 
the land they defended and guaranteed(l). Mirdas also  
acknowledged the p erm iss ib i l ity  of ’a l- ta q iy y a ’ or dissembl­
ing in face of danger.
I t  w ill  be observed that the creed of Mrdas was not 
at  a l l  aggressive or v io len t in i t s  conception although in  
practice  i t  did often times lead to the contrary.
For one month, Nafi<and h is  followers remained quite  
peaceful a t  al-^Ahwaz* Then suddenly Nafi* developed the 
radical and a l m o s t  revolutionary views that have s in ce
formed the creed o f  the ^zariqa, which i s  the d is t in c t iv e
name of the Kharijite s e c t  founded by him.
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(1 ) .  Kam. 585-87.
S o
B rie f ly ,  the following are the cardinal pr inc ip les  of 
th is  new creed ( 1 ) : -
1. 15very one who does not believe in the dootrines  
of the ^zariqa i s  a ' raushrik* i . e .  outside the pale of  
Islam. Hence, i t  i3  prohibited to partake o f  an animal 
slaughtered by him or to have any re lations with him by 
way of marriage or inheritance.
2. 'Al-Taqiyya* both in word and in d eed ,is  unlawful 
and the *Qa<ad* i . e . ,  the Abstainers or the passive m slim s  
(Kh5,rijites) are to be treated the same way as the non- 
bel ie vers.
3. Further, the opponents are to be placed in the 
same category as the non-Muslims o f  Arabia. E ither they 
should come over to Islam, — ( Islam as defined by the 
^zariqa) — , or they should be' put to the sword. Jizya was 
not to be accepted from them.
4. The country is  to be regarded as ’ Dar al-Kufr’ . 
Therefore, i t  i s  lawful fo r  the true i2 u s lim s( i .e . , the 
^.zariqa themselves) to s p i l l  the blood and to se ize  the 
property of a l l  the inhabitants except those who declared 
their  ’I m a n ( ’Iman in the sense that they understood i t ) .
5. The women and minor children of those regarded as
i n f i d e l s  have  o n l y  a place i n  th e  H e l l . H e n c e ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  
l e g i t i m a t e  to  k i l l  them .
THE QKEED OF NAFI .
. From Kam. 610 seq. 5 tab. 2/518; non. 
Shah.. 89 seq.
6 . whenever a new per3on came to join the settlem ent  
o f  the >Azariqa i t  was necessary to hold an *a l - >Imtihan’ 
or an enquiry into his r e lig io u s  views.
Such was the m ilitan t creed of the ^zariqa. In a 
word* they deemed i t  th e ir  re lig iou s  duty to exterminate 
a l l  those who d iffered  from them. Sven the l iv e s  o f  women 
and innocent children were not to he spared.
It  was obvious from the very beginning that even a l l  
the K harijites themselves did not find i t  p oss ib le  to go 
the whole hog with H a flS  The resu lt  could be but a 3p l i t  
in th e ir  own ranks. Henceforth, they were divided among 
themselves. Najdah b. ^Amir who had followed JNafi* to al*  
>ihsfui was the f i r s t  to d issen t  from him. Having fa ile d  to 
dissuade Nafi* from the new course he had se t  for h im self,  
he l e f t  him and went away to el-Yamamah. <\bdullah b. 
Saffar, ^Abdullah b. >Ibad and ^bu Baiha3 founded separate 
schisms o f th e ir  own. I t  i 3 needless here to enter into a 
discussion about the points o f  agreement and d ifference  
among them as we are concerned with the ^zariqa alone. 3o 
we pass on to the subsequent h istory  of the ^Izariqa.
With the dawn o f  the year 65 Nafi* elaborated and 
vigorously pressed forward with h is  radical views t i l l  
seven months after  h i t  arrival in al-^khwaz ( 1) he rushed 
headlong into the path of indiscriminate slaughter. 
Consequently the morale of the whole population even in
the d istant comers of the province m 3 badly shaken and 
panic spread throughout the land. N a f ^ ’ s power, rather 
his terror grew as every day passed and h is  agents
( i ) .  Anon. 95.
established themselves in many parts o f  al-3awad.
These happenings at l a s t  perturbed the people of 
al-Basra. Perhaps i t  was the actual advance of Nafi< 
towards the capital that roused them to resistance.Anyhow, 
their  perturbation was so great that many of them kept 
th e ir  camels by th e ir  side in order to be ready to leave  
the c ity  any moment(l). They gathered round al^Ahnaf b. 
qais, the prominent ch ief of the TamTm and to ld  him that  
the enemy was only a t  two or three n ig h ts ’ distance from 
them. And the enemy was what they a l l  knew, — cynically  
in d ifferen t  to slaughter and destruction. ’1 - ‘*m f replied*  
" Yerily, i f  the enemy gets the upper hand of you, he w ill  
do unto you as he has done in the suburbs. 5o, be earnest  
in your f ig h t  against him." Thereupon, ten thousand people 
flocked to al^^hnaf. Prominent men spoke .o Babba and Babba 
appointed to the ir  command Muslim b. <Ubais b. ftiraiz b. 
Rabl<ah. >Ibn ^ b a is  was knowi to be a man of honesty and 
bravery and the force under hi3 command a lso  included 
many a learned man and theologian(2 )*
(1 ) .  THE BATHS OF DULAB.
Mtan Hjbais s a l l i e d  fo rth  in Jumada I I ,  and continued
hi3 inarch onwards t i l l  he reached Uulab, a village  at a 
distance of  four farsakh from al^Ahwaz (3 ) ,  where he
encountered Nafi^who had a force 500 or 600 strong* A
(1)* Anon, 93.
(2 ) .  Ibid
(3 ) ,  Anon. 84, Dulabj Yaq. 2/622 Daulab.
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deadly f ig h t  ensued in which >1 bn <‘Ubaia f e l l  on the 
b a t t le f i e ld  and was succeeded by his own nominee, al-Babi* 
b. ^mr al-^j^ham  al-Uhudahl, Another close f igh t  
followed and resu lted  in the death of tfafi* b. al^Azraq 
(Jumada I I ,  65
The death o f  Nafi^was not the end of the b a tt le ,  
^Ubaidullah b, Bushair b. a l-iahuz(2) f i l l e d  h is  p lace.
On the side o f  the Basrans a l -  labi* b, <\mr al-^Vjdham 
al-Ghudanl and al-Hajjaj b. Bab al-Himyari su ccess ive ly  
fought and f e l l  before him (3 ) .  The b a tt le  had la s te d  for  
about a month when Haritha b. Badr al-GhudanT took the
% - '  ■' 
banner in h is  hands. In the meantime the ’Azariqa received  
a fresh accession of strength from al-Yamamah and i t  
became impossible for the Basrans to withstand them. 
Haritha beat a retreat towards the Du j a i l  (?Srun) and 
crossed over to flahr ’l ir a  ( 4 ) ,  a fcowi to the west of a l -  
>ihpias* The ^zariqa were too wearied to pursue them.
^3
(1 ) .  la s .  (5/229) has quite in c id en ta lly  dropped a h in t  
that Nafl was k i l led  a t  the hand8 o f  al-LUhallab in the 
year 65. Also according to Yqb. 2/317 and Da in 282, Waft4, 
survived th is  battLe t i l l  he was k i l led  la te r  on in an 
encounter with al-Muhallab. This vers ion* however, does not 
merit any attention because i t  goes against established  
subsequent fact3 without o ffer in g  any"satisfactory a l t e r ­
native account.Mas. does not 33 beyond that mere nint.Yqb. 
(2/324) makes Hafi* survive t i l l  the time of^bdu *1 -Malik 
which i s  as absurd as the omission by Dain o f any mention 
o f  the leadership o f  al-Zubair b, ^Ali in succession to 
MJbaidullah b. al-Mah.ua. Al-3kahrastani (89-90) confirms 
that Naf^was k i l le d  before a l-Ib h a llab 's  leadership.
( 2 ) , Anon.; Bushair; Tab. and Kam., Bashir.
3 ) . The report of Hi§iiam in Tab.2/581 varies as regards 
he order of succession.
(4 ). The town of Nahr l i r a  (Anon.Taira) was situated  on a 
r iver  or canal o f  the same name which flowed into the 
Karkha from i t s  right s id e . (Le S tra .2 4 i) .
The leader of the >Azd in this battle  was Qabisa b. 
>Abi Sufra, a brother o f  al-Fuhallab and the grandfather 
of  Hazar £2ard (1).  The whereabouts of al-Mihallab him self  
at th is  time cannot be ascertained. Dain,(280,3} is  
obviously wron  ^ in saying that he was acting  as wall o f  
Khurasiii on behalf o f  >1111 al-^ubair because i t  has 
already been established  that he had long ago been ousted 
from that o f f ic e  by Abdullah b, Khazim, — a fa c t  o f  
which Dain has taken no notice  at a l l .
(2 ) .  THE KXPSDITION OF ^THHIAH.
Again the^'zariqa continued th e ir  usual a c t i v i t i e s  
unabated in al^Ahwaz with ^Ubaidullah b, Bushair at th e ir  
head. Three months elapsed a f te r  the death of^Ibn ^Ubais 
and Babba made no further attempt to check them. He would 
not risk another encounter with them. This h es ita n t  and 
inactive a ttitu de at l a s t  tired the patience of the 
Basrans who made a representation to *Abdullah b. al-2ubair  
requesting him that Babba be removed and another man 
appointed in h is  place. I^bn al-3ubair wrote to >Anas b.
ISJlik to lead  the prayers who did so fo r  forty  days and 
then came *Umar b. ^Ubaidullah b. Ma^mar as the new
stattho ld er . Thus the dismissal of Babba m s t  have taken 
place approximately about the end of Hamadan, 65 A.H.while
the appointment of Hjraar b. ^Ubaidullah must be placed
forty  days la te r  i . e . ,  in the month o f  flhu '1 Qa<da»
65 A.H.
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( 1 ) .  Anon. 89, Agh. 6 /4 .
*Umar b^Ubaidullah summoned his oisn brother <Utnnteh 
to lead a fresh campaign against the ^zariqa. seanwhile 
the news o f  the new changes and the preparations o f  the 
Basrans against them reached th e^ zariq a  who at once 
decided to take the i n i t i a t i v e  and advance towards a l -  
Basra. Haritha b. Badr, who had a l l  the time stayed at 
Nahr l i r a ,  made a bold attempt to in tercept them and 
su ccess fu lly  pushed them back to iSlab.
A l i t t l e  l a t e r  there came ^Uthmah with a body of 
ten or twelve thousand so ld iers  from al-Basra. Accompanied 
by Haritha b. Badr he crossed the Du j a i l  and met <Ubaidullah 
b. Bushair a t  the old b a tt le  ground o f  Dulab. ^thraah was 
brave to a fault; he was rash. Haritha b. Badr cautioned 
him a t  the very ou tset  against judging the strength o f  
the Mzariqa by the ir  numbers or underestimating th e ir  power 
in any way-But the overweening pride and the haughty 
o ver-confidence of ^Uthmah would not l e t  him heed the 
advice o f  an Iraqite.To him i t  was nothing but cowardice 
to hold back from a head-on clash. So he plunged forthwith  
into a s tra ig h t  and deadly f igh t the re su lt  of which was 
not in doubt for long, within a few hours, ^Uthnsan was 
k i l le d  and h is  army put to f l ig h t  ( ]Jiu , 1-Qa<da, 65 \.H. ) (1 ) .  
I t  again f e l l  to the l o t  of Haritha b. Badr to push back 
the ^zariqa 30 as to prevent them from pursuing the 
rennanta of ^Uthman’ s army. Haritha succeeded in e f f e c t in g  
a retreat to Nahr ‘l ira  while the ^Azariqa went back to 
al^Ahwaz*
The remnants o f  thman1 s army reached al-Ba3ra and




>Ibn a l-2ubair  d i3mi3aed <Umar b, ^Ubaidullaii and appointed 
al-Harith b. ^Abdullah b. ^bi Rabi<a called  * al-quba*'’ as 
his successor* The appointment o f  al-qubaMs mentioned 
by al-Tabari under the year 65, I t  mist, however* be noted 
that the report o f  Hicham b, Muhammad on the authority o f  
>k)M Mkhnaf as given in T'ab.( 2/581 s e q , ) omits the mention 
of the governorship of ^Umar b, <Ubaidullah b, Ma^mar and 
the expedition of ^Uthman, Hence a l l  subsequent chronology 
i s  ante-dated by several months. As compared with i t  the 
account in Anon, * which i s  quite perfect and coherent* 
expressly  avers (1) that the advent o f  al-Qaba* came o f f  
only in 66 i , e , f in the very early days of th a t  year since  
the change o f  gpvemorship was e ffec ted  as a consequence 
of* and not long a fter , the fa ilure  of the expedition of 
4 Uthman,
HarithLa was s t i l l  at Nahr lira* His request for formal 
commission and reinforcements was rejected by al -  Qu ba< who 
recalled  him to al-Basra. Haritha, however* refused to move 
u n ti l  he was relieved  by a successor, 0ut soon the so ld iers  
around him began to melt away t i l l  he found himself deserted  
by a l l  except a small band of his own tribesmen,As soon 
as th e^ za r iq a  learn t o f  the precarious posit ion  of Haritha 
they crossed the Dujail and in f l ic te d  a n ight attack upon 
him.Haritha was compelled to take to heels,He reached the 
bank of the Da j a i l  and boarded a boat which, however* aank
( i ) .  Anon, 99.
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with him (1) .
Anon. 78-101,
Tab. 2/517-20; 580-82. 
Kam. 616-17 and 623-26.
Agfat. 6 /1 -5 .
(1)* Anon. 100? Kam. 626. According to Tab. 2/585;
Yaq.4/268 Haritha was droimed a f te r  the appointment 
of al-Mihailab#
C H A P  T S fi V.
AL-MUHALLAB *S 7ISIT TO JflCCA .
already know that ^Abdullah b. Khazim ousted a l -  
l£ihallab from the governorship o f  Khurasan and even k i l led  
the Tanamite whom the l a t t e r  had l e f t  behind as h is  deputy. 
I t  was* no doubt, a c lear  affront to al-Muhallab’s honour 
and p restige  and* naturally  enough* he should have f e l t  
i t  the more keenly because h is  rival belonged to the Midar 
tribe which had a l l  along been h o s t i le  to the *Azd in a l -  
Sasra and consequently also in Khurasan «hich was a mere 
colony of al-Sasra and whose population consisted la rg e ly  
of Basrans iho had been transplanted there. That tr ib a l  
jealousy was s t i l l  a potent factor  in State a f fa ir s  and 
that the traditional animosity between the >!izd and the 
iSidar counted with ^Abdullah b. Khazim as much as personal 
ambition are c learly  brought out by the words o f  “‘Abdullah 
b. Khazim himself who i s  reported to have pulled up 3alm 
b. jiyad at Slsabur for  having handed over the province 
to a man of *Mizun ‘Umah’ ( 1 ).
In the circumstances, therefore, i t  i s  ju st  p oss ib le  
that al-Muhallab should have se t  h i3 heart on repairing  
the damage to his position  and prestige by supplanting>Ibn 
Khazim in Khurasan, i f  p ossib le . Happily enough the 
internal conditions in that province immediately following
( 1 ) .  Tab.2/489. The remark of 3ulaiman b. Marthad ( ib id . )  
was also in the same stra in .
the coup de e ta t  of ^bn Khazim» were also tempting and 
favourable for  such a desiga. Daring the years 64 and 65, 
the province was seething with discon ten t ,  disorder and 
disin tegration  consequent upon the wars of I^hn Khazim 
against Sulainian b,Marthad o f  iterv and >Aus b. Tha<laba 
of Harat, his haughty and cruel treatment of the Bakrites 
and his eventual break with h is  erstwhile supporters, the 
Tamimites( 1) • By a s ig n if ic a n t  coincidence i t  was about 
the 3ame time that al-Mihailab undertook a journey to laecca 
where he net *Abdullah b. al-Zubair and received i'romiiim 
the w rit o f  appointment as governor o f  Khurasan. Al -Mahal lab  
may or may not have asked for i t  because i t  i s  not clear  
i f  the v i s i t  was designed particu larly  for th is  purpose 
but in e ith e r  case the disorderly conditions in the province 
mast have been an important factor in influencing the 
decision of *Abdullah b. a l - 3ubair to depose Abdullah b. 
Khaaim whom he, according to Bal,414 and Yqb. 3/304, had 
previously confirmed in the stattholdership  on the l a t t e r ’s 
acknowledgement o f  h is  authority*
An incident during al-iaihallab*s stay  at Mecca i s  
s ig n if ic a n t  enough inasmuch as i t  gives us a clue as to 
tiie height o f  fame and glory that he had attained by now. 
h h ile^ b n  al-!5iba ir  was closeted with al-Muhallab and was 
busy in conferring with him, there came to him <Abdullah 
b* Safwah b. ’Umaiya b. Khalf b* Wahb al-qurashi al-JumahJ,
6~9
( 1 ) .  Tab. 2/490 seq.? 593 seq.
sho asked " 0 Commander of the Faithful* isho i s  th is  man 
that has kept you engaged today f^ b n  a i~ 3ubair replied*
" Do n ’ t  you know him ? He i 3 the Ohief o f  the people o f  
al-^Iraq.8 Thereupon >1 bn Safwan exlaimed, ■  Then he must 
be al-i'uhallab b. >AbT 3ufra, * (1 ) ,
We do not know when al-Mihallab started  on his  
journey to Ifecca because h is  whereabouts a fter  h is  
withdrawal from ierv  cannot be ascertained, we ,however, know 
that he returned to a.1-Basra just when a l - 2ubair b. "‘AIT 
was threatening the town from the ea s t  ( 2) which event. , 
as determined h ereafter , mist be placed in the fourth month 
of the year 66 A.H.
The governorship of  Khurasan was indeed a great 
triumph for al-J&ihallab but a greater task and a greater  
triusph was yet in store for  him at al-Basra*
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( 1), Ikh. 2/146.
(2 ) .  Tab. 2/583, 2-3.
C H A P T E R 71.
AL-MJHALLAB ASSUMES LEADERSHIP OF 
OAMPAIGS AGAINST THE ?AZARIQA.
After the drowning o f  Haritha b. Badr, <U bai dull ah b, 
Bushair continued in Nahr l i r a  ior  three months(i) during 
which period he co llected  the taxes of the d i s t r ic t s  of  
al-^Ahwls around him and estab lish ed  h is  sway over them.
Then a f te r  three months he dispatched h is  cousin, al-2ubair  
b. *Ali b, al-!Hhus, at the head of a detachment to a l -  
Furat (2)* Al-2ubair b, ^ 1  subdued the land ly in g  along 
the eastern bank of the D ij la tu  ’1 -  <Awra> and lev ied  
taxes from i t .  Having thus firmly estab lished  a foothold  
on the eastern bank* he fixed  al-Basra on the other aide 
of  the r iver  as the next objective  before him,
A l-3ubair b, "^ All advanced towards al-Basra t i l l  he 
arrived at the point where the river was to be crossed. 
Thither the people o f  al-Basra flocked in tens o f thousands 
’ on foot,  on beasts and in boats t i l l  they covered the 
whole ground,' The Basrans knew fu l l  well that the river  
formed th e ir  only l in e  of defence, once th e^ za r iq a  were 
allowed to cross i t ,  their  doom wa3 sealed , Spurred on by 
th is  grim rea lisa t io n  they put up a stout r e s is ta n ce ,hewed
(1).Kam, 626, 5j cf. also Anon. 101,
(2 ) .  Used for the jo in t  stream of D ijla  and a i-ifurat,a lso  
ca lled  Dijlatu ' l -3 a sr a  or Dijlatu , l - <^ wra> , The 
d i s t r i c t  extending from Maisan and al-Madhar up to 
al-Basra was known as ’Furatu *1-Basra’ (Yaq. 1 /770),
down the bridge and succeeded in keeping the enemy to the 
other s id e  o f  the river. In one account (1 ) ,  i t  i s  even 
asserted that the ^Azariqa had actually  crossed the river  
when they were overwhelmsd by the Basrans and compelled 
to cross i t  back to the eastern s id e .
The s itu ation  was extremely c r i t i c a l .  The d i s t r ic t s  
had already capitulated to the^Azariqa. i'he authority o f  
the government o f  al-Basra was confined to the c ity  i t s e l f .  
Even the c i t y  was threatened with a 3iege followed by 
u tte r  destruction and ruin. The Basrans, however, proved 
equal to the occasion and acted with oouraj® and determina­
tion. Immediately they s e t  about to marshall th e ir  forces 
and to give b attle  to the enemy. Al^Ahnaf went to a l -  
Quba* and impressed upon him the gravity  o f  the occasion  
saying, M the enemy has already deprived us o f  our 
d i s t r i c t s  and our income. I t  only remains for him to la y  a 
siege to us in our own c ity  t i l l  we die o f  exhaustion .’ 
Al-nuba* inv ited  suggestions as to *ho should be appointed 
to the co man d, Al^Ahnaf’ s prompt reply was that he could 
see none for  the task except al-JHihallab b. ^ b l  3ufra.
As a further indication  of the high reputation that a l -  
Muhallab had b u i l t  for  him aelf, i t  i s  even stated  that a l-  
>Ahnaf rejected a request of the people to take the coaanand
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(1) .  Anon. 101.
h in a e lf  for* he 3 a i d , a l -i.iiha.llab was more competent for  
the task ( i)«  Al-quba* , however* l e f t  the choice to the 
people themselves and deferred a decision t i l l  the following  
day.
Three names were put forward on behalf o f  the people
1. Al-Muhallab.
2. MSlik b. iisma< al-Jahdari.
3. Ziyad b, ^mr b. a l - >Ashraf a l -  <Ataki.
Al-Quba* found l a l ik  and Ziyad no t very enthaaias  ti c 
about the a f fa ir  and in the meantime th e i r  supporters too 
changed th e ir  mind and acknowledged the superio r  merits 
of al-Muhallab. The other two names having been i/ithdrawn* 
al-lluhallab was chosen by the unanimous w ill  o f  a l l  the 
people of si-Basra.
Fortunately enough* i t  was just a t  th is  juncture 
that al-Muhallab returned from his v i s i t  to i^cca (2 ) .  Soon 
the ch iefs  of the c ity  approached him with a view to 
obtaining his consent. Al-Qaba< informed him of the 
unanim3u3 choice of the people in that grave hour o f  
impending danger and impressed upon him the confidence 
reposed and the high hopes placed in him by h is  countrymen.
£ 3
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/590.
(2 ) .  Obviously Dain.(28l) i s  wrong in saying that a l -  
Muhallab was at the time acting as wall of j&iurasan 
on behalf o f  ’Xbn al-Subair who ordered him be proceed 
to al-Bafra and take up the command of the campaign 
against i.’ne >A.s5riqa*
He said that a l l  eyes i?ere u p lif ted  to him and that a l l  
hearts fondly entertained the hope that >111 ah may d e a r  
the overshadowing clouds o f  calamity through him. Al^Ahnaf 
further urged that there was no substitu te  for him and 
that i t  was he alone iho could capably shoulder the 
stupendous task. Al-i4ihallab p o l i t e ly  th&nkod them for  
the camplim8nt3 that they had paid him which he did  not 
consider him self worthy of.As for  h is  responde, he was not  
the man to shrink from onerous re sp o n s ib i l ity  or be daunted 
by dangers and d i f f i c u l t i e s .  But at the s?me time he was 
too conscientious and dutifu l to throw out, o f  his own 
arbitrary w i l l ,  the ob ligation  that he had just entered  
into with>Ibn al-Subair.So* he put forward the plea that  
he had already been invested with the governorship o f  
Khurasan and, hence, was not free to undertake any other 
r e sp o n s ib i l ity  so long as >Ibn a l - 2ubair did not absolve 
him oT his previous o b liga tion . Al^Ahnaf further urged that 
the governorship of Khurasan could not be of much value 
i f  the *zariqa were allow, d to continue to threaten the 
c ity  of al-Basra. But a l l  of them fu l ly  understood that 
the plea of al-i&xhallab was reasonable enough not to be 
brushed aside so l ig h t l y .  They, the re fo r e , suggested that  
they as well as a l- in h a llab  should iranediately v/ri ;e to 
>Ibn a l - 2ubair representing to him the needs of the s itu a t io n  
and asking him to authorise al-Muhallab to lead the campaign 
against the >Azariqa. Al-Muhallab agreed to the suggestion.
I t  is  doubtful, however, whether the proposal was honestly  
carried into e f f e c t .  According to one of the two versions,  
al-quba* » al-^Ahnaf and the other people agreed among
6 4
themselves to forge a l e t t e r  purporting to come from^bn
a l - 2ubair and to concede what they desired, >lan a l - 2ubair 
l e a m t  o f  th is  forgery la t e r  on and i 3 reported to have 
kept s i l e n t .
The wisdom o f  the course adopted by a l -SHuhallab is  
also proved in another way* Apart from the fact  that i t  
absolved his conscience from a l l  t a in t  of insubordination 
and d ere lic t io n  of duty* i t  also Want a :;reat change in 
h is  formal s ta tu s . How that he was duly commissioned by 
*Ibn a l - 2ubair, he derived his authority not only from 
the people of al-Basra but also d irec t ly  from the Ualiph 
him self.
On the l e t t e r  being showi to al-Huhallab, he 
expressed h is  w illingness  to undertake the campaign but 
only on certain terms and conditions. His terms were
1. that he shall have authority to recruit for  
service  whomsoever he l ik ed  from among the nobles and 
distinguished warriors ( i ) ,
2. that he sh a ll  have at h is  disposal a sum from 
the Baitu 'l-Mal with ^hich to provide for  his troops,
3. that he sh a ll  be given authority over a l l  the 
lands that he subdued, and
4. that he 3h e l l  be e n t i t le d  to the taxes lev ied  
from a l l  such lands that he reduced(2).
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( 1 ) . According to Jain. 281, al-^oiiallab expressed his  
intention to recruit so ld iers  from the middle c lasses  
because the rich were too sluggish and the poor too 
unprovided to be useful to him.
( 2) . I t  does not seem to be in the f i tn e s s  of things that  
al-Hihallab should have sp e c if ie d  any p articu lar  *
Al->!Ujnaf readily accepted the f i r s  t three i  fcsitkj 8.3 
they stood# As for the fourth, he pointed out to a l -  
ruhallab that 1 Fay ( ta x e s)1 was the cotmion possession of  
the whole Buslim cosmmity and none was e n t it le d  to 
appropriate i t  to himself or to authorise i t s  appropriation 
by others. *l-£*uhallab would be no better  than an enemy of 
th e irs  in case he in s is te d  on i t .  I t  was,however# possib le  
to authorise him to spend as such out o f  the revenue of  
the subdued lands as he deemed f i t  on the maintenance of  
his troops as well as a l l  other requirements o f  the 
campaign( 1). The argument was cogent and al-Kuhallab seems 
to have proved amenable to i t .
F inally , the terms were incorporated in a document 
composed by a l - 3 a l t  b. Huraith b, .J lb ir a l-llanafl and 
guaranteed to quite w il l in g ly  and unreservedly by a l l  the 
elders except Malik b. Jftema4 and a few others o f  Bakr b. 
H | l l «  I t  was r e a l ly  surprising that the le a d e r  of a tribe  
which had for a long time been bound with the .^zd by strong
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* period ( three years. Tab.2/590: one year, I s a .3/536) 
during which he was to have exclusive  control over the 
revenue of the lands reduced by him.
(1 ) .  As to the amount l e f t  over a fter  disbursing the pay 
o f  the so ld iers  and other necessary outlay on 
equipment e t c . ,  al^Ahnaf in Kam. 627 i s  reported to 
have said that i t  was to gp to the M slim  coronunity. 
But according, to Anon. 103 where the words are put 
into the mouth o f al-Quba* , the amount could be 
taken over by al-Mihail ab. This at l e a s t  see m3 to 
have been the practice in subsequent days.
t i e s  of a l l ian ce  and f im id sh ip  should oppose the granting  
o f  a few p r iv ileg es  to an Azdite. This discordant note, 
which could only be explained by a personal weakness for  
haughtiness in M i k ’ s character, evoked general d is ­
approbation from a l l  quarters. Al-^Ahnaf and a l - . ’undhir b. 
al-J^rud indignantly questioned M lik  whether the p r i v i l e ^ 3  
which he sought to deny to a l-M hallab  were ac tu a lly  
possessed by him or h is  e n e m y .  And when M lik  was forced 
to admit that he did not possess  what he denied to a l-  
Muhallab they took him to task for the apparent in ju st ice  
that he should a3k al-Mxhallab to protect his blood and h is  
honour and then grudge him what he had already been d is ­
possessed o f  by the enemy, 'ihey further taunted him by 
o ffer in g  him that he should take upon himself to crush the 
enemy on exactly  the same terms that al-Muhallab demanded* 
Malik,however, refused to take up the gauntlet and thus h is  
motives were fu lly  exposed ( 1).
No doubt, the unfriendly a ttitu de  of Malik a ffected  
al-53uhallab deeply. He could not forget i t  for a long time 
afterwards. B it the so l i ta r y  note of d issent oould not at  
a l l  influence the course of  events. Al-Mihallab was assured 
by al-Ahnaf, <TJbaidullah b. Ziyad b. . |abyan and a i l  the 
chiefs that Malik and his party could not withhold what 
a l l  the people of al-Basra had agreed to bestow on him. 
U ltim ately , a l-i iiha llab  took over the command and promptly 
s e t  about making necessary preparations. The terms o f  the 
agreement were also r a t i f ie d  by < Abdul lab. b. a l- lu b a ir  
la te r  on.
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( 1 ) .  Yqb. 2/316.
Let us pause awhile to a ssess  the true s ig n if ica n ce  
of the terms put forward by al-Muhallab, Really, the terms 
are far more important than they at f i r s t  appear to be,
'they are of immense value to us in the assessoent o f  a l -  
B ihallab's m ilitary  genius. I t  i s  true, indeed, that the 
commanders before him did not i n s i s t  on any term3 at a l l .  
But, can al-Muhallab be accused of bargaining at a c r i t ic a l  
time when the fate  of  his  own hearth and home hung in 
balance ? fa s  i t  a mere haggling designed to secure soma 
personal advantage fo r  him self T Ho, the very terms are 
a s u f f ic ie n t  refutation o f  any 3uch insinuation , the 
terms were absolutely  necessary for the successfu l prosecu­
tion o f  the campaign. The reason why others in h is  position  
did not think of any such terms i s  that al-Muhallab's 
method o f  warfare was rad ica lly  d ifferen t  from theirs . Al- 
Muhallab did n o t believe ,  as they did, in one decisive  
stroke in which a l l  the available forces were hurled against  
the foe and which resu lted  in a few hours e ith er  in victory  
or in defeat. Al-Muhallab could foresee from the very s ta r t  
a prolonged campaign extending over many years,H ence,it  
was the height o f  prudence on his part to assure him self  
beforehand that h is  tnoop3 did not su ffer  for lack of 
provisions or deficiency in equipment on which, of course, 
he 3et a greater value than others.
The f i r s t  condition gave him a free hand in the choice
o f  h is  so ld ie r s .  Al-Mihallab was yet to form his own army 
and, as a general, i t  was h is  f i r s t  care to see th a t  i t  
included the f in e s t  flower of the so ld iery  o f  al-Basra,
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Next came the question o f  equipment to which a l-  
Muhallab attended with much more care and earnestness than 
h is  oolleagues and r iv a ls .  I t  was but necessary that there 
should be some provision fo r  in i t i a l  expenses. Hence the 
second condition.
Items three and four we re designed only to ensure 
continuity o f  supplies unhampered by interference from 
any other authority.Ko doubt, the s t ip u la t ion  that to him 
should belong the governorship as well as the revenue of  
the lands that he subdued, brought a personal honour and a 
very great personal advantage to h im self. But wa3 i t  not, 
at the sams time, necessary for the smooth working of his  
plans ? I t  was in the in terests  of the campaign i t s e l f  that  
al-Muhsllab should be able to conduct i t  independently o f  
any other authority.That independence of action form d the 
cherished object o f  al-Mihallab is  borne out by the account 
in Dain. (281-82) where i t  is  mentioned that al-Muhallab 
expressly  s t ip u la ted  that he should be given unfettered  
discretion  in the conduct of the campaign and that there 
should be absolutely  no interference with his Ians from 
any quarter whatsoever. As a further proof of his s in ce r ity  
of purpose he also expressed h i3 w illingness to serve under 
any other general in case the Basrans were not prepared 
to accede to h is  terms. An^  even i f  i t  meant a personal 
gain, i t  was, as pointed out by al-^hnaf and a l - t a S h i r ,  
but a just reward for the invaluable serv ices  rendered by
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him. I t  w i l l  be remembered that i t  was made p er fec tly  d e a r  
that the major portion , i f  not the whole, o f  the revenue 
was to be spent on the requirements o f  a campaign which 
was no l e s s  than a f i ^ i t  for  ex istence .
Thus we see that the terms only reveal the calm and 
ca lcu la tin g  mind o f  al-Mihallab. To foresee the nature o f  
the coming struggle i s  one of the e s se n t ia l  a ttr ibutes  o f  
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CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ’AZARIQA.
F ir s t  Period 66-67.
I t  is  d i f f i c u l t *  indeed* to determine p rec ise ly  the 
time when al-Muhallab formally assumed the command. All 
that we know i s  that al-Zubair b. 4All was at that time 
encamped on the eastern bank of the Dijlatu , l - <Awra>. Al- 
Zubair b. ^ l  was sent by ^Ubaiduirah b. Bushair three 
months a f te r  the drowning of Haritha b. Badr which must 
have occurred soon a f te r  the appointmsnt o f  al-Quba< 
early  in the year 66 . Thus, according to a rou^i estim ate,  
al-SBuhallab'a assunqption o f  conanand can be placed approxi­
mately in the fourth month of the year 66 A.H. when he 
was a l i t t l e  over 59 years o f  age.
Al-Iuhallab l o s t  no time in s e t t in g  in r igh t earnest  
about the preliminary preparations. The garrison town o f  
al-Basra ¥as divided into f ive  d iv is ion s  or wards, every 
one of which was occupied by a particu lar  tribe a f te r  whom 
i t  was ca lled . The ^AkhmasJ as the f ive  d iv is ion s  were 
called* were (1) Bakr* (2) ^bd al-Qais* (3) Tamim, (4)
*Azd and (5) A^hl a l -  ‘‘I l iy a  ( ^Ahl al-SSadlna, mostly 
Q a is ite s ) .  Al-Muhallab se lec te d  twelve thousand (1) recru its  
for his army from a l l  the f iv e  d iv is ions and placed each
(1 ) .  According to Bain. (282, 3-4)* twenty thousand,ei jit 
thousand from al-^Azd and the rest from the other 
tr ib e s .
div ision  under a leader of i t s  own. Thus* ^Ubaidullah b,
3iyad b. Zabyan was appointed headman of the 'khums* o f  
Bakr b, Wa>i l  while al-Harish b. H im  al-Sa^dl was placed  
a t  the head of Banu Tamim.
Now the army having been formed*the next question 
was of i t s  equipment. The funds in the Bait al-Mal did not  
exceed two hundred thousand dirhems. As i t  would not do 
to draw upon these meagre and inadequate reserves, a l -  
Muhallab had to tap some other source. 1 i th h is  extra ­
ordinary resourcefulness* he conceived of a very bold and 
an e n t ir e ly  or ig ina l plan of providing the necessary amount. 
The Kharijite incursions had almost paralysed the upcoiintry 
trade and the commerce of the c i t y  which depended l a r ^ l y  
on the in sert  of raw materials and co mao di t ie s  from a l -  
^ w a z  and Fars was completely a.t a s t a n d s t i l l .  Al-Mahal lab  
ca lled  the traders o f  al-B asra  and impressed upon them 
that the only hope of the revival o f  the ir  trade, which 
they had lo 3 t  for the l a s t  one year* la y  in the extermination  
o f  the menace o f  the ^zariqa, Once the po int was driven 
home to them that they had a genuine stake in the success 
o f  al-ASuhallab's cacpaigi* they w i l l in g ly  agreed to contri­
bute th e ir  mite by advancing large credits  on the assurance 
o f  early payment and a f u l l  recognition o f  th e ir  services  
afterwards. '.Vith the credit thus available to him, a l -  
Huhallab coDeleted the equipmont of his army. Padded over­
coats ( ) and quilted  ga iters  ( v V ^  ) are
p articu lar ly  mentioned as some of the a r t ic le s  o f  equipment.
7Z
1. THE BATTLE AT AL- JI5B .
Al-Muhallab was now ready for an encounter, the 
imnediate objective being the dislodging of the ^zariqa  
from the threatening p os it ion  that they had occupied on 
the other side of the Dijlatu '1 -  <Awra>.'fhe town of a.1- 
Basra la y  twelve miles to the west o f  the river and was 
connected with i t  by moans of two canals, — Nahr Ma<qil 
in the north-east and Nahr a l -  >Ubulla in the so u th -e a s t ( i ) .  
Thus the road to the ea s t  passed over two bridges, —the 
one across Nahr Ma<qil ( c f .  Tab. 2/1350,6) in close  
proximity to the c ity  and the other over the main stream 
farther on. These two bridges are generally  referred to in 
the annal3 as J i3ru *1-Basra ( probably id en tica l with a l -  
Jisru •l^Asgbar) and ’ a l-J isru  ’1-^Akbar’ resp ective ly . I t  
was on uhd eastern extremity of a l -J isru  ’l-Akoar that al - 
Zubair b. . al-Mahuz (2) was enosmped. Advancing from a l -  
Basra in the west a l - M u h a l l a b  alighted a t the western end 
of i t ,  h is  troops following him mostly on foot. Both the 
armies now stood opposite each other on e ith er  bank of 
the D ijla .
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(1 ) .  Le Stra. 44.
(2 ) .  Al-2ubair i s  substituted  in Tab.&/584 by <Ubaidullali 
b. al-Mahuz who according to Kam. and Anon, had 
remained behind at Nahr l ira .  Al-.luhallab is reported 
to have encountered ^baidullah  j u s t  behind a l-J isru  
'l^Afgbar 33(3 haYa oo spall ed Him to re tire  f i r s t  
to a l-J isru  'l-^kbar and then to 3 i l la -w a -3 i l l ib r a .
In another report (Tab. 2/591) lAmr al-Qana, an ^sraqite  
l ieu ten a n t ,  i s  said to have been driven out from the 
land between the two bridges by Habib b. al-Muhal 1 ab. 
The accounts of Kam. and Anon, are more coherent and 
credible.
The bridge, i t  w i l l  be remembered, had already 
been destroyed by the Basrans themselves. Al-fiiuhallnb 
was now in  urgent need o f  re-build ing i t  in order to 
carry h is  troops across the river. But the real problem 
was o f  es tab lish in g  a bridgehead on the other side where 
the enemy was firmly planted. For th is  purpose he re­
quisitioned a number of boats and ordared their  speedy 
repairs. The boats were ready for use before the day 
advanced and in them he rushed across the r iver  a contin­
gent led  by h is  son, al-Mugkira. As they neared the 
other shore, the enemy f e l l  upon them and put up a 
strong f ig h t  to prevent th e ir  landing* In the end o f  a 
hard and close f ig h t ,  the >Aaariqa l o s t  ground ch ie f ly  
due to a.1 -MighTra* 3 strong archery. A l J u r a *3 forces  
at l a s t  succeeded in ge tt in g  a foothold on the other  
bank and kept t h e  enemy at bay t i l l  a l - K u h a l l a b  b u i l t  
the bridge and crossed the river with the main body o f  
h is  troops. A l-M u h a l la b  only found t h e  ^Izariqa f le e in g  
before the Basrans and he forbade his men to pursue them. 
Al-Zubair b . <kil may have lingered somewhere for a 
short while but soon joined ^Ubaidullah b .  Bushair at  
Nahr Tira.
This f i r s t  success o f  al-yuhal lab * s arms had only 
the e f f e c t  o f  a tonic for the down-hearted people o f  a l -  
Basra. rhey received the happy news with a sigh of  
r e l i e f  and an outburst o f  joy. I t  was really  a major 
operation accomplished with signal success through the 
wise leadership of  a l-m h a lla b .  M -m ^nira’ s bold dash 
to the other bank in boats and his acquirement of -
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bridtgshead there wag but a daring fea t .  Al-mhallab*a  
prestige stood doubly enhanced in the estimation o f  h is  
townfolk and the morale o f  h i3 troops rose high* G leefu lly  
did the poets celebrate th is  v ictory and joyously did 
they h a il  al-Muhallab as th e ir  Saviour. Thus said a man 
of al*^Azd;- t
* » ' M t
( Anon.103)
Ano the r >Azdi te poet says J-
j  c ^ r i \ j  *)
( Kam. 628).
Ai-iyiuhallab’ s immediate objective  was only the 
driving out o f  a l - 2ubair b. <Kli and h is  troops from 
the v ic in ity  o f  al-Basra. This aim having been achieved, 
he did not pursue the enemy any further. He knew that  
the defeat ox a l - 3ubair b. ^All was not the end o f  the 
^zariqa. Many a great battle  was yet  in a to  re for which 
he should be fu l ly  prepared. He was not  puffed up with 
victory and even in the f i r s t  flush o f joy, would act  
according to the sober d ic ta tes  of prudence. He would 
not advance a step further without consolidating the 
ground he had gained, thereby also safe guarding h is  l in e  
of communication and retreat.
Al-Mahallab, therefore, stayed in the d i s t r ic t s
t in
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of D ijla  ( i )  for forty  days (2) and co llec ted  a consider­
able sum of money by way o f  taxes, out of which he forthwith  
cleared the due3 that he owed to the merchants and also  
paid h is  so ld ier s ,  ih is  singular act o f  lo y a lty  to 
ob ligations and so lic itu d e  for those under h is  cnmmand 
coupled with the heartening e f f e c t  o f  his in i t i a l  su ccess ,  
inspired anong the people 30 auch confidence in his  
leadership that they began to e n l i s t  in h is  army of  
their  own voluntary w il l  in the hope o f  booty and future 
coianercial prosperity. Prominent among those who joined 
him a t  this time were Bukammad b. ;.'asi< al^Azdi,
*Abdulr&h b. :-kbah al*^Ansari, l*Ii<awiya b. ourra a l -  
Muzanl and A^bu ^mran ai-Juwanl, - -  a l l  of them deadly 
enemies o f  the K harijites .
Al-Bihallab then started for Nahr Tlra where the 
^zariqa were assembled. Ti;ey,however, moved to al^Ahwaz*
Al-L'uhallab again made a h a lt  at Mahr ’lira, and co llec ted  
taxes from the neighbouring d is tr ic t s  of pl-3us and 
Manadhir. I t  appears that a l -m h a l la b ’s stay  at liahr 
Tlra must have prolonged at le a 3 t  fo r a couple of months, 
which period he u t i l i s e d  to the f u l l e s t  advantage for  
arming him self with a f u l l  understanding of the conditions  
in the enemy camp. Al-iSuhallab had always been a great  
believer  in the u t i l i t y  of espionage. liven in peace time 
he used to send spies to bring him news o f  a l l  so r ts .
(1 ) .  T h e'd istr icts  o f  Diila* extended from J"ai3an doim 
to the sea. (Yaq. 4 /319).
(2 ) .  Kam. 628, 1 J.
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So, while her© at Nahr l i r a ,  his spies were acUve in
the enemy can$) and they info rued him that the \zraqite
force consisted mainly o f  low people l ik e  f u l l e r s ,  dyers,
blacksmiths e tc .  Al-Muhallab, yho had a due regard for
psychological and emotional fac tors ,  oould miss no
rousing
opportunity o f / in  h is  so ld iers  a contempt of the foe. 
Forthwith he addressed his so ld iers  and impressed upon 
them that the ’Azariqa, low people as they we re,should  
never gpt the upper hand of them.
Al-Muhallab1 s army was now s u f f i c ie n t ly  strong and 
well-equipped. His ranks had swelled to about twenty 
thousand. He was now ready for  a major encounter.He, 
therefore* appointed h is  brother, al-j&^arik b. ^bl  
Sufra, as his agent at Ilahr Tira and departed for 3uq 
al ->Ahwaz.
Al-Maghira b. al-Muhallab led  the vanguard of the 
array. As soon as he approached the >Azariqa they gave 
him battle  in which he was deserted by some of his  
so ld iers .  He him self, neverthe less , stood fa s t  the rest  
of the day as well as the succeeding might in which he 
l i t  f ir e s  as a beacon to h is routed so ld iery . The following  
moming a l - l ig h lr a  advanced for another be.: t ie  but the 
enemy had already departed, s e t t in g  fire  to th is  
burdensome s to res .  Al-Iiiu^ira entered 3n:q al**Ahwa« and 
was soon joined by a l- lah a llab  and his army. A l-M ia llab  
3tayed in 3uq a l -A im i  for a while and wrote a l e t t e r  
to al-'uba* in which he sa id : -
i n
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* 3ver since we started , we have been in the 
enjoyment o f  the constant favour of ’Allah while the 
enemy is  doomed to Hi3 continuous displeasure. We 
advance forward and he runs shy of an encounter. We 
alis^ht and he departs t i l l  we have now occupied Suq 
al-^Ahwaz. *( 1).
How b r ie f  yet v iv id  and eloquent i 3 th is  account 
of h i3 progress: Al-Quba* wrote in r ep ly :-
* 0 'Brother of the *Azd. * May you enjoy glory in 
th is  world and reward in a f t e r - l i f e ."
> >
This rather unconventional form oi' address (X/VJU) ) 
could not but offend al-iiuhallab's fine sense of decorum.
He remarked to hi3 friends: "How uncouth are the people 
of al-Hijaz: Do n ' t  you think he ( al - l ib  a*) knows my 
name, my fa th er’s name and my kunya as well ?*
From Suq alVAhwas al-Mihail ab advanced towards 
Kanadhi r al-3ughra where the >Azariqa had previously  
moved. Before h is departure* he delivered an exhortation  
to his troops in i»hich he sa id :-
" 0 Peoples You are fam iliar  with the way o f  the 
K harijltes . Verily, i f  they get the upper hand o f  you, 
they would 3educe you from your re lig ion  ana wauld 
s p i l l  your blood. 3o f igh t  them for the same that <A1I 
b. >\bi TaLib fought their  predecessors for. lie fore you* 
war was waged against them by Mislim b. <Jbai3 who was
(1 ) .  For Arabic text see Appendix* p.  ^ , L etter  U
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patient and reckoned only upon a rev, rd fr a m ^ llto  
^Uthffian b. ‘‘I!bai dull ah ’,?ho was rash and extravagant 
and Haritha b. 3adr who wa3 opposed and disobeyed 
Now you should meet them with zoa 1 and earnestness for 
they are bat your servants and slaves and i t  will be 
very shameful for you and w il l  constitu te  a s lu r  upon 
your n o b i l i ty  and your fa ith  that they should deprive 
you of your in.com  and v io late  your lomen. ’ (1)
The above address is  very remarkable in that i t  
affords U3 a proof o f  al-rnhallab* s extraordinary  
m ilitary  acumen. The short ep ith ets  prefixed to the names 
of the three unfortunate commanders who preceded him 
are p articu lar ly  a i^ i i f ic a n t .  They give us the causes 
that, according to him, brought about the ir  u tter  
fa i lu re .  Muslim b. ^ubaia was, no doubt, patien t and 
steady, but he was no more than that. Ke was lacking in 
strategy. ^Utnman was rash and imprudent. Haritha h.
Badr was, indeed* a capable leader. On several occasions  
he acted wioh energy and prudence. His lamentable fa ilure  
i s  accounted for  by the only reason that he was always 
opposed by others, ^thman rejected h is  valuable advice 
outright. Al-Quba* would not concede his request for  
ccEBission and reinforcements and l a s t l y ,  he \yas disobeyed 
and deserted by his own followers.
This deep insigh t o f  al-Mihail? b into lie causes
of h is  predecessors' fa ilure  helped him to be careful 
not to su ffer  hi itse lf  from any such drawbacks. I t  i s  here
(1 ) .  This i s  only a free translation , For \rabic text  
see Appendix p ^ •
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that we appreciate the f u l l  implications of his terns of
agreement with the people of al-Basra. The terms were 
d e s ir e d  to secure him against a l l  interference from any 
other authority and to place at his disposal one means 
whereby he oould conduct the campaign according to his ovm 
unfettered discretion. As for strategy, prudence and a lacr ity ,  
these formed the distinguishing tr a i t s  of h is  character.
OF .SbrM ilSUL •
In the meantime i t  happened that ^Ubaidullah b, Bushair 
despatched a mail called  Waqid(i), a mawla of ’Abu Sufra from 
among the cap tives  of al - Jahil iyya, to iialir l ir a  where al»  
Mi<arik was stationed as al-ifuhal la b ’ s agent. laqid was 
acccopanied by a party o f  f i f t y  men* prominent among them 
being Salih b. Llikhraq. This party captured al-Mi<arik# 
k i l le d  him and then put him on the cross, hen the unhappy 
t id in g  reached al-f.!iuhallab» he sent his son al-iUgnlra who 
reached the place when Waqid had already l e f t  it* \ l - : u j i i r a  
performed the funeral o f  his u n d e ,  pacified the people 
and appointed another a ^ n t .  He, then, returned . is  
father who had already alighted at Sulaf#
2. TH3 BATTLE AT SUL A? .
Sulaff a place s ituated  to the west of the Uujail near 
Manadhir al-Kubra (2 ) ,  was the scene of the second engagement
(1 ) .  Thus Kam. 630; Anon. 104, 'Fayid* ( ) •
(2 ) .  Yaq. 3/196.
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between al -;iuhallab and the ^aariqa. At the verj outset* 
the whole of the Azraqite force f e l l  upon a l-ru h a llab*3 
army with i t s  fu l l  weight t i l l  the l a t t e r ,  being unable to 
withstand the stunning onslaught, broke in iisorder leav ing  
seventy dead on the b a t t le f ie ld .  Al-Muhallab and al-iii^hira  
however* 3tood firm and the l a t t e r  p art icu lar ly  proved his  
m ettle. I t  appears from certain accounts that even a l-  
1‘uhallab was at one time driven to f l i g h t ( l ) .  .'he ^ad* 
however, explain that i t  was no act of cowardice on a l -  
JAihallab's part. Ha the r he only wanted to ca ll  back his 
routed so ld iers  and to defend them from behind.
Al-Muhallab passed the night with barely two thousand 
men. In the morning some of the routed so ld iers  returned 
and the number reached four thousand. Addressing them, 
al-Muhallab sa id :-
■  By >A11 ah* your number is  in no way small, these who 
deserted you were only the coward* the weak, the greedy 
and the unrighteous. I f  you suffered in juries  then the 
enemy has also suffered l ik ew ise . 3o, march towards the 
enemy with the b less in g  of ^ l a h , "(2).
Thereupon alHHarlsh b. HilaL, the c i ie i  of the Taaum* 
stood up and urged upon al-Mihallab that he should not seek 
an encounter unles3 the enemy forced i t  upon him because 
the so ld iers  were miserably wom out by previous dny's
81
(1 ) .  A Taffllaite addresses a.l-mhallab thus 5- 
KaB,63i,n j Anon. 10o.
( 2 ) .  See Appendix P- S •
discom fiture. Al-Muhallab agreed to the suggestion. He 
then went out along with a party of ten t i l l  he overlooked 
the camp o f  the ^zariqa where he found that none of them 
was on the move. i l-H arish  b. H ilal again counselled him 
to leave that place and* accordingly, al-Muhallab crossed 
the D ijail and reached the bend of a valley  which was 
approachable only from one s id e .
An incident during the battle  a t  3ulaf amply i l lu s t r a t e s  
al~ffiihallab'1s anxiety to treat a l l  h is  so ld iers  on an equal 
foo tin g  without any d is t in c t io n  o f  b ir th , class or status  
in l i f e .  I t  was the m ilitary honours alone that counted 
with him. I t  so happened that a 'mawla* o f  a lA z d ,  *Abdur 
%hman al-*Iskaf by name, in a f i t  o f  excessive zeal rode 
up and down between the two l in e s  of b a t t le ,  exhorting his  
own people to combat the foe vigorously and unflinch ingly .
The >Azariqa soon punced upon him. Al^l3kaf fought g a l la n t ly  
against heavy odds t i l l  the very l a s t  breath in him but 
ultim ate ly  succumbed to his in ju r ie s .  When al-Mihallab  
lea rn t  o f  his death, he admonished al-Harlsh and ^ t iy y a  
a l -  "^Anbarl, two noble and distinguished warriors* for  not  
rushing to the succour o f  the brave al^Iskaf who met h is  
end single-handed. Indignantly he asked them, ■ as i t  
that you made no attempt to rescue ’ a chief of the army* 
just because you were jealous o f  him on account of h i3  being 
one of the ' mawali’ t  * This was, indeed, the quality  t h a t  
endeared al-Utihallab to his so ld ie r s .
82
3. ‘ms BATTLE AT SILLMA-SILLIBRA.
Al-Kuhallab passed three days in that haven of a 
valley  t i l l  h is  so ld iers  regained their  lo s t  vigour and 
were refreshed for a fresh clash o f  arms. He iien started  
for 3 i l la -w a -S i l l ib r a ,  ( in the d i s t r i c t  o f  al^Ahvas near 
lianadhir a l-3u ^ ra)»  and pitched his camp just near the 
^Azariqa who had already been there before him. Three days 
had elapsed without a serious clash when MJbaidulIah b. 
3u3hair exhorted h is  troops to take the i n i t i a t i v e ,  heartening  
them with the thought of th e ir  victory only the other day 
at 3ulaf. The next morning al-Muhallab, #10 had a l l  the 
time kept hinBelf on the a le r t ,  arrayed h is  army in p erfect  
order, p lacing the *Azd and the Tamlm in the right wing* the 
Bakr and the <Abd al-Qais in the l e f t  wing and the a l -  
^Aliya in the centre. S im ilarly , the ^Azariqa also carefu lly  
arranged the d isp osit ion  of th e ir  troops with </,bida (1) b. 
K ilal al-YashkurT and a l -  2ubair b. al-Mahua coamandin ; 
th e ir  right and the l e f t  wings resp ective ly . I t  is  note ­
worthy th a t,  despite the best and the constant e f fo r ts  of 
al-Mihallab, th e^ zar iq a  were s t i l l  superior in equipment, 
in the number o f  horses and in am®. This only throws into  
bold r e l i e f  the f o l ly  o f  a l- lu h a lla b 's  predecessors in 
sharp contrast with his own wisdom and f o r e s i s t .  The
^Azariqa had drained the whole country from Karraan to al^Ahwaz 
and, hence, they were beset by no financia l d i f f i c u l t i e s
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(1 ) .  Thus in Kam. and Tab.; Anon 94 and IA th .4 /83 ,<Ubaida.
such a3 worried al-iiuhallsb . The ’Azariqa had equipped 
themselves with long helmets ifaich reached up to th e ir  
breasts , ample ooats o f  mail *hich they dragged behind 
them and leggin  gs o f  mail which they tucked up to th e ir  
b e lts  with iron hooks(l) .
At l a s t ,  the two armies net. Three days were spent 
iaarsly in an ostentations display of patience and determina­
tion . A hundred horsemen advanced from the l in e  of the 
'Azariqa, planted th e ir  spears and 3tood leaning upon them.
Al -Muhal lab also sent an equal number who did l ik e  wise,not  
budging from th e ir  p o s it io n s  except for  prayers t i l l  dusk 
when both the parties  retired  to th e ir  respective camps.
Jftft__Third Dav of__tM__gfl.t.tl3»
This t r ia l  o f  determination at la 3 t  yielded to actual 
t r ia l  of strength. On the third day the^Azariqa launched 
an attack and the Basrans replied to i t .  In the course of  
the struggle , al-JSuhallab speared an Israqite who had 
already k i l led  a ’Ban of h is  army. This proved to be the 
s ig ia l  for a mass attack on behalf o f  the >Azariqa. They 
again adopted the sans whirlwind ta c t ic s  which they had so 
su ccess fu lly  used at 3ulaf. The resu lt too was not very 
d ifferen t .  Consternation, confusion and disorder again
broke out in al-Muhallab*s army and the Basrans took to f l i g h t  
in a l l  d irection s. JSven al-Muhallab him self, #10 is  reported
<34
( 1 ) .  Tab. ^ 587 .
to have fainted a3 a resu lt of  a blow on the fa c e ( l ) ,  waa 
l o s t  for some tin®. Only al-Migbira stuck to his p osit ion  
in a party consistin g  mostly of the people ©f *Uman. t'iqn 
at midday al-Mihallab reappeared along with a hundred 
horsemen, h is  tongue l o l l i n g ,  h is  palms smeared with blood 
and the 3 i lk  s tu f f in g  o f  h is  four-cornered hat ( worn over 
the helmet) a l l  tom  and hanging lo o se ly  about. Al-Mihallab, 
however, maintained the f ig h t  t i l l  n ig h t fa l l  when the 
casu a lt ies  on e ith e r  side were very numerous.
Al-Mihallab was ye t  undaunted; forthwith he took active  
steps to c a l l  back his worsted so ld iery . He himself rushed 
towards the f le e in g  remants o f  his army and standing on a 
h illo ck  ca lled  out to them to return to him. The call was 
responded to by a number of h is  own tribesmen and a contingent 
of ^Uman re-joined him. Thus, al-Mihail&b succeeded in 
c o lle c t in g  around him about three thousand so ld ie r s .
3 ven at such a c r it ica l  time when he was hard pressed 
for men, al-Mihallab was not sorry to lose  a coward who 
would not f ig h t  for him wholeheartedly and o f  his own accord. 
I t  i s  re lated  that he deputed a man o f TShi& b. rad ( a 
descendant o f  al^Azd) to turn back the routed so ld iers .
That man oame across one ‘‘Amir bi Misma< -who pleaded that 
al-Mihallab had excused him from serv ice , ’.vhen asked as to 
whether <Amir should be allowed to gp* al-Mihallab replied*
" Leave him, for I do n*t want men l ik e  him who are weak 
and coward. *
8 S~
(1) .  Dain. 282, 15.
.the .fourth Dav.
The following morning, al-Mihallab planned a surprise  
attack with the three thousand men that remained with him.
A considerable number of the Azraqite so ld iers  had gone 
far  o f f  in pursuit o f  the f le e in g  rennants of al-Muhallab1 s 
army. Those who remained in the camp were complacently 
g loa tin g  over th e ir  victory. I t  never occured to them that,  
a f te r  the events of the previous day, i t  should ever be 
p ossib le  for al-Muhallab to raxster coura08 and strength to 
a t t e s t  another o ffen sive  against them. No doubt, the 
^zariqa  had relaxed but al-Mohallab was not the man to relax  
h is  unrelenting watch on the enemy. To him, this was a rare 
opportunity of turning defeat into victory. He would not  
allow any consideration of numerical weakness to deter him 
from a v a ilin g  himself of a golden chance. He a t  once deter­
mined to embark upon the bold adventure without the l e a s t  
del ay.
Al-Muhallab mast have f e l t  i t  necessary that the 
whole strategy should be revealed beforehand to h is  so ld iers  
in order to inspire hope and confidence in them. So, he 
addressed his so ld iers  and presented the whole plan before 
them ,(l) Adverting f i r s t  to the question of numbers which, 
of course, mast have been the uppermost in th e ir  minds,he 
assured h is  followers that victory did not always ;o with  
superior numbers. Hather i t  depended on the help of > Ml ail 
which very often was on the side o f  those who were 
numerically weak^ Farther he said that they were in no way a
(1 ) .  See Appendix f. 1- •
fi)  j *2, \Sc'
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small body and that he had the f u l l e s t  confidence in the 
su ff ic ien cy  of th e ir  strength. They were a l l  distinguished  
horsemen known for  th e ir  perseverance and valour and he 
did not wish that they had with them any of those who had 
turned back for they would only have added a l i a b i l i t y  
rather than an a sse t .  He then held out before the® the 
t e s t i n g  prospect o f  a l i^ i t n in g  raid on enemy camp while 
the enemy was simply rest in g  on h is  la u re ls  and was quite 
unmindful o f  and unprepared for any such contingency. Al- 
Mihallab further enjoined upon them to throw in th e ir  f u l l  
weight and to be so quick as to k i l l  the enemy commander 
and annihilate  h is  entire army before i t  was replenished  
by the return of that Azraqite band which had gone out in 
pursu it of the routed Basrans. To make up the defic iency  
in arms and equipment, al-ftohallab h i t  upon a strange but, 
n everth e less ,  e f f e c t iv e  makeshift device. He asked everyone 
of his so ld iers  to provide him self with a bag in which to 
oarry stones which he should hurl in the face of h is  opponent 
for * they ( the stones) w i l l  serve to s ta r t le  the horses 
back and to turn th e ir  faces a3 well as to confound the 
footmen and to repel them.* He even suggested to them to 
have recourse to such tricks as to * shoot one’ s spear’ 
l ik e  an arrow and then, ge tt in g  i t  out of the victim 's body, 
do the same with i t  again and aga in .( 1)
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Al-Muhallab13 plan was executed s t r ic t ly  according to 
his calculations* A surprise attack v/as launched against, 
the ^Azariqa with such conspicuous success that they learn t  
of i t  only whan al - lull al lab had penetrated the outsk ir ts  
of th e ir  camp* A deadly and desperate struggLe ensued.-/hen 
the ^zariqa were at the point of exhaustion, a c lever  man 
from among them called out, rt Hark J al-Mihallab has been 
k i l l e d . ” To contradict th is  d isq u ietin g  falsehood which 
was bound in stan tly  to a f fe c t  the morale of his troops,  
al-i$ihallab rode a 3hort gray hackney and rushed speedily  
up and doim between the two l in e s  o f  b a tt le  crying out
* Here, I am a l-M ih a llab ." Such proc^t action s e t  a t  rest  
the apprehensions of h is  so ld iers  and they continued their  
attack with unabated vigour. In the aftemoon,however, the 
so ld iers  showed s ig is  of weariness and,consequently, 
enthusiasm was at a low ebb. But aI»Mihallab was resolved 
to press the attack to a decisive end. He again roused the 
s p ir i t s  of hi3 3old iers and ca lled  upon them to shake o f f  
the slackness that was creeping upon them.Peremptorily he 
ordered h is  3on, a l- iu gh ira , to advance and urged h is  
mawla, Dhakwan, to move forward with h is  standard. Then he 
turned to Banu l'amm and admonished them saying# • Would 
you disobey me when I give you an order ? ’ These admonitions 
had the desired e f f e c t  and a l - i l ih a l la V s  warriors pressed 
forward with renewed determination t i l l  they came face to 
face w ith  <Ubaidullah b. Bushair and h is  companions who 
were a l l  fu l ly  equipped with arms and coats o f  mail.
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All th e ir  defensive armour* however, proved of no ava il .  
Al-Muhallab's men flung stones at th e ir  faoes t i l l  they 
were overpowered and then k i l led  them with spears or swords. 
By the evening, <Ubaidullah was k i l l e d  and h is  entire  army 
was a n n ih i la ted ( l) .  Al-Muhallab,however, did not know of  
*U bai dullah' 3 death t i l l  the following morning* Oaring the 
nigjht, he took strong measures to giard h is  camp against a 
night-attack . At mid-nigjit, he sent a man of Yahmaa, along 
with a party o f ten, to the enemy camp. The party returned 
with the news that the ^zariqa  had already departed for  
^Arrajan. Yet, no tiling would make al-Muhallab relax h is  
v ig i l .  He only said , B Beware of  a nighi-attacfc% I fear  
them the most at th is  moment.8
The night passed o f f  without any untoward incident.
In the morning, al-L’uhallab went round the corpses o f  the 
s la in  when the body of <Tdbaidullah was id e n t i f ie d .
In the meantime, there returned the ^ zraq ites  iho 
had gone in pursuit of the Basrans. Al-Muhallab had not 
neglected them. He had already stationed  a number o f  horse­
men and footmen along the way who dealt with them e f f e c t iv e ly  
and in f l ic t e d  heavy lo s s e s  upon them (2 ).
The murder o f  <Ubaidullah Look place in che month o f  
Shawwal, 66 A.K. a f te r  he had been leader of tho ’Azariqa 
fo r  sixteen  months (3 ) .  The^zariqa suffered heavy lo s s e s
$9
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/588.
(2 ) .  Ibid.
(3 ) .  Anon. 105, I*'16 •
estimated at seven thousand ( 1 ) although the lo sse s  on the 
side of al-Muhallab mast also have been very considerable.
Both as regards v ic is s itu d es  and in te n s i ty ,  the 
b a tt le  was the f i e r c e s t  yet fous^it between al -M ahal lab and 
the ^zariqa. Al*Skihallab was comple te ly  routed on the 
third day. I t  speaks volumes for  his presence of mind,his 
indomitable courage and confidence that he turned the 
tables against h is  foe the following days I t  must be 
remembered that the f in a l  iriuuph of a l-itihallab  was not 
due to mere chance or rashness bom of despair. I t  was a 
well -tnou^it-out p re -meditated plan which worked out 
exactly  according to ca lcu lations. Moreover, the Basrans 
embarked upon i t  with a fu l l  consciousness of th e ir  
in fe r io r i ty  in numbers as w ell as arms and equipment.It 
was only th e ir  confidence in th e ir  own prowess and in the 
stra tegy  and resourcefulness of the ir  worthy coimHander 
that spurred them on to ultimate triumph and buoyed up 
th e ir  s p ir i t s  during the most exacting t r i a l s .  $o doubt, 
the Basrans f e m g h t  against overwhelming odds and s e t  up 
examples of h ighest courage and honest devotion.For instance, 
>A'bu <A1 qama al-YahmadT, #10 distinguished him self by his  
deeds of valour, went round the young so ld iers  o f  al-'Xzd 
asking them to ’ lend th e ir  s k u l l s ’ for  a part o f  the day.
The youn^ so ld iers  f o u g h t  as best as t h e y  could and on 
t h e i r  r e t u r n  jokingLy said to him, " Urns are l e n t ,  no 
doubt, but not the sk u lls ."  ?hen th is  incident reached the 
e a r s  of a l-m h a lla b  who oould not l e t  a  merit &  unrecognised, 
he rewarded ^bu <KLqaJS& with one hundred thousand dirhQms(l). 
( 1 ). Tab. 5 7 m  “
3 0
S in i la r ly ,  al*Mighira performed an amazing fea t  of s k i l l .  
Whenever he found a number o f spears pointed at him, he 
bent down h is  head on h is  saddle-bow and cut them o f f  from 
beneath and then overpowered h i3 assailants*
I t  i s  noteworthy that the apparently worthless devioes 
suggested by al*5£dhallab proved as helpful as he had 
antic ipated . One <!t.yyasii i s  reported to have su ccess fu lly  
performed the tr ick  o f  1 shoo t in g  one's sp e a r .’ ( i )  The 
other device o f  3 to n e -f l in g in g  was commonly practised  by 
most of the so ld iers  with conspicuous resu lts .  One of  
al-Iliuhallab's c l ien ts  i s  even reported to have k i l l e d  
three Azraqite so ld iers  su ccess iv e ly  with one, s ing le  stone,  
the f i r s t  victim being h i t  on the ear and the second one 
on the head. A Kharijite taunts ai-Mahallab with the seme.
He says.-  ^  V U i - U A U , - !
(Anon.108 ; Kam.638)
* He came to us with stones in order to k i l l  us 
with them.
But, woe be to you, are the valiant men k il led
with stones ? "
Many verses are recorded in ihich the events of t i i i3 
fa te fu l  b a ttle  are referred to by poets from e ith e r  s id e ,
A man from the side o f  al~Mihallab rejo ices  in the murder 
of ^TJbaidullah thus 5-  ^ > ~
( Anon. 109; Kam. 639 ; Yaq. 3 / l i i ) .
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The ^zraqites  in th e ir  verses make no attempt to 
mince matters or to extenuate the trag ic  events* with an 
aching heart they frankly acknowledge th e ir  u t te r  defeat 
and the heavy lo s s e s  suffered by them.Thus, according to 
one o f  them, the only consolation is  that the defeat at  
3 i l la -w a -3 i l l ib r a  i s  o f f s e t  by the victory at  Sulaf. He says:-
' ( Kam. 639; Yaq. 3 / l i O - l i l ) .
Barely three thousand Azraqites survived the battle  
at J i l la -w a -S il l ib r a  (1)* Their number hed thinned iovn 
to such an extent that only one f ir e  sufficed for  those 
viho formerly used to gather round five  or s ix  d ifferen t  
f ires*  Besides, a l l  o f  them were in sad p l ig h t  due to 
u t te r  exhaustion. Under cover of darkness they managed to 
escape to ^Arrajan wiiile ^J-Mihallab 3tayed in al-^Ahwaz(2).
'.Then victory was completed, al-^uhall ab despatched 
al-Biqad (3) and al-Sa^ab b. Zaid ( an uncle of Jarir  b.
Hazim b. Zaid,the famous *ravl’ ) with a l e t t e r  to a l-  
%
Quba* conta ining, in a remarkably terse language * an account 
of the chief event3 as well as the happy end of the b a tt le (4 )
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/591.
(2 ) .  Ibid.
(3 ) .  Al-Riqad was one of the distinguished warriors o f  e l -  
^unallab's  army. His lineage is,however, uncertain. \non.>byi
> o )\  Trb* 2 / 1 0 0 4 , ); Ibid* 2/1106 ;
Yaq*' fy56oiP}j^Crj>\,y)1 * Further Kam.(681, 6 )menti6ns  
him as a roan "of Banu Malik b. Kabl* a while according to '£ab* 
( in  both places) he belonged to the tribe of a l-^ t ik .O f .  
also Bal.& 17,14 * ".
(4 ) .  For Arabic tex t  see Appendix p. \ , Letter 2.
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The rennants of al-i&hallab*s worsted array who turned 
t a i l  on the third day o f  the battle  had already preceded 
th is  l e t t e r  to al-Ba3ra. Their arrival in the oity isith the 
new3 that al-^ohallab had been smitten again created the 
3amB 30rt o f  panic with which we are already fam iliar.
I t  seemed as i f  the only dam against the onru3hing tide o f  
the ^Azariqa had burst. Dismayed as the people laere, they 
planned an exodu3 to the countryside, iilven a l-ru b aS  the 
governor, i s  reported to have prepared for a f l i  ;ht from 
the e i t y ( i ) .  The new3 o f  victory*however, gave them peace 
and joy and even those who had already evacuated, returned 
to th e ir  home. TMs incident airily demonstrated that a l -  
Muhallab was the only bulwark o f  sa fe ty  for the Basrans. 
Impressed with the 3ame al-'Jmaf b. la is  remarked* " a l -  
Basra i s  al-M ihallab's .* ( 2)
Al-Quba* redirected al-Muhallab's l e t t e r  t o ’Ibn a l -  
Zubair who had i t  read before the people o f  Mecca.
^ p ly in g  to al-Muhallab, al-Quba* congratulated 
the ’ Brother o f  t h e ’Azd'C )>.<** again the same un­
conventional form ) on his glorious victory and commended 
him as the most impregnable fortress  o f  the in s iim s, ne 
destroyer of the p il la r s  of the in f id e ls  and a Lian endowed 
with diplomacy and leadership(3)*
( l) .D a in .  282. The extent o f  the panic which was an index 
to al-Muhallab' g importance can be gauged from the 
verses of a man o f  Banu 3a<ds- j ,  >




Besides al-Ouba*» a large number of Basrans wrote to 
al-Muhallab o ffer in g  the ir  f e l i c i t a t io n s  to him on the 
auspicious occasion. Al-^hnaf did not write a l e t t e r  but 
instead sent a word through the messenger assuring him that  
he stood fa s t  by the pledge he gave to him at the time of  
th e ir  parting. Al-Uohallab was anxious to hear from a l-  
"Ahfcaf most probably because he wished to know whether the 
people of al-Basra s t i l l  adhered to their  undertaking. So, 
when the 3 h e a f  o f  l e t t e r s  was delivered to him he eagerly  
looked for  the l e t t e r  o f  al^Ahnaf and, finding i t  nob, 
asked whether he had not written to him. Thereupon the 
mes sengs r conmini cated to him the verbal message and a l -  
itohallab f e l t  so reassured with i t  that he said , ' th i s  
mes3age is  more pleasing to ms than a l l  these l e t t e r s . '
A l i t t l e  la t e r ,  al-Muhallab thought of impressing 
the Basrans s t i l l  further with h is  momentous succes. He 
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coianissioned an ?Azdite to take the heads of <Ubaidullah 
and a few prominent men of h is  army (1) to al-Basra and 
present them to al-Quba* as a trophy o f  war. 'Hie Azdite 
had only reached KurbujDInar, a t  a distance of e igh t  
farsakh from 3uq al-^Ahwaz (2 ) ,  when he was met by Habib,
<Abdul Malik and ^ X #  sons o f  Bushair b. al-iauuz. They 
asked him as to uhat the news was and the unsuspecting
* (2 ) .  Kam. 642, 13; cf. Naw. 582.
(3 ) .  Anon. 108 5 Kam. 640.
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(1 ) .  Anon. 107.
( 2). Yaq, 4/249.
Azdite, unacquainted with their id en tity  as he was, replied  
to them, with an a ir  of pride mingled with joy, ^ H a h  has 
k il led  the heterodox’I bn al-M huz and lo i  here is  h is  head 
with me.'* Instantly  the sons o f  Bushair rushed upon him, 
k i l le d  him and even put him on the cross. Then they buried 
the head of <Ubaidulla]i and also dug a hollow to ^iiich the
r e s t  of the heads were committed ( 1).
Beferring to the same incident a poet saysj-
aW < >
(Anon. 107).
& -m M IR  B. "-XI .
Having withdrawn from Khuzistan a f te r  th e ir  defeat  
at 3 i l l a “wa*-3il l ib ra ,  the ’Az&riqa assembled at *Arraj an, on 
the other side o f  the river Tab, and appointed al-2ubair b.
■^Ali as th e ir  3mir. Al~2ubairf s task was in no way an easy
one. He had to reorganise the routed remnants of a vanquished
army and to regenerate the former s p i r i t  in them. He,however, 
se t  about h is  task promptly and in right earn est .Through 
h is  energetic  e f fo r ts  and constant exhortations, the >\zariqa 
were rid o f  the paralysing defeatism that had overtaken 
them and were again determined to continue the ceaseless  
warfare with th e ir  ch aracter istic  t e n a c i ty ,But for the 
following few months they could n o t ,  despite the t e s t  e f fo r ts  
of their  new leader, regain even a fraction of th e ir  
former strength.
< i )  • Anon. 107 and Kam. 542. According to Yag. 3 /liO , i t  was
a Tamimite who happened to pass by the corpse o f  ^Ubaidullah 
as i t  la y  on the b a tt le  f i e l  a. Be cognising i t ,  he cut o f f  
the head and proceeded with i t  to al-Basra. On the way,however, 
he met a band o f  Kh&rijites who k i l le d  him.
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From ?Arrajan al-Zubair b. ^AlT advanced to see t a l -  
Muhallab but was eas ily  repolled and forced to retreat, vhil® 
on the retreat, he commissioned a hundred horseman to l i e  
in ambush for al-Muhallab in a lowland near h is camp. Al- 
Muhallab, however, proved too a lert  and too far-sighted  
to f a l l  into the trap. One day while he was out on an 
inspection tour round his camp, i t  occurred to him that 
the enemy could very well have laid an ambush at the foot  
of the mountain nearby which place was esp ec ia lly  suited  
for the purpose. So, he despatched ten ho raemen to the 
spot and soon they came upon the hundred enemy soldiers  
who had been hiding there. As soon as the enemy soldiers  
learned that their p lo t  had been discovered and their  
designs fo i led ,  they rushed out of their place o f ambush# 
crossed the bridge (1) and escaped. Soon there ocourred an 
eclipse  of the sun and the ’Azariqa were heard to cry out 
to the Baa ran so ld iers ,  * 0 Enemies of ^ l a h ,  even i f  
Resurrection were to take p lace, we w ill continue cur holy 
war against you. "(2)
Al-Muhallab was now so firmly established and the 
-^zariqa so greatly weakened that al-Zubair gave up a l l  ho$e 
of gaining an advantage over the former for the time being. 
He therefore moved in the direction of Isfahan where he
%
stayed for a month. Then, having co llected  fresh troops,he
(1 ) .  Probably the reference i s  to some bridge on the river  
Tab cause i t  does not appear that al-2ubair should 
liave advanced very far from i t .
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(2) .  Kam. 64i.
n marciied down to ^Arrajah Via al-3us and Tustar at 
.v of m ich  places he was s to u tly  opposed by al-Muhallab( 1). 
fi ^r raj an he once again advanced with the intention of 
w >rming the camp of a l-B ihallab  by surprise but al-Muhallab 
waa not to be taken unawares. He had already anticipated  
and even warned his soldiers against an attack from a l-  
2ubair with a reinforced army. All the time his 3ound advice 
to his troops had been neither to be frightened and panicky 
so that their  morale may remain unimpaired nor to be lax  in 
vigilance l e s t  the enemy be tempted to gain an advantage 
over them. As a r e su lt ,  the^Azariqa, to their u tter  d is ­
appointment and defeat, found al-saihallab fu lly  prepared 
and the entrances well-guarded ( 2 ) ,  The attack only resulted  
in a clear victory for al-Muhallab (3 ) .
Jver s i n c e  h i 3  victory at 3 i l l a - w a - i i l l ib r a  in Shawwai,66 , 
al-i^ihai l a b * s a c t i v i t i e s  against the ^ z a r i q a  were mainly of  
a defensive character* He himself took no in i t ia t iv e  to 
launch an offensive against them. Rather he confined himBelf 
to r e s i s t in g  their occasional incursions into Khuzistan and 
alAhwaz* His main concern was to keep them to the adjacent
9 7
(1 ) .  Anon. 110.
(2 ) .  Kara. 641.
( 3 ) .  A T&mlttl te ( probably tm m  Banu Hi yah b. Yarbu*) 
celebrates th is  triumph in the fo llow ing:-
.VV“')
! / t o > w i j L M
( Kara. 641.)
country o f  Isfahan in the north-east and ^ r  raj an in the 
south-east. No attempt was made even to dislodge them from 
the i  r base at *Ar ra j ah *
Al-Zubair b. *A11 was s t i l l  a t ?Arrajan when al-Quba* 
was deposed and succeeded by Utus a^b b. al-Zubair early in 
67 A*H.(i). With the arrival of Mus<ab a t  al-Basra, we 
hear of  al-Muhallab as the former's agent in M rs. from 
thera» however, he was recalled  very soon in order to help  
Mus<ab in h is  expedition against al-Mikhtar of al-Kufa.
thus ended rather abruptly the f i r s t  period of a l -  
Muhallab' s campaign against the ?Azariqa* I t  la s te d  barely 
one year during ih ich  time al-Mihal lab had three major 
engagements with the enemy. The resu lts  achieved were very 
great. At the end of the period the ^zariqa had been swept 
away from the very w alls  o f  al-Basra to ’Arrajah and Isfahan.  
They had l o s t  th e ir  veteran chief <Ubaidullah b. Bushair 
and had suffered incalculable lo s se s  which immeasurably 
weakened th e ir  strength for a long time to come. But the 
menace was far from being t o ta l ly  crushed. Al-2ubair b.
<AlI was s t i l l  marshalling his forces with unabated zeal.
No doubt, al-Mihailab did not follow  up his victory at  
S il la -w a -3 i l l ib r a  and made no e f f o r t  to give a death-below 
to the enemy #10 la y  severely wounded. But a closer examina­
tion w il l  prove that hi3 restrained p o licy  was fu l ly  ju s t i f ie d
9d
(1 ) .  Yqb. 2/Z1A i s  wrong in p lacing the arrival of  
Bis<ab so la te  as in the year 68 .
by the stark r e a l i t i e s  of the s itu a tio n . I t  should not be 
forgotten that he had to pay very dear for his victory at 
3 il la -w a -3 i l l ib ra *  this hard-won victory was gained only 
at an immense cost to his own strength. According; to one 
es t im a te ,(1) the lo s s e s  on the side of al-Muhallab were 
even greater than those on the side o f  the enemy. Thus 
al-Muhallab had no s tr ik in g  power l e f t  to seek an encounter 
with the enemy with confidence in h is  own success. Yet he 
attended to his defence with such a ler tn ess ,  a la c r i ty  and 
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( 1 ). Anon. 105, 17 .
not a few o f  them to quit the ir  hearth and hon® and to 
seek refuge in al-Basra ( i ) .
At al-Basra these refugees* prominent araon^  them 
being Sihabath b. Hib^l and Mhanmad b. al^Ash^ath, 
continually brought pressure on SSis<ab, the new governor# 
to launch an expedition against al-Mu&itar. Mis<ab was 
at f i r s t  reluctant to embark upon the venture but u ltim ate ly  
gave h is  assent provided that al-Muhallab oould be 
persuaded to join him. Accordingly# he wrote to al-Muhallab# 
then acting  as his agent in Jfars, informing him o f  h is  
intention and in v it in g  him to come down and to accompany 
him in his march upon al-K3fa.Ihe l e t t e r  found al-Muhallab 
as well as h is  companions in no mood to leave the ir  
established posit ion  and to undertake another hazardous 
cangjaign. Al-Muhallab, therefore# replied  to Mis<ab in 
the negative on the pretext of some engagement in connection 
with ta x -c o l le c t in g .  But al-Muhallab was indispensable  
fo r  a v ictory. Lius<ab made i t  p lain  to Muhammad b. a l -  
^sh^ath while the l a t t e r  was goading him to p rec ip ita te  
action# that he was determined not to move unless a l -  
Muhallab came to help him. He, however, suggested that  
Muhammad should personally  go to al-Muhallab and try  to 
bring him round to comply with th e ir  request. Accordingly, 
Muhammad proceeded to al-Muhallab, taking with him a l e t t e r  
from Mis<ab whioh deserves a place here as an index to 
the eminently sublime p os it ion  that al-Muhallab had attained
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( 1 ) .  IAth. 4/112-18.
0 H A F T 3 R n i l .
al- mhallab HELPS MJS^AB'S expedition 
AGAINST AL-MJKHTAR *
Year 67 A.H*
Towards the end o f the year 66 , al-Kufa was in the 
throes o f  a v io len t  upheaval. Al-Mikijtar, who had in s ta l le d  
himself firmLy in the town, pretended to be the Avenger 
of al-Husain and the champion of the cause o f  the down­
trodden ’mawali.' Such a move naturally  caused a great 
deal of offence to the noble party isho resented very keenly 
the lo s s  of th e ir  priv ileged  position  and the encroachment 
by the * maw a l l ’ upon what they considered their  natural 
and leg it im ate  r igh ts . Matters cams to a head when the 
armies o f  al-Mukhtar l e f t  al-Kufa in order to oppose 
<Ubaidullah b. Ziyad who had attacked al-Mausil and was 
try ing  to advance to al-^Iraq from that d irection . The 
aggrieved noble party thought that a gplden opportunity  
was afforded them of ridding themselves of a l - l to ^ ta r  and 
thus reasserting  th e ir  forner p os it ion  and influence. They 
rose in an armed rebellion  which, however, was crushed 
with an iron hand by al-lftik^tar. This unsuccessful insurrection  
generally  known as the incident of JAbbanat al-Sabl'had very 
trag ic  consequences for the nobles. Besides heavy lo s se s  
during the course of the b a tt le ,  al-MuMitar subjected to 
wanton massacre a l l  those who had fought against al-Husain
at Karbala* Such cruel and revengeful persecution caused
in the estimation of the high au th or it ies ,
&ia<ab wrote to al-Mihallab
■ No doubt, you are the greatest  man of al-^Iraq  
and the chief of the Yamanites. Through you, ? Allah has 
warded o f f  the enemy and protected the howesteais.*Vliar 
( i . e .  al-ilokhtar) has raised his head in al-Knfa and we 
have deferred a l l  decisions concerning him pending your 
a rr iva l.  I t  i 3 your view that w i l l  be adopted and your 
werd that Hist p re v a il ,  oo, do come in the name of ^11 ah 
and appoint a l -m ^ i lr a  b. al-Muhallab as your successor  
with instructions that he should consult you by corres­
pondence on a l l  3uch matters as he i s  not able to decide 
for h im s e l f ."(1 )
Al-Muhallab read the l e t t e r  and then, turning to 
Muhammad, expressed his surprise that Mis<ab could find 
no other man to act as h is  messenger than him. Muhamnad 
replied that he was no messenger. Bather i t  was the d is ­
tre ss in g  p l ig h t  o f  th e ir  ( the Enfan nobles’ ) women and 
children who had passed under th e ir  slaves and c l ien ts  
that had brought him th ither. Al-Mhallab now yielded to 
the p er s is ten t  appeal and handed over the command to a l -  
JAig&ira. Addressing h i3 people on the occasion,he assured 
them that al-£Sughira would behave with h is  younjers kindly 
and a ffec t io n a te ly  l ik e  a father, with h is  elders obediently
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(1 ) .  Raghba 8/35.
and d u tifu lly  l ik e  a son and with h is  equals s in cre ly  and 
s y p a t h e t i c a l ly  l ik e  a brother.farther he increased upon 
them the competence and wisdom of a l-B iJ iIra  saying, * I 
did not wish for  any right tiling but al~m _iura preceded 
me to i t * " In return he appealed to them to show obedience 
to him and to deal gsn tly  with him*
Mus<ab also wrote to al-Mighlra formally appointing  
him as successor to h is  father and hoping that he would 
prove equal to the task and would act earnestly  and 
reso lu te ly  ( 1)*
Al* Muhallab started  for al-Basra with a l a r p  force 
and an immense amount o f  wealth. His magnificence and 
grandeur were such as no other Basran could boast o f .  On 
reaching al-Basra he went to see Mis<ab whose chamberlain, 
unacquainted with his id en tity  as he was, checked him. 
th is  offended al-Muhallab's sense o f  d ignity  so much that  
he struck the chamberlain on the nose. The chamberlain went 
to h is  master with h is  nose bleeding and said to him that  
a person whom he knew not,had beaten him. Soon al-M hallab  
appeared before him and on seeing him His<ab forthwith  
bade the smitten chamberlain go away. 3ucli was the p r iv ile  ed 
p osit ion  that al-Muhallab had attainsdi
i .  m  BATHS . .A3LJL-HHfflijR •
Having secured al-Muhallab's active help and co­
operation, &u3<ab had no hesita tion  to embark upon the 
expedition. At once he ordered a r a lly  at the Great Bridge 
( a l -J isr u  'l^Akbar) and thence he started  on his inarch 
U ; .  Anon. i l l .
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upon al-Kufa. Al-iBukhtar sent a huge army under I^hmar b. 
Shumait to meet J®is<ab. The two armies met at al-Madhar, 
the capital town of Maisan s itu ated  between al-Basra and 
¥ a s i t .  Al-Mihallab conmanded the l e f t  wing o f ms<ab'3 
a may while the right wing was commanded by ‘‘Umar b. 
^Ubaidullah b. Ma<mar. As the zero hour struck, fibbad b. a l -  
Husain who headed the cavalry of MisKab, in i t ia te d  an 
attack on>Ibn Shumait. But the attack fa iled  to produce 
any tangible re su lt  and ^bbad retired .
I t  was now al-Muhallab1 s tum to attack the rig£it 
wing of the Sifan army ishich was comiranded by Abdullah 
b. Kamil a l-Shakirl.  Al-Mihallab's attack proved e f fe c t iv e  
and i r r e s i s t ib le .  The enemy wing was thrown into disorder  
and Kamil had to a l ig h t  from h is  horse. Al-Mihallab, 
however, withdrew for a short while during which both the 
contending win233 kept to th e ir  respective p o s it io n s .  Al- 
Muhallab had now tested  the might of h is  adversary and he 
commended to the notice  of h is  so ld iers  that the enemy had 
already betrayed h is  weakness by h is  disorderly behaviour. 
Soon he launched another f ierce  attack with the resu lt  
that the general body of Ibn Kamil’ s so ld iery  turned t a i l .  
>Ibn Kamil himself, along with a number o f  Hamdanites, 
persevered but even they could not withstand the terr ib le  
onslaught for long and were u ltim ate ly  routed.
At the same time *Umar b .‘Ubaidullali also .tacked
and su ccess fu lly  repelled the l e f t  wing of the Kufan 
army end then followed a general attack on^bn Shumait.
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As the KXifan troops were on the verge o f  defeat they 
called out to their comrades of Bajila and Khath<am to 
be steady. This evoked from al-Mihallab a subtle eounter- 
appeal to take to heals so as to spare themselves the 
la s s  o f  their  precious l iv e s  for the sake of the 'slaves*  
i . e . ,  the *mawall' who under the leadership of al-Mikhtar 
aspired to deprive the nobles of their privileged position . 
Very soon ^bn Shumait was k il led  and his entire army was 
annihilated.
2. THS BATTL3 AT HMMRA*.
From al-Madhar Mus<ab advanced towards al-Kufa. Al- 
FakhtSr. however, determined to intercept him on the way. 
Therefore, he himself came down with a large army and 
engaged Mus a^b at Harura* the disposition of ais<ab's array 
was such that al-?Aihallab commanded the rigfct wing which 
consisted of al-^zd and the Tanam while <Umar b. *11 bai dull ah 
commanded the l e f t  wing which comprised of Bakr b. WaMl 
and ^bd’ al-Qais. ihe Mfans began with a vigorous 
attack on the l e f t  wing, 'ihe Bakr and the *Abd a l -  
Qais fought hard and tenaciously and bore the attack well. 
But Mus^b was anxious that al-Muhallab should create a 
diversion by attacking the enemy on h is  own front. Accordin, 
l y  he sent a word to al-13uhallab exhorting him not to 
be a passive spectator o f  the miserable lo t  of the two 
’ fifths*  ( i . e . ,  the Bakr and the <Abd al-^ais) and to 
rush upon the enemy forthwith. Al-Vuhallab, however, 
thought d ifferently . He was not the man who would submit 
tamely to the advice of Mis<ab unless i t  coincided with
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h i3 own judgement* He sent back the reply that he was not 
prepared to have the '"Azd and the Tanam cut to pieces  
because of the dread of the Kufans and that he would not  
move unless he thought a favourable opportunity presented 
i t s e l f  to him.
ius^ab, however, was not s a t i s f i e d  with al-Muhal lab 's  
reply. The l a t t e r  had two large and compact d iv is ion s  of 
al-^zd and the Tamlm under him and Mis<ab could not understand 
why 3uch an e f f e c t iv e  force should remain inactive while 
the l e f t  wing m3 almost weighed down with the brunt o f  the 
attack. He again urged upon al-I'uhallab not to wait any 
longer.
Before long, al-iiuhallab did open the attack saying  
to h is  so ld ie r s ,  " Others have been f igh tin g  a l l  the day 
while we remained inactive . They have fought well and i t  
i s  now our turn to do our duty.* Al-Muhallab manoeuvred the 
attack with h is  ch a ra c ter is t ic  thoroughness and i t  f e l l  so 
heavily  upon the other party that i t  was impossible for 
i t  to ou tlive  i t .  Within a short tin®, the Kufan army was 
u tte r ly  defeated and al-Dakhtar f led  back to al-Kufa.
The words addressed by al-Muhallab to iis so ld iers  
just  before opening h is  long-awaited attack are a conclusive 
proof that i t  was no fa c i le  complacency that prevented 
him from complying with iu3<ab's advice* Al-Muhellab was 
fu l ly  conscious of h is duty and was prepared to do i t  
conscientiously  a t the r igh t moment. But at the same t in e  
he also knew the expediency of the hour. It  wa3 in the 
in tere s ts  o f  m ilitary  strategy alone that he held back 
from deliver ing  h is  crushing blow earlier*  Most probably 
he wanted to hold his own strength in reserve to be U3ed
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only when the enemy was s u f f ic ie n t ly  weakened by his own 
ra3h ta c t ic s  .Surely , he must have known the ’great precept' 
that * in a cavalry combat the side which holds back the 
l a s t  reserve must win." I t  i3 also remarkable that * th is  
l a s t  reserve was thrown in on the flank rather than on 
the front of the enemy* which i s  p er fec t ly  in accord 
with p rincip les  of m ilitary science (1 ).
3. TH3 BLOCKADE OF THS FORT 
OF Mi-MJKHTAR.
Both a l- lu h a lla b  and las<ab were well p leased  with 
th e ir  triumph at Harura^Only. the unhappy lo s s  of liiharomad 
b. a l J>t\sh<ath on the l a s t  day of the b attle  a ffec ted  them 
very deeply. Their next step was a d irect  march upon a l -  
KBfa whither al-Mikhtar had already retired .
Al-Mikhtar had long ago f o r t i f i e d  his c itadel at si - 
Kufa and made f u l l  preparations for  a possib le  s ie j e  by 
Mus^ab. So, f le e in g  back to al-KSfa he at once entrenched 
him self along with his supporters in the f o r t i f i e d  c itad e l .  
Soon he was followed by al-Mahallab and Mis<ab who blockaded 
a l l  supplies to him. Yet the blockade was often  run through 
by women sympathisers who employed a clever ruse for  the 
purpose. They hid provisions and foodstuffs  under th e ir  
ample coverings and started from their  hones osten sib ly  
for  the Great Moaque or the residence o f  some re la tion  of
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( i ) .  Hist- of the Art of warfareCp. 21l) by Prof.^man.
th e ir s .  Bat a3 they reached near the citadel he gates  
were opened to them end they slipped s t e a l t h i ly  into i t .
Certainly, Mis<ab could not for a moment allow the 
continuance of these loopholes. Al-Mihallab, who Knew beat 
how to deal with such problems, advised him to order that  
the by-streets  be blocked so that the besieged army be cut 
o f f  from a l l  communication with i t s  sympathisers outside .
As a further measure to tighten the blockade Mas<&b ordered 
h is  men to move forward and occupy points nearer the 
beleagured fo r t .  Accordingly, ‘Abbad b. al “Husain advanced 
to near the mosque o f  Juhaina while a l - Mahal lab  estab lish ed  
himself at Ohihar Suj Khunais (1 ) .
Soon the besieged army began to fee l  the rigour of  
the blockade. Scarcity of provisions became acute and 
discontent grew. Ultimately (2) al-Bukhtar gave way but 
determined to 33 dom f ig h t in g .  3o, he in company of only 
nineteen of h is  s o ld ie r s ,  made a so r t ie  upon the besieging  
army and was k i l le d  ( 15th RamacUan, 67 ) .  The next morning 
the garrison surrendered and thus Ms<ab’s campaign came 
to h: successful end.
Events fu l ly  ju s t i f ie d  His<ab’s firm b e l ie f  in the 
in d isp en sa b il ity  of al-lSuhallab’s assistance  for the 
achievement of success. Apart from h is  valuable contribution  
in men and money, which he brought with him from Fars,
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(1 ) .  Mast have been the name of a quarter in the c ity  o f  a l -  
Kufa just as a quarter in al-Basra was called  Onahcr 
Suj Bajla ( Yaq. 3/339).
(2 ) .  the siege la s ted  four months.
al-IAihallab contributed a great deal in generalship and 
direction  of strategy* Both at al-Madhar and Ilarura’, the 
f in a l  blow can© invariab ly  from al-Mihail ab's wing, 'fhen 
again at  al-Kufa i t  was al^Suhallab #10 ;xi0k an active  
p a r t  in devising ways and means o f  t igh ten ing  the blockade 
o f  the fort  of al-Mukhtar. A l-luhallab  more than f u l f i l l e d  
the best hopes of h is  friends and admirers and we may 
sa fe ly  a sser t  that,  but for  alHfell&ll&b* s he lp , ius<abfs 
success mruld have been very doubtful i f  n o t  impossible,
Reference 8 i -
Anon. I l l ,
Kam, 643,
Tab, 2 /7 18 seq.
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GK510BNORSHIP OF AL-KADSIL .%
Bcui<ab had now to reckon with an enemy f a r  more 
formidable than al-i&iiditar. H U  al-Malik, the Umayyid 
Caliph a t  Damascus, oould no t look with equanimi by over 
the extension of the 3way of h is  rival* < Abdullah b# al -  
Subair. He was only waiting for a favourable opportunity  
to make a thrust into al-^Iraq. Mas^ab turned ser iou sly  
and earnestly  to th is  imianinent danger* which almost 
stared him in the faoe, immediately a fter  he was relieved  
of al-M khtar. Prudently enough* he decided th a t  a very 
strong and capable general should be placed at a l - l a u s i l ,  
the intervening region between al-^Iraq and Syria* as a 
buffer between him self and <Abd a l-JSa lik (i) . He invited  
al - ‘uhellab  to counsel him as to the choice of 'he man who 
should be placed in charge of th a t  s t r a te g ic  po in t .  Al- 
Muhallab r e coamended a panel of three names, viz.* Muhammad 
b. *11 mat b. <TJtarid a l -m r im i ,  Ziyad b. <Amr b. a lA s h ra f  
a l - ^ t a k l  and Da/ud b. Qahd^am. But who could ba more 
capable than al-Muhallab him self f  Lli^ab reouested him to 
take th is  onerous r e sp o n s ib i l i ty  upon his own shoulders. 
Al-luhallab* who never shrank from a d i f f i c u l t  task, agreed
and* accordingly* was appointed governor over al-Mausil,
*
al-JazTra* HdhrabI jan and >4rmlnya (2). Al-::uhallab took
C H A P T E R  I X .
(1 ) .  Kam. 643.
( 2 ) .  Tab. ^ 750 ; T\ n o n .  I l l  ^ r a b i j a n  omi tied.Dain. 316 i s  
wrong.in saying that al-LUhallab was sent back against the 
^zariqa.
charge of his new post in the year 67 A. I. shortly after  
the murder of al-Mukhtar ( 14th Hamadan ) (1 ) .
Having despatched al-Muhallab to ai-l^ausil* Mus^ab 
invited suggestions from the people of al “Basra (2) as to 
who should be appointed o^ the leadership of the campaign 
against the >Azariqa. The people of al-Basra were o f  three 
opinions; some recommended the name of <TJbaidullah b. ^bT 
I Bakr )^* others put forward the name of <Uma.r b. ’^Jbaidullah 
b« Ma<mar while a th ird  p a r ty  in s is ted  th a t  al-fiihallab  
be sen t back onoe again to his former post because " there 
was none for them ( t h e ’Azariqa) except al-Muhallab.”
\7hile the three suggestions were yet under considera­
tion by Mis^ab, the >Azariqa heard of them and discussed  
the respective merits of the three nominees among themselves. 
The opinion of Qatari b. al-J*‘uja>a, who had also been a 
colleague of al-Muhallab in h is  early  days, i s  very helpful 
to us in understanding the d is t in c t iv e  features of a l-  
Muhallab’s strategy as con$>ared with that of h is  contemporary 
colleagues. He sa id  to his Azraqite brethren I*
• In ^Ubaidullah b. >Abt Bakra there w i l l  come against  
you & noble and generous chief who would waste h is  army. 
Ir/Umar b. ^TJbaidull ah, you w i l l  have to face a brave, 
daring and energetic  3oldier who f igh ts  for h is  re lig ion  
and his country with such an in s t in c t iv e  impulse as i s
I l l
( 1 ) .  Tab. 2/743; IAth.4/135. Al-Muhallab was sent to a l -  
::ausil as soon as Ibrahim b. al-Mshtar proceeded to join  
Ms<ab a f te r  the nurder of  al-Bikhtar.» *
(2 ) .  Kam. 643. According to reports in Kam. and A n o n .(p .I l l ) , 
i^iS<ab returned to al-Basrr a f te r  h is  victory over a l -  
iiukhtar a t al-Kufa. Tab.‘also mentions th is  out has added 
another version to the contrary ( S/751).
seldom found in any one e l s e .  I have seen him in many a 
b a t t le .  Never wa3 there issued a c a l l  to arms but he was 
the f i r s t  horseman to coma forward and engage h is  foe t i l l  
he struck him. As for  al-Muhallab you are already familiar  
with him. I f  you oaught one end of a cloth he would hold
the other end. He would draw i t  ?/hen you l e t  i t  loose and
would lex; i t  loose  whon you draw i t .  He would not s ta r t  a
move against you unless you take the i n i t i a t i v e  f i r s t
e ic e p t  in case lie should see a seasonable opportunity 
which, of course, he w ill  se ize  at once and take the f u l l  
advantage of. He i s  the mighty l io n ,  the s l y  fox and the 
la s t in g  ca lam ity .” (1 ) .
iM s is  how al-Muhallab*s method of prolonged warfare 
and his strategy of pounding the enemy w i  un he a vy attacks  
a t  p articu lar ly  opportune momenta* affected  h is  foe.His  
colleagues could think of no other method of warfare than 
the old trad itional one which was to oven/helm the enemy 
with superior force ,  dash and tenacity  in  one short 
d ec is ive  engagement. Al-Mihailab al3o had enough o f  dash 
and ten acity  but he would use them only at the proper 
moment, i<'or th is  purpose he p atien tly  looked out for moments 
of weakness and unpreparedness on the part of h is  enemy.
His motto was maximum resu lts  at minimum cost.
&f<83> recognised the superior merits ox al-Buhallab  
as Baich as# perhaps such more than, Qatar? did. But i t  
was th is  very recognition of a l-^ ih a lla b ’ s transcendent 
m ilitary a b i l i t y  that made Mus<ab not to remove him from
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( 1 ) .Kam. 643-4.
al~JL”a u s i l .  The menace of the Mzariqa was very great indeed, 
but the danger from Syria was s t i l l  g re a te r  and el  -Mahal lab  
wa3 to be reserved fo r  the more d i f f i c u l t  of the two 
m il i ta ry  tasks. Mus<abfs choice, th e re fo re ,  f e l l  upon^Jmar 
b. ^Ubaidul lab. b. Ia<mar ihoffl he appointed gpvejnor o f  M r i  
as well as le ad e r  of the campaign aga in st  he ^ z a r i qa( 1). 
Al-Mu^hira, who had been acting  as h is  f a t h e r '3 deputy, 
made over to the new incumbent and joined h is  f a th e r  a t  
al-Mausil ( 2 ) .
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(1 ) .  Kam. 644: .toon, l l l .^ b n  a l A t h l r  (4/138) is  obviously 
mistaken in placing the appointment of <U»ar b. *Ubai dull ah 
to_Firs and the leadership o f  the campai^a ag a in s t the 
^tzariqa so la te  aa in 68 a t  the beginning of Ms<abf9 second 
term of o f f ic e  as governor o f  al-Basra. He has bailed  to 
note that al-M ihallab's leadership of the campaign suffered  
a short break by h is  appointment to al-Mausjil shortly  
a f t e r  Mis^ab'a viotory over al-Makhtar. This discrepancy 
is  probably due to the fa c t  that fab. (2 /753,10) has 
mentioned the a c t i v i t i e s  of < Umar b. <Ubaidullah against  
the ^Asariaa during Bus<ab, s f i r s t  term of o ff ice  ( year 
67 A.H.) together witfi the happenings during h is  second 
term ( year 68) in one continuous account under the year 
68. The accounts in Anon. 114 and Kara. 644 seq, however, 
make i t  clear that °Jmar's a c t i v i t i e s  aga ins t the *Azariqa 
be "an towards the end of l l i s <abl s f i r s t  term of governor­
ship, i n n  interrupted during the one year of Hamza's 
regime and were again renewed on Mis<ab's restoration  in  
68. I t  must be renumbered that Tab. "has a lto g e th e r  ondUted 
the f a c t  that al-Muhallab was recalled from al-Mausil by
?amza and entrusted with the campaign aga in s t th e ^ z a r iq a  or the period of h is  governorship of al-Basra*
( 2 ) .  Haghba 8/37.
Al-Mi^iTra seems to have su ccess fu lly  checked the 
advance o f  the ^zariqa beyond ’’Arrajah (1) for  they, under 
th e ir  leader al-Zubair b. ‘AIT, were s t i l l  there at the time 
■^ TJaar b . ‘Ubaidullah assumed charge o f  his  duties ( 2 ) . <Umar 
drove them to Isfahan but they soon returned urith fresh  
preparations and reinforcements t i l l  they e n c a sed  at  
3abur.<Umar advanced to meet them and pitched h is  camp at  
a distance of four ’ farsakh’ from the enemy. Malik b. Hassah
of al-'Xzd, #10 had known and fu l ly  appreciated the value
of al-I&hallab’ s habits of a lertness  and watchfulness, 
counselled ^Umar to eaulate the exan^le o f  his predecessor 
who used to send sp ies  and keep him self a le r t  and v ig i la n t  
against a n igh t-a ttaG k  even when he was at a greater distance  
from the enemy th a n m a r  happened to be a t  that time. <Umar» 
however, f e l t  a b i t  i r r i ta te d  that he should be asked to 
fo llow  the methods of h is predecessor and only replied
to M£Lik w Do you think that you w i l l  die before the
appointed hour T* Al-Muhallab’s wisdom and foresight,however,
(1 ) .  According to ijain.(311) al-Muhallab, before s tar t in g  
for  al-Basra, haa managed to arrange an armistice with the 
Azraqites for  a period of eighteen months. ‘fhis may seem 
plausib le  because al-Ifafciitar was a conaaon enemy and also  
because we do not hear of any a c t iv i ty  on the part o f  the 
^zariqa during al-Mihallab's absence.Hevertheless, i t  
remains unconfirmed and a b i t  improbable.At any rate Dain. 
i s  wrong in saying that at ohe time o f  the conclusion o f  
the armistice a l- lu h a llab  was in Karman and that the leader  
of the 'Azariqa was Qatan b. al - t?uja>a.
(4  ). Kam* 644 , 4 . Here the account in Kam. i s  more perfect  
and elaborate. According to Anon. I l l ,a l-Z u b a ir  b. 4 l l  was 
at'Istakhr at the time of ^Umar's appointment.But the 
account in Kam, makes i t  c lear that"the engagement in 
which ‘ Umar l o s t  hi3 son came o f f  only a f te r  the return of 
th e^ za r iq a  from ^fahan  whither they had previously been 
driven fron^Arrajah by ^mar.
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were soon vindicated when the ^ z lr iq a  did launch a n ight-  
attack on <Umar*s camp* No doubt,<Umar met the attack with 
h is  oh aracter ist ic  composure and bravery* He fought the 
attackers ga l la n t ly  and en erg et ica l ly  t i l l  dawn when they 
were compelled to re t ire  without any gain. But when he 
turned with a sense o f  exalted pride to Malik, expecting  
from him a tribute to his success, Malik only sa id ,  ^Allah 
saved u s , indeed, but they ( the ^zariqa) dared not show 
even so much boldness against al-Mihallab*" ^Umar was now 
obviously offended. I t  was clear that his so ld iers  did 
not have the same confidence in him as they had in al - 
Jluhallab. Indignantly he sa id ,  " I f  you were as sincere  
to ms as you were to al-lluhallab, I hope I could dispose 
o f  th is  enemy. But you say about me, ' He i s  a quraishite  
h a i l in g  from al-H ijaz . Ttis home is  far o f f .  His gLory 
would not be o u r s .’ Hence, you f ig h t  with me only h a l f ­
heartedly "(1).
Later on^mar achieved some signal v ic to r ie s  over 
the ^Azariqa, but they were a tenacious foe and swooped 
down again and again with unabated zeal.
.... -..— . ■..... — ........... .......... ..........................--------- -....
(1 ) .  Kam. 644 J Anon. (112) also refers b r ie f ly  to the 
nigjht-attack.
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were soon vindicated when the ^.zariqa did launch a night-  
attack on <Umar* s camp* No doubt,<0mar met the attack with 
h is  ch aracter is t ic  composure and bravery. He fought the 
attackers ga lla n t ly  and e n erg et ica l ly  t i l l  dawn when they 
ware compelled to re t ire  without any gain. But \?hen he 
turned with a sense o f  exalted pride to Malik, expecting  
from him a tribute to his success, Malik only sa id ,  ^Allah 
saved u s ,  indeed, but they ( the ^zariqa) dared not show 
even so much boldness against a l - lu h a l la b ," *tfnar was now 
obviously offended. I t  was d e a r  that his so ld iers  did 
not have the same confidence in him as they had in a l -  
Muhallab. Indignantly he sa id ,  " I f  you were as sincere  
to me as you were to al-Muhallab, I hope I could dispose 
o f  th is  enemy. But you say about ms, 1 He i s  a Quraighite 
h a i l in g  from al-H ijaz . Ilis home is far o f f .  His gLory 
would not be ours.' Hence, you f ig h t  with me only h a l f ­
heartedly “(1 ) .
Later on*11 mar achieved some signal v ic to r ie s  over 
the ^Azariqa, but they were a tenacious foe and swooped 
down again and again with unabated zeal.
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(1 ) .  Kam. 644 ; Annn.(llE) al3o refers b r ie f ly  to the 
night-attack .
C H A P T E R  X.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE A^ZARIQA.
Second period -  68 A.H*
Before the end of the year 67, Mis<ab was dismissed 
from al “Basra where he was succeeded by Abdullah b. al - 
Zubair’ s own son, Hamza (1 ) .  Mus^ab s t i l l  re ta ined  his* •
position  at  al-Kufa (2) but he was ordered by >Ibn al -
Zubair to send back the people o f  al-Basra
who happened to be with him to join Hamza. Accordingly, a l -
Mihal 1 ab was recalled  from a l-^ ausil  ju st  within a month 
or two of  h is  appointment and Ibrahim b. al-Ashtar was 
appointed to succeed him on behalf of Mxs<ab (3).
Al-Muhallab Was now at the disposal of Hamza. In 
the eb anti me the ^zariqa advanced as far as RamaHurmuz 
and al-^Ahwaz while ^m ar b. *Ubaidullah had l e f t  for  
>Istakhr. In response to public clamour, Hamza again 
commissioned al-Mihallab to command the campaign against  
them although he l e t  <IImar b. <Ubaidullah continue in the 
governorship of fars. 1-Muhallab su cc ess fu lly  pushed the 
*Azariqa back to Isfahan  (4 ) .
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/751.
(2 ) .  Anon. 114. I t  i s  expressly denied that yamza was 
appointed to the governorship of al-Kufa as well.
(3 ) .  Anon. 114.
(4 ) .  Ibid { Kam. 646. Tab. doe3 not mantion al-'fuhallab’s 
r e c a l l  irom a l -I a u s i l  and h is  appointHBnt to the 
leadership of the campaign against the ^zariqa by 
Hamza.
0 H A P T S R I I .
BACK TO AL-15ATJ3IL.«
Hamza’s term o f  o f f ic e  la s te d  scaroely one year (1).  
Mua<ab was restored to the spvemorship  of  el-Basra about 
the end of the year 68 or the beginning of the year 69(2). 
Al-Muhallab was in a l -Basra when lflus<ab returned there
m •
a fter  his  restoration (3 ) .  Soon lfti8<ab learn t  the disturbing  
news that the ^zariqa  had rushed down from^sfahan through 
Fars up to al^Ahwaz, circumventing <Umar b. ‘Hibaidullah 
by taking a route via SSbur and >Arrajah(4). Mis<ab was much 
a g ita ted ,  almost enraged at th is  example of negligence and 
d ere lic t ion  of duty on the part o f  <Umar in not in tercepting  
the advance of t h e >Azariqa. Accompanied by al-Mihallab ($) 
he hi HE e l f  s e t  out from al-Basra while <l!mar b. 4\ U bai dul l'ah 
hastened his advance from the rear. ■fee>Azariqa were now 
in danger of being hemmed in between the two forces . 3o» 
on the advice of th e ir  leader al-Zubair b. < k l i t they 
escaped to al~3us and then continued th e ir  march to Kaskar, 
al-MadiPin and 3abat from where they headed towards al-Kufa(6),
( 1). Tab. 2/752, 15.
(2 ) .  Mus<ab returned to al-Basra aocording to Tab. ^ 7 5 3 ,5 .  
in the year 68 and according to Anon. 133,6 in the year 69. 
This can only mean the end of  68 or the beginning or 69 
because Mus^ab returned about one year a fter  h is  dism issa l  
which took place towards the end oi the year 67,
( 3 ) .  Kam. 646 ,7 .
( 4 ) .  Tab. S/754.
(5 ) .  Anon. 114,15.
(6 ) .  Tab.2/755-56; Anon. 114-5; Kam. 646.
Ills <ab's deposition from al-Basra in favour of Hamza 
had caused great resentment to him (l). The administrative  
changes wrought by Hamza particu lar ly  the reca ll  o f  a l -  
Muhallab from the s tra teg ic  post o f  a l-M ausil, had greatly  
upset his plans for  the defence of the province and were 
bound to hurt h is  prestige  a lso . I t  i s ,  therefore, quite 
understandable that on h is  restoration he should have 
taken the f i r s t  opportunity of reverting to h is  former 
arrangements.
I t  appears that al-Muhallab was sent back to al-iaausil 
inmediately a f te r  the escape o f  t h e >Azariqa to al-3us (2 ) .  
There are two reasons for th is  assumption. f i r s t , >Ibrahim 
b , . al-^Ashtar, who held the governorship o f  al-i& usil
a f te r  al-Muhallab was sent back to join Hamza, i s  noticedi *
in al-Kufa when the ^Azariqa advanced towards i t  from Sabat. 
I t  was Ibrahim who at#!ukhaila exhorted the wavering and 
h es is ta n t  a l -  Quba*, Mis<ab's deputy in al-Kufa, to b es t ir  
himself to repel the onrushing ^Azariqa and push them back 
to^sfahan (3 ) .  Ibrahim's presence in al-Kufa suggests that
u s
(1).Anon. 114,6, M is^b's chagrin is  hinted a t .
(2 ) .  The circumstances a tted n inga l-M ihallab ’ s f i r s t  with­
drawal from Fars in order to a s s i s t  Mis<ab against a l-
 
iukht&r, have been wrongly inserted by*>Ibn a l-^ th ir  (4/138)  
in~Ehe account of hi3 second appointment to al-l/iausil on 
the restoration of Mis^ab/Ibn al-^Athir has evidently  drawn 
upqn some other source besides al-Tabari and has thoughtless­
ly  mingled the fact3 gleaned from the two sources without 
caring to arrange them in th e ir  proper chronological order. 
According to Kam.(646 ,7 ) al-Mahallao was already in a l -  
Basra when I3u3<ab returned there a f te r  h is  restoration .
% *
( 3 ) . Tab.%/759 » 761; Anon. 116; Kam. 646,15. Anon.adds a 
remark that i t  is  a lso related that Ibrahim was at the 
time a t  al-13au?il. This re mark,however, does not merit any 
attention  3ince Ibrahim's presence at al-Nukhaila is  
confirmed by the reports oi Tab. and Kam,
al-Muhallab had relieved him o f  his  post at al-Mausil, Second* 
al-Muhallab was governor of al-Mausil when <Ubaidullah b. 
al-Hurr marched upon f i k r i t  shortly a f te r  Mu3<ab'3 restora ­
tion and forced al-l&ihallab’3 agent to withdraw from the 
place. Al-Buhallab i3 also reported to have contributed 
f ive  hundred horaesen, headed by Yazid b. al-Iti ^ a f  f a l » 
to the expeditionary force that was dispatched a l i t t l e  
l a t e r  by Mis<ab a g a in st>Ibn al-H urr(l). iMa affords a 
conclusive evidence that al-Mihallab had resumed charge 
of the governorship of a l-i'ausil  soon a fter  lus^-ab's 
restoration .
We hear l i t t l e  about the a c t iv i t i e s  of al-Muhallab 
at a l-ilau3il .  A s iege  of Sasibin with doubtful r e su lt s ,  i s  
however* re corded, which event must belong to a la te  period 
during h is  term of governorship, Kaaibin was the stronghold 
of al-Kha3habiyya ( cudgel-be are r s ) or Kaisaniyya ( 2 ) ,  a 
remnant o f  al-^ukhtar* 3 maw a l l  adherents wno be l iev ed  in
l i d
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/774, 12.
(2 ) .  So called a fter  Kaisan^bu ^Amra, one of al-MikJitar' s 
intimates. Later on Kaisan was erroneously explained 
as a 'laqab'of al-iiikhtar. Kaisaniyya i s  also derived 
from a certain Kais&n* a mawla of HXx who f e l l  at  
S if f ln  and from whom al-Mikhtar is  said to have 
derived h i s  views. They bore wooden clubs; hence the
name al-Khasliabiyya. (Ency. 2 /657-8 .)
<Abd fu-^alik attacked $asIbln probably in the 
beginning 01 71 and forced the l&a^jjabiyya to surrender 
to him. At that tin© th e ir  number is  reported two 
thousand and th e ir  two d i ie fs  are referred to^as 
Yazid and al-Haoashl, the two c l ien ts  of al-Harith. 
(lias, 5/241), •
the Imamate o f  Mihammad b. al-Hanaf iy^L At the head of them 
was ^bu Riqab Yazid b. >AbT 3akhr. Al-iiihallab la id  a s iege  
to the c ity  and inuresaed upon his troops that they were 
not l i k e l y  to encounter any serious resistance becauae the 
inhabitants were slaves with no arma except wooden clubs.
The cudgel-beare r s » however* achieved unexpected resu lts  
with th e ir  wooden cluba and forced the troops of al-toihalLab 
to f a l l  back. Thereupon al-SHihallab resorted to secre t  
machinations and hired a man o f  *Abd al-Qais to dispose of 
YazTd* the leader of the Kheshabiyya. kcoordingly* the 
<Abdite, who was given a huge p e lf  o f  two hundred thousand 
dirhems in advance and a promise of a s im ilar  amount a f ter  
the deed* caught Yazid unawares and assassinated him but 
he himself was k i l l e d  l a t e r  on. (Agh. 5/147).
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a H A P T S R X I I .
AL-HJHA1LAB R§-CALLED FH5M AL-MAUSIL.
(Events Oaring the Years 69-72).
Ve l a s t  3aw th e^ zar iq a  on the march towards al-Kufa 
which event i s  recorded in Tab. under the year 68. But i t  
must be remembered that the chronology of th is  period i s  
very such confused ch ie f ly  because o f  the fact  that most o f  
the major events took place about the turn of the year while 
only one year i s  given by the reporters. Hence i t  is  quite  
probable that the a c t iv i t i e s  of the^Azariqa culminacing in 
the march upon al-Kufa should have extended over the early  
days of the year 69» e sp e c ia l ly  in view of that Anon, places  
the return of Uu^ab in the 3ame and not in the previous year.
Having been repelled from al-Kufa, the^\zariqa repaired 
to th e ir  haunt in Isfahan  where they la id  a s iege  to the  
c i ty  of Jayy and engaged in daily skirmishes with the forces  
of i t s  governor, <Attab b. VarqV, for a number of months(l). 
But *Attab put up such a s tc u t  defence that eventually they 
gave up the s iege  and made a dash from Isfahan to al-Ahwaz 
bringing indiscriminate murder and untold misery in th e ir  
train (2 ) .  The arrival of the ^zariqa a t  al-^AIiwaz was, as 
on former occasions, the a i ^ a l  for an uproar among the 
Basrans who r ightly  regarded the town as the nearest base 
for an invasion of the c i t y  o f  al-Basra i t s e l f #  R ealis ing  
the gravity o f  the s itu a t io n ,  aus^ab conferred with the
(1 ) ,  Anon. 113,
( 2 ) .  Kam* 648. Here the account in Kam*. supplies a gap in
the accounts of Tab. and Anon. oi which n&kfe
no reference to th is  incident.
people as to the choice of the general who should be 
commissioned to deal with the menace. Qatari again 
discoursed with his  brethren on the r e la t iv e  merits of the 
three prominent generals to whom, he surmised* the choice 
of the Basrens should be restr ic ted - According to him,
*Attab b. ./arqa/was rash and reckless. He was always 
foremost in the front l in e  but never achieved any great  
r esu lts .  *Umar b-^Dbaidullah wa3 a bold and intrepid f i s p t e r  
who was wont to make a vigorous and decisive onslaught 
which resulted very soon e ith e r  in h is  defeat or in h is  
victory, a i t  al-Mihallab was a la s t in g  calamity and an 
irremoTable curse. He would not make a move unless  the 
other party took the in ia t iv e  and would i n f l i c t  lo s s e s  upon 
his enemy iriiile he h in s e l f  would su ffer  none.
Al-Mahal lab conananded respect equally from friend and 
foe. The Basrans were at one with Qatari in ihe ir  
estimation of his transcendent m ilitary genius. lliey 
de mended with one voice (1) that al-Muhallab should be 
summoned once again. Mus<ab also f e l l  in with this view 
and f in a l ly  decided that a l-m h a llab  should be sen 
against the 'Azariqa while he himself should proceed 
against *Abd a l - M a l i k  [summer 69-70 ( 2 )1
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(1 ) .  Kam. 648.
(2 ) .  No date i s  mentioned anywhere.the chronology of tki3 
period i s  very obscure and uncertain. Yet the statement 
(Kam. 64 8 ,6 .)  that Mus<ab was intending to proceed against  
^bd al-M alik , is a h in t  that i t  must be the#summer 69-70 
when <Abd al-Kalik f i r s t  took the f ie ld  against Mis<ab.
?2-*iUhallab, s name had become such a terror to the 
^.zariqa that no sooner did al-^ubair b. 4A1T learn of 
Mis<ab’s decision than he decided not to face 1 the la s t in g  
calamity, * Forthwith he moved with the ^ .ZEriqa to al~Kay(i)» 
a principal city in the north-east of the province of al-Jibal 
Characteristically enough, as the ^ Azariqa left al^Ahwaz*the 
Basrans again seem to have relapsed into complacency,They 
did not hotter mach as long as the >Azariqa kept away from 
al^Ahwaz. Mus^ab, who was very reluctant to remove al - 
Btahallab framMausil, al3o shelved the decision till 3uch 
time as the ^ Azariqa again invaded al-^ Ahwaz.
At al-Ray, the killed Yazid b. (al-HSrith b.
Yazid b,) Ru>aim after they had besieged him for one month(2). 
Then from al-lay they again marched dom to Isfahan (3) 
and besieged * At tab b. Warqa> a second ..'hen the
siege had lasted for seven months (4), *Attab made a sortie 
upon the besiegers with 3uch vehemence as coses only of 
desperation. Ultimately al-Zubair b. <l\ li was killed and the 
^zariqa were completely rou'ed.
QA.TA2I— Ha.— AL-FUJA A.
The next leader of the ^ Azariqa was Qatari b. al-
Fuja>a al-fazini, once a eolleagie of al-mhallab in the 
army of ^ bdur Haiiman b. Samara. 7ellhausen assumes that
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(1 ) .  Anon. 118,8; Kam. 648. Tab. doe a not record the raid 
upon a l - ^ y  and makes the siege o f  ^ ttab  an uninterrupted  
one.
(2 ) .  Anon. 118,10.
(3), Anon, 120, 3,
(4 ) .  Kam. 649, 9 i Iqd 1/110,
hi a e le c t io n  as Oaliph should have taken place at the end 
of 69(3ncy. 2/818). This seems rather based on a misappre­
hension. In the first place the murder of al-Zubair b. <A1I 
could not have occurred t i l l  the year 70 because i t  came 
at l e a s t  e ig h t  months ( s iege of Tazid b. Hu>aim, one month\ 
siege  of 4Attab, 7 months) a f te r  the dash of th e^ zar iq a  
to al-Ahwaz which i3 timed shortly  before the departure 
of Mus^ab for Bajumaira in the summer, 69-70. Secondly, 
there are indications that the e le c t io n  of Qatar! did not1 *
immediately follow the death o f  al~2ubair b. f i l f *  The 
statement in Kam.( 652,7-8) that the leadership was offered  
f i r s t  to *AbIda b. Hi la !  and then to Qatari i s  a h int that  
the choice was not a s tra ig h t  one. Itorther, we do not hear 
o f  any a c t iv i ty  on the part of t h e ’Azariqa t i l l  a short time 
before the departure of Hiis<ab for  Bajumaira in 71 which 
may have been due to th e ir  not having agreed upon a new 
Emir for  some time.In view of t h i s ,  the express assertion  
in Anon. (123 ,7 ) ,  which is  the only authority recording 
the date, that qatari was sworn as Oaliph (early) in the 
year 71, seems quite credible.
Qatari spent some time in Is fah an  and Karmah and then# 
with a reinforced and r ev ita lise d  army, marched doroi to 
Mdhaj, (between Isfahan and Khuzistah), and al^Ahwaz(l) 
with the deliberate intention to stab Mis<ab in the back 
as soon as the la t t e r  l e f t  al-Basra in order to meet
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(1 ) .  Anon. 123; Tab. 2/764; Earn. 652.
A^bd al-Malik ( year 71), His^ab was now faced with a very 
d i f f i c u l t  s itu a t io n .  For more than a couple of years, he 
had made i t  a cardinal point of h is  m ilitary  p o licy  to 
keep al**Jtohallab in al-Kausil so as to have h is  invaluable 
help at the t iro  o f  *Abd al-M alik's threatened advance 
from Syria. But now ^hen the threatened dan30r did 
a ctu a lly  m ater ia lise ,  he could not but go without the help  
he had long s e t  a store by. The untimely incursion of the 
^Assariqa coupletely fo i le d  h is  cherished plans for he had 
to divide his strength on two equally important fronts.  
S t i l l ,  he would have liked  to keep al-Muhallab with him 
on the Syrian front and place 3ome other general in 
command o f  the c&mpaigi against the >\zariqa. But the 
Basrans would not allow him to leave al-Basra unless a l -  
Muhallab was f i r s t  sent to check the ^ Azari q a ( l) .  'Ihus 
Mus^ab was compelled to reca ll  al-Muhallab from al-Mausil 
and to order him to proceed against the ^Azariqa. 
Accordingly, a l- l l iha llab  cams to al-Basra where he 
se lec ted  so ld iers  for h is  army ( 2 ) and then s e t  out to 
take up h is  old command for the third time.
No doubt, al-Mihallab*s new appointment relieved  
I&is^ab and the people of al-Basra of a l l  anxiety about 
the secu rity  of the rear. But very soon (3) these came 
the news that <Abd a l - M i k  was preparing for his advance
i 2 6 '
(1 ) .  Agh.17/162; of. Anon. 124,2.
(2 ) .  Tab. 2/765, 4 .
(3 ) .  IAth. 4 /1 5 8 ,7 , .  Uu3<ab had not yet l e f t  al-Basra.
in right earnest. At no time was al-Huhallab’s value 
f e l t  so rmch a3 at th is  c r i t ic a l  time. Al-Mihallab was 
a guarantee of victory in himself.His presence was 
indispensable on both the fronts and there was no worthy 
substitu te  to replace him. E&is<ab at once turned to him 
for advice in th is  d i f f i c u l t  s itu a t ion . In reply, a l -  
Buhallab urged, e ith e r  personally or by correspondence 
from the fron t,  that h is  serv ices  could be b etter  used 
in the war against *Abd al-Malik. In this connection he, 
well-informed as he always kept h im self,  also pointed out 
that h is  presence on the Syrian front was a l l  the more 
necessary because the ch iefs  of both the c i t i e s ,  al-Basra 
and al-Kufa, had already entered into correspondence 
with the enemy and hence th e ir  adherence and lo y a lty  
could not be oounted upon(l). His<ab, however, was 
compelled to reject  th is  loya l offer by the refractory 
attitude of  the people o f  al-Basra who would not leave 
the c ity  i f  it3  safety  were endangered by the removal 
of al-Muhallab from the Persian front.
So, lea v in g  al-Muhallab in charge of the campai-ji 
against the ^zariqa ( 2 ) ,  Mus<ab proceeded against ^bd 
al-Malik, But any competent observer coaid foresee h is  
trag ic  fate.W ith particu lar  reference to the absence of 
al-Muhallab and <TJmar b .<TJbaidullah b. Ma<Ber, <A.bdullah
1 2 6
(1 ) .  IAth. 4/158; cf. Anon. 123.
(2 ) .  IAth.4 /162,9  ; Anon. 124,14. JIhe report in Anon, in 
another place ( 15,8) and in Tab.(2/807) saying that  
al-Mihailab was a t  al-Mausil is  incorrect.
b. Khazim i3 reported to have recalled the following verse:1
s '  ) “'  >
(Anon.15)
Similarly*the circumstance of Bus<ab being deprived 
of the help o f  al-Muhallab and other fa ith fu l  generals 
evoked the fo llow ing verse from Abdullah b. al-3ubair ( I ) # ’
(Kam.430)
In course of time al-M ihallab’s warning against the 
treacherous designs of the chiefs of al-Basra and a l-  
Kufa cams out l i t e r a l l y  true. I&i3<ab was betrayed by h is  
own people and was k i l l e d  a t  Maskin on the 13th Jumada I 
or II ,  72 A.H.(2 ).
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(1 ) .  In Anon. 15} 125; Tab. 2/Q07, th is  verse is  also said 
to have been recalled by Ibn Khazim.
(2 ) .  Tab. 2/313,16; cf. also Anon. 124,12 ; Mas. 5/249,10.  
Ifa^ab's fa ll is variously reported in 71 and 72. 
7ellhausen (198), however, has proved conclusively  
that the l a t t e r  year i s  the correct date.
a H A P T 3 R m i .
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THS >AZARlQA . 
Third Period 71-72.
Al-Mihail ab assumed for the third time the leadership  
of  the campaign against the ^zariqa towards the middle 
of the year 7 i  A.H.(1 ) .  Although he does not seem to have 
achieved any great victory t i l l  Mis<ab’s f a l l  ye t ,  no 
doubt, be succeeded very well in keeping the enemy in 
check. He dislodged Qatari from the threatening p os it ion  
that he had taken up in ’Tdhaj and al-'Ahwaz and compelled 
him to r e t ire  to Karman. But a fter  a short while, the 
Aaraqite leader again returned to al-*Ahwaz, where a l -  
ilxhallab had established  h im self ,  with an army which, 
despite  the best and the constant e f fo r ts  of al-Muhallab 
in that d irec t io n ,wa3 s t i l l  far superior in equipment, 
arms and the number of horses to the array of the Basrans(2). 
Faced with heavy odds as he was, al-Muhallab fought the
(1 ).  The exact date cannot be determined. Mis <ab returned 
to al-Ba^ra from Baiumaira early in the year 71 A.H.(Mas. 
5/241) and then, a f l e r  what seems to have been a short  
stay , again started  for al-Kufa whence he proceeded 
against *Abd al-Malik (Tab.2/8G4) for the decisive b a tt le  
at Mas kin (Jumada, 72). I t  was during h is  stay in a l -  
Basra that al-Muhallao was transferred from al-Mausil to 
lead the campaign against Qatari. Keckoning backwards, 
according to the account oi Abu Mikhnaf in Tab.(2 /764-5 ) ,  
we find that al-l&ihallab had fought the >Azariqa for e igh t  
months when Mus^ab f e l l  a t  lask in . I t  must be noted that  
^bu lakhnaf seems to place the transfer of a l-m h allab  
at a comparatively larar  date for, according to him,Mis<ab 
had l e f t  al-Basra when al-3ubaS whom he haa l e f t  as h is  
deputy, informed him of the onrush of the-^zariqa with  
the request that al-Muhallab be sent against them.
( 2 ) .Kam. 652.
^zariqa  tenaciously at the old battleground of  3ulaf for 
e ig h t  months t i l l  Mu^ab’ s f a l l • (1)
Both the contending armies la y  opposite each other 
at HamaHurmaz (2) when ias'ab  f e l l  a t  laskin. I t  so happened 
that the new3 o f  Mus^ab’s f a l l  reached the canp of the 
>Azariqa a couple of day3 e a r l ie r  than the catup of  a l -  
Mihallab. The >Azariqa bethought themselves of putting  th e ir  
enemies to r id icu le .  So, standing on the bank of the 
ditch* they called out to the so ld iers  of al-Mihallab  
asking them as to what they believed about Mas<ab and 
his enemy, <Abd a l -Malik. Al-Mihallab’s soldiers,unaware 
of <Abd al-M alik’s triumph as they were, acclaimed Mu^ab 
as ' th e ir  rightfu l and virtuous ^mam, their  lord in this  
world as w ell as in the n e x t . '  On the other hand, they 
denounced *Abd al-Malik as one who had strayed from the 
right path and who was even misleading others. They cursed 
h is  father and affirmed that they treated him as the ir  
enemy on a par with the ^zariqa themselves. Thereupon the 
Azraqites broke the news of Mas<ab's f a l l ,  adding 
s a r c a s t ic a l ly ,  ’ Tomorrow you w il l  acknowledge *Abd a l -  
Malik as your^Imam while you have denounced him even 
tod ay .’ Al-Muhallab’ s soldiers,however, did not believe  
them and declared them to be l i a r s .
(1 ). Tab.2/765,6 > also 821,11. Here IAth. (4 /163,9) describes  
Sulaf as * a c ity  in Jfars on the bank of the s e a . ’ Events, 
however* point out that i t  mast have been in the d i s t r i c t  
of al^Ahwaz which is  a lso  the description of Yaq.
(2 ) .  Anon.124,12: cf. Kam. 652. where i t  i s  stated that  
al-Muhallab had driven the Azraqites to amaHurmuz when 
he received the news of Bis<ab's f a l l .
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The next day* the news reached al-Muhallab and 
then cane to him a letter from the victorious <Abd al- 
Malik formally commissioning him on his behalf. His old 
master having fallen, al-Muhallab had no he si a ion in 
aclmowl edging obedience to the new one and forthwith 
took the oath of allegiance to *Abd al-Malik from his 
soldiers. When the hostile units again confronted each 
other, the Azraqites taunted al-Mihallab’s soldiers with 
having acknowledged as their rightful ^ m&m one idiom they 
had cursed a day before. The 3in$>le reply of al-Bihall ab's 
soldiers was, ft acknowledged Mis^ab and have submitted 
to Abd al-Malik when each of them successively established 
his mastery over our affairs and our souls." Sit the 
fanatical Azraqites would not listen to any such plea.They 
only said* " Nay, you are the slaves of this world and 
the auxiliaries of Satan. May the curse of 'Allah befall 
you."(1)
The incident typically illustrates the difference 
between the position and the mentality of the 'Azariqa on 
the one hand and al-Muhallab and his warriors on the o<:her. 
Al-Mihallab was but a military chief and he owed i t  as 
his duty to 3how obedience to every successive government 
that established itself in the land. He readily acknowledged 
Abdullah b. al-Zubair the moment al-Basra went over to 
him. He served I£us<ab faithfully and loyally as long as 
the latter lived and wielded authority over the province.
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(1 ) .  Tab.2/821-22; Kam. 653; Anon. 125j c f .  a lso  IN. 107,
The loya l o ffer  of his  serv ices  that he, of h is own accord, 
made to Mus^ab just  ?/hen the other chiefs were busy 
promoting th e ir  treacherous designs, is  a p os it ive  proof 
that al-Mihallab’ s honesty, in te g r ity  and lo y a lty  stood 
above a l l  suspicion and above a l l  tenotations of material 
wealth or worldly gain. Vith the f a l l  o f  £flus<aba however, 
a l-* lraq  lay  at the f e e t  of the new conqueror*No doubt, 
Abdullah b. al-Zubair was s t i l l  there at Becca but was 
he in a position  to regain h is  l o s t  possessions or even 
to maintain h is  authority over al-H ijaz agains h is  powerful 
r iv a l  ? Al-Muhallab, with h is  deep knowledge of m ilitary  
a f f a i r s ,  could not have fa i le d  to foresee that the position  
of the Caliph at Bascca was so precarious and untenable as 
to make h is  f a l l  inevitable  and just a matter of time. 
Sim ilarly , a l- lu h a llab  mist also have realised  that he 
alone, however powerful and in f lu e n t ia l  he might have been, 
could o f fe r  no e f fe c t iv e  resistance to the Syrian conqueror 
e s p e c ia l ly  when the ch iefs  of al-Basra and al-Kufa had 
already betrayed and the internal conditions o f  the 
province were far from reassuring. In the circunstances, 
realism and prudence demanded what al-Muhallab did i . e . ,  
not to 3tick to a leaky boat when the leaks are irreparable  
beyond hope. Evan i f  views may d i f fe r  about the a d v isa b i l i ty  
of the course adopted by al-Muhallab, his motive, at l e a s t ,  
was quite unimpeachable inasmuch as the events imnediately  
preceding h is  change of a l leg ian ce ,  show that he was 
strong and scrupulous enough not to be guided by s e l f i s h  
considerations a lo n e .I t; must be remembered that the 
fa ith fu l  adherence of al-Muhallab to ims<ab up to fche
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very l a s t  moiasnt in contrast with the attitude of other 
nobles, was deeply impressed on the hearts of the people.
At a la t e r  date al-Hujjaj pointed i t  out as an argument 
for m istrusting the Mahlliba but *Abd al “Malik was sure 
that th e ir  f i d e l i t y  to th e ir  former masters was only a 
guarantee of th e ir  f i d e l i t y  towards him (Tab.3/1140; 
1143-4).
I t  was during th is  period of al-Muhallab*s leadership  
that he dispatched a contingent against another Kharijite  
c h ie f ,  ^Atiyya b. al-^Aswad al-Hanafi who by th is  tic© had 
estab lished  himself in Karnian. <Atiyya was formerly a 
l ieu ten an t of Najda b« ‘Amir al-Hanafi who* l ik e  many 
other Kharijite chiefs* had parted with fiafi* as a resu lt  
of the s p l i t  in oonsequenoe of the energence of the radical 
doctrines of the ^zariqa. Leaving al-Basra, Raj da betook 
him self to al-Bahrain ?/here he founded the moderate s e c t  
ca lled  Najdiyya a fter  him. In course of time, Najda 
l o s t  the confidence of *Atiyya who seceded from him and 
went across the sea to Karman. At Karman, ^Atiyya was 
overtaken by the contingent of al-Muhallab1 s army which 
pursued him as far  as Qandabil in a l-3 ind  and k i l le d  .im 
there. According to some, however* he was murdered by 
the K harijites themselves (1 ) .
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(1 ) .  Anon. 135; IAth.4 /99*Although the exact date is  not  
mentioned yet the sequence o f events follow ing the 
expedition of Ton <TJmair in 69 (Anon.133) j u s t i f i e s  
the assumption that the dispatch o f  the contingent 
by al-Mihallab should belong to th is  period.
G H A P T HI R XIV.
AL-MJHALLAB UNDER KpLID B. < ABDULLAH.
Hitherto, a l- lu h a llab  had been singularly  fortunate 
not to encounter jealousy from any quarter* high or low. 
His spectacular successes against the baf f l i n g ’Azariqa 
had only been a source of immense g r a t i f ic a t io n  to the 
successive governors, chiefs and the common people of  
a l-3asra ,  a l l  o f  whom showed themselves under a deep 
debt of gratitude to him. No doubt* SlaLik b. 3"isma< 
grudged him a few terms in his agreement with al-Quba* 
and the Basran chiefs which, he feared, were d e s i r e d  by 
a l-M h allab  to e x a l t  his own p osit ion  and to secure a 
personal advantage for himself. But the unworthy behaviour 
of faLik had no practica l e f f e c t  whatsoever; i t  only 
served to throw into clear r e l i e f  the deep a ffec tion  and 
the high regard which the general body of the Basrans bore 
towards al-Mihallab. Al-Quba^ throughout held him in 
great awe and lavished the h ighest compliments upon him. 
Al-Ahnaf, the famous chief of Tarnim, was generous enough 
to concede that * al-Basra was al">lkhalL&b> s. * Mus<ab 
was unstin ting  in h is  recognition of al-iluhallab's  
ind ispensab ility  for success in any major canpaign. >Jven 
Hamsa showed himself too ready to coolly  with the 
p ers is ten t  request o f  the people to reappoint a l-m h a lla b  
to lead the oampai^i against the 'Azariqa. 'l'he general 
population of al-Basra hailed him as their  protector who 
had given them sa fe ty  and secu rity  and they looked to 
him alone to defend the c ity  every time i t  was threatened
by the >Azariqa.
?or the next three years ( 72-75), however* the 
path of al-Euhallab was beset with jealousy on the part 
of no l e s s  a person than the governor o f  al-Basra# No 
doubt, <Abd al-ii’a l ik  from the very beginning  valued a l -  
Muhallab as much as he deserved. Soon a fter  the f a l l  of 
t'us<ab he took early opportunity o f  sending the p atent  
of co amis si on to him in antic ipation  of hi3  submission 
to the new authority . But i t  was th is  ardent recognition  
of al-Mihallab*s worth on the part o f  both the Basrans 
and <Abd al-K alik which, to the exclusion of any oiiier 
thing, excited the displeasure of the two governors whom 
*Abd a l-E alik  su ccess ive ly  appointed to al-Basra during 
the f i r s t  three years of the establishment of h is  sway 
over a l -^ r a q .  The f i r s t  o f  them, Khalid b# Abdullah b. 
Khalid b. ^ s ld ,  took charge of the governorship shortly  
after  ^\bd al-L'al ik ’ s victory at Baskin. Al though Khalid 
does not appear to have had any previous grudge against  
al-Muhallab, yet he took strong umbrage a g a in s t  him soon 
a f fe r  h i3 assumption of duties on the only ground that 
the people of al-Basra should believe him to be the only 
general capable of defending the c ity  against the in veter  
?Azariqa. He was determined to prove that others, besides 
al-Muhallab, could also score a victory over them. The 
inhabitants of al-Basra tr ied  their  b t s t  to make Khalid« — -* 
d e s is t  from e f fe c t in g  the change contemplated by him 
because, they pointed out, i t  endangered the sa fe ty  o f  
the town. But these pressing requests only proved their  
f a i t h  in al-Muhallab and as such they only served to
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harden Khalid in h is  prejudice against him, He could not  
brook that al-iSuhallab should exercise  such a powerful 
hold upon the minds o f  the people and, therefore , flatly-  
rejected th e ir  representational 1).
Khalid did not even care to consult <Abd al-Malik 
in the matter (2) who himself had previously confirmed 
al-Mihallab in the command. He on h is  oin in i t i a t iv e  
issued orders deposing al-Huhallab from the leadership  
of the campaign and appointing him instead as his  agent 
to administer, and to c o l le c t  the taxes of, al-Ahwaz(3).
Khalid chose for the comand of the campaign his  
owi brother^vbd a l - <Aziz (4) whom he reinforced with a 
powerful detachment headed by Miqatil b. :lsma<. About 
the same time, the A zraqites , who had fa llen  back to 
Karman, again made an incursion and advanced as far as 
Darabjird in Fars. %'od a l - <Aziz s e t  out to meet them 
with an army 30,000 strong. On his way towards the 
’Azariqa, <Abd al^AzTz showed h ins e l  f  actuated by the same 
uncharitable fee l in gs  towards al-Muhallab as had prompted
(1).Kam. 656.
( 2 ) .  This is  proved by <Abd al-M alik’s l e t t e r  to i&alid ( Tab.2/325,9) where he says that he lea r n 1 oiTal-  
Muhall ab’ s deposition only from the messen p r  who 
brought him tne news of \lbd al ^ Aziz’ s defeat.
( 3 ) . Thus in Tab. 2/322,15. According to Kara. 654, a l-  
Muhallab was recalled to al-Basra whence he proceeded 
again to al-^Ahwaz in the company of Khalid whose 
carnpai^ against jatari i s  placed before that of  
<kM a l-A ziz .
(4 ) .  Tab. 2/822,15 seq.
135'
hi a brother to bring about h is  deposition* He openly 
indulged in sweet dreams of shatter ing  the b e l i e f  o f  the 
people in the in d isp en sab il ity  o f  al-Mihail ab. Arrogantly 
he said to his soldiers:"The Basrans think that a l -  
Mahallab alone can accomplish th is  task. Very soon they 
w il l  be d i s i l lu s io n e d ."(1) The d is il lusionm ent, no doubt, 
cam® very soon not to the Basrans but to the vaingLorious 
*Abd al-A ziz  him self.
Qatari dispatched one o f  his generals , 3a lih  b. 
iidiraq (2) or 3a<d al-Tala^i* ,(3 )  with barely 500 or 
900 so ld iers  to face <Abd al^Aziz and h is  army of 30,000. 
The two armies mot at Jaruz(4), a place in Fars. *Abd a l -  
Slzlz proved himself rash enough to be inveigled  into a 
valley  where the cunning Azraqites ambushed h i 3 army end 
in f l ic te d  a disastrous defeat upon him* m q a ti l  b. Mi3ma< 
was k i l le d  and a wife of <Abd al-Aziz» >Unime Hafs by name, 
was taken p r ison er .(5)
Al-Bihallab knew fu l l  well that *Abd al - Azi z was 
no match for the^Azariqa. To him the outoome o f  the battle  
at  Jaruz was already a foregone conclusion.His u n fa i l in g  
fo res ig h t ,  therefore, made him anxious about his own 
defence because he f e l t  that in case *Abd al-A ziz were 
worsted, the ^Izariqa were sure to march stra ig h t  upon 
al^Ahwaz.Now h is  pos i tion at al -Ahwaz was on tenable a van
(1 ) .  Kam. 656,11-12.
(2 ) .  Thu3 Tab. 2/323,1.
(3 ) .  Thus Kam. 657.
4 ) .  Yaq. 2/66.
” 2/ 823; Kam. 657.
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for  a moment because Khalid had l e f t  him ;:here as a rare 
ta x -c o l leo to r  with barely three hundred s o l d i e r s d ) .  He, 
therefore, s e t  about taking precautions so that he may 
not be taken unawares by the onrushing ^Azari qa.
Ho sooner did 4Abd al^Azxz depart from al^Ahwaz 
then al-Mihail ab sent his chamberlain, Kurd us* to bring 
a l-3 a <b b. Zaid to him. As al-Sa^b entered h is  presence, 
he said to him, * 0 3a<b, I am l o s t .  I see ,  as i f  i t  
were, the defeat of *Abd al^Aziz and am afraid l e s t  the 
^Azariqa should overtake me while I have no army with me. 
So, send a man on your behalf who should bring to me 
th e ir  news beforehand.** Al-Sa^b accordingly deputed a 
man, ' <Imran byname, to accompany the army of *Abd a l-  
^Iziz and to write to him about the day-to-day developments 
which information he used to pass on to al -Mihailab( 2).
There can be no doubt that al -  Mihail ab was fu l ly  
aware of the maligaant motives that lay  behind his 
deposition. He must also have known that <\bd al-^Aziz 
too shared the i l l - w i l l  of h is  brother towards him. Yet 
he was too noble to harbour any rancour in his own jontla  
heart. A^bd a l -^ z iz  had arrived at HamaHurmuz a f r.• r h is  
shameful defeat of ishich a l-m h a lla b  was yet un aura, re s .  He 
dispatched al-Sa^b b. Said to find out the news but at  
the same time took particu lar  care to in struct him that 
in case <Abd al-Aziz were defeated, he should also convey 
h is  message of sympathy and consolation to him.
( 1 ) .  Kam. 656,10.
(2 ) .  Kam. 656.
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Accordingly a l -  3a*b started on h is  errand t i l l  he 
reached near Pama.Hurmu% where he met <kbd al-1lzTz who 
looked dejected and sorrowful. Introducing him self as 
the emissary o f  al-Mihailab» he consoled *Abd al-A ziz  
and then hastened back to break the news to al-!iuhallab. 
"flfhat news T* asked 4 H b k a U # k  as soon as al-Sa^b 
appeared before him. /JL-3a<b had, not without obvious * * 
reason, calculated that the news of <khd ol^Aziz1 a defeat  
would cause immense sa t is fa c t io n  and joy to^a^^grieved 
al-Muhallab. 3o he rep lied , H I t  is  a l l  ^ood news for you. 
He has been defeated and h is  army routed. " No doubt, 
the defeat of *Abd s i-A z iz  represented the fa ilu re  of a 
malicious attempt to under in^ the glory and injure the 
reputation of al-Muhallab. But al-Jffluhallab proved s e l f l e s s  
enough to subordinate h is  personal in terests  to the larger  
in te r e s ts  o f  h is  community. He said  to al*3a<b, n ,oe to 
you. How can I rejoice  in the defeat o i a chief of Quraish 
and an army of Mislims t* Contrary to his fond expectations  
as the reaction of al-Mihallab was, a l - :3a<b said  rather 
languidly , " The fa c t  is  a l l  the same, whether i t  pleased  
you or hurt you .” (1)
Noble and d ignified  as the a ttitude of al -Mihail ab 
towards nis r iva ls  was, his re la tion s  with h is  loyal  
followers were also based on love for h is  awe-inspiring  
personality  rather than on fear and coercion. This was
an^ly revealed in the l a t t e r  part (2) o f  s l-ft ih a llab 'a
(1 ) .  Kam. 660.
(2 ) .  This l a t t e r  part i s  omitted in Kam. but supplied  
in Tab. 2/Q2&.
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discourse with the same a l “3e/b. /d-I.iuhallb wanted him
•
to carry the news of <Abd al ^ Asia’ s defeat to Khalid at  
al-Basra. Al-Sa<b was afraid l e s t  he should incur the
•  •
wrath of JjiaLid by breaking this sad news to him. \1- 
Muhallab in s is ted  that al-Sa^b was the man best f i t t e d  
fo r  the taakbut al-3a<b was s t i l l  reluctant. Thereupon 
a l -  :-uhal 1 ab f e l t  a b it  ir r i ta te d  and sa id , ’Ifo doubt you 
are assured of impunity on my part. But remember that i f  
you were placed under some one other than me and i f  he 
were to order you to go on foo t  you would have gone without 
sparing any exertion *’ The remark cut al-3a<b to the quick 
who replied rather im patiently, ■  Do you ms an to reca ll  to 
us the consideration and forbearance that you have shown us ? 
f e l l ,  we repay i t  to you f u l ly ,  rather even more than that.
Do n ' t  you rea lise  that we endanger our l iv e s  for your sake 
and defend you from your adversary. By'Allah, i f  we were 
placed under one who is harsh upon us and who makes us go 
on foo t  for  his own ends, then, were such a man to require 
our help and s a c r i f i c e ,  we would only put him forward 
between ourselves and our energy and would save ourselves 
at h is  expense.” These m rds went home to al-i'uhallab who 
had no fa lse  notions of honour and prestige  to prevent iiim 
from acknowledging, l i t h  an a ir  o f  gratefu lness ,  that a l -  
3a*b was perfectly  right. He then sumnoned another man 
and dispatched nim to 0 a l i d  with the news of his 
brother's defeat.
Thus, i t  is  noteworthy that al-M ihallab's so lic itu d e  
for h is  so ld iers  was only a source o f strength to him. He
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never  allowed the virtue of kindness to degenerate into  
the vice of weakness.Far from tending to make them 
remiss in the discharge of th e ir  d u ties ,  i t  only urged 
h is  subordinates to give him th e ir  w i l l in g  and unquestion­
ing obedience and to hold h is  cause as dear to them as 
th e ir  own personal cause.
Al-iiuhallab's generosity towards those who grudged 
him his  glory reached a crescendo ifoen <r.bd al-'Hziz 
arrived at 3uq al-Ahwaz( 1) • Al-Muhallab treated him with 
every respect and even presented robes to him. He also  
accompanied him to al-Basra, leav in g  h is  son Habib behind 
as h is  deputy. As an attack by the ^ zariqa , which a l -  
luhallab had long foreseen, was s t i l l  feared, he instructed  
Habib to keep himself informed of th e ir  movements and z-o 
re t ire  to al-Basra on th e ir  approach. Accordingly, vnhen 
the 'Azraqites reached so near as the Brldg? of ^rbuk 
( near HamaHurrauz), Habib withdrew.IQiali d,however, fa iled  
to rea lise  :he expediency of this  action which he d is ­
approved so 3tron^y that Habib dared not face him and 
was compelled to hide among the Banu H ila l.
The defeat of *Abd al^AzTz was such a serious  
a f f a ir  that i£halid could not keep i t  from Hbti al-i:alik.
He wrote to him but not without mincing words, savin that  
' ‘Abd al - I  z 1 z was put to rout when the people desefied  him. ( 2 ) ’ 
This veiled  attempt to miniruse the resp o n s ib i l i ty  o f  *Abd 
al -  A z I z for  the shameful defeat and to s h i f t  the blame to 
his army,however, fa i le d  to have any e f f e c t  on *Abd a i - ”alik.
----- ------ v
(1 ) .  Kam. 660.
(2 ) .  Tab. 3/825,5.
i 4  p
He could at once know where the fa u lt  lay . <-.bd al-Malik 
had not yet Isnown of the deposition of al-Mihallab.
Khalid in h is  l e t t e r  had avoided, de lib era te ly  we may 
assume, any mention o f  h is  arbitrary action. I t  wa3, 
therefore , quite natural that h is  f i r s t  thought should 
turn to the commander whom he him self had commissioned.
He said in his  reply to KhSli d, “ I asked your messenger 
as to the p os it ion  o f  al-Mihallab and was told that he 
was acting as your agent in al-^Ahwaa* -hat a bad decis ion  
i t  was on your part that you appointed your orai brother, 
a rougja, inexperienced and raw Bedouin from Mecca, to 
conduct the campaign, preferring him to ai-!Juhallab 
Y/hom you l e f t  nearby to c o l le c t  the taxes whereas he is 
endowed with fortunate judgment and e x c e l le n t  statesmanship 
and possesses a very long experience in and an expert  
knowledge of w arfare."(1)
dondermation o f  Khalid’ 3 arbitrary choice o f  <'bd 
al-^lziz was not confined to *Abd al-Malik alone. I t  seems 
to have been as v/ide spread and universal as the demand 
for the appointment o f  al -Mihallab. A poet denounces 
Khalid in the following verses:-
( Kam* €60 . }
In the same l e t t e r  *Abd al-i&alik also ordered 
Oil!id to 3end al-Muhallab back to active  m ilitary  service
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(1 ) .  Tab. 2/925t 8seV
In obedience to KM .  a l -^ a l ik ,  Khalid, along with 
the Basran army, s e t  out for al^Ahwaa where he was joined 
by the promised c o n t in e n t  from al-Kufa, f iv e  thousand 
strong and commanded by ^bdur Hahman b. Mihammad b. al - 
^ksh^ath. (1) The >Aaraqites came forward to meet :hem and 
the f i r s t  tria l of strength took place at KurbujdTnar (2) 
near sl^Ahwaz. Qatari was resolved to make a Ion and 
determined stand and when the b a tt le  had la sted  for  
th ir ty  days he 3 e t  about f o r t i fy in g  himself 7/ith a ditch.  
Who combined in himself the necessary prudence and 
experience to foresee the immense advantages that accrued 
to an enemy from a ditch ? Al-:iuhallab came forward and 
pointed out to the unwary Khalid that Q a t a r !  should not  
be allowed to have the advantage of a d itch . Khalid, 
t h e  r e f  upon, crossed the Du j a i l  and moved westwards to the 
region o f  Nahr Tlra* $ £ t a r l *  however, was n o t  slow to 
follow them. He estab lished  himself in the c ity  of Nahr 
H ra which he doubly f o r t i f ie d  with a wall and a ditch.
Al-Mahallab again tr ied  to rouse Khalid into a c t iv i ty  
pointing out to him the i t e r a t i v e  n ec e ss i ty  of having a 
ditoh  for himself as well, because without i t  h is  camo was
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(1 ) .  'fab. 2/Q26.
(2 ) .  Kam. 6^4 seq. Tab*4I account (2/326-27) o f  Khalid’ s 
engagement with Qatari i s  very short, i t  only says that 
when' the contending arciies hau stood opposite each other 
for  20 days, IgiaLia advanced towards tne enemy with a l -  
mihallab on h is  right and Ua^ud o. Qahdham on h is  l e f t  
wings, The ^ zraa ites  were so over-awed hv M ialid’ s 
superiority  in numbers and equipment that tney a t  once 
turned t a i l .
and in oonjunction with him to proceed himself to al-^Jbwaz 
in order to conduct the war against the ^.zlriqa. He al3o 
promised him reinforcement? from al-Kufa which Bishr b. 
J'arv/an, the gu vom er of that tom , had already been 
directed to dispatch. But *Abd al-Malik had l o s t  tru st  
in  the wisdom of I j j s l id .  Although he reta in ed  him as 
tiie nominal head o f  the expedition yet he concluded his  
l e t t e r  with this  unpalatable r e s tr ic t io n  on his authority. 
He sa id ,  " ."hen you meet the enemy you are not to decide 
on any step until  you place i t  f i r s t  before a l -ru h a lla b  
and have h is  view3 on i t . ’
Khalid, no doubt, very keenly f e l t  the chastisement 
administered to him for h is  blunder in preferring h is  
brother to al -Mihallab. But what offended him s t i l l  more 
was that A^bd al-Malik should not leave the d irection  of  
the expedition to h is  unfettered d iscretion  and oblige  
him to obtain the concurrence of a l-m h a lla b  on every 
i m p o r t a n t  i3 su e ( l ) .  This v irtual power of veto in the 
hands of one whom he had neglected and provoked 3o much 
in the p ast ,  was a s l i g h t  too hard for  him to swallow. No 
doubt, th is  m a t  have added to his sp ite  against a l -  
Muhallab whose only fa u lt  was that he possessed those 
superb q u a lit ie s  which marked him cut for g lory,but for  
the time being i t  was obvious that he had no a lternative  
but to submit quietly .
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( i ) .  Tab. ^ 325 ,17-18 .
constantly exposed to night-attacks by the enemy. Khslid, 
who was only f i t  for a sinecure, replied with foolish  
indifference, * 0 ^bu 3a4 id , i t  i s  sooner said than done.* 
Seized with despair, al-Mihallab remarked to one of hia 
sons that i t  appeared to him aa i f  the whole a f fa ir  were 
doomed. Sut 3oon he took courage in h is  both hands and 
started h a sti ly  taking 3uch defensive measures as he could 
on his own account, f i r s t ,  he somehow managed to improvise 
a ditch with the assistance of Ziyad b. <Amr. He also 
warned the leader o f  the Mfan auxiliary corps, ^bdur 
Rahman b. l&ihanmad b. al-^Ash^ath, against overdrawn s e l f -  
confidence in h is mere valour which was the besetting  
weakness o f most of the generals of the time. Imprudently 
enough ^Abdur Rahman expostulated that he did not care a 
f i g  for the ^zariqa but was ultim ately prevailed upon by 
al-Bihallab to fo r t i fy  his canp with a ditch (1).
Secondly, rea lis ing  that the boats presented a 
tenpting target for an enemy attack, al-Mihallab suggested  
to Khalid that the boats ly ing  scattered abou: should be 
dram together and concentrated at one point around him; 
otherwise they iere most l ik e ly  to be burnt by the enemy.
Sven before the slow-moving Khalid could make up his  
mind, an enemy coluim rose and burnt the boats exactly as
(l).Tab._2/826. The statement in Iqd( j/74) that *Abdur 
Rahman remained without a ditch despite al-Muhallab’s 
advice and was put to f l ig h t  by the ^zariqa, i s ,  
unconfirmed. I t  may be a distortion of the incident 
with *Abdur Rahman b. Mikhnaf at a la te r  date.m "
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al-Mihailab had anticipated and warned.(1) il-iluhallab was 
s t i l l  very apprehensive about the sa fe ty  o f  boats. He* 
therefore, ordered that the boat3 be abandoned and that 
the men should entrench themselves on land. Khalid refused 
to f a l l  in with th is  wise expedient and refused to evacuate 
the boats under h is  inanediate aommand(2). Al-Mhallab  
s t i l l  pushed forward with his own defensive measures as far  
he could independently of Khalid.Fortunately enough, his  
lead  found favour with many a prominent warrior. For instance, 
Fxroz Husain, a prominent Persian chief with a large  
following of mawall archers, acknowledged the wisdom o f  h is  
e f fo r t s  and favourably responded to h is  request for help 
and co-operation.
Forty days were spent in mere skirmishing. Then i t  
became clear that a major assau lt  on the part of Qatar! 
was imminent. Al~Muhallab braced himself for the even t.He 
deputed a ’mawla’ o f  'Abu ^ y a in a  to keep a n ig h t ly  v ig i l  
from a funeral crypt in the neighbourhood and to hasten 
to him with the news o f  the s l ig h t e s t  movement or the 
neighing o f  horses from the direction of the enemy. 5o,he 
was not to be taken unawares. One n ight the sane scout 
came to him and informed him in good time that the enemy 
had moved. Al-Mihallab personally organised the defence 
and himself took up a position  at the very entrance o f  the
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/826.
( 2 ) .  Kam.6S4,9.
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d itch . Soon Qatari launched a major attack which was 
heralded by a novel and confounding device. ;ith remarkable 
d e x te r i ty » Qatar! prepared a number of boats f i l l e d  with 
burning wood and sent them down upon the boats of Khalid 
who was foolhardy enough to re jec t  the advice o f  a l-luha llab  
and to p e r s is t  in occupying them. He now had to pay dearly 
for this ind iscretion . In the wake o f  these f i r e -bearing  
boats came Qatari hi ms e l f  who e f f e c t iv e ly  penetrated the 
ranks o f  the defending army and started  wanton destruction  
of a l l  l i f e ,  human as well as animal, and property that 
f e l l  in his way. Al-Muhallab directed h is  own son, Yaald, 
to meet the enemy which he did with the help o f  a hundred 
horsemen and acquitted him self well o f  the task. *Abdur 
Bahnian b. Muhammad b. al->Ash<ath also gave ample proof o f  
his valour and made a worthy contribution to the defence. 
True to his undertaking,Hr5z Husain also came forward with 
a body of  c l ie n ts  who achieved very great resu lts  with 
th e ir  s k i l fu l  archery.
The attack was repulsed no doubt but not without huj>e 
lo s s e s .  The next morning, the camp o f  KhaLid presented the 
appearance o f  a black stony ground, strewn a l l  over as i t  
was with the corpses o f  the s la in .  Moved by this evidence 
o f  the vehemence o f  the attack, Khalid remarked to a l -  
Muhallab with a sense o f  s a t is fa c t io n  that ill-became hi3 
i^om inious part, " were ju st  on the brink of being put 
to shams. "(1) Al-;!uhallab again shook him out o f  h is
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(1) .  Kam. 655.
complacency. He warned Mm that i f  he did not even then 
care to provide him self with a ditch the enemy was bound to 
attempt another raid. After a l l  that he had seen and 
suffered i t  was now impossible for Khalid to dismiss the 
advice o f  al-Muhallab as sunmiarily as he had done on 
previous occasions. But even i f  he were to adopt a suggestion  
he lacked the a b i l i t y  and resource to execute i t .  So he 
requested al-Muhallab to oblige him by taking the work of  
the ditch in h i s  own hands. Al-Muhallab iho was possessed  
o f  an inexhaustible fund of energy, readily agreed and 3et  
himself to the task with h is  ch aracter ist ic  ab ility .H e  
completed i t  soon with the labour o f  a l l  the prominent 
warriors #10 were engaged on i t  without any d is t in c t io n  of  
higfr and low.
The timely and energetic  measures o f  al-Ufuhallab 
proved the ruin of the hopes o f  the ’’Azraqites. Despairing 
of the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  gaining any advantage* they at l a s t  
decided to retreat to th e ir  stronghold in Karraah. But 
before they departed they f e l t  constrained to pay what may 
be called  the greatest  conpliment to the genius o f  a l -  
Muhallab in the words* * 3ut for the presence of  this  
Sorcerer o f  Muzun.* you would have been completely destroyed 
by 'A llah ."(1) The Sorcerer of  Muzun was no other than a l -  
Muhallab whose b r i l l ia n t  foresight and e f f e c t iv e  counter­
measures could only be explained* according to the thwarted 
and bewildered 'Azraqites, as magic and sorcery.
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(1) .  Kam. 655.
Thi3 successfu l repulse of Qatari is well e n t i t le d  to 
a place among the brightest  la u re ls  o f  al-Mihail ab. The 
pecu liar  s ig a if ica n ce  of th is  event lay  in the fa c t  that a l -  
Muhallab defeated not only the intentions of the Azraqites 
but also  the unwisdom and the in ert  complacency of K^ilici 
who also happened to nurse an i l l - w i l l  against him. At every 
step a l- lu h a llab  wa3 opposed or a t  l e a s t  hampered by K hali.,  
so much so that he was driven to remark that the whole 
a f fa ir  seemed to be l o s t .  But* l e t  Khalid do whatever he may, 
a l- iu h a lla b  was determined not to l e t  h is  f a i r  name be so iled  
by a shameful defeat. Although Khalid was the nominal head 
of the nifhole expedition yet al-Muhallab acted almost 
independently with the troops under his immediate command 
and 3aved an impossible and hopeless situation.H e well 
deserved the tribute that the retreating 'Azraqites paid him. 
Also he fu l ly  ju s t i f ie d  the hopes and the confidence reposed 
in him by <Abd al-Malik, I t  i s ,  however, doubtful whether 
<khd al-Malik was ever apprised of the true facts  about th is  
engagement. Of course, i t  could not be expected from Khalid 
that he should deal fa ir ly  with al-Muhallab's b r i l l ia n t  
part in this victory. In his l e t t e r  to a l -Malik inform­
ing him of the repulse of the ’Azraqites ( Tab, 2/828}, 
f u l ly  brings out the fierceness of the struggle but mr.kes no 
mention at a l l  o f  al-Buhallab or of any other general and 
claims the victory wholly for his om leadership.
Qatari having retired* lOaalid returned to al-Basra  
while al-IMhallab i s  reported to have stayed in a l-^ w a z  .
The reports of Khalid’ s regime in Tab. and in Kam. 
(654-662), although they agree very strongly on the e ssen t ia l
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features of the two campaigns* ( the one led  by ^bd a l -  
°zT z  and the other led by Khalid in conjunction with a l -  
Mihallab), d i f fe r  as to the order of their  occurence,The 
order mentioned in Tab,, which has been followed above, is  
just  the reverse o f  that given in Kam. According to the la t t e r ,  
Khalid f i r s t  took the cocmand of the can^aign in his own hand3 
and then, in the second place, placed i t  in the hands of <Abd 
al-^Aziz (1 ) .  Further, i t  is  added in Kam. that i t  was the 
news of ^bd a l-A ziz ’ s defeat which caused <Ahd a l-^ a lik  to 
dismiss Khalid from the -pvemorship of al-Basra. The tex t  
of *Abd al-Malik’ s l e t t e r  in reply to 3 ia l id ’ 3 note conveying 
the news of the defeat as given in Kam.( 662) ends thus,
’ ^ere I to punish you in proportion to the magnitude of 
your s in ,  i t  would have been inpossib le for  you to o u tlive  
i t .  But I was reminded of  your relationship with me whioh 
diverted me from you. I order that your punishment be your 
dism issa l . '
Al-Muhallab i3 a lso  reported ( Kam, 661-2) to have 
foreto ld  to Khalid th a t,  despite his  re la tion sh ip , *Abd a l -  
Falik was most l ik e ly  to dismiss him when he l e a m t  of <Abd 
al^Aztz’ s defeat following c lose ly  upon the defeat of  
>CTmayya* another brother of EhSlid, by >lbu ifudaik in al-Bahrain.
whether or not the defeat of ^bd al^Aziz was the 
immediate cause, i t  is almost certain that i t  was the
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(1 ) .  ^ellhausen ( p . 227) has adopted the version of Kam. I t  
ia d i f f i c u l t  to find an argumant for the adoption of 
one or the rejection  o f  the other version.
principal cause of Khalid's d ism issal. al-JMalik long
remembered i t  against him that he should hay© deposed a l -  
luhallab from the leadership of the cair^aigja against the 
>Azariqa(l). He was most anxious to curb the menace # iich  
had caused him a good deal of uneasiness and he knew that 
none but al-Muhallab was equal to the task. As Khalid -'O.i.ld 
not co-operate with al-Mihailab i t  was thought necessary  
that he should be dismissed and supplanted by one who should 
be more favourably disposed towards the leader of the 
campaign
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(1 ) .  Yi de <Ab d al ~Ial ik ’ s re mark ( Kam. 663»6) to <ftkbdul 1 ah 
b. Hakim al-Mujashi<I  that Bishr was proving no better  
than Khalid ( in putting o f f  tBe appointment of a l -  
SSuhal l i b ) .
C H A P T E R  XY.
AL-HJHALLAB UHD3R BISHR B. MAR'7 AN.
Khalid'a jealousy o f  al-Mihallab and hi a prejudiced  
and unfair a tt itu de  towards him, apart from being detrimental 
to the course o f  the war against the ^zariqa, u ltim ately  
reco iled  upon himaelf. Hbd al-Halik waa i n d i c a n t  at the 
diaartrous reault3 o f  his refusal to recogaiae the superior  
msrita o f  al-Mihallab and to give him h is  due. He waa ao 
diaguated with Khalid that even at a l a t e r  date he rejected  
o u tr i^ it  the 3uggeation to confirm him in the governorship 
of al-3aara, to ih ich  he had succeeded once again p ro v is io n a l ­
l y  a fter  the death of Bishr b. Marwan, 3aying that 'Khalid 
had bungled with the administration and had proved h is  
in co mpe ten ce to gpvem a l - <Iraq. ’ (1) The principal factor  
that turned Hbd al-Malik against him was, no doubt, h is  
arbitrary choice of Hbd al**Aziz* in preference to a l -  
Muhallab, for the leadership of the campaigp against the 
‘’’Azariqa.
Khalid was dismissed in disgrace and al-Basra also  
was handed over to Bishr b. Marwan, ^bd al-M alik’s own 
brother and his governor in al-KHfa. According to reports 
in Tab., the event of Bishr*a entry into al-Baara is  variously  
placed by some in the year 73 and by olhers in 74. (2 ) .  The
(1 ) .  Anon. 267,1-2.
(2 ) .  73s Tab. a/853, 13 seq; 74i 855,7.
l a t t e r  year* however* seems to be the correct date.
According to Anon. 26, Bishr died within * four or 3ix months 
of h is  entry into al-Basra.* The death of Bishr occurred 
at al-Basra in the year 74 not long before (1) the arrival  
of al-Hajjaj at the beginning of the following year 75.
Thus recknoning backwards from thB event of h is  death*the 
entry of Bishr in al-Basra can only be placed in the year 
74 A.H. I t  does not aeem far from probable that the appoint­
ment of Bishr should have taken place in 73 and that he 
should have deferred h is  entry into al-Basra t i l l  the 
fo llow ing year.
"'Abd al~£5alik*s cherished hopes of e s ta b l ish in g  co­
operation and harmonious re lation s  between a l - lM ia l la b  and 
the government o f  al-Basra as represented by the new governor, 
were not to be f u l f i l l e d .  Bishr, far from being favourably 
disposed towards al-Muhallab, proved even more antagonistic  
towards him than h is  predecessor.
No sooner was al-Basra made over to Bishr than ^bd 
al-Malik s e t  about g iv ing  e f f e c t  to the purpose which had 
n ecess ita ted  the change in governorship, 'while Bishr was 
yet  a t  al-Kufa, ^Abd al-Malik wrote to him to the e f f e c t
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( 1 ) .According to Anon.270 al-Hajjaj 3ntered al-Kufa in Hajab, 
7 5 .The tenure of o f f ic e  of Ine interim goveroor*Kh£lia, 
whom Bishr had nominated to succeed him*i3 said to be 
’about two months.’(M on .2 6 6 ) .S u r e ly , i t  must have lasted  
much longer than that because the death of Bishr i s  
almost certain ly  an event o f  the year 74. (The report of 
al -  «'aqldl in Tao. 2/852* 8 that Bis^r died in 73  ^i s  
increuible.Wellhausen has also rejected i t  as ‘ impossible.*  
Well. p .228,note 1). Yet the report i s  a d e a r  h int  
that tne death o f  Bishr occurred only towards the d o se  
of the year 74.
that * he should be considerate to al-Muhallab and appoint 
him to the corcmancl of the war against the ^.zariqa because 
he was a brave and experienced chief, and also reinforce  
him with e ight thousand sen from al-Kufa. *(1)
Although Bishr also appears to have had some previous 
grudge against al-Mihallab(2) yet  i t  wa3 th is  l e t t e r  from 
Slbd al-Malik which was d ir e c t ly  responsible for  h is  
developing a v iru lent enmity against him, Bishr resented  
very keenly that al-Muhallab should receive hi3 conmando 
d ir e c t ly  from the EhalTfa and not from him. He became so 
sp ite fu l  against al-Mihallab as i f  the l a t t e r  had done him 
any wrong(3). In indignation he 3aid, " Surely I w i l l  k i l l  
him. "(4) Ms a b. ilusair, h is minister who was ir ien d ly  
disposed towards al-Muhallab, counselled moderation to him 
saying that ' al-Muhallab was a man of honour, proven 
bravery and l o y a l t y . ’ Yet Bishr’ s animosity remained unabated, 
so much so that k§l3a b. Hus a ir  and <Ikrima, b* Mb<i f e l t  
i t  necessary to write to al-Muhallab to advise him that on 
Bishr's entry in a l -Basra he should see him only in such a 
manner as would not d isc lose  h is  id e n t ity  to him. Accordingly 
when Bishr entered al-Basra al-Mihallab rode an ass and 
greeted him in a multitude o f  people.A l i t t l e  la t e r  when
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(1).Kam. 662.
(2 ) .  cf. the words in 13. 2/76 1
(3 ) ,  Tab. 2/856,5.
(4 ) .  Earn. 662*
Bishr fid830d al-Muhallab among the people who came 
to v i s i t  him, he inquired, • lh a t  has happened to your Himir 
al-Muhallab ?* He was to ld  that al-Muhallab had already  
greeted him and that he was i l l .
Bishr would not la g  behind Khalid in h is  disregard 
for the express orders of ^bd al-Malik, While a l-B ihallab  
kept away from him, Bishr appointed (1) Talid b. Khalid o 
lead the campaign against the Mzraqites. Valid met l.he same 
fate as had befallen  *Abd al^Azis on a previous occasion. 
Bishr then appointed another man who also fa i led  to achieve 
anything. A^bd a l-^ a lik  now wrote to Bishr in a sim ilar  
stra in  as he had done to o*1 the defeat of <Abd a l -
^ z iz *  denouncing him for  h is  ind iscretion  and chastis in g  
him for n eg lec tin g  h is  orders. Bishr,however,remained 
unaffected and stuck to his  oisn view. When the menace 
assusBd alarming proportions and Biihr was constrained to 
look for a capable commander hia p r o c l iv i t i e s  were s t i l l  
against al-Muhallab. He thought of choosing <TJmar b. 
^Ubaidullah b. 18a<mar for the ta sk (2 ) ,  but before doing so 
he was wise enough to confer with his  advisers on the subject.
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(1 ) .  Thus I S .2/76 al-Mas*UdI also mentions (5/290) that 
one or two ( vide variant under note i )  expeditions  
were sent and defeated before al-Mihallab was 
approached to accept the leadership. Al-Mas., however, 
ascribes the in i t ia t iv e  for these unsuccessful 
expeditions to <Abd al-Mallk which seems imorobable.
(2) .  Kam. 663.
>N*Wk> b. Kharija encouraged him in his defiant a ttitude  
saying that he was f u l ly  e n t it le d  to act according to h is  
own d iscretion . Ifila b. ilusair (1) was conscientious enoujh 
to warn him that the Jaliph would not tolerate insubordina­
tion and that there wa3 no denying the fact that a l -  
Muhallab stood unequalled as regards honour, prestige and 
experience which remained unaffected by Bishr*s opposition  
or disfavour. Msa also advised him that i f  he had any 
complaint against al-Muhallab, then the proper course 
was to ask for  an explanation from him so as to be sure 
of h is  g u i l t  or innocence. The third adviser, ^krima b* 
Bib*! (2) h i t  upon a via media and suggested a p lausib le  
move which at once commended i t s e l f  to Bishr. \oting on 
h is  suggestion, Bishr wrote to <Abd al-Hal lie informing 
him that al-l&ihallab was i l l  and that i t  was not d i f f i c u l t  
to find an equally worthy substitu te  for him. Bishr also  
dispatched a mission under the leadership of A bdullah  b. 
Hakim al-Mijashi^i to take th is  l e t t e r  to ‘Hbd a l-F a lik .
On reading the l e t t e r ,  *Abd al-Malik spoke privately to 
451 Abdullah b* Hakim and a f te r  expressing h is  confidence in 
his honesty and prudence, invited him to suggest a man 
who, in his opinion, was best f i t t e d  to conduct the war 
against the Azraqites. Abdullah unhesitatingly  suggested
I S f
( 1 ) . I 3 .£ /7 7 .  Musa's advice i s  not mentioned in Kam.
(2)*I<hus in Kam. 663. According to 13. 2/77. ^Ikrima's 
view was identica l with that of >Asma>.
the name of al•Miihallab and also assured <Abd al-Mal ik 
that h is  i l ln e s s  would not prevent him from assuming the 
command. The intrigues of Bishr were now clearly  la id  bare 
before <A.ba al -l£al ik . In disapu ointment be sa id ,  * Bishr 
wanted to do the same that Khalid ha.d done." Then he wrote 
to Bishr enjoining upon him to invest al-Muhallab with the 
comnand, emphatically s e t t in g  out h is  superior merits and 
prescribing, most probably as a precaution against h is  
i n t r ig ie s ,  every d e ta il  o f  the manner in which help was 
to be rendered to al-Muhallab. In the l e t t e r ,  which re flec ted  
very v iv id ly  the h i^ i  esteem in which al-riihallab -as held  
by A^bd al-Malik, the l a t t e r  gave the following instructions  
to Bishr:-
1 Send al-J&ihallab at the head of the people of 
his  town to f ight the 'Aaraqites and allow him a free hand 
in the choice of c h ie f s ,  distinguished horsemen, and men 
of rank and experience from among the pecrole o f  h i s  town 
because he knows them very well. Leave everything about 
the war o^ h is  unfettered d iscretion  for I have f u l l  tru st  
in h i s  experience and in the s in c e r i ty  of h is  wishes for  
the Muslims.Also you should dispatch a powerful contingent 
of the Kufans under the command of a strong and prominent 
noble man of outstanding prowess and experience in war.
Then the people of the two c i t i e s  (a l-Basra and al-Kufa) 
should pursue the ’Azraqites wherever they went t i l l > All ah 
exterminates t h e y ' d ) .
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Bishr now rea lised  that he could not with impunity 
go against the repeated orders oi' the Oaliph. He, therefore, 
extended the o f fe r  to al-Mihallab who readily accepted i t  
notwithstanding hi3 i l l n e s s .
According to the report in 13 .(2 /77 ) ,  al-Mihail ab* a 
constant friend and bene facto r, Sfisa. b. jiufairjhnd succeeded 
in hi3 attempts to bring about a recon cil ia t ion  between 
Bishr and al-Mihallab and i t  was only a f te r  a l-tuha llab  
had cleared his p osit ion  to Bi3hr that the l a t t e r  agreed 
to appoint him to h is  former post. But the enmity of a l -  
Fuhallab was already so deep-rooted in the malignant heart 
of Bishr that the recon cil ia t ion  could only be a ca3e of  
making virtue of a n ecess ity .  JSver since his f i r s t  outburst 
of indignation at the d irect  appointment of al-Muhallab,
Bishr had never relaxed h is  determination to k i l l  al-Muhallab 
only i f  he could la y  h is  hands upon him.
During the days of hi.3 estrangement with Bishr, 
al-fMhallab once happened to be a l l  alone in some lonely  
quarter of the land which was his own property. A man 
•went up to Bishr and informed him of the unique opportunity 
to k i l l  al-Muhallab when he was unguarded and unacoompr;ined 
by any of h is  tribesmen. Bishr at once dispatched r c dy 
of horsemen for the purpose. Al-Mahallab,however, was 
saved only through the prompt action of :Hsa -ho happened 
to be with Bishr at the ime and #to dispa ched n s la v e ,  
promising him freedom i f  he outstripped the horsemen of
3ishr» to al-r&ihallab to v/am him in the niok of time 
against the danger to h is  l i f e .  Al-Muhallab had already 
f le d  when the horsemen of Bishr reached the spot. This
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incident in conjunction with the origin of the enmity and 
other circuoBtances make3 i t  clear that i t  was not a case 
of genuine misunderstanding which could be removed by 
bringing both sides together, the subsequent conduct of  
Bishr as recorded in Kam. and Tab. leaves  no doubt that  
i t  was only under duress that he to lerated  the appointment 
of al-Muhallab whom he had opposed so vehemently and 
con sis ten tly .  The f ire  of enmity s t i l l  remained smouldering 
under the ashes of help lessness  and expediency.
Al —MaarSIdx also  records (5/291) the conclusion between 
al-Mihallab and <Abd a l-S a lik  of an agreement not very 
d issim ilar  to that concluded between him and al-Quba* and 
the Basran chiefs on a former occasion. I t  is  said that 
%
a l-lu h a llab  demanded from <kbd al-Malik two guarantees a3 
a condition precedent to hi3 acceptance of the leadership  
of the canpaign against the >Azariqa.He asked, f i r s t ,  that 
he be granted the entire  revenue of a l l  the land wrested 
by him from the hands o f  the ^Azariqa, and, secondly, that 
he be assured o f  a supply o f  troop reinforcements »<;lbd a l -  
Mal ik objected to the f i r s t  item on the ground that i t  
was derogatory to the p restige  and the prerogatives o f  a 
king because i t  was tantamount to the i;rant of a share in 
the kingdom. M»Muhallab, thereupon, agreed to w hittle  
down h is  demand f i r 3 t  to two thirds and then to a h a lf  o f  
the revenue and firniLy refused to lower i t  any further.
As for the second item, i t  could not obviously be objected  
to on any reasonable ground. Al-Mihallab categorica lly  
affirmed that i f  there was any h itch  in the supply of 
reinforcements then he w i l l  consider him self absolved
IS  8
of a l l  re sp o n s ib i l ity  io r -  the conduct of the campaign,
I t  was quite consistent with the nature, the methods 
and the p ast  character o f  al-Muhallab to have in s is ted  on 
the fu lf ilm ent o f  the above conditions before he agreed 
to take upon himself the leadership o f  a major carapaiji.
These terms were e s s e n t ia l ly  the same as put forward by 
him to the Basrans at an e a r l ie r  date with s l ig h t  modifica­
tions to s u i t  the changed circumstances o f  the time. I5ven 
the circumstances were not very d if feren t .  On e ith er  
occasion, the Azraqites had defeated more than one 
expedition sent against them and had advanced as far as 
al-^iihwaz and al-Furat. Bishr wa3 a l l  alone in h is  enmity 
of al-Mihallab and in th is  respect h is  posit ion  was analogous 
to that o f  .731 ik b. Misma .^ liven now as before, the 
general cry of d is tre ss  on the l ip  of the Basrans was no 
other than " al-Muhallab.'’ ^bd a l -Malik stood in as 
great a need o f  his serv ices  a.s did al*Qiiba< and the Ba3ran 
ch ie fs .  I t  i s  thus clear that in the present case a l -  
Muhallab wa3 in as strong a p osition  to d ic ta te  terms as 
he was on the former occasion. The main purpose underlying  
the terns cannot be sa id  to be s e l f i s h .  Al-Muhallab's 
ch ief  anxiety on both the occasions was to ensure that h is  
plans for  the conduct o f  a prolonged campaigi should not 
su ffer  e ith e r  from lack of material resources or from 
interference by any other authority. The recent experience  
of the jealous in tr ig ie s  and the o b stru ct io n is t  ta c t ic s  
adopted by Khalid and h is  successor Bishr must have done 
a great deal to strengthen his b e l ie f  in the n ecess ity  and
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wisdom of such a oourse. In the present case, no doubt# 
i t  was p articu lar ly  necessary that al-Mahal lab should 
secure for him self immunity from the intrigues of Bishr 
and the means to conduct the carqsaigp unhampered and 
independently. Al--Bahai lab* s en$)hasis on the second term 
that <Abd al-Malik him self should guarantee a supply o f  
reinforcements betrays an apprehension of an a t t e s t  on 
the part of Bishr to withhold or to delay them which was 
amply ju s t i f i e d  by the subsequent a ttitu de o f  Bishr.
<Abd a l - M i k ’ s objection to granting the en tire  
revenue was indeed very d if fe ren t  from that of al^AJjnaf 
on the former occasion and i t  may very well be taken as 
ch a ra c ter is t ic  of the s p ir i t  o f  the Umayyid sovereigns.  
Unlike al^Ahnaf, *Abd a l -Malik was anxious not to see 
that the wealth of  the whole Muslim commnity be not  
appropriated unlawfully by a s in g le  individual»however 
great and serviceable  he may be, but to safeguard h is  own 
imperial authority and in terests  aga inst the l e a s t  
semblance of encroachment from any quarter, Al-Muhallab 
who had never had 3uch wild and preposterous aspirations  
was ready to make an allowance for i t  and hence he lowered 
his demand to one h a lf  o f  the revenue. In practice ,howe ver, 
al-Uuhallab seems to have been l e f t  in oontrol of the 
entire  revenue. I t  i s  just possible that <Abd a l - i k l ik  
should have allowed the agreement to remain p r a c t ic a l ly  a
dead le t ter *  Towards the end of the cangpaign, we hear of  
al-Muhallab’s authority being circumscribed to the two 
d is t r ic t s  of ^ s ta ^ ir  and Darabjizd but we never hear o f  
his contributing one h a lf  of the revenue to the State
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treasury* On the other hand h is  warning to Yazid 
at the -conclusion o f  the carapaiigi that the position  
had chan^d from what i t  had been before so that 
thenceforward he oould have only such amount out 
o f  the revenue of Karman as al-Hajjaj was pleased  
to allow him ( in fra  p. 2 4 9 ) ,  i s  a proof to the 
contrary. As for the secsond demand, <Abd al-Mal ik ’3 
keen personal in te r e s t  in arranging reinforcements 
for al-Muhallab as evidenced in h is  elaborate  
instructions to Bishr* shows that i t s  v a l id ity  
was accepted without question*
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a h a p  t e r  r n .
OAVPkKM AGAINST THE IZARlQA .
Fourth Period. 74-78.
F ir s t  Phase Under Bisfcp: b. Marwan.
Although <Abd al-Malik had taken p articu lar  care to jive  
al-Muhallab a free hand in the choice of so ld iers  and to leave 
everything connected with the expedition to his unfettered  
d iscret ion , yet  a disgruntled and w ilfu l subordinate could not 
f a i l  to find a loop-hole or two to s a t i s fy  hi3 own personal 
grudge. In obedience to the orders o f  the Khalifa, Bishr 
ordered that the reg is ters  be taken to al-BJSuhallab so as to 
f a c i l i t a t e  h is  choice of so ld iers  for  the expedition. Al- 
Mihallab deputed Judai* b. Sa^Id b. Qabisa b. Sarraq al-A zdl,  
maternal uncle of his own son YazTd, to do the work of se lec t io n  
fo r  h im (l).  But Bishr was determined to hamper a free choice.
He refused to give e f f e c t  to the choice of al-Muhallab and 
reserved for himself a great number of the so ld iers  whom a l -  
Muhallab had chosen. .Further, with a view not to g£ve him 
s u f f i c ie n t  tin© for  f u l l  preparations, he ordered al-Muhallab 
to quit al-Basra within three days (2 ) .
Hitherto, the reaction o f  al-Mihallab to the malicious 
in tr igues  both of Khalid and of Bishr had consistently  been 
one o f  d ign ified  indifference. He behaved throughout as i f  he 
refused to take note of the s in i s t e r  moves against hinuNever
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/8 5 6  , 2.
( 2 ) .  Kam. 663.
did he stoop to protest  against, or to m r i i r  at, the obvious 
in ju st ice  o f  which he was a constant victim e ith e r  in public  
or even in private . Never did i t  occur to him to requite e v i l  
with e v i l  and to launch any counter-move against his un­
provoked enemies. This attitude was oonanendable, indeed, 
but only so far  as h is  personal in te r e s ts  were concerned.
No sooner did he assume the formal command o f  the campaign 
than i t  became clear that any further intrigues were bound 
to a f fe c t  ser iou s ly  the very fortunes of war. Now a l -  
Muhallab's sense o f  duty prompted him to press home the 
adverse e f f e c t  of these intrigues on the progress of the 
expedition in a way that was most l ik e ly  not to slander  
his opponents but to yield  useful re su lts .  Two such incidents  
are recorded in Kam. ( 663) which afford us a proof not 
only of al-iHuhallab’ s honesty o f  purpose but also his great 
f l a i r  for turning every t r i f l i n g  opportunity to his  
immense advantage.
While al-Muhallab was a t Shahartaq on h is  way to meet 
the ’Azraqites, an old man of 3anu Tamim came to him with 
the p e t it ion  that he be excused from m ilitary service on 
the ground of old  age. Al-Muhallab granted him his p e t it io n  
but only on condition that he served him in another way. 
Al-l!uhallab deputed him to say to the 7mir ( i . e . ,  Bishr) 
when he harangued the people to e n l i s t  for war, "How do 
you exhort us to war while you keep back the noble chiefs  
and chivalrous warriors from us ?M The old man did 
accordingly whereupon Bishr sa id , " 'That have you to do 
with i t  ?* " Nothing" replied the man whose only purpose was 
to f u l f i l  the promise that he had given to al-Muhallab.
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Sim ilarly , al-Mihallab gave one thousand dirhems 
to a man for the only service that he should o^ to Bishr 
and urge upon him the n ecess ity  of re-in forc ing  al-Mihallab  
with p olice  and m ilitary  force, Bishr again asked him,"'/hat 
have you to do with i t  ? ■  In reply the man said that he 
only wanted to convey a sincere advice for the ben efit  of  
the 3mir and the Mislins and that he was never l ik e l y  to 
do the sans thing a second time. Such protests  and exhorta­
t io n s ,  coming as they did from apparently d is in terested  
men, could not go without e f f e c t .  Al-Mihallab's one thousand 
dirhems were w ell-spent when Bishr sent him a reinforcement 
consisting  of both the police  and the m ilitary.
Assuming the command of the campaign for the fourth  
time, al-Muhallab s e t  out from al-Basra to meet the Azarina* A
who had advanced as far  as al-Furat, leaving al^Ahwai behind 
them. In the meantime that al-Mihallab was advancing towards 
the ^ sraq ites ,  Bishr, in compliance with the orders of <Abd 
al-M alik, wrote to h is  deputy in al-Kufa, '‘Amr b. Huraith, 
to raise an army e igh t thousand strong under the coomand of  
^bdur Rahman b. Idk^naf al-^Azdi and to dispatch i t  to help  
al-15ihallab. Accordingly the contingent l e f t  al-KUfa to 
proceed to the front via al-Basra.
Vhile ^bdur Hahman b. l/ikhnaf was at a l-3asra  on h is* — i
way to join a l-B iha llab , Bishr gave another proof o f  h is  
abiding rancour which ms strong enough to sweep aside a l l  
scruples o f  honesty and fa irp lay  no l e s s  than the v ita l  
in te r e s ts  of s ta te  and coranunity. He invited  ^vbdur Hahmah 
to a private talk and, a f ter  f la t te r in g  him with high
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compliments, indulged in preaching d isa ffe c t io n ,  d is lo y a lty  
and treachery to the would-be comrade of al-i£uhallab. He 
exhorted him to defy al-Muhallab and to work for hi3 fa ilu re .
The response o f  the fa ith fu l  >Azdibe, however, was only that
o f  contempt * for the youth who, instead of exhorting him to 
f ig h t  the enemy and to work for the in terests  o f  the Muslin®, 
in c ited  him to betray h is  om  * >ibn r^am (cousin, meaning 
al-Mihallab who was also an>Azdito). When pressed by Bishr
for a reply, he only said " I cannot but obey you in a l l
matters that I l iked  and that I d is l ik e d ”, but came out 
b it t e r ly  resenting the preposterous f o l l y  of young Bishr in 
trea tin g  him, an old man, as i f  he were a fool who could 
e a s i ly  be seduced or taken i n . ( l )
As soon as the 'Azraqites learnt of the approach o f a l -  
Mihallab, they withdrew from al-Furat without a f ig h t .  Al- 
Muhallab pursued them as far as Suq al-^liwaz and thence to 
i^maHurmuz where he entrenched him self with a Jitch and a fter  
an engagement in which his 21-year-old 3on, Yazid, took a 
prominent part, in f l ic te d  a heavy defeat on the enemy(2).
The defeat of the ^zraqites at Ramaliurnuz seems to have 
been very serious because i t  immediately roused in the camp 
of a l - M u h a l l a b  a hope o f  their  speedy end. When al~Mihallab 
showed his determination to pre33 the advantage and dispatched 
his son al-Mughlra to pursue the enemy Ao had repaired into
( 1 ) .  Tab# 2/Q56 /  Kam. 664.
( 2 ) .  Kam. 664.
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Fars, ^bdur Kaliman b. 3ubh said to him, *0. I'kdr, i t  is  no« * «
wisdom to do away with these dogs because in that case you 
w il l  have to s i t  id le  in your home. Hather i t  i s  better that 
you should procrastinate with them and make your l iv in g  
through them." To th is  tempting suggestion which any s e l f i s h  
man would have gladly adopted* al-Mihallab rep lied , 9 This 
i s  not fa ith fu ln e s s .  *( 1)
This s ig n if ic a n t  incident mist be bo me in mind throughout 
our s budy of al-13uhallab's conduct during the next three or 
four years. I t  constitu tes  an advance refutation o f  the mis­
g ivings that sometinBS agitated the mind of the s te m  alHtfajjaj 
who seems to have had a vague suspicion that al-Muhallab was 
d elib era te ly  deferring with the Azraqites in order not to lose  
his important p o s it io n .  There can be no doubt that the abo ve 
reply was a genuine manifestation of a permanent t r a i t  in 
the character o f  al-Muhallab because i t  m3  lmde unostenta­
t io u s ly  to a colleague who was obviously an ardent friend 
of him. I t  i s  an undeniable evidence of al-Mihallab*s iron 
character, his high sense o f  duty and h is  unimpeachable honesty 
of purpose.
While at RamaHurmuz, a l- lu h a lla b  was joined by *Abdur 
Ralman b. Mikhnaf who is reported to have pitched h is  camp 
at a distance o f  one or one and a h a lf  mile from that of a l -  
Mihallab so that the two armies stood within s igh t  o f  each 
other (2 ) .
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(1 ) .  Kam. 664, 14.
(2 ) .  Tab. £/857,9. The account in Kam. (£G4) leaves the time 
of >Ibn Mikhnaf's jo in ing al-Mihallab rather vague.
Al- Hihallab had passed barely one month (1) andMbn
Mikhnaf just ten days (2) at Hamallur m z  when there came the 
news o f  Bishr1 s death at a l -Basra. This news had a very 
aggravating e f f e c t  on the d isc ip l in e  of the two armies 
particularly the I®fan army. The so ld iers  did not l ik e  the 
idea o f  being long in the f i e l d ,  far  away from th e ir  wives 
and children, they ’were only waiting for a favourable opportuni­
ty to ge t  back to the easy and luxurious l i f e  uMch they were 
accustomed to enjoy at home. Hence they proved only too ready 
to take advantage of the weakness of the local ‘overawnt due 
to the disappearance of i t s  permanent head. The Kufan army 
was the f i r s t  to d is in tegrate . The leaders of three out of 
the four tr ib a l d iv is ion s  of which that array was composed, 
defected and l e f t  the camp without permis3ion(3). The 
contagion soon spread among the Basrans also. 7e have already 
seen that i t  was against the very grain of al-Muhallab to 
force any one to f ig h t  on his side unwillingly. oreover, 
i t  was w ell-n igh impossible .and certa in ly  u se le ss  and 
inexpedient in the present circumstances to apply compulsion. 
Hence* he resorted to persuasion but the words he used on 
the occasion bear the stamp of his ingenuity. Addressing the 
Basrans, he sa id , " Your posit ion  i s  d ifferen t  from that of
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(1)Kam. 664,14.
(2 )  Tab. £/857,10. Thus >1 bn I'ikhnaf must ho.ve joined a l -  
ttahallab a f te r  the l a t t e r  Sad been in KamaHurmuz for  
twenty days.
(3).T ab.£ /857 , 13 3eq.
the Kufans. You are f ig h t in g  in defence of your own c i ty ,  
property and women, *( 1) This grim warning found a response 
among a section  o f the so ld ier s  but s t i l l  very many o f  them 
decamped. Al-Muhallab and bn liikhnaf continued in Kamaliurnuz 
with a handful o f  so ld iers  t i l l  the arrival o f  al-H ajjaj a 
short time afterwards(2 ) ,
The three Kufan ch ie fs ,  along \dth the multitude o f  
other deserters , gathered at al^Ahwas with the intention of 
proceeding to al-Basra. But before they could do so, they 
received a long l e t t e r  from Khalid b. Abdullah, the acting  
governor o f  al-Basra, in which he threatened them with death 
i f  they did not at once return to th e ir  Gan$. No doubt, the 
l e t t e r  was received with jeers and booings but i t  had the 
e f f e c t  of diverting the intransigents s tra ig h t  to al-Kilfa.
The prefect  of al-Kufa, <Amr b. Huraith, a lso  prohibited  
th e ir  entry into the town. They, however, disregarded the 
ban and entered the c i t y  under cover o f  darkness where they 
remained t i l l  the arrival of a l-H ajja j(3 ) .
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(2 ) .  Kam. 665,7-6.
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c h  a p t a  r  m i .
CONDITIONS UNDBR AL-HAJJAJ B. YUSUF.%
The death of 3ishr, although i t s  inmediate e f f e o t  
was a temporary breakdown of a l - l ih a l la b * s  w ar-effort,  
proved in the long run to be a b le ss in g  in every respect,
I t  rid al-Muhallab of the malignant jealousy which not 
only a ffected  h is  l i f e  and personal in terests  but also  
caused an inh ib ition  of the much-needed assistance for the 
prosecution of the campaigja. This alone, however, was not 
s u f f ic ie n t  for  an in te n s if ic a t io n  of the war. the hope of 
an improvement in the s itu a t io n  la y  only in the appointment 
of a worthy successor, fortunately , <Kh6 al-Melik did not 
agree to confirm Khilid b. ^Abdullah, the nominee of the 
deceased Bishr, whose h s o t i l i t y  towards si-J'uhallab we have 
already known. The lucky choice f e l l  on a l-ija jja j  b. Yusuf, 
the right man of the hour for the truculent province, who, 
whatever may be the view about the moral ad m iss ib ility  of 
his  methods, was singularly  adept in reducing the rebels  
to obedience and evolving order from chaos*
I t  is  the generally  accepted view that al-Hajjaj was 
at alHMadlna* where he had been gpvemor of al-Hi jaz»when 
he received the orders of Hbd al~Malik transferring him 
to the governorship o f  al-^Iraq. Accordingly he proceeded 
to al-Kufa straightaway from al-Madina (1 ) .  Mas., however*
( i ) .  Tab. 2/863,14; Anon. 267, 2 ; IAth. 4 /  182, 7.
records a d ifferen t  account of the circumstances of h is
appointment ih ich  i s  lacking in other sources. vccordin ; 
to i t  (D ^A bd al-Malik had appointed to the javemorship  
of al-Basra 1 a weak man* who did not rentier fa l l  aid to %
al-Muhallab with the resu lt  that the Azraqites pushed 
forward t i l l  they reached al-Furat. Al-riihallab, thereupon, 
made a strong representation to <Abd al-Malik saying that 
he had no troops l e f t  with him and that i f  he received no 
reinforcements, he would be conpelled to give up contesting  
the forward inarch o f  the Azraqites and to leave the way to 
al-Basra open to them. This led <Abd a l -I.’a l ik to decide 
that Khalid, whose incompetence and bungling with the 
administration were already well-knov®. to him, should 
in&ediately be replaced by a competent and strong man.He, 
therefore, offered the post to the grandees present at h is  
court, of whom al-H ajjaj alone had the courage to con© 
forward and undertake the onerous charge.
Now the 1 weak man' referred to in the above report 
can e a s i ly  be id en tif ied  with Khalid b. *Abdullah* the 
immediate predecessor of a l-H ajjaj whose weakness was 
amply proved by his ignominious fa ilu re  to force the 
deserters from al-Muhallab* s army to go back to the front. 
That al-Muhallab in his u t ter  help lessness shculd have 
written to ^bd al-Malik in the manner described in the 
report, is  quite understandable and p art icu lar ly  consistent  
with the previous report in Mas. i t s e l f  that *Abd al-Malik 
had personally guaranteed a regular supply of troops to a l -  
Muhallab before the l a t t e r  consented to assume the command.
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(1 ) .  Mas. 5/291,4 seq.
Further, the presence of al-Hajjaj at the court of *Abd al -
I'alik about the tin© o f  the death of Bishr and his own 
appointment, to the governorship o f  a l - ^ r a q ,  which is  the 
only  feature of the report that can be held o m il i ta te  
aga in st  i t s  v era c ity ,  i s  corroborated by a report in Anon. 
(6 9 ,1 )  where i t  i s  expressly  asserted  that a l-H ajja j  proceeded 
to al-Kufa from Syria whither he had been on a v i s i t  to <Abd 
al-M alik. Thus the report in Mas. i s  credible enough to be 
taken as f i l l i n g  a gap in the account o f  o ther  a u th o r i t ie s .
Armed with h is  l e t t e r s  patent as the governor of the 
whole o f  a l - <Iraq, ( exc lud ing , o f  course, Khurasan and 
S i j i s t a n ) , a l - i la j ja j  entered al-Kufa on a Friday in the 
month o f  3ajab, 75 A.H. (1) Soon a f t e r  i i is  entry  he delivered  
to the 133 fan a a powerful speech which i3 s t i l l  r0 m  mbe ro d 
for  i t s  roaring and thundering oratory. In i t ,  he s e t  forth  
in unequivocal terms h is  determination to rule with an iron 
hand and to brook no d isresp ec t  for  law and authority ,  'using  
sword where h i s  predece3sors used ohe r o d .’ Then re ferr ing  
to the most urgent problem of the hour, he swore by ^ ‘lah  
that he would put to 3word a l l  such deserters who f a i l e d  to 
re jo in  the camp o f  al-i£uhallab within a l i m i t  o f  three days. 
Further in pursuance o f  the above declaration  he prom lgated  
a number of  prompt and s t e m  measures whioh l e f t  no doubt as 
to h i s  earnestness about i t .  i'or in stance ,  he ordered h is
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(1 ) .  Friday: Anon. 274»2 : Kajab, 75; Anon. 270,1; ex. Tab. 
2/944,9 . In Tab. 2/372,9 i t  i s  placed as la te  as in the 
month of Hama<J*n but. that ia impossible. The chronology 
of subsequent events does not allow that.
dhief o f  the P o lice  to wield h is  sword as fr ee ly  as a 
rod a f t e r  the expiry o f  the three days1 l i m i t  and alio  
enjoined upon the ’t lra fa* ’ to produce before him 
c e r t i f i c a t e s  from al-M ihallab to the e f f e c t  that th e ir  
men had joined the co lours(1 ) .
Thus the f irn n ess  of resolve with which a l-H ajjaj  
emphasised h i s  threats worked l ik e  a magic wand in 
e f f e c t i v e l y  cowing the Eufans. 111036 whose duty i t  was 
rushed with a l l  speed to join si-Mahal 1 ab, not delaying  
even so much as to take th e ir  luggage which they l e f t  
behind to be sent afterwards( 2 ) .  I t  i s  reported that even 
new bridges had to be i mprovised for the passage of the 
large  number o f  returning troop s.{3)
From al-KEfa al-Haj ja j  proceeded to al-Basra  
where he delivered  a s im i la r  speech in which he again 
gave three days to the people to join r l - ' s ih a l la b ,  
threatening  the d efau lters  with death (4 ) .  But the Basrans 
did not w ait  fo r  any 3uch express orders which they had 
already an tic ip a ted  from the news o f  the events a t  a l -  
Kufa. TSbst of them had l e f t  fo r  the front even before 
’ he ar ri val o ? al -Ha j j a j (5) .
( 1 ) .  Kam. 665; Anon. 270; Tab. 2/866.
( 2 ) .  Mas. 5 /301,9  ; Kam* 66S'.
( 3 ) .  Mas. 5/300.
(4 ) .  Anon. 276*1.
(5 ) .  Kam. 666.
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As a resu lt  o f  these s te m  measures which were 
executed both in al-Kufa and si-Basra with a m erciless  
in s is ten ce  on the l e t t e r  of the ukase, there was a 
stampede at the bridge o f  RamaHurmtiz where al-Mihallab  
was s t i l l  camping(i).Within ten days the troops poured 
upon him in such largB numbers (2) that al-Muhallab 
exclaimed* " This new governor of a l - <Iraq i3 r e a l ly  a 
very strong man. Now, certainly* the enemy w il l  be 
su ccess fu lly  fought out. "(3)
Al-Mahal la b  spoke the above words with h is  
ch a r a c ter is t ic a l ly  in te l l ig a n ” and far3igfrted vision .  
What al-Mihallab needed* and what had hitherto been 
lack ing, for  bringing the canpaigi to a successfu l end 
was a 3table and strong provincial government and an 
earnestly  helpful governor. The return of the troops  
was a convincing proof that the e s se n t ia l  need had been
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( 1 ) . Tab.2/874,1 . According; to Mas.5 /2 9 8 ,6 ,a^-Mu^allab 
was at the time at M hft jinQadhaa* a d i s t r i c t  in
the south—west or the province or a l-J ib a l  near the 
border of a l - <Irlq  (Yaq.; Le 3 t r a .2 0 2 ) .This i s  quite  
improbable.
( 2 ) . The continuous in flux  of troops i s  v iv id ly  
described by a poet in the following verses :-
(Anon. 277$
(3 ) .  Mas.5/302; Tab.2 /874 , 1; Anon. 277,1.
f u l f i l l e d  and that a f ina l v ictory was only a matter of  
course. Subsequent events ju s t i f ie d  the confident hope 
of al-M ihsllab and che arrival o f  al-Hajjaj stands out 
as the beginning of the ooneluding phase o f  the campaigi 
against the >laariqa.
At the top of a l l  these measures for the restoration  
of s t r i c t  m ilitary  d isc ip lin e  came a proof in black and 
white o f  a l-H ajja j's  recog iit ion  of the exceptionally  
high and unrivalled  position  of al-Muhallab. Al-Hajjaj 
wrote to al-Mihallab :-
" While Bishr dealt  with you under duress and professed  
that he could do without you, I affirm my need of you.
So show me earnestness in f ig h t in g  your enemy. 'Whomsoever
you suspect of disobedience there* k i l l  him for I w ill
k i l l  a l l  such people here. If  there be here a friend of  
any one who deserted you* l e t  me know of h is  place because 
I propose to puni3h a friend for friend and a namesake 
for  namesake,*(1)
The opening l in e s  of th is  l e t t e r  reveal al-H ajjaj  
as an able administrator who did not b e l i t t l e  the merits 
o f  h i s  subordinates and wa3 ready to recogiise  greatness  
in them. They a lso  show how widespread was the denunciation 
and condemation of the p o licy  that Bishr had adopted 
against a l -Mihallab, In reply al-Muhallab wrote to a l -  
Hajjaj i-
"Here with me there is  none who is  not submissive
and repentant for h is sin . Verily* when the people fear
punishment they hold offenoe as some tiling very great;
1 74
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when they are assured of impunity they trea t  i t  as 
something t r i f l in g ;  and when they despair o f  forgiveness  
they are inc ited  to rebellion . Therefore, send over to 
me those persons whom you have called disobedient because 
they are but chivalrous horsemen and I hope t h a t ’Allah 
may k i l l  the enemy through them."(l)
The above reply bears out very v iv id ly  the fine  
contrast between the po licy  of al-Mihallab and the 
methods of a l-H ajjaj. Al-Hajjaj ruled with an iron hand, 
al-Muhallab with a firm but gentle hand. Al-Hajjaj knew 
no mercy; al-Muhallab’s sense of d isc ip lin e  waa tempered, 
but not corrupted,with consideration and kindness. The 
resu lt  was that ishile al-H ajjaj struck terror , a l -  
Mihallab comnanded love and w il l in g  obedience.
Al-Hajjaj showed extraordinary zeal for  strengthening  
the hands of al-Muhallab and in ten s ify in g  and accelerating  
the campaign against the >Azariqa. Not content with the 
above nBasuras, he him self, along with a number of Basran 
and Kufan c h ie fs ,  moved to r&tstaqabadh in the beginning 
of Shaman, 75 A.H.(2 ) .  Rustaql,ba<ih stood at a distance 
of e igh t  farsakh from al-^Ahwaz and eighteen farsakh from 
the camp of al-Muhallab(3). Al-Hajjaj had carried ou^
( 1 ) .  For Arabic text see Appendix p. r •
( 2 ) .  Tab. 2/874,3 . Ibid 1. 9 has " * but the 
former 3eem3 to be more credible.
( 3 ) .  Anon. 277, 10 j cf .  Tab. 2/874,10.
th is  move with a view to strengthening the rear of a l -  
!&ihallab and he o r ig in a l ly  proposed to stay  there t i l l  
the extermination of the A zraq ites(l) .I i is  p la n s ,however* 
were soon upset by a revolt in which he embroiled 
himself by his untimely announcement to discontinue the 
increase in pay previously granted by Mis<ab b. a l -  
^ubair(2)* Naturally enough th is  unpalatable announcement 
caused a rebellion  which*according to the 3hort account 
in Tab.(2 /8 7 4 ) ,  does not seem to have been a very long  
and serious one.But the detailed  version in Anon.(277 seq) 
which has also been adopted by >11x1 a l JAthIr ( 4/185 seq) 
depicts the incident as a grim episode whioh took several  
months to come to a head and the fe r o c i ty  of which at  
l e a s t  for  a time made the /ery fa te  of a l-H ajjaj tremble 
in the balance. According to the l a t t e r  version the 
f in a l  breach between the rebel3 and the adherents of a l -  
Hajjaj came o f f  only as la te  as in the month of labl<a I I ,
76 A.H. (3 ) .  Ultimately the rebellion  was su ccess fu lly  
crushed and <Abdull‘5,h b. al-JSrud, the head o f the 
rebels , was k illed  along with a number of h is  a sso c ia tes .
This untoward rebellion  was p art icu lar ly  inopportune. 
I t  conpletely defeated the object which al-Hajjaj had
(1).Anon. 279.
( 2 ) . An uniform increase of hundred in the pay, Anon.280*5.
( 3 ) . Anon. 281, l a s t  l in e .
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envisaged in e f f e c t in g  the move to ^ustaqabadh. Instead 
of being a demonstration o f  s o l id a r i ty  and strength i t  
only served to weaken the position  o f  al-Mihallab in  
the eyes of the ^zariq.©, who began to cherish hopes 
of p ro f it in g  thereby. The damaging e f f e c t  o f  th is  
incident wa3,nowe?er, repaired ishen the heads of the 
rebels were sent to ike camp o f  al-Muhallab and displayed  
to public  view a t  HamaHurmzC 1), S t i l l » contrary to 
h is  or ig ina l progranme, al-HajjSj had to cut short h is  
stay at toataqabadh and return to al-Basra,
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( 1 ) .  Tab. 2/874,5; cf .  Anon. 292,2,
C H A P T E R  I f l l l .
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE >AZAK[ QA.
Fourth Period (Continued).
Second Phase: Offensive at Kazarun.
i ith in  a month or 30 of a l-H ajjajf s arrival every thing 
waa ready for a full-blooded offensive against the ^zariqa* 
By express orders of the new gavemor, al-Muhallab and ^bn 
Mikhnaf in it ia te d  a concerted drive on Monday, the 20th 
3ha<ban, 75 A.H with the result that the enemy retired  
from RamaHunnuz without a serious military engagement 1). 
Qatari then thought of entrenching himself and Ms army 
in the inaccessible lo f ty  mountains of Sardan or Saradan on 
the Khuzistan-Fars border , but on the advice of his  
lieutenant %bi da b. Hi 111» moved into 3Ebur -nd encamped at 
Kazarun. Al-Muhallab advanced in his pursuit to ^rrajah and 
thence to 3ardan where he hoped the retreating enemy was 
most l ik e ly  to seek shelter . But finding that Qatari was 
not there, he continued his inarch forward t i l l  he arrived 
at Kazarun in the beginning of the month of Ramac]ah(2).
Both the h osti le  armies now lay in close proximity 
to each other in Kazarun and a major clash was in a ll  
probability quite imminent. Before the battle  oould 3 tart,  
however, al-Muhallab received a le t t e r  from al-Hajjaj
%
(1).Tab. 2/875.
( 2 ) . T ab .a /875 ,li;  Kam. 667.
adnonishing him for having turned to tax-co llecting  to the 
deliberate neglect of military operations. In the le t t e r  a l-  
Hajjaj also thought i t  f i t  to taunt al-Muhallab with his 
descent from al-^Aad and his domicile in T^Jman, both of 
whi ch were generally held in low esteem, and to t e l l  him 
that he had been allowed to continue in the comaand despite 
the presence of Abdullah b. Halam al-lbjashi^I and ^bbad 
b. al-Husain al-Habatl whose claims deserved recognition.
The l e t t e r  concluded with an e x p l ic i t  threat 'that i f  a l-  
Kuhallab fa iled  to launch active operations against the 
enemy at a given time and place then al-Hajjaj would 'aim 
the point of spear at h im .'( i )
This was the f i r s t  of a ser ies  of le t te r s  bearing on 
the same subject but couched in d ifferent tones, 3omBtinBs 
mild and persuasive and at other times har3h and threatening, 
that al-Hajjaj sent to al-lfahallab at intervals during cae 
future course of the canpaiga. Obviously diese le t te r s  
were promp ted by a vague misgiving l e s t  al-Munallab should  
attempt to procrastinate with the ^zariqa in order to main­
tain himself in an advantageous position . The misgiving was 
but the direct consequence of a l-H ajjaj's fa ilure to under­
stand and appreciate the true implications of al-Muhallab' s 
pioneer method of warfare. As a matter of fact, al-Mihallab 
was alone in rea lis ing  that the ^zariqa presented an
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entire ly  new problem and that i t  was quite inpossible to 
exterminate them by a mere succession of f ierce  battles*
Hence he always planned and prepared for a protracted war 
of manoeuvring designed to exhaust the nerves and the 
resources of the enemy with occasional hard knocks aimsd 
at  particularly weak points and delivered at carefully  
chosen and opportune moments.A l-H ajjaj»on the other hand* 
to ta l ly  fa iled  to rise above the common leve l of the 
military generals of the time who could conceive of war 
only in terms of desperate head-on clashes. Thus a l l  consi­
derations of tin®, place and strategy being quite u n in te l l i ­
g ib le to him, he could not but suspect the motives behind 
a protracted war.
Nevertheless i t  m 3t be admitted that the circums­
tances of a l“ISihallab were indeed such as to tempt a dishonest 
and le s s  scrupulous man to seek personal ends at the expense 
of the in terests  of the 3tate. <Abdur B&ha$n h* Subh did
• • •
actually  suggest such a s e l f i sh  oourse to him.Further,his 
particular care to c o l le c t  taxes, which was necessary with 
a view to provide for the heavy financial outlay on main­
tenance and equipment and was also ju s t if ie d  by considera­
tions of consolidating the gains, was enough to lend colour 
to the suspicion about his s e lf ish  m otives.lt  was therefore 
quite natural rather even wise and prudent on the part of a
v ig ilan t master l ik e  al-Hajjaj to see tha a military c i ie f  
should not be tespted to take unfair ad van age of his  
exceptionally high and unrivalled position.But the tone and
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the wordings of th is  f i r s t  le t t e r  were highly offensive and 
taunting and, a3 such, constituted a grave deliberate  
affront to the honour and prestige of a prominent personali­
ty that a l-m hallab  was. I t  was really indiscreet on the 
part of al-Haj jaj to attempt to cow al-Mihallab by the same 
bullying ta c t ic s  that he had adopted with the common people 
as well as le sse r  nobles and petty o f f i c ia l s .  The tone, 
though not the subject, of th is  l e t t e r  was as such a blunder 
aB the previous le t t e r  recognising the merits of al-Muhallab 
was a stroke of administrative wisdom. Al-Mihallab was 
obviously hurt by i t  and even though his 3ons conn3elled 
moderation to hiaa(l), he could not, without compromising 
his se lf -re sp ec t ,  help replying to every point in the same 
coin. He wno ba back to al-Hajjaj that 9 a man iho was 
unable to co llect  the tax would prove 3 t i l l  more inoompetent 
to f igh t  the enemy' and that the two generals named by him, 
i f  appointed to the oommand, would have surely deserved i t  
by virtue of their s k i l l  and experience in war. I t  i s  
remarkable that a l-liiha llab  had nothing derogatory to say 
about h is  r iva ls . Such generous and disyiified attitude is  
quite ch aracter is t ic  of a man so confident of his own 
greatness as to disdain to try to estab lish  i ay indulging 
in s ligh tin g  the merits of others. Answering the taunt of 
al-H ajjaj, a l-lu h a llab  said that ’worse than al^Azd' was 
the tribe ishose geneology remained a matter of dispute and 
was traced to three different or ig ins , th is being a 
reference to a l-H a jja j '3 own tribe of Thaqlf whose origin
1S1
(1 ) .  Kam. 668?13.
was variously ascribed to Qais b, <h i l m ,  la.bi<ajb. Hizar 
and the tribe of fhamd (1 )-  L astly , aft for the threat  
hurled at him, he retorted that i f  al-Hajjaj aimsd the point  
o f  spear a t  him he would on his part ’ turn the outer aide 
of the sh ie ld  towards him* i . e .  would change h is  present  
fr ien d ly  a ttitu de  towards him.
I t  must be noted that cnly a man with a d e a r  cons­
cience could venture to write such a bold and categorical 
reply even returning personal s l ig h ts  in the same coin.
This was ty p ica l ly  the reply of one who was not a t  a l l  
eager to keep himself in a p os it ion  which could not by 
comraan consent be worthily f i l l e d  by any one e ls e ,  Al- 
Mihallab was always ready for service whenever i t  was 
offered to him but, in the words of ^shaq al-3abl4T(2 ) ,  
he never showed an anxiety to secure any p os it ion  for  him­
s e l f .  I t  was the strength of th is  unique p os it ion  that 
made 6ven the b luster ing  al-H ajjaj swallo v up the retort  
with regard to the doubtful orig in  of his tribe and to put 
up with al-M ihallab’s c lear refusal to follow the d irections  
from above against h is  own judgment.
As soon a3 al-Mihallab and >1 bn Mikhnaf a l i^ ite d  at  
KSzarun where qatari was already encamped, preparations 
were afoot in both the opposite camps for  an imminent b a tt le .  
Al-Mihallab’s f i r s t  care was to f o r t i f y  himself with a
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(1 ) .  Ra^iba 8/77 ; see also Ency. 4 /734 ,
(2 ) ,  Isa. 3/535.
ditch . He also  sent a word to h is  comrade >1 bn Hikhnaf whose 
army was encamped separately at K&zar ( which place must 
have stood not very far from Kazarun)#to do l ik ew ise .  But 
^bn likhnaf, l ik e  <\bd a l-A ziz  and ^Tmar b .4Ubaidullah,had 
no prudence to convenient hi3 bravery. His reply was*
" Our ditches are our swords." Al-Mihallab again urged that  
a ditch was necessary as a protection against n ight-attack .  
This t im e>Ibn Mikhnaf’ s son, Ja<far, who would not la g  
behind hi3 father in disasterous over-confi donee, sent the 
arrogant reply, that they bothered as l i t t l e  about a n ight-  
attack as*the breaking of wind by a camel*. Al-Muhallab 
did not i n s i s t  any further but he could clearly see the 
d is a s te r  that was to overtake the auxiliary  Kufan contin_;eni. 
Turning to h is  son al-Migblra he remarked that the Kufans
had fa iled  to take the safe side and had taken up an
en tire ly  wrong a t t i t u d e . ( l )
On Wednesday, the 21st Ramadan, 75 . the two
armies mst and the battle  was a t  i t s  peak soon a f te r  mid-
day(2). Al-luhallab requisitioned succour from^bn Mikhnaf(3) 
who sent a reinforcemsnt under the oaranand of h is  own son 
Ja far. The Kufan warriors, wearing new white robes, took 
a very prominent part in the battle  and proved to be the 
weight that tipped the scales in favour of a l- lu h a llab  
although he and his sons equally distinguished themselves 
by th e ir  prowess. Al-Mihallab had the upper hand of h is
1
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(1 ) .  Tab. 2/875 ; Kam. 667.
(2 ) .  Tab.2 /376,3-5 .
( 5 ) . Kam.668; of. Tab,2/876*5 sea.
menemy when the l a t t e r  retired  from the f i e l d  a fter  su ffer ing  
heavy lo sse s  of k i l l e d  and injured*
Towards the end of the day's battle  Salih b. rilrhraq , 
the Azraqite l ieu ten a n t,  wa3 observed organising a picked 
corps of about four hundred distinguished knights from his  
army. Al-Muhallab could at once guess the purpose behind 
th is  move and remarked to al-Mughlra that i t  could be no 
other than a night-att-ack. Re also knew the vulnerable 
point of hi3 caiqp. When the ^zariqa has retired  for the 
day he dispatched al-Uughlra to supervise the defence of 
the auarter o f  Banu TamTnu The Tamimite ch ief ,  al-Haiiah  
b. H ila l ,  however, sent al-Mxghlra back with the assurance 
that the Emir should not worry on their  account(l) .
At mid-ni^it al •I.Sihallab* s warning to Banu TamTm and 
h is  apprehensions about >Ibn Mikhnaf came out to be pa infu lly  
true. Salih  b, Mikhraq at the head of the same 400 s o ld ie r s ,  
f i r s t  launched a n igh t-a ttack  on the BanH Tamlra but,finding  
them on th e ir  guard,was compelled to retreat. I t  then 
ocoured to the attackers that >Ibn Mkhnaf offered an easy 
target because he was u n fo r t if ied  by a ditch and h is  ranks 
were depleted o f the so ld iers  who had exhausted themselves 
on the side of al-Muhallab during tha day.They also recalled  
the arrogant boast of the Mfans that the Azraqites mattered 
as l i t t l e  to them as the 'breaking of wind by a camel.'So 
they at onoe turned to the can$ of Mikhnaf a t  Kaxax 
which they stormed by surprise, >11*1 Mikhnaf was cau^it
(l).Kam. 668,3-5; 669«
completely unawares so much so that he knew of the attack  
only when the enemy had penetrated far into h is caiqp. He 
encountered the enemy on foo t  * fought him va lian tly  and 
met a warrior’s death, before any help could reach him from 
any quarter. Ja4far b. <Abdur Rahaen #10 had gone to the 
succour of al-Muhallab during the day was s t i l l  in a l -  
Huhallab's camp when he received the news of h is  father's  
d is tr e s s .  Forthwith he rushed to his help but f e l l  in an 
engagement with the Azraqites who blocked h is  way and was 
removed wounded from the f i e ld .  Al-Muhallab also hastened 
to dispatch hi3 3on Habib who succeeded in rep e ll in g  the 
enemy attackers. The next morning a l-m h a lla b  h in s e l f  came 
and personally led  the obsequies of >Ibn Mikhnaf and h is  
co nt> an ions (1 ) .
The above account of the circumstances o f >Ibn Mikhnaf's 
trag ic  end is  recorded in Tab.( 2/875) and i s  further  
amplified and confirmed by a more deta iled  p ara lle l  account 
in Kam. Against th is  generally  accepted version, Tab. records 
(S/876 seq .)  another version ascribed to the Kufans, This 
version of the Kufan3, apart from supplying a few d eta ils  
which have been incorporated in the above account* i s  
obviously an attempt to exonerate themselves and their chief  
of the charge o f  improvidence and overdrawn contempt for  
the enemy and to s h i f t  the resp o n s ib il ity  for the shameful 
d isaster  on to the shoulders of the Basrans.According to 
i t*  when the Azraqites saw reinforcements coming in a
i
( 1 ) .  Kam. 670.
a continuous 31roam to a l- lu h a lla b  from the camp of >1111 
Mikhnaf* they surmised that the posit ion  of ^bn Mikhnaf 
oust be very weak and untenable and forthwith decided to 
take advantage of i t .  Towards evening they l e f t  f ive  or 
s ix  detachments to keep the army o f  al-Mihallab a t  bay and 
turned th e ir  main forces to launch a v io len t attack upon 
the camp of >Ibn Mikhnaf. In the encounter that ensued ft bn 
Mikhnaf was deserted by his people. S t i l l  with a handful 
of fa ith fu l  companions he continued the f ig h t  on a hif*h 
mound t i l l  he was k i l le d  la te  a fter  mid-night.
I t  w i l l  be seen that thi3 account d i f fe r s  from the 
common version only on such points  as were unfavourable 
to the Kufans and cast a s lu r  upon th e ir  name. Thus i t  i s  
but a mere ishitewash. The chief anxiety seem3 to be to 
deny the incident of the n ight-attack  ih ich  could very 
well have been avoided i f  they were wise enough to adopt 
the counsel of al-Muhallab to provide themselves with a 
ditch, further i t  i s  insinuated that al-Muhallab and the 
Basrans remained an in d ifferen t  spectator o f  the massacre 
of the Kufans who had been of such valuable help to them 
during the day. I t  i3  expressly alleged  that only a few 
people responded to the ca ll  of Jsffar b. <Abdur lahmah to 
accon$)any him to the help o f  his father. But he omission 
of the fa c t  that al-Muhallab dispatched Habib mo drove 
back the enemy only betrays a b ia s30d mind#
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All th i8  seems to have been purposely d e s ir e d  to 
refute the condemnation that must have been lev e l le d  against  
the i’ufans for  th e ir  ind iscretion . I t  i s  recorded that 
*Abd al-Malik when he announced the death o f  >1 bn MiMinaf 
severely  c r i t i c i s e d  and denounced the M fa n s ( l ) .  There ia  
every reason to suppose that such denunciation m s t  have 
been general.
There is  no doubt that, as the poet Suraqa b. Mirdas 
complains(2 ) ,  >Ibn Mikhnaf could not be helped by those 
whom he had so generously helped,but the fa c t  s t i l l  remains 
that he courted the d isa ster  by his own ind iscretion  and 
over-confidence. Hi3 p os it ion  was so unguarded that the 
Azraqites took no time in overpowering him and i t  was 
impossible for any help to reach him in time and be of  
much a v a il .
(1 ) .  Tab. 2 /877,9 .
( 2 ) .  Vide h is  elegy on ^bn Mi&maf:-
& t - y - >
J?b ) r-y ^> ^> 3
 ^4I1) d>\ z)y
(Tab. 2/880).
H A P T fi R III.
CAMPAI® AGAINST THE "AZlRlQA.
Fourth Period (Continued).
Third Phase: The L ull.
After the death of *Abdur Rahman b. Mikjinaf the Kufan 
army was amalgamated with the Basran army under al-Mihallab  
who invested with i t s  command h is  son Habib (1 ) .  The Kufans 
had fa l le n  in such disgrace that the Basrans were often  
teupted to upbraid them with the ir  ignominious conduct at  
Kazar. A man is  reported to have taunted Ja^far* the 3on 
o f^ b n  Mikhnaf with the following verse:- .
A l-llihallab, who had no p a r t ia l i t y  for his own 
townsmen, the Basrans, to r e l i s h  the taunts hurled at the 
so ld iery  of the r iva l c ity  of al-KCTfa, f e l t  i t  necessary  
to stop these provocations vsdaich were l ik e ly  to embitter 
the re la tions between the two sections of h is army. He 
consoled the iSafans by saying that they had shown no 
cowardice; only they had disobeyed their  Emir. Further he 
reminded the Basrans that i t  did not l i e  in th e ir  mouth 
to upbraid the KtXfans with th e ir  f l i g h t  because they 
themselves had behaved likew ise at Dulab, had f le d  from 
^thman at Daris (2) and had even deserted himself in 
the past (Kam.671).
(1 ) .  Kam. 670,16.
(2 ) .  The author o f Raghba (8 /81) has taken i t  to refer  to 
<Ut&m§n b. Qayan who was sent by al-Qajjaj against  
Shabib. This i s  an error for various * reason s.F irst ,  *
Habib retained the command of the KSfan army t i l l  
the arrival of ^ tta b  b. ,Varqa>al-RiyahA in the month of 
Jumada I or II o f  the following year* 76 A#H. During this  
period of 3even or e igh t  months, both the contending 
armies lay  opposite each other at 3§bur. Ho major encounter 
i s  recorded and i t  seems that both sides contented themselves 
with occasional skirmishes. An idea of the nature of those 
skirmishes is  afforded by the report of two incidents  
recorded in Kanw 673-4,
1. One night i t  rained heavily  at Sabur where the 
camp o f  al-Mihallab 3tood in such close proximity to the 
Azraqites that only a mountain pass intervened between them. 
Foreseeing danger from the d irection of the mountain pass,  
al-Mihallab asked h is  so ld iers  i f  any of them would come 
forward to keep a watch at i t .  7,hen no response came a l -  
Mihallab himself put on h is  armour and proceeded towards 
the pass, followed by his son al-Mighlra. 3oon the so ld iers  
repented their  inaction. A man called ^Abdullah said*
* The 3mir called upon us to guard the pass in our own
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* ^Uthman b. Qatan was k i l le d  on the river Haulaya . 
near al-Bat ( a 'd i s t r i c t  o f  Baghdad) and not at Daris or 
Barish which according to al-BakrT i s  a place near Masiftqan, 
a v il la g e  in the province o f  al-Basra. A reference to Daris 
in Tab. j/2382, also suggests th a t* it  must be somewhere 
near al-^iwaz.Second, HJtnman b. $itan was k i l le d  so la te  
as on the 10th Qhu 'l-H ijja*  76 A.H.*( Tab. 2/933) whereas 
the words of al-I$ihallab were apparently spoken long before 
that date. Third* considering the occasion and the context,  
the reference can only be to an act of the Basrans and not 
of the Kufans. Hence, i t  can only mean <TJthman b. <Ubaidull'§h 
b. Ma<mar who led  a Basran expedition against the Azraqites 
in Dhu *1-Qa<da, 65 A.H. ^thman b.^Ubaidullah m s k i l led  
and his army put to f l i g h t  in the v ic in i ty  of Dulab (near 
al->Ahwaz).
in te r e s ts  but we did not obey him." Thereupon a number of  
so ld iers  followed him and a l l  of them went to the pa.38 
where they found al-Muhallab and a l-lligk lra  unaccompanied 
by any third person. Seized with gratitude, the so ld iers  
requested al-Mihallab to return to the camp, assuring him 
that they would su ff ic e  him the v ig i l  at the pass. At dawn, 
the Azraqites appeared on the mountain-road but were 
su ccess fu lly  repulsed by Bidrik b. a l-IM iallab with the 
help of a number of brave so ld ie r s .
2. I t  wp.s  the Day o f  al-Nahr ( 10th Dhu *1-Hijja),  
and a l -Mihallab was addressing the people from the pu lp it  
when the Azraqites suddenly swooped down upon them. Al- 
Muhallab was rather piqued that he should be attacked and 
compelled to f ig h t  even on such an auspicious day. i3ut as 
the other side had thought i t  f i t  to take the in i t ia t iv e  
he f e l t  j u s t i f i e d  in r e s is t in g  i t  by every mBana(l).So he 
promptly ordered al-Mighira to meet the attackers. According­
l y  al-2iig$£r& went forth , preceded by 3a<d b. Najd al - 
QurdusI, a knight of proverbial valour, and followed by a 
number of warriors. The Azraqites were su ccess fu lly  repulsed 
but in the encounter al-IfoghTra suffered a f a l l .  Sa<d b.
Najd and Dhubyan a l-3akhtiyanl, along with a number of other 
warriors, defended him t i l l  he was able to ride his horse
once again. In the neantiias,however, a few people f led  and
informed al-Muhallab that al-Mighira had been k i l le d .  Later
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( 1 ) .  CJf. Da in. 285.
on Dhubyih al-3akhtiyani cams with the news that al-Mighira  
was sa fe .  Al -Mihallab was so pleased that he 361 a t  l ib e r ty  
a l l  the slaves that happened to be in h is  presenoe at that  
time.
Al —Eajjaj had already ^iven s u f f i c ie n t  indication of 
his impatience to bring the war against the ’Azariqa to a 
speedy conclusion. I t  ms d i f f i c u l t  for him, far  away from 
the theatre of war as he was, to have a tm e  estimate of 
the r e a l i t i e s  and the l im ita t ion s  of the s itu a tion . The 
prolonged l u l l  a f ter  the storm at Kazarun was s u f f ic ie n t  
cause to make him f r e t  and fume a t  what he suspected to be 
a deliberate attempt on the part of al-i'uhallab to put o f f  
the extermination of the >Azariqa in order to maintain 
himself in an advantageous and lucrative  p os it ion .H e , 
therefore, continued to send reproachful messages and 
spec ia l envoys in order to impress upon al-Mihallab h is  
extreme in d ic a t io n  at the delay and to urge him to give 
up the waiting game for a forc ing  one. Two of such messages, 
the second and the third of the s e r ie s ,  apparently belong 
to the period under review before the arrival o f  fAttab 
b. Warqa>.
1. The f i r s t  of the two envoys was al-.3ara> b. Qablsa 
(b. ^bi ^ q i l  al-Thaqafl). His mission is  also confirmed 
by a deta iled  account in Tab.{2/1004 seq)thou ii there i t  
is  placed in a la te r  d a te ( l ) .  Al-Bara> came to al-Uuhallab
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( 1 ) .  In Tab. tiie mission of al-Bara is  placed afuer al"  
Fuhallab had arrived at J ir a f t  and had wrested tha whole 
of ?£rs from the ^zariqa, i . e . , . a b o u t  one year a fter  the 
departure of^Attab b. **arqa> ( in the beginning o f  '")•_ 
Chronology i s ,  o f  course, often neglected and confused in *
with a 1 e t  te r f  ro m al - Ha j j a j f  ur the r el abo rating  the 
charge that he wanted to make a l iv in g  through the ^zariqa  
because, otherwise, he could e a s i ly  crush them only i f  he 
wished to do so. I t  was further stated that al-Bara> had 
the mission to rouse him to push the offensive  without any 
further delay. The l e t t e r  ended with a warning that a l -  
m hallab  should no more indulge in any lame excuses which 
w i l l  not be acceptable a t  all*
Al-Muhallab had no h es ita t io n  in g iv ing to the 
messenger of a l-B ajjaj a demonstration of the f u t i l i t y  of  
the course of action so strongly,and p ers is ten t ly  urged 
by his overlord. Ho ordered h is  troop3 to move and to 3eek 
an engagement with the enemy.Accordingly, the forces  
advanced in perfect b a tt le  array with proper d isp os it ion s .  
The sons of al-Muhallab were a l lo t te d  a lead ing role and 
every one of them was put in command of a 'division. Al- 
3ara> b. Qabisa watched the b a tt le  from a mound nearby.Men 
attacked men and d iv is ion s  f e l l  upon d iv is io n s;  a bloody 
war raged from the time of morning prayers t i l l  noon when 
there was a short break. In the afternoon, al-l&ihallab
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* Kam. but in the present case i t  appears that the e ig h t  
dispatches of al-Hajjaj are mentioned in order of their  
occurence. Besides‘it, nust .be borne in mind that in the year
77 al-Bara> was acting as the wall of Isfahan  ( 2ab. < /9y4 ,i)  
and also took part in the expedition against a l-M itarr if  
b. a l -M i^ ir a  b. 3iiu< ba( Tab*y996 sen). It is ju s t 'p o ss ib le ,  
although i t  i s  not d e f in i te ly  knom ,that he should nave 
taken m is  appoint men t  in immediate succession to <Attab. 
Hence i t  i s  more l ik e ly  that he 3hould have been sent as 
al-H ajjaj*s emissary before ^ t ta b  joined al-Jlihallab.
again lead the people to b attle , with h is  sons at the 
command of th e ir  respective d iv is io n s ,  and another foray 
l ik e  the previous one fo llow ed(l) .D uring the b a tt le  a l -  
Jfehallab*s so ld iers  l e f t  no doubt as to th e ir  dash and 
tenacity . Even as regards perseverance , they always 
refused to re t ire  unless the Mzariqa were the f i r s t  to leave  
the f ie ld .  But, despite a l l  that, they fa i le d  to make any 
impression upon th e ir  inveterate and fanatica l foe.
This practica l demonstration of earnestness*however, 
served i t s  purpose p erfec tly  w ell.  JUL-Bara* urns convinced 
that the * wait and s e e ’ po licy  of al-Mihallab was not due 
to inert complacency, lack of courage or any s e l f i s h  motive. 
Rather i t  was based on a r e a l i s t i c  estimate of the peculiar  
s itu a tion  in which the ip o te n c y  of mere force was a stark 
r e a l i ty .  I t  was a vain hope to subdue the enemy by rushing 
headlong into a reckless encounter, Giving h is  impressions 
of the previous day's engagements, al-Bara? acknowledged 
to al ""Mahal lab that he had never seen before chivalrous 
knights l ik e  h is  sons or warriors l ik e  his Arab so ld ier s ,  
"Nor", he sa id , “ have I ever knom an enemy more p ers is ten t  
and mightier than the people whom you are fighting*By >Allah» 
your excuse is f u l ly  proved," (Tab.2/1005,4-6).
Al-Mahal lab  then bestowed ten thousand dirhems, loads  
of presents and robes of honour upon al-Bara> and />f® him
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( 1 ) .  Tab, 2/1004 36q. ; Kam. 671 seq .
a hearty send o f f  as b e f it ted  an emissary o f  the jovemor 
o f  a l - zIraq( 1).
On h is  return al-Bara* conveyed to al-Hajjaj h i t  own 
imp res si on as given above and also  the reply o f  al-Muhallnb 
which stated  that he had fa i th fu l ly  carried out the order 
to attempt an offensive  under the eyes o f  the specia l envoy 
who would bear witness to what he had seen as to the outcome 
of i t .  As for  the charts of d e lib era te ly  prolonging the 
campai^i with a s e l f i s h  motive, sl-M ihallab urged that the 
s itu a t io n  was r ea lly  so d i f f i c u l t  a8 not to allow of any 
usefu l move and assured that he deemed i t  a criminal breach 
of h is  moral and relig ious duty to the coianunity, the 
governor and the Khalifa to delay the operations any longer 
than absolutely necessary (2 ) .
The tex t  o f  the above l e t t e r  a3 preserved in Tab.
( S /1006),however, la c fe  a very s ig n if ic a n t  sentence which 
i s  quoted in Kam. 672,4 as having been written by al-Muhallab 
to al-Hajjaj on th is  occasion. I t  was t h i s : " I am loo kin : 
forward to one of three things to b e fa ll  them; quick death, 
d is tress in g  hunger or a s p l i t  in the ir  views."
This affords us a proof that al-Mihallab was throughout 
acting  according to a calculated plan for the extermination
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(1 ) .  Tab. 2/1005.
( 2 ) .  For Arabic t e x t  see  Appendix p. jr  .
of the ^Azariqa. He had thought out a t  such an early  date 
the e f fe c t iv e  means o f  destroying the enemy. I t  w i l l  be 
seen in the fo llow ing p a ^ s  that i t  was a combination of 
the same three causes mentioned above that brought about 
the f in a l  end o f  ohe ^zariqa. Al-luhallab never missed an 
opportunity o f  in f l i c t in g  lo sse s  upon the enemy whenever 
he could do so without massacring his own ranks, he 
gradually extended his control over the raw materials of 
Fars t i l l  his enemy began to fee l  the pinch o f  sca rc ity  
and then f in a l ly  he worked h is  c lever intr igues for dividing  
the ^zariqa amon  ^ themselves.
2* After a short time al-Hajjaj dispatched another 
envoy, al-Jarran b. ^bduIlahC 1), i t t h  a l e t t e r  to a l -  
M ihallab containing a repetition  of the old accusation of 
deliberate procrastination despite superior m ilitary strength. 
Al-Hajjaj, however, made i t  c lear that in h is  opinion the 
delay on tne part of al-Mihallab was not due to any s p ir i t  
of defiance or cowardice but s in g ly  on account of the 
temptation of greater material gain. He, therefore .warned 
him that he would treat him quite d if feren t ly  i f  a b a ttle  
was not undertaken forthwith.
On reading the l e t t e r  al-Fuhallab said to al-Jarrah  
that he had employed every tr ick  and exhausted a l l  moans 
and that in the circunBtances i t  was no surprise that the 
f in a l  v ictory should be delayed. * The stran,'^ thing is*  
he added * i i'ii an an^u iahed h e a r t ,” that the decision should
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(1 ) .  Kam. 674 seq*
l i e  with him who has the au th ority  to enforce i t ,  instead  
of him who is competent enough to judge i t .  "(1) This sentence 
which is  often quoted as a pearl of wisdom, very fa ith fu l ly  
and poignantly depicts ttoe anomaly that al-Hajjaj» by 
virtue of his superior authority, snould seek to dictate  
to al-Mihallab who m s the man on the spot competent enough 
to judge the right course. /U -Mihallab, ho we ver, treated 
a l - Jar rah in the same manner as he had treated  al-Bara>. His 
troops engaged the Azraqites and fought them for  three 
days from mom in s  t i l l  asr  tins mien e i th e r  s ide retired  
with losses  of k il led  and wounded. Al-Jarrah was even more 
convinced of al-Muhallab’s honesty o f  purpose than al-oara*. 
Giving his inures sions o f  a l -Mahal lab and h is  troops he 
sa id  to al-Hajjaj, H 0 Sfl4r* by^Allah I have never seen a 
man l ik e  him and I do n ’ t think that any one could continue 
in the circumstances in which he i s  placed.Further he 
t e s t i f i e d  that he had watched for three days the warriors 
of a l -Mihallab going to and returning from furious engage­
ments as i f  i t  were a matter of habit and d a ily  routine 
with them. Upon these words al-Hajjaj exclaim ed, ’ How 
g r e a t ly  have you e x to l le d  him, 0 ^bu ^Jqba s ’ ^bu ^Jqba 
rep lied  that he had only given the irrepressib le  ’ t r u th . ’ 
Al-ilihallab’ s reply which al *Jarrah brought with 
him to al-Hajjaj read as fo llow s:-
H I am in receipt of your le t t e r .  You accuse me of 
delay in fighting the people despite the fact that you
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( 1 ) .  Kam.674,13-14.
do not a ttr ibute  defiance or cowardice to me. S t i l l  you 
have reproved ms a3 a coY/ard i3 reproved and have threatened 
roe as a disobedient man i3 threatened. 3o please inquire of  
al-Jarrah* ’(1)
I t  w il l  be seen that th is  reply further proves how 
jealous of h is  honour and s e l f -r e s p e c t  al-Mihallab was.
He would leave no stone unturned to convince al-Hajjaj of 
the f u t i l i t y  and the f o l ly  of the course of action  
suggested by him. But he could not brook any threats or 
disparagement, of h is  om  exa lted  posit ion . That is  why he 
p o l i t e ly  and mildly pulled up al-Hajjaj for  addressing 
him as i f  he were g u i lty  o f  cowardice or defiance.
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0 H A P i  i& ii aCX .
<?TTAB B. JAR QA> AM HIS 
RUPTURE m TH AL **MJH ALL AB.
Al-Hajjaj's ciioice of a successor to the i l l - f a t e d  
>Ibn Mikhnaf f e l l  upon <Attab b. farqa> al-Hiyahl# the wall 
o f  >13fatten, whom he ordered to jo in  si-M ihallab and to take, 
over the oomraand of the Kufan army* It  was a very appropriate 
and helpful choice, indeed, for ^ t ta b  was a high and 
prominent general and had already won his laurel3 against  
the Azraqites by k i l l in g  th e ir  leader al-2ubair b. H j S  in  
a protracted b a tt le .  H ttab joind al-IJuhallab at Sabur in 
the month o f  Jumada I or II ,  76 A.H.(1)#
But the nopes of ^ t ta b  proving a valuable asset  to 
al-Muhallab foundered on uhe rock of an overweening sense 
o f  3elf-in|)ortanGe vjhich made him resent hi3 subordination 
to al-Muhallab, According o Tab*(2 /8 7 7 ,1 1 ) ,  al-Hajjaj had 
la id  i t  down that irhenever al-Miliallab and < At tab were to 
launch a jo in t  action, the supreme command would vest in 
the formsr and the l a t t e r ,  in his capacity o f  chief o f  the 
Kufan contingent, iould be in duty bound to show obedience 
to him. The report in Kam. (675 ,13 -15),however, puts the 
position  of ^ t ta b ,  as defined by a l-H ajja j , on a footin.j 
of equality  with al-Muhallab. According to i t ,  al-Hajjaj 
had ordered that the supreme command should be held a lternate ­
l y  by alH&mailab and ^Attab. Then they -were in a country
(l).Kam. 675,15.
which belonged to the or ig ina l conquests o f  the Basrans, 
then al-Mihallab was to hold the supreme command of the 
whole army with < At tab a t the head of the Kufsn contingent. 
Qontrarily* when they entered a country o r ig in a l ly  conquered 
by the Xu fans, the supreme conaaand was to so to < At tab and 
al-Muhallab was to be the head of the Basran army alone.
This l a t t e r  report does not record that *Atbab m s in any 
way d is s a t i s f ie d  with th is  arrangement. Hut the vehemence 
of the f in a l  breach suggests that i t  could only have been 
the r e s u l t  of suppressed rancour and strained fee lin gs  
before, 15 o doubt *Attab may have been reconciled with h is  
p o s it io n  of equality  for some time but d is sa t is fa c t io n  mist 
have come very soon when he found th a t  the eq u a lity  remained 
only on paper. In actual practice  he had a l l  the tim o be 
subservient to al-Muhallab. Throughout the l ig h t  months that 
^Attab stayed with al-Mihallab, they seldom moved out of 
Sabur which belonged to the conquests of the Basrans. Al- 
Muhallab* therefore , held the supreme command a l l  the time 
and ^Attab could never have an opportunity o f  being at the 
head of his r i v a l ( l ) .  This could not have fa i le d  to be 
i r r i ta t in g  to a man of ^AttSb's ten^erament* To turn once 
again to the report in Tab., i t  e x p l ic i t ly  mentions that  
<Attab took keen offence that he should be assigned a 
subordinate p osit ion  by al-H ajjaj and joined al -Mihallab 
only under duress because he oculd ne ith er  hope o^ ^pt a l -  
Hajjaj rescind h is  orders nor had he the temerity to gp
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against them. ^Attab, hov. v r ,  propitiated  h i3 wounded 
vanity by avoiding to take cc'ins3.1s with al-Mihallab and 
a 0 t in g  almost independently and arb itra r ily .  > i t e  naturally*  
al-Muhallab ooald not to lerate  such a sta te  of a f fa ir s .  
Haughty arrogance and lack of co-operation on the part o f  
ons who was to serve as an auxiliary  to him, was bound to 
a f fe c t  the 33330th working of h is  plans. Perhaps el-Mihallab  
may have f e l t  doubtful about the resu lts  of a d irect formal 
complaint to  al-Hajj a i .  He, therefore, preferred to h o s it  
MU tab with his own petard , f t  ms t be noted that a l -  
lu h a lla b  , to whom war was a contest as mch o f  mind as of 
body, never had any h es ita t ion  to enploy a clever ruse f o r  
h is  purpose. He sabotaged the position  o f  <Attab by winning 
oifer a few men from among the Kufans and in c it in g  them 
against their  leader. Prominent and vocal among such men 
was Bist? a b. J ia sq a la  b. Hu bai ra.
The tension continued t i l l  the clouds burst towards 
the departure o f  ^Attab (1 ) .  I t  so happened that H t t i b  
went, to cil-f'uhallab with the purpose o f  asking him \>q order 
the payment of annuity to the so ld iers  of the Kufan army.
I t  seems that there had occurred no open breach a,s yet for  
al-lfohallab recoived h is  v i s i to r  with every courtesy and
Z o o
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respect and offered him a seat beside h im self, u <A ab 
made his request in such a harsh and offending tone that a l -  
Ifahallab oould not restrain  himself and, in the excitement 
of rage* ca lled  out to him, c0 sen of a stink ing  woman(l)." 
Banu Tarnim, the partisans of 4Attab assert  that the abuse 
was returned to al-Fuhallab in the same coin but according 
to o thers , ^Attab only refuted i t ,  saying, " By ^dlah, 3he 
has many paternal and maternal uncles ( i . e .  she belongs 
to a powerful and honourable fam ily). I wish that ^ftllah may 
separate us from each other." Further hot words and passages- 
at-arcs provoked al-Muhallab to stand up to poino a rod at 
his in^udent v i s i to r  but was prevented from do in ;  so by hi3 
son al-Mughira who took hold of the rod end p a c i i e d  his  
father saying that KAttab was also a riooleman and a ’ shaikh’ 
of the Arabs and as such a few harsh words from him should 
not be taken amiss. Al-Mahallab accepted the 3ober counsel 
of his son and < At tab l e f t  the place. On his way back he 
was met by Bis tain b. Masqala (2)  who openly abused and 
slendered him. As the report in Kam. has i t ,  the quarrel 
between al-Muhallab and ^Attab soon threatened to develop 
into a tr iba l conflagration. The ' a.mim, E lf an s as well as 
Basrans, took the side of ^Attab # i i l e  the >Azd,including 
those of al-KUfa, stood by th e ir  chief al-luhallab* The
(1 ) .In  Kam.(6 7 7 ,3-4) ^Attab is  reported to have said to a l-
Muhallab, I uasd to hear that you are brave but found 
you a coward and I used to hear that you a r e  gene p u s  _ but 
found you a ^ i s e r . Thereupon al-Mihallab retorted with uhe 
abuse a  ^
(2)* Thus in Tab. According to Kam. (677*5/ »
a neoliow of I-asqala b. Hubaira.
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Bakr b. :l a >i l  acted with admirable f id e l i t y  in th is c r i s i s ,  
3y virtue of their  old a llian ce  with the ^zd they gave suGh 
s o l id  and whole-hearted support to al-lixhallab that he 
became an ardent champion of the a llian ce  abou which he - i
been very lukewarm so far. A f i r s t  c lass  tr iba l war was, 
however, averted by the intervention of the peace-loving  
al-lUglilra b. al-Mihallab who had already checked his father  
from coming to blows with *Attab. Al-Might ra calmed ^Attab 
by assuring him that h is  reouest w i l l  be granted and then 
prevailed upon h is  father to pay the annuity to the Kufans. 
Thus a c r i t ic a l  s itu a tion  was saved and the peacemaking  
e ffo r ts  o f  al-Maghlra won him such popularity that the whole 
of the lamim always spoke very highly of him afterwards.3 ven 
^Attab himself said that he f u l ly  recogaisrd the superior ity  
of  al-Mughlra's merits to those o f  h is  father.
* At tab 's  position  was now c lear ly  unienable.He wrote 
to al-H ajjaj (1) complaining to him against the behaviour 
of al-Mahal lab in in c it in g  the uncouth people against him, 
and requesting that he be recalled  and attached to al-Hajjaj  
him self, fortunately  for ^ t ta b  this l e t t e r  reached al-Hajjaj  
a t  a time when he was in dire need of the former's servicea
2
(1 ) .  Thus in Tab.S/878,9 sea; 944. .The report in Kam. (676-77) again d iffers  on th is  point. According to i t ,  
quarrel w i t h  a l - M i h a l l a b  only fo llow ed ,a l-  
H ajjSi's orders for his r e c a l l .  is  reported^to
have declared that he would not proceed to al-Haj jaj 
unless a] -Mahallab paid the iifans.
in order to send him against 3hablb who had already played 
havoc with the people o f  al-KSfa and had defeated a number 
o f  expeditions sent against him. Al-H ajjaj,therefore, at 
once ordered ^Attab to join him, leav ing  the Kufan array 
to al-Mihallab. Accordingly, ^Attab l e f t  al-Mihallab in 
the beginning ( most probably in the f i r s t  or the second 
month) of the year 77 A#H* (1 ) .  The command of the Kufan 
army was again entrusted by al-Mihallab to h is  son# Habib.
There is no doubt that the immediate cause of the open 
breach between al-Mihallab and ^ ttab  was the former' a 
refusal to pay the annuity to the Hlfans. But what prompted 
al-Mihallab to do so ? According to the report in Kam. 677 
al-Muhallab was g u i l ty  of discrimination between the Basrans 
who constituted his own army and the ESfans who formed the 
army of H ttab . Al-Hajjaj had ordered him to pay the annuity 
to the whole army but he paid only the Basrans and strongly  
refused to pay the Kufans. Thereupon follow  d the interview  
and the v io len t  a ltercation  which led  even to the verge of 
coming to blows. As compared with i t  the report in Tab. does 
not mention any orders from al-Hajjaj nor any attempt by a l -  
Muhallab at discrimination. According to i t ,  apparently 
without any previous cause for o ffen ce , <Attab v is ited  a l -  
luhallab to aak him to pay the K0fan3. But he presented h is
£ o 3
(l).Kam. 677,15. This i s  also confirmed in Tab.2/941,5  i 
942,1 where i t  i s  stated  that a l-H ajjai re called <Attab 
during the three hot months beginning irom Dhu '1 -H ijja  
76 ( i n  which month ^tijnSh b, Qatan was murdered) which 
ShabTb passed at iah Bahra<&an before advancing to a l -  
Mada^in and threatening al-Kufa when “Attab was d i s ­
patched against him.
request in such an iopudent way that al-Mihallab flared  up 
and hot words folloTsed. ^Attab’ s unseemLy inpudence can 
s a fe ly  be ascribed to a pent-up sp ite  caused by his resent­
ment o f  al-Muhallab’ s authority  but i t  is quite p lausib le  
that he should have had some provocation in the form o f  an 
attempt by al-Mihallab to withhold the pay o f  the Kufans.
Here the account in IAth.(4/204) i3 very helpful in ascer ­
ta in ing  the cause of a l-M ihallab '3 action. According to i t  
4 At tab had demanded from al-Mihallab that the Kufan army 
should be paid * out o f  the revenue of Fars “ which the 
l a t t e r  refused to do. Thus the stand taken up by al-Muhallab 
was that the revenue of Fars should be earmarked ex c lu s iv e ly  
for  the main Basran army and the auxiliary  Kufan c o n t in e n t  
should have no claim on it*  Probably al-M ihallab’s in ter ­
pretation of hi3 understanding with the government did not 
en ta i l  any re sp o n s ib i l ity  on h in se lf  for  paying the annuity 
to the Kufans out of the taxes lev ie d  from the land wrested 
by him from the Azraqites p ar ticu lar ly  when the land happened 
to belong to the orig inal conquests of the Basrans,Thus i t  
becomes clear that al-Muhallab was not g u i l ty  of discrimina­
tion as such. His past behaviour and h is  anxiety to respect  
the s u s c e p t ib i l i t i e s  o f  the i&fans are a sure guarantee 
that he treated the Kufans and the Basrans equally and 
fa ir ly .  His action , i t  seems, was motivated only by a desire 
to conserve the resources at h is  disposal and probably also 
to sp ite  the conceited ^ ttab  #1030 a ttitu de had nuch 0 do 
with hardening him on this point as is  evidenced by the fa c t  
that he acceded to the demand as soon as tension was a b it  
relieved by the noble e f fo r ts  o f  a l-M i^ ira .
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The period of ^Attab’s s tay  with al-Muhallab la s te d  
e igh t  m m ths(l) . During th is  period also no major engagemsnt 
with the enemy is  recorded. Ms re skirmishing seems to have 
been the order of the day in which ^Attab, despite h is  d is l ik e  
of al-Muhallab, played his part thoughserai-independently as 
stated  above. He i s  also reported to have led  the Basran 
arnrp on a commission from al-Mihail ab( 2). The position  at  
the time of *At tab's arrival was that the Azraqites held 
in th e ir  grip the region of Karman and were p it te d  against  
al-Mihallab in Fars, f ig h t in g  him from a l l  quarters(3).
This p os it ion  had not m ateria lly  changed ¥/hen * At tab l e f t .
The only event recorded of th is  period is the arrival  
of the fourth mission from al-Hajjaj soon a fte r  ^Attab 
joined al-Muhallab. The addition o f  an experienced general 
was indeed a f i t  occasion for al-Hajjaj to remind al-Mihailab  
of the urgent n ecess ity  o f  a b ig  b a tt le  which to him was 
long overdue. He dispatched two em issaries — one called  
2iyad b. ^Abdur Rahman ( o f  Banu *1adr b, Sa<sac a) and the 
other a descendant o f  ^bu ^ q i l ,  the grandfather o f  a l -  
Hajjaj, — with the purpose of exhorting al-Muhallab to 
launch a bold action against the enemy. Al-Muhallab's 
method of dealing with such emissaries was almost patent.
He attached Ziyad and the Thaqafite to his sons Habib and 
Yazid resp ective ly  and asked the emissaries to force the 
two conmanders into fu ll-b looded b a tt le .  Accordingly a deadly
( 1 ) .  Kam. 676, 18.
( 2 ) .  Mrf. 212, 1.
(3 ) .  Kam. 675,17.
f ig h t  took place in which 3iyad was k i l le d  and his  
coapanion, the r£haqafite, was l o s t ( i ) .  The f igh tin g  wa3 
continued the next day when the Thaqafite was found. Al- 
Muhallab ca lled  the Thaqafite to h is  presence at the 
same time as the morning meal was served to him. Soon 
arrows began to f a l l  around them and al-Mihallab sa t  
unperturbed while the Thaqafite was amazed at h is  undisturbed 
calm. I t  i s  obvious what reply the Thaqafite must have taken 
to his m aster.( Kam* 676)*
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(1 ) .  /OL-Sal a tan al -  <AbdI refers to the incident in the 
following verses:-
S > x ^ \ ) V w
Oy / ) z V  ! u  l>
-  4V )  ^  ZS> ) '&l>>
-a-~> 2$Aa_^
( Kam. 676).
C H A P T E R  XXI.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ^ZARlQA 
Fourth Period (Continued).
Fourth Phase: ^Azariqa Wiped Out Of Far a.
After the departure o f  ^ t ta b  al-Mihailab stayed 
in Sabur for about a year ( 1 ) ,  which period i s  also barren 
o f  any major engagement and seems to have been spent in 
mere skirmishing to which the operations had to be confined 
ever since the b attle  a t  Kazarun. As a matter of f a c t ,  
the conditions were such that no advance was p o ss ib le .  This 
was anply demonstrated by the various engagements that took 
place under the eye o f  al-Haj ja j 'a  em issaries. The Azraqites 
were a t i l l  undaunted and the balance of power was almost 
equal on e ith e r  s id e . Any attempt to force the enemy back 
resu lted  only in heavy lo sse s  on both sides without any 
advantage to e ith er . I t  was, the re fore , but wise and 
expedient on the part of a l-B ihallab  to wait p a t ie n t ly  for  
such time as the Azraqites were worn out and showed sigas  
o f  weakness.
Such an opportunity seems to have occurred about the 
end of the year 77. When al-Muhallab had been at Sabur for  
about a year after  the departure o f  ^ t t a b ,  he launched an 
attack on the Azraqites ih ich  is  mentioned in the annals 
as the Day o f  al-Bustan(2). No d e ta i ls  are available and
( 1 ) .  Tab. 2/880,14.
(2 ) .  Tab. 2 / 1003.
even al-Boatan remains un identif ied . Yet the battle  seems 
to have been a major one in i t ia t e d  at the instance o f  a l -  
i'uhallab. Thus i t  can be taken as marking a turn in the 
course of war.Now at l a s t  the r ight moment to s tr ik e  had 
come and al-Mihallab was not the man to ignore it,The  
Azraqites had ' l e t  loose  one end o f  the c lo th ’ and i t  was 
now his turn ’ to p u ll  the other e n d ( l ) ’ . Henceforth he 
would allow no resp ite  to the enemy. He at once launched a 
drive aimed at squeezing the ^zariqa out of Fars. At one 
3ame time he also  played another trump card which succeeded 
s ingu larly  and profited  him imaensely.
The d istingu ish ing  quality o f  al-Mihallab was that he
• »  ✓
combined in himself a mastery o f  ’ al-khad^a’ with
s k i l l  and experience in ’ al-Harb’ ) .  This was the
reason why he succeeded where others f a i l e d  m iserab ly .lt  
must be remembered that the Azraqites were not mere rebels  
or depraved criminals. They were the s e l f l e s s  champions o f  
a certain re lig iou s  creed* no matter however destructive i t  
was. I t  was th e ir  fa ith  that inspired them with fanatical  
zeal and inexhaustible courage and fo r t i tu d e ,-q u a l i t ie s  
which carried them through a l l  the ordeals and sustained  
them in the face of overwhelming odds. I t  wa3 vain zo hope 
for  their  extermination so long as they were united on the 
tenets o f  th e ir  creed. I t  i s  impossible to subdue a m ilitan t  
re lig iou s  sec t  with mere persecution and force of arms. The 
destruction of th e ir  unity  and th e ir  fa ith  i s  a prerequisite
%0S
(1 ) .  Tide the words of  Qatari supra p. 112, .
o f  the ir  o m  annih ila tion . Al-Mahallab had c lea r ly  realised  
th is  from the very beginning when he said  that he counted 
upon a s p l i t  among the ^zariqa themselves for th e ir  des­
truction. But dissensions were not l e f t  to ar ise  themselves; 
al-Muhallab himself sowed the seeds of discord. Kam. (677-79) 
records three successive moves on hi3 part in th is  
d ir e c t io n ( l ) .
JU It. so happened that there was anH zraqite black­
smith called ?Abza who made poisoned arrows which were used 
against the army of al-Muhallab. ..hen the matter was brought 
to the n o tice  o f  al-Mihallab he promised to deal with i t  
su ccess fu lly .  The plan that he h i t  upon was sp e c ia l ly  w e ll-  
adapted in view of the rash fanaticism  o f  the Azraqites.He 
comnissioned a man to go secre t ly  and cautiously to the 
caa|) of the Azraqites with a l e t t e r  and a purse o f  one 
thousand dirhems and to drop them there. The l e t t e r  was 
addressed to ^bza and contained the fo llow ings-
" I am in receipt of your arrows and am sending you 
one thousand dirhems. 3o receive the amount and 3end us 
more of the arrows."
As designed the l e t t e r  and the dirhens f e l l  into the 
hands of  Qatari who summoned ^bza and questioned him about 
the matter, ’Abza, innocent as he was, denied a l l  knowledge of
( l ) . I t  is  c lear  from Kam. that these incidents were not 
the imnediate cause of the f in a l  disruption as Jaey 
appear to be in lAth. (4 /213).
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the l e t t e r  or the dirhems. He was, n everth e less ,  beheaded 
by orders of Qatari. ?hi3 action of Qatari met with the 
disapproval of a prominent follower of h i s ,  <Abd Rabbihl 
al-3ag|}Tr* a 'mawla1 o f  Banu Qais b. Tha<Laba* ^ o  can© 
to him and protested that i t  was rather rash to condemn 
a man to death without making sure of h is  g u i l t  by a careful 
in vest iga tion  of the charges le v e l le d  against him. Further 
he stressed  --hat the whole thing about the l e t t e r  and the 
dirhems was equally l i k e l y  to be true or fa ls e .  To thi3  
Qatari only replied that the murder of a man in the common 
in te r e s t  of the community could not be objected to and 
that i t  was no business of the subjects to c r i t i c i s e  the 
actions of th e >Imam who had f u l l  authority to do whatever 
he deemed to be necessary in the in te r e s ts  of the common 
weal. This authoritative  reply s i len ced  but not s a t i s f i e d  
the conscientious objector who* along with a number of h is  
own way of thinking, was henceforth inwardly opposed to h is  
leader3hip.
Seeing that the f i r s t  seed o f discord had fa l le n  on 
f e r t i l e  ground al-Muhallab followed i t  up by another two 
clever moves which speak of h is  thorough understanding of 
his  enemy and his deep insight into the peculiar sentiments 
and psychology o f  the Azraqites. The Azraqites had a 
particular fo ib le  for quibbling over su b t le t ie s  of the 
orthodox S h a r ia t  law and their extreme puritanism often  
led  to a ludicrous ea$hasis on l e t t e r  at the expense of  
the s p i r i t .  Al-Muhallab proved him self shrewd enough to 
play upon th is  b ese tt in g  weakness and to ex p lo it  i t  to h is  
advantage.
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2, The second move of al-Mihallab was to despatch a 
Christian with instructions to f a l l  prostrate before 
"atari and* on his deprecating the worshipful act being  
done to him,to affirm that he had done i t  to none other 
than him. The Christian did accordingly and when Qatari 
admonished that ’ sujud’ belonged to ’‘Allah alone he asserted ,
* I did i t  to none but yourself."  An >Azraqite was quick to 
se ize  at i t  and urged that the worshipful act of the 
Christian had placed Qatari under the category o f  "those 
whom you worship instead o f ^ l a h "  who, t o o th e r  with their  
worshippers, the Qu^an declares , w i l l  be turned into fuel 
fo r  the f ir e  of Hell# ( I )  Qatari argued in vain that the 
Chris tians worshipped ^Isa b. Maryam wi thout the practise  
e n ta i l in g  any harm to the l a t t e r .  In the meantime another 
>Azraqite hastened to k i l l  the Christian which action further  
accentuated the controversy because Qatari denounced i t  
openly on the ground that the Christian was a ,dhiffim ,^ and 
as such was e n t it le d  to protection. This move l e f t  the 
A zraqites s t i l l  more divided than before.
3. The third move was to confront the Azraqites with a 
poser calculated to ^ v e  r ise  to a th eoretica l controversy.
At the in stiga tion  of al-SSihallab, a man went to the 
Azraqites and asked them as to th e ir  judgment about two 
emigrants one of ihom died on h is  way towards them while
the o ther  reached them but f a i l e d  to oome up to he }
2 1 1
(1 ) .  Cf. ^ir>an 41 i > J J 0JJ> lS*, *
Some declared that both were in f id e ls  while others made 
an exception in favour o f  the former whom they pro­
nounced to be a ’ m^min* e n t i t le d  to a place in paradise.
ill though i t  took some time before the L a r i s a  
suffered  actual disintegration* the d ifferences among 
them, as a resu lt of the foregoing machinations engineered 
by al-Mihallab, were now s u f f ic ie n t ly  acute to paralyse 
th e ir  warring a c t iv i t ie s *  fh ile  the d ifferences showed 
no signs of abatement Qatari withdrew across the 
boundary of the neighbouring d i s t r i c t  of ^Istakhr where 
he spent one month in id leness  and inactiv ity#  Then he 
turned again for a battle  with a l- lk h a llab  which was 
precip itated  by h is  vociferous l ieu tenants  Salih  b,
Mkhraq and <Amr al-Qana who were now seized  with a 
so r t  of penitence for the d issensions in th e ir  ranks 
which, in the words of the former, 1 had cooled the 
eyes of th e ir  enemy and had emboldened him against them? 
<Amr al-Qana gave the si-gaal for a renewal of active  
warfare by darting f o r t i e t h  the following verse on 
his l i p s ; -  u _
The l u l l  was a t l a s t  broken and brisk f ig h t in g  
took place in which al-Mig&Tra b. al-Mihallab acaie ved 
some notable fea ts  (1 ) .  It  i3 not recorded whether the
21%
( 1 ) .  Kam. 679.
battle  ended in a decisive advanba e for e ith er  s ide.
But henceforth we cease to hear of the ^zariqa in Sabur 
and thus i t  may sa fe ly  be assumed that a f te r  th is  battle  
they had l o s t  th e ir  footing  in Fars and were s tea d ily  
retreating  towards Karman.
An incident during the above battle  affords us a 
further i l lu s tr a t io n  o f  al-Muhallab's unrelenting  
vig ilance. I t  so happened that the sons of al-Mihal lab 
had l e f t  th e ir  c a tt le  unguarded. Al-Muhallab was not 
slow to apprehend a raid upon them. But he had hardly 
pointed out the danger to his sons vihen there cams a 
messenger with the news that Salih b. likhraq had 
already carried out the raid. Al-Muhallab was much 
grieved at i t  and admonished h is  sons saying that every­
thing which he him self did not personally attend to was 
spoilt*  Thereupon Bishr b. al-Mighlra b. Sufra* his
own nephew, calmed him, saying* ' I f  you wish for your 
own equals then, by *A1 lah, no t  one of us is  worth the 
strap of your sandal. , Al-£:uhal lab then ordered that the 
raiding party be forthwith intercepted on i t s  way back. 
Accordingly Bishr b. l ig h lr a  and Mudrik and al-Mifaddal» 
sons o f  al-Muhallab, darted forth and made f u l l  amends 
fo r  th e ir  n eg lec t  by su ccess fu lly  wresting the ca tt le  
from the enemy#
The position  wa3 now c lear ly  untenable for  the 
>Azariqa* Fars lad fa s t  s l ip p in g  out of th e ir  hands end 
thus they were deprived of the commodities of that rich  
province. They were now hard pressed for  supplies.No  
doubt they s t i l l  possessed Karman but the problem of
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transport b r ist led  with d i f f i c u l t i e s  because the distance  
wa3 very considerably  1). So the pinch o f  sca rc ity  compelled 
them to r e t ir e  into Karman while al-Muhallab established  
hi a sway over the d i s t r ic t s  of ^stakhr and Darabjird.
I t  was in one of the v i l la g es  o f ’ls ta k h r  that a l -  
fahallab received the f i f t h  commission from al-Hajjaj  
con sis t in g  of two men, one belonging to the Kalb and the 
other to the 3ulaim(2). When the two messengers exhorted 
him, on behalf o f  al-Hajjaj* to embark upon rash warfare, 
he recalled  the following verse
^ 1 <_>
(Kam. 681).
Then, a3 on previous occasions, he ordered his son 
YazTd to seek an engagement with the eneny. The engagement 
provided the two messengers with a convincing proof of the 
might of the ’Azariqa. An Azraqite speared a so ld ier  of  
al-Muhallab with such vigour and s k i l l  that the spear 
transpierced his thigh together with the saddle.Pointing  
out the incident to the two messengers, al-Mihallab sa id ,
'* How can we f ig h t  a people who spear l ik e  th is  ?* S t i l l ,  
the attack of Yazid succeeded in routing the enemy.
th is  engagement also  served in an indirect way to 
bring about a reunion between Bishr b. al-Mughlra b.^Abi 
Sufra and h is  cousins, the sons o f  al-Mihallab. There 
had been some estrangement between the two parties  *-nd
£ 1 4
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/1003.
(2 ) .  According to Dain. 285 the two messengers were
Bishr was anxious for  a recon cil ia t ion . In th is  engagement
Bishr distinguished himself by h is  fea ts  of arms and he 
thought i t  best to make an appeal to h is  cousins while 
they were inuressed with his worth. 3o he put before them 
the t r iv ia l  position  to which he had been reduced by th e ir  
negLeot and indifference and asked that he be given an 
honourable place that was due to him. The 3ons of a l -  
Mihallab agreed to and al-Muhallab also  approved of the 
reunion.
while a l-S S ih a lla b  was yet  struggling with the 
?Azraqiuea» al-Hajjaj hastened to appoint a man, Kardam by 
name, to be his agent in fars .  rhis appointment osist have 
been generally  d is ta s te fu l  to the army of al-iiuhallab  
because i t  involved the lo s s  o f  the means of i t s  mainte­
nance. A man even indulged in a pun on the name of the 
new Incumbent: ^  _
(Kam. 684).
Al-I'uhallab n atura lly  f e l t  compelled to protest  
against i i i s  action. He wrote to al-H ajjaj asking him to 
leave the two d i s t r i c t s  of ^Ista&ir and Darabjird fo r  the 
maintenance of h is  troops. I t  is  even reported ( Tab. 2/1004) 
that ^bd al-Mal ik also wrote to al-H ajjaj advising him to 
leave the two d is tr ic t s  in the hands of al-J&ihallab because 
th e ir  revenue was indispensable for meeting the war expenses. 
Al-Hajjaj thereupon acceded to the reasonable demand and 
al-Mihallab se t  about occupying the two d i s t r i c t s .
Qatari(1) had razed to the ground the c ity  o f >Iatakhr
2/^T
(1 ) .  Kam. 684.
because i t s  inhabitants were in correspondence with a l -  
Mihallab. He intended to do the same with the c ity  of iTasa 
in the d i s t r i c t  of Darabjird but the sa fety  o f  the town 
was purchased from him by >Azadhmard b. al-Hirbidh for a 
hundred thou a and dirhems. Al -Mahal lab ousted ^zadhmard 
after  a f i^ a t ,  drove him to Karnan and even sen t h is  son 
al-Mughira in h is  pursu it. The occupation having been 
completed, he appointed his son al-MighTra and the notable  
chief al-Euqad to c o l le c t  taxes from the two d i s t r ic t s (  1).
During al-M ihallab's stay in Sabur several minor 
clashes are al3o mentioned to have occurred at various 
other places in ifars, v i z . ,  Shi*b Bawwan ( one of the four 
'heavens on earth', near al-Hubandjah to the north of  
Kazarin)* Das^t, Barin ( to the south of Kazarun) and 
Jubairin (2 ) .  No d eta ils  are,however, availab le .
The eventual weakening of the ^zariaa which permitted 
the circumspect al-Mjfcallab to take the in i t ia t iv e  and 
embark on the long-awaited o f fen s iv e ,  was an occasion of  
great re jo ic in g  in h is camp. I t  is  reported that al-Mihallab  
celebrated the f l i g h t  of Qatari from 3abur by organising  
a levee  at which he was presented with encomiums by various
speakers and poets. Al-S&ighira W Habna>, a poet and
(1 ) .  Kam. 684? Tab. ^1004 .
(2 ) .  Of. the qaslda of Ka<b al^AshqarT quoted infra  p. 246 *
Itelevant^vorse3 from the same are al3o quoted in Yaq. 
under, the pi ace-names consented.
TDM event ao DashtBarin 13 also mentioned by *
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For this ode, the poet was rewarded by a l-M hallab  
with tfcn thousand dirhems, a noble horse and an increase  
of f i? e  hundred dirhems in the pay*
%l-Nu<Bgin b. *Uqba al-f/Ltakl, a warrior and poet in 
Millahab’s army:-
( Yaq. %/576).
( c s ^ J b
Having consolidated h is  posit ion  in the border 
d is t r i c t s  of^Istakhr and Darabjird, which, by the way, 
were to remain under him in order to supply him the means 
of maintaining h is  troops, al-Mihallab had cleared the 
whole of the province o f  Fars of the Azraqites(1 ) .  He was 
now strong enough to follow the r e l a t i n g  enemy into the 
adjacent province o? Karman. At al-S^rajan, the old capital 
c ity  o f  Karman not far from the boundary o f  Fars, the 
Azraqites put up resistance but were overwhelmed and 
defeated,Thenceforth they were a l l  along f le e in g  before 
al-Mihallab #10 followed them c lose ly  and en erg et ica lly  
t i l l  they entrenched themselves in J ir a f t ,  a c ity  in the 
heart o f  Karman. Here again the stra teg i c p os it ion  o f  the 
stronghold did not allow o f  a d irect a ssa u lt .  Al-Mihallab, 
therefore, p it te d  himself a t  a short distance and decided 
on t ir in g  the enemy with his o ld  waiting game. Fortunately 
enough, 3oon the 'Azraqites broke out among themselves and 
within a few months th e ir  f in a l  extermination wa3 an 
accomplished fa c t .
The ’A zraqites were at JTraft, although i t  cannot be 
ascertained how long they had been there, \^en a revolt
C H A P  T 13 R H I I .
( 1 ) . During the course o f  the f l i g h t  fxom Fars, an 'Azraqite 
i s  reported to have sa id ;-
(Dain. 286).
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broke out against the leadership of Qatari towards the 
middle of the year 78(1). The ringleader of the revo lt  was 
the sams <Abd Rabbihi a l-3agh lr  (2) who had for  some time 
past been inwardly opposed to Qatari’s leadership as a 
r e su lt  of al-Muhallab’ s c lever in tr ip le s .
( 1 ) . I t  i s  impossible to determine p rec ise ly  the chronology 
o f  events subsequent to the departure o f  ^ tta b  early in 
the year 77 A*H. This much,however, i s  almost certain that  
the v io len t  r i f t  among the Azraqites and their  f in a l end 
at the hands of al-Minallab #hich followed c lo se ly  upon it*  
were events of the year 78. Tab. ha3 mentioned them under 
the year 77 but that is  impossible according to the 
evidence of Tab. i t s e l f ,  i i  not for any other reason. The other 
version ( Tab,2/1032,5) which places the events in the year 78 
i s  the more credible one. According to Kam.(677 ,16)the open 
cleavage between Qatari and h is  opponents occurred eighteen  
months a f te r  the departure of ^ t ta b ,  i . e .  towards the middle 
of the year 78. [Tab, also  mentions the same words ’eighteen  
months* (£ /1006,7) but the context is  so vague and confused 
that i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to determine the event from which the 
period i s  dated.] Qiis asaurqption a^so agrees very well with 
the report that the death or Qatari, which seems to have 
followed not more than a few months a fter  h is  f a l l in g  out 
with <Abd Rabbihi, occurred a t the fag-end of the year 78 or 
perhaps even in the year 79 (IK h... 1/430). The poet Ka<b a l -  
^shqarT also hint3 that the concluding phase o f  al-M ihallab’s 
war mu3t have la s te d  ’ three years’ ( viae in fra  p. £ 4 7 , 1.5
“  ”) •
( 2 ) . Kam. throughout gives the ep ith e t  ’a l-3agh lr ’ ( the Leas ) 
while in Tab. i t  i s  invariably substitu ted  by i t s  antonym 
’al-K ablr’ ( the Great). I t  i s  remarkable that the role 
assigned to *Abd Rabbihi is  id en tica l in both the au th or it ies  
and each of the two refers only to one <Abd Ifebbihi, a l -  
§a^hir and al-Kablr resp ective ly , without adverting to the 
ex istence of any other person of the same name but with the 
opposite ep ith e t .  Yqb.(2 /329), on the other hand, expressly  
mentions that there were two individuals called <Abd Rabbini 
who were distinguished bv the ep ithets  a l-3agh lr  and al-K ablr» 
which i s  also  the view or a l-Shahrastani(89). These two 
individuals are said to have led two separate groups of the 
mawali which broke o f f  su ccess ive ly  from Qatari and ware 
disposed or by al-l5uhallab one a f te r  the otiier.(3ee also  
Sncy. under Katari). I t  is d i f f i c u l t  to adduce any argument
in favour of one or against the other vers ion. On Ihe whole* 
however, the assumption of the aut&or of Raghba (5 /98) that  
the real name was 4Abd Rabbihi al-Kablr and that the same 
individual was al3o ir o n ic a l ly  ca lled  al^Sa^iIr* seems to be 
quite p lausib le . Even i f  there were two individuals of that *
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The re v o l t  wa3 the cumulative r e s u l t  of numerous 
inc iden ts  which eventually  led to the climax of a v io len t 
rupture. The rea l fundamental cause.however, was the 
extreme puritan  ism and r ig id  dogmatism of the Azraqites.
I t  was th e i r  p e c u l ia r  h a b i t  of con tinually  impeaching and 
d iscard ing  a l l  au th o r i ty  which u lt im a te ly  reco iled  upon 
themselves. The account in Kam.(684,16 seq) deals a t  length  
with the process of d is rup tion  and mentions as many as 
three in c id e n ts : -
1. ^ b id a  b. H ilal a l-Y ashkurl, the prominent Azraqite 
l ie u te n a n t ,  was suspected of i l le g i t im a te  re la t io n s  with 
the wife of a blacksmith whose house he used to frequent 
and en te r  without formal permission. When the people referred  
the matter to Qatari he pointed ou t the high p o s it io n  held 
by Slbida both as regards p ie ty  and as regards serv ices  in 
war. But the people were adamant; they ca teg o r ic a lly  
declared th a t  they would n o t to le r a te  him despite  h is  
immoral conduct. Q atari understood the m entality  of h is  
followers f u l l  w ell. He ca lled  ‘Abida in p r iv a te  and, on 
the l a t t e r ’ s denying the charge and seeking h is  advice, 
suggested to him th a t  while answering the charge in pub lic  
he should n e i th e r  show himself weak and submissive l ik e  a 
g u i l ty  person nor should he adopt the arrogance of an 
innocent one. This was sound advice indeed for in the former
* name iihen there seems to be no reason why they should not 
have united in th e ir  revolt against c&yarT. probability
the supreme leadership should have belonged to one of them 
while ohe other one should have been his chief collaborator  
and l i e u t e n s n t . l t  nai3t be noted that Yaa» gives the name as 
and Mas.(5/350) as which apparently
are errors of orthography ana transmission.
case the Azraqites would have found en excuse for disowning 
and deposing him and in the l a t t e r  case h is  arrogance would 
have only provoked them to p e r s is t  in th e ir  a l le g a t io n s .  
Accordingly* when <AbTda met the Azraqites in the presence 
of Qatari he answered the charges in the following words of  
the Qur> an
* Verily* those who have come forward with a fa lse  
charge are your own people. Do not take i t  as an e v i l  to 
you* rather i t  i s  good for  you#( i ) .
The words were very c leverly  chosen, indeed. They 
were most appropriate for  the occasion because while denying 
the charge they also la id  s tre ss  on generosity towards 
opponents which went a long way in appeasing them. The 
sa n c tity  attaching to the words of the must also
have been a factor  in carrying conviction. The e f f e c t  was 
that the'Azraqites wept in repentance, embraced *AbTda and 
begged him to pray for forgiveness of th e ir  sin which, of 
course, ^Ibida was too ready to do# S t i l l ,  *Abd Eabbihl 
was d i s s a t i s f i e d  and declared that ^bida had only taken 
them in through a clever ruse. There were many people who 
thought l ik e  f/vbd Kabbihi and these men promised alleg iance  
to him although they dared not declare 30 because they 
possessed no proof to substantiate their  a llega tion .
2. Qatari had appointed as h is  agent a dihqan vdio was 
l a te r  on found to p o s s e s  itsen se  wealth. The Azraqites  
l o s t  no tims in rushing to Qatari and urging upon him shat
( l ) .  3f. ( j n r > a ^ ^ P "
u ^x$) '£ /ry > S . "
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*Umar b. al-Khattab d id  not to lerate  h is  agents in l ik e  
cases, Qatari silenced them by personally  t e s t i fy in g  to 
the f a c t  that the dihqan owned lands and business even 
prioi to his appointment, S t i l l  the people were not 
sa t is f ie d  and they nursed i t  in th e ir  hearts that Qatari 
had connived at the gross misconduct of liis agent,
Al-Mihallab had already shown by hi3 words and conduct 
what a great store he s e t  by internal d ifferen ces auon^ 
the Azraqites, When he heard of the growing d isa ffe c t io n  
against Qatari he sa id , "¥erily , th e ir  discord w il l  prove 
harder for them than myself,"
3, The third incident i s  the most t r iv ia l  and conse­
quently the most aausing of a l l .  The people urged Qatari 
to launch an attack against the enemy. At f i r s t  Qatari 
rejected the suggestion with a ’no' but la te r  on changed 
h is  mind and decided to move. This brought upon him the 
odium of h is  fan atica l followers who accused him of 'lying*  
which crime was s u f f i c ie n t  to shatter th e ir  fa i th  in h im (l),  
Feelings against him were so intense and vddespread that  
Qatari must have l iv e d  in oonstant fear  of h is  followers.
One day he found nimself shadowed by some of them and, at  
once apprehending some e v i l  design* slipped into a house 
nearby along with a number of h is  companions. The people 
thereupon called out tc him * 0 'dabba', (2) cornu out to us."
(1)*This incident is also hinted a t in Yqb. 2/329*
( 2 ) * any animal on eart& including both rational mid 
irra tion a l creatures*Originsllysheweveri-it^aa appliec^ 
x»o irration a l creatures and i t s  predominant s ig n if ic a t io n
i s  a beast that i s  ridden.(Lane: Arabic-SngLisn Lexicon).
Qatari was hurt by the disregard thus shown to him and, on 
coining out, chastised his impudent followers by saying that 
they had turned apostates. The people argued that they had 
done no wrong by c a l l in g  him a 'dabba' because even in the 
Qur^an the word was used to include h im (l) .  They i'urUier 
hoisted  him with his own petard and counter-charged him 
with apostasy on the ground that he had un ju s t i f ia b ly  
accused them of the asme crime. They demanded from him a 
frank declaration acknowledging his repentance to >A11 ah.In 
h is  embarrassment, Qatari turned to <Ab!da b* Hi l e i  for
%
advice a3 the la t t e r  had turned to him on a former occasion.
<\blda repaid Qatari h is  advice almost in the same coin. 
He pointed out that a declaration of repentance was not 
going to be acceptable to the people and suggested to him 
to plead that he had meant not an assertion but only an 
interrogation. “ Have you turned apostates? "
This was ju s t  the proper answer for the quibblers 
that the reca lc itra n ts  were; they accepted the p lea  and 
allowed Qatari to return to his house. 3uch incidents were 
s u f f ic ie n t  to thrust upon Qatari the painful rea lisa tion  
that he had fo r fe ite d  the confidence of h is  fo llow ers. He, 
therefore , proposed to appoint al-Hiq&<tar a l - ^ b d l ,  a 
veteran lieu ten a n t ,  to the command and himself to swear 
alleg iance  to him. But this intended chan, e of command, 
far from restoring unity in the 'Azraqite ranks, only 
hastened the f in a l  disruption. The ’Azraqites as a whole were
(1 ) .  Vide CJir^ asa/i ‘‘ <>Jv) ”
/ '  } ' s ' '
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vehemently opposed to al-Miqa^tar and through t h e ir  spokesman, 
Salih  b. Liknraq, p o s i t iv e ly  refused to acknowledge 
alleg iance  to him. 3alih  b. Ilkhraq i s  reported to have 
p la in ly  told  Qatari that the people were prepared to submit 
to any one but not ai-iftqa^tar.
The account in Kara, i s  s i l e n t  as to what th is  strong  
and popular opposition to al~ftiqa^tar was due to. Surely, 
the character of the >Azraqites coupled with the universal  
nature of the opposition suggest beyond doubt that there 
must have ex is ted  some genuine grievance against him based, 
of  course, on conscientious objection to some act of h is  
which mist have gone against th e ir  s t r i c t  orthodox canons.
Here Tab. Mentions an incident concerning al-iiiqa*tar which 
furnishes us with the cause of h is  disgrace and thus, to 
a l l  appearances, supplies a gap in the otherwise f u l l  and 
d eta iled  narrative of Ham. There i s ,  however, sqgb d i f f i c u l t y  
in id en tify in g  the al-Mqa^-tar of Kam. with the al-Muqa^tar 
of Tab.because the former describes him as an "^bdl" ( i . e . ,  
belonging to the tribe of^Abdu ’l-Q ais)  while the la t t e r  ca l ls  
him a ’Dabbl' ( i . e .  of the tr ibe  of Banu JJabba) . Yet i t  is  
more than probable th a t  the discrepancy may only be due to 
so ms error because a l l  through the annals of the Izraqites  
we hear only of one individual bearing that name who 
occupied in th e ir  heirarchy a high and notable place along  
with^Abida b. H i la l , A^mr al-Qana and o th e r s ( l ) .  I t  seems
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(1 ) .  Vide verses o f^ k n  al-Munjib,Kam. 681.
somewhat improbable that the account in Tab. 3hould refer  
to another al-Miqa^tar, otherwise obscure and unknown, 
because he is  described as * a man of great merits and 
long serv ices' so mich so that Qatari thought i t  rather 
ra3h and inadvisable to take any step against him.
According to Tab. ( 2/1006) al-Miqa*tar (al-Dabbl) 
had been appointed by Qatari to be h is  agent in some part  
of Karniah. While on an expedition he k il led  a Kharij i te  
knight of proven valour and strength who had previously  
been assured o f  protection . This gave r ise  to a storm of 
protest  from the general body of the Azraqites who insisted  
upon Qatari to hand over al-MiqaHar to them so that they 
may take th e ir  blood-revenge from him. Qatari refused to 
comply with the demand on the ground that i t  was simply an 
error of judgment which did not j u s t i fy  tiie execution of a 
man of d ign ity  witii a long record of serv ices  behind him.
The demand grew more and more p er s is ten t  but Qatari 
remained adamant.
Now Tab. makes th is  incident the immediate cause of 
the f in a l  breach between Qatari and *Abd Rabbihi. But the 
narrative in Kam. i s  profuse and coherent enough to warrant 
the assumption that th is  episode only strained the allegiano* 
of the Azraqites to Qatari to breaking point. The l a s t  
straw on camel's back was the issue of submission to a l -  
Muqa^tar.
To turn again to the narrative of Kam., Qatari met 
the protests of Salih b. Mkhraq with admonitions that  
time had altered him and h is  followers and made them
2Z6~
Z IG
in sen sib le  of the supreme n e c e ss ity  of c los ing  in th e ir  
ranks in the face of the enemy. In reply, Salih cited the 
precedent of ^Uthman who had thought i t  f i t  to submit to 
the demand of the KSfans for the deposition o f Sa^Id b. 
al-^Asi and argued that the Imam should not ia$>ose on his  
followers any thing which they would not fain  accept,
Qatari was s t i l l  unyielding and refused to rescind his 
order. The Azraqites thereupon took the extreme step of  
throwing o f f  the yoke of allegiance to Qatari and openly 
s e t  up <Abd Rabbihl as the rival 3mir# The schism became 
doubly formidable ^aen rac ia l  d is t in c t io n s  came into play.
The majority o f  the non-Arab mawali, who numbered e igh t  
thousand and were classed as * al-Qurra> ,» flocked round 
*Abd Rabbihl, himself a c l ie n t  of Banu Qais b, Tha<laba» 
whereas Qatari retained the a lleg iance  of the Arabs.Four 
hundred Arabs under the leadership of the prominent l ieu tenant  
“^Amr al-Qana, however preferred to join <kbd Babbihi.Qatari 
could only retain a fo llow ing estimated at about one-fourth  
or o n e - f i f th  of the w h ole(l) .  Then the d iv is ion  was actu a lly  
conplete, S a lih , to his great regret, rea lised  i t s  dangerous 
im plications and in a l l  earnestness made a l a s t  appeal to 
Qatari not to i n s i s t  on al-Miqa<tar and to advance against
( 1 ) .  Tab. 2/1006. The statement in Yqb. 2/329 that Qatari 
had a fo llow ing o f  twenty two thousand when he ’ * 
departed for  Tabaris tan seems highly exaggerated and 
incredible .
the ir  common enemy with a united front. Qatari,however,
proved as implacable as ever#
llie s ignal for a clash of arms came when a young Arab 
adherent of Qatari* provoked by S a lih ’s refractory a t t i tu d e ,  
transfixed  a spear into the l a t t e r ’s body and k i l le d  him. 
Immediately there was some skirmishing, the following day 
a fu ll-b looded b a tt le  raged f ie r c e ly  resu lt in g  in two 
thousand killed* and on the third day the non-Arabs scored  
a triumph over the Arabs and before i t  was noon drove them 
out o f the c i ty  o f  J lr a f t .  <Abd Habbihl was now the 
undisputed master of the c ity  inhere he established him self  
firmly. Qatari, having been forced out of the c i t y ,  took 
up a p o s it io n  outside i t  and on the advice o f  h is  chief  
l ieu ten a n t,  *AbIda b. H ila l even entrenched himself with 
a ditch near the c ity  gate in order to continue the f i ^ i t  
(Kam. 686).
Al-Muhallab wrote to al-Hajjaj informing him of th is  
new favourable development which, he hoped, ’ would prove 
to be the cause of their ( the 'Azariqa’s ) r u in .*(l) .A l-H ajjaj  
must have sorely  missed any mention in al-Muhallab’s l e t t e r  
of h is  intention to launch an attack upon the enemy while 
he was divided. He was afraid  l e s t  al-Mihallab should l e t  
th is  unique opportunity s l ip  and defer an o ffensive  t i l l  
the enemy wa3 again united when, as far he oould judge 
from a d istance , i t  would be as d i f f i c u l t  to subdue him 
as i t  was before. So he hastened to write to a l-m h a lla b  
enjoining him to open operations the very moment he 
received the l e t t e r .  Al-Muhallab thereupon revealed h is
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( i )  For Arabic tex t  see Appendix p. &•
strategy in the follow ing l e t t e r .  He replied to al-H ajjaj( 1 ) s-
* I received the l e t t e r  from the Emir and studied  
a l l  i t s  contents. I am not o f  the opinion that I should 
f ig h t  them ( the ^zariqa) so long as they are f i t t i n g  
among themselves and th e ir  own d ifferen t  sections are 
reducing the strength of each other. I f  they go on l ik e  
that then i t  is  but what we desire and through i t  w i l l  
come th e ir  destruction . And i f  they un ite  they w ill  do so 
only when the d if fe r en t  sections w il l  have grea tly  weakened 
each other. At iiiat seasonable time ^ien they m i l  be in a 
sta te  of utmost weakness and ins ign ificance , I w il l  advance 
against them. '
The assurance must have inpressed al-H ajjaj for he 
did not think i t  wise or expedient to press h is  own plan 
any further.
Al-Muhallab l e f t  the Azraqites free to f ig h t  among 
themselves for one month. He did not want to d is tra c t  them 
from internecine warfare by advancing against them during 
that tims.Then after  one month he moved forward and took 
up a p osition  a t  a n ig h t ’s distance from them.
Al-Hajjaj’s emissary was s t i l l  with al-Mahallab. He 
urged him not to delay an attack ’ t i l l  they ( the Hzariqa) 
r e u n ite d .’ Al-Mihallab, with h is  ch a ra cter is t ic  fo re s ig h t ,  
confidently  asserted: ■ Verily, they shall never reunite. 
Better leave them alone for soon they w i l l  be reduced to a 
condition in which they can never prosper.”
One month was a s u f f i c ie n t  time for the two sections  
of the^Azariqa to weaken each other’ s might considerably
Cl) For' fext See. Ajj^ e-noliy p. & *
and irreparably through da ily  f ig h t in g . 3t i l  1 both the 
sections were persevering enough to continue the f i ^ i t  to 
the l a s t  man and al-Mihallab knew that i f  he looked for  
the to ta l  ex tinction  of one of them at the hands of the 
other he wouii have to wait for an unlimited and unknown 
period. He was now anxious to s tr ik e  but was sober and 
ca lcu la tin g  enough to face one enemy at a time. He, therefore, 
drew upon his ingenuity to get  rid  of Qatari. At his behest, 
a man went into the can?) of qatari and talked that Qatari, 
who always acted wisely* had erred conspicuously in taking 
up the p os it ion  which he held at that tims. He was dangerously 
placed between al-Mihail ab on one side and V^bd Rabbihi on 
the other and thus had to face two enemies a t  the same 
time. These words spread and reached the ears of Qatari 
who at once f e l l  into the trap. He forthwith decided upon 
a move arguing that i t  w i l l  enable him to meet al-Muhallab 
with f u l l  strength i f  the l a t t e r  chose to pursue him. on 
the other hand i f  al-Mihallab preferred to s tay  behind 
against *Abd Sabbihi then i t  v/as a l l  that could be desired.
Qatari, therefore, l e f t  the place for  Tabaris tan along 
with h is  followers. On receiv ing  the news of h is  departure, 
al-ESuhallab conmissioned Huraim b. <Adi' b. Vdi Tahrna a l -  
liijashi^I to ascertain whether Qatari had actu a lly  l e f t  
because, he sa id , he was afraid l e s t  th is  wi hdrawal should 
be a mere ruse. Huraim in a party o f  twelve horsemen proceeded 
to the camp of Qatari. The re was none to be found in uhe 
camp except a slave and a boor who confirmed that Qatari and 
h is  followers had l e f t  the place in search of some other s i t e
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fo r  encampment* Having thus s a t i s f i e d  h is  scrupulous regard 
for  v ig i la n ce ,  al-Mihallab entrenched himself in Qatari's  
camp which, as stated above, was f o r t i f i e d  with a d itch ,
Al-Muhallab then dispatched Yazid to inform al-H ajjaj  
o f  the new p osition  that he had acquired and to ask him to 
send an expedition conmanded by a va liant chief to pursue 
Qatari and do away with him, Al-Hajjaj expressed great  
s a t is fa c t io n  and joy at the favourable turn of events but 
i t  only whetted his impatience for a head-on attack against  
the enemy. He wa3 30 obsessed with d is tru st  of al-Mihail ab's 
go-slow policy  that he, instead o f  complimenting him for  
the magnificent r e su lt s ,  which he probably attr ibuted  to 
mere chance, thought i t  f i t  to discharge a broadside 
against the methods o f  the s tead fast  commander.
As another attempt to rush al-Mihallab into p rec ip i ­
tate  action , al-Hajjaj dispatched Mjbaid b ,  Uauhab, h is  
own inawli and secretary , with a l e t t e r  a l leg in g  that a l -  
Muhallab de liberate ly  held back from action t i l l  such time 
a8 he was goaded to i t  by a l - H a j j a j ' s envoys and t h a t  the 
reason why these envoys returned invariably with a t e s t i ­
mony o f  al-Muhallab’s honesty of purpose and the 
a d v isa b i l i ty  of his l in e  of action in the l ig h t  o f  th e ir  
personal observation, was that the attacks were few and 
far between, A long interval between two onslaughts, the 
l e t t e r  xntinued , provided the enemy with a s u f f i c ie n t  
resp ite  to resover from the e f fe c t s  of the past attack
and to prepare to meet the new one with fresh vigour and
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unimpaired strength. On the other hand i t  also caused 
al-Muhallab’ s own troops to lo se  zeal by damping th e ir  
ardour for  vengeance for  the lo sse s  sustained by them.That 
was why the enemy showed him self equally strong and unbend­
ing whenever al-isohallab was goaded to attack him at  
in tervals  by a l-H ajja j’ s em issaries. Hence» i t  was urged* 
the advisable course was to force a continuous and un­
interrupted o ffensive  rather than r e s tr ic t in g  one’ s s e l f  
to a h a lt in g  and interm ittent one. In conclusion, the 
l e t t e r  reminded al-Jluhallab that he had d e f in i te ly  better  
resources and stronger incentives to war than his enemy and 
that half-hearted measures w il l  never achieve victory.
Al-i'uhallab's reaction to th is  l e t t e r  was the same 
with which we are already so fam iliar. He addressed his  
troops reminding them how ^ l la h  had rid them o f  the four 
great enemy ch iefs ,  — nanely, Qatari b. a l-F u ja /a , Salih  b. 
ITikhraq, ^.btda b. H il3 l and 3a<d al-Talari* , — and exhorted 
them to f i^ a t^ b d  Habbihi, the only foe that remained, 
with courage and confidence because h is  following wa3 a 
mere ’ rabble of Satan ’ (1) . Bie troops thereupon 
moved and fousfct the enemy constantly and vigorously  
with remarkable sang-froid. I t  is  re lated  that when 
al-luhallab*s so ld iers  returned from the b a t t l e - f i e ld  
with wounds on th e ir  body, i t  looked as i f  they were coming 
back f u l l  of mirth and l iv e l in e s s  from a pleasure party.
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Bat the enemy was s t i l l  undaunted and unimpressed, 'This 
t r ia l  demonstrated once again the u t te r  f u t i l i t y  and the 
f o l ly  o f  a rash attack so strongly urged by al-H ajjaj  
and evoked from <TJbaid b. i:auhab the spontaneous remark 
that a!-Mihallab*s excuse was quite manifest. Al-UUhallab 
then wrote a deta iled  reply to al-H ajjaj which, apart 
from the excellence o f i t s  l i t e r a r y  composition, is  also  
remarkable for  the fa c t  that i t  embodies a clear  
exposition  o f  his ta c t ic s  from his own pen.
Al-Mahallab’s reply began with the retort that the 
favourable opinion of a l-H ajja j’s envoys represented th e ir  
genuine ingress ion of «hat they actu a lly  saw and thaij he 
had never sought to influence them by any unfair means 
such as canvassing or bribe. Next he controverted the 
suggestion of al-Hajjaj by assertin g  that a pause was 
advisable and b en efic ia l  both for a victorious sad a 
vanquished army so that bhe former may take the necessary  
r e s t  and the la t t e r  may think out a new pl-m o f  a c t io n .I t  
could not have the e f f e c t  of dancing the troopa* ardour 
fo r  vengeance because i t  was impossible for thorn to forget  
thoir lo s s e s .  Further, al-Mihallab explained that hi 3 
attitu d e  was cpvemed by the a tt itu d e  of h is  opponents 
which ia  turn varied according to changing circumstance.
The opponents attacked him when they hoped to ;ain an 
advantage over him; they kept back when they f e l t  disgusted  
and they retired  vjhen they l o s t  a l l  hope. Y is-a-vis  t h is ,  
the best po licy  for  him was to f ig h t  them when they l a u n c h e d  
an attack; to be on his guard when they held backj and to 
pursue them when they retired . In conclusion, al-Mihallab
??2
declared that he was confident of the success of h is  
p olicy  only i f  he were l e f t  to h is  d iscretion  and that  
i f  i t  was sought to rush him into prec ip ita te  action he 
would rather give up the command than obey or disobey 
the orders imposed upon him (l).
th is  was indeed a f i t  reply, as regards both the 
contents and the tone, to the l e t t e r  of ol-Hajjaj which 
was rather strong in tone and contained some d e f in i t e  
arguments against al-M ihallab's p o licy . Al-Mihailab 
refuted them a l l ,  one by one, and ju s t i f ie d  h is  own 
p osition  convincingly. He then put forth boldly and 
candidly the cardinal points of h is  strategy  of which he 
was so sure and which he understood so well* Faced with 
equal, i f  not superior, odds he would seek no head-on 
clash but at the same time would avoid none i f  the 
enemy took the in i t ia t iv e  for  it.He would never relax his  
vigilance and would be quick to press an advantage 
whenever the enemy showed the l e a s t  sign o f weakness. M s  
frank exposition of p o l ic y  \7as followed by an impressing 
assertion  of h is  unshaken fa ith  in i t s  wisdom and 
e f f ica c y .  The concluding words of the reply constitute  
an undeniable testimony of h is  courage o f  conviction and 
independence o f judgment combined with a keen 3en3e of 
d isc ip l in e .  A weaker man in his place would have long  
before submitted to the pressure o f  his stern overlord.
The r e to r t  th s t  he would give up the command rather than
act against h is  own d iscretion  was almost overdue in view
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of a l-'^ajjaj's  refusal to be amenable to arguments of 
reason or practica l demonstration t e s t i f i e d  by h is  own 
em issaries. I t  is  also very remarkable that al-Muhallab 
never thought* even for a moment, of revo lt in g  against  
h is  superior authorities# He -would only give up the 
ccnciand i f  i t  were made impossible for him to act according 
to h is  independent judgment.
Perhaps the arguments contained in the above l e t t e r  
had some e f f e c t  on a l-H ajjaj. According to JJain (287) he 
wrote back to al-Uuhallab allowing him f u l l  d iscretion  
in the conduct c f  the caapaigu
The threat o f  resignation contained the concluding 
l in e s  of al HlSihal lab 's  l a s t  l e t t e r  i s  a clear indication  
that he frequent reproachful messages from al-H ajjaj had 
severely  strained patience and hnd already become i r r i t a t i n g .  
I t  was on one such comparatively l a t e r  occasion that an 
episode involving Xa<b al-AshqarT, al-Slihnllab's poet and 
warrior* took place, ’hen al-Mahal lab  had explained to 
the messenger of al-H ajjaj that 1 a man or. the spot knew 
b etter  than him who was far  away from it* » Ka<b, who 
happened to be present at the moraBnt, stood up and recited  






The verses bring out very v iv id ly  the anomaly of an 
inpatient overlord seeking to d ic ta te  the method o f  war 
from h is  d istan t and luxurious hons in the capital to a 
high m ilitary conmander engaged in actual warfare on the 
front who j u s t i f ia b ly  claimed for himself the cred it  of 
having a b etter  estimate of the exigencies o f  th3 s itu a t io n .  
But the mo3t objectionable feature o f  the above verses was 
the reference to a l-H ajja j's  alleged former profession of 
tannery. On h is  return the messenger mentioned the verses 
to al-H ajjaj who took so strong exception to them that he 
at once wrote to al-IHhallab to aend Ka<b to h is  p resen ce  
Al-ISihalla.b, however, f i r s t  sent Ka<b to KAbd al-Malik 
with the reouest that the poet be assured of protection  
on behalf o f  the Caliph. Ka<b impressed *Ab4 al-Malik so 
much that he at once gave him a l e t t e r  asking al-Hajjaj  
to show forgiveness to him. With th is  l e t t e r  Ka<b arrived 
at the court o f  al-Hajjaj who questioned him about h is  
derogatory reference to tannery. Ka<b m s t  have thought 
that he could propitiate  al-Hajjaj with a s im ilar  
derogatory remark against al-Buhallab. rle, therefore , 
replied  that he of ben wished ne could be •; cupper or a 
weaver (professions associated  with the >Azdites) rather 
than face the terrors whidi he sometimes had to run 
through under al-'uhallf.b during the course of warfare. 
Al-Hajjaj, however, declared that these words would have 
been of no avail had not Ka<b brought with him the l e t t e r  
from Hbd al-Malik and then dismissed him.
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In th is  connection, <Abd a l - “Malik is  also reported 
to baft written to al-H ajjaj not to in terfere  with 
al-ttihallsb* s conduct of war and to tru st  h is  d iscretion( 1)
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C H A P T S B I H I I .
THE 2ND OP THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
THE 'AZARIQA.
By h is  occupation of Qatari’ s camp, al-Mihallab had 
acquired a position  of vantage from where to s tr ik e  
e f f e c t iv e ly  a t  his only foe , <Abd Kabbihl, whose strength  
had already been f r i t te r e d  away in the wars with Qatari. 
Frequent engagements took place every now and then but 
the enemy s t i l l  showed himself far from being irreso lu te  
or d e f ic ien t  in  strength. Hence al-Mihallab, true to h is  
p o licy ,  concentrated h is  e f fo r ts  on a blockade o f  the 
c ity  o f  J lr a f t  rather than pressing  horns an imnediate 
fu ll-b looded attack on h is  own i n i t i a t i  ve( 1). I t  did not  
take very long for  the blockade to compel *Abd r&bbihl 
to seek a way out o f  i t .
About the sane time that the besieged Azraqites 
were planning a s o r t ie ,  al-Muhallab received *Ubaid b. 'Abl 
Rabi<a b. *AbI a l -S a l t  al-'Ihaqafi along with two ’ confidants'  
who came from al-H ajjaj with the same object of urging  
prec ip ita te  action. Sven the l a s t  l e t t e r  o f  a l-m h a lla b  
went in vain. Al-Hajjaj, indeed, proved himself 30 
inqpervious to the arguments of al-Muhallab that i t  son»times 
raises a fa in t  suspicion that he d e lib era te ly  kept up a
( i).According to Dain.288 al-Muhallab l e f t  Yazid in charge 
of the siege operations w hile  he established h im self at  
a distance of rive farsakh from the c ity .  In accordance 
with al-Muhallab's in stru ctio n s ,  Yazid allowed <Abd 
Rabbihl an unmolested passage out of the c ity  but as the 
Azraqite chief advanced further he was c lo se ly  pursued 
by al-Mihallab.
pretence of impatience and d issa tisfaction .P erh ap s, he 
deemed i t  necessary to p u ll  up al-Mihallab every now and 
then l e a t  the l a t t e r  should f o s s i l i s e .  ^Jbaid reproached 
al-Muhallab for having defied the injunction o f  al-Hajjaj  
and preferring procrastination and prolongation o f  war. 
Al-Muhallab only replied  that he had spared no pains and 
was doing hi a best.
Towards evening  the Azraqites appeared out of the 
c ity  d e te mined to s h i f t  to some o th er  place with their  
women and bag and baggage. Al-Muhallab i s su e d  orders to 
hi3 troops to stand by and to allow the enemy an unmolested 
p assage .<Ubaid b. ’Abi BabT<a naturally  took i t  as a sign o f  
slackness of which al-Muhallab had so long been accused 
and taunted him saying that i t  was indeed e a s i e r  fo r  him 
not to obstruct the enemy. Al-Muhallab would not allow 
h i s  actions to be misconstrued by a l-H ajja j’s em issaries.  
Forthwith he reversed h is  orders and enjoined the troops 
to check the enemy. He also took care t*) a ttach‘Ubaid b.
^bi Rabl<a to Yazid and one of the two confidants to a l -  
Magfctira 30 that the two emissaries might s a t i s f y  themselves 
that no e f f o r t  was spared.
Both the sides plunged into a deadly f igh t  t i l l  the 
casu a lt ies  mounted high. The Azraqites m re  so reckless  
that they did not refrain from a free fi^ht even for such 
p a ltry  things as a cup» a whip or a lance. About sunset 
i t  became a very serious a f fa ir  and al-Muhallab thought 
i t  f i t  to stop f ig h t in g  and allow the enemy to pass. 
Accordingly the Azraqites moved on and estab lish ed  th e ir  
new camp at a distance of four farsak& ( = 15 m iles) from
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J ir a f t .  Al-Muhallab then marched into the c ity  and ordered 
a co llec t io n  of a l l  that the enemy had l e f t  there of lug ­
gage an£ equipment, the booty waa carefu lly  sealed  jo in t ly  
by al-Muhallab , *Ubaid al-?haqaH and the two confidants.
Having occupied Jiraft*  al-Mihallab went out in 
pursuit of the A z r a q i t e s  and attacked them in their new 
posit ion . Al-Muhallab opened the attack a t dawn and the 
f ig h t in g  continued t i l l  mid-day when an Azraqite push 
imposed a set-back on h is  army and forced i t  to withdraw.
During the b a tt le  al-Mihallab had again attached
*Ubaid a l - ’£haqafi to Yazid and one o f  the two confidants
to al-Mugklra as he had done be fore *7/hen the battle  was
over, he inquired o f  al-lJUghlra about the confidant who
had been attached to him and was to ld  that he had been
s la in .  This grieved the other confidant so much that he
turned to al-Mug^Ira and exclaimed " You have k i l le d  my
colleague." The surviving confidant was also t e r r if ie d
to such an extent that a l i t t l e  la t e r  he refused to
accompany Habib on a night raid upon enemy caop. Similarly*
al-Mihallab also asked Yazid about <Ubaid a l-B iaqaft  and
was informed that he had not been seen since the set-back.
As a matter of fact* the Thaqafite had f led  and returned
only in the evening. I t  was th is  f l i g h t  o f  the Thaqafite
which caused a man of Banli<Amir b. Sa<3a<a to address
* .
the following verses to hims-
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^ c i  ^ rip ' -  (J^jKi a V^T4>>
(1)
These verses may also be taken as an indication of  
the way in which al-Haj ja j 's  repeated and p e r s is te n t  
demand for a head-on attack was treated by a l-m h a lla b 1 s 
warriors generally* As the fourth verse 3ays the grim 
r e a l i t i e s  o f  war could not be rea lised  by those immersed 
in the luxuries o f  the court.
There were two in tere s t in g  incidents during the 
b a t t le . if'irs t , al-Muhallab asked ^.bu qama, perhaps in 
remembrance of the l a t t e r ’ s action on the Day o f  S illa -w a-  
S i l l ib r a ,  to reinforce him with the horsemen of al-Yahmad 
and to urge them to lend him th e ir  sk u lls  for  a w hile(2).  
^bu ^Alqama replied that sk u lls  were not earthenware 
which could be le n t  nor the necks were the raceme which 
could grow afterwards. Second, al-Muhallab asked Ma<an b. 
al-Mighira b, ^bl Sufra to attack the enemy but the la t t e r  
refused to do so unless a l-m h a lla b  promised to give h is
(1 ) .  Kam. 691-92.
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occasion is the a am  that the former received from the 
knights of al-Yahmad on the previous occasion. ( See Supra 
p. 90 ). >Abu ^Uq&ma i s  variously described in Tab. as 
al-Yahmadi ( al-Yahmad being, a branch of al-^Azd: Kam.t>o8,l) 
and in Kam. as ’ a l-^ b d T 1. The former,however, aeens o^ be 
more appropriate in view o f  the fa c t  that on e ith er  occasion  
he i s  represented as exerc is in g  influence over -^ e knights 
of al-Yahmad.
daughter, ^ame M51ik, in marrige to him. Al-Mihallab 
granted the condition whereupon lla<an proved h is  raBttle 
and cleared the enemy.
After th is  in i t i a l  engagement, al-Muhallab continued 
to stay opposite the camp of *Abd RabbihT (1) £0 none of  
the two caeps was fo r t i f ie d  with a d itch , both the armies 
had to be perpetually  on the ir  guard, so raich so that the 
animals lere always kept saddled. This s ta te  of continuous 
dreadiful v ig ilance soon wearied both the p a r t ie s .  But a l -  
Iluhallab had the advantage that his army, which numbered 
nearly th ir ty  thousand, was anply supplied with provisions  
and other req u is ites  which the other side lacked.Hence i t  
did not take many days for <Abd Pabbihl to give way.On the 
eve o f  h is  murder, he ca lled  together h is companions and 
exhorted them to derive reckless courage from desperation. 
The next morning, he launched a vigorous onslaught against  
al-Muhallab. Soon the f ig h t in g  be cane so vehement and 
deadly that i t  ob litera ted  the memory o f a l l  the battles  
before. The Azraqites proved as reckless as <Abd RabbihT 
had exhorted them to be. As a mark o f th e ir  determination 
to fig£it to the end, they hamstrung th e ir  animals and 
became on foo t  so that they might not be d istracted  by 
the thought o f  f l ig h t .
Al-Muhallab, on his s id e ,  al30 ordered his troops 
to be on foo t.  He also advised h is  sons to sca tter  them3elvp
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1).  Qain. 288 make3 the engagement l a s t  continuously 
or throe days t i l l  the murder o f  HW  Rabbini.
among the troops so as to keep op the morale by th e ir  
presence. The warriors of al-Muhallab proved themselves 
equally in d ifferen t  to death. An >Azdite i s  reported to 
have gpne about asking the people to pledge thenselves 
to death. Another zealous knight, Abdullah b. Rizam a l -  
Haritbi* who hailed from Naj ran, exhorted hi3 colleagues 
in such a i«-3h and boisterous manner that al-Muhallab 
declared him to be a ’ mad boor’ . <Abdullah thereupon 
rushed single-handed with such vehemence that he penetrated  
across the enemy l in e  twice. As usual, the sons o f  a l -  
Muhallab distinguished themselves by th e ir  outstanding  
valour and perseverance. E spec ia lly  Yazid achieved some 
very notable fea ts  under the eye o f  h is  father who 
acknowledged that the battle  was the severest  he had 
ever experienced. When the battle  had advanced,the 
Azraqites broke the scabbards o f  the ir  swords in desperation 
and soon there followed vigorous assaults  on e ith er  3ide. 
This close f ig h t  ended in the murder of  <(lbd Rabbihi. <Amr 
al-Qana, along with h is  Arab followers who had remained 
mounted took to f l i g h t  and the rest  surrendered and 
begged for  meroy. The casualties  on the side o f the 
?Azsriqa are estimated at four thousand k i l le d  and a large  
number wounded who, on the orders o f  a l- lu h a lla b ,  were 
handed over to the care of their  respective re la t ion s .  
Al-Muhallab captured a l l  that he found in the >Azraqiie 
cainp and also made prisoners of the Azraqites because 
they tnenselves vjere wont to do the same with :heir  
enem ies(l) .
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(1 ) .  Tab. 2/1007,15.
Thus ended the l a s t  and a very great battle  o f  al -  
Iluhallab's canpaign against the ’Azariqa which began 
th irteen years a g o ( l) .  Ihe triunph of al-Iluhallab was so 
conplete that i t  meant the virtual extermination o f the 
^Azraqites. I t  is impossible to ascertain the exact ime 
of th is  crowning victory but, no doubt, i t  mast have come 
about very shortly a f te r  the departure of Qatari for  
Tabaris tan.
After the victory al-Muhallab returned to his head­
quarters a t  J ir a f t  and on reaching i t ,  expressed h is  joy 
and s a t is fa c t io n  at the successful termination of the 
hazardous canpaign in the words; * All praise be to ^ftllah 
who has again restored ease and comfort to us a fter  our 
l i f e  had been no l i f e  at a l l ."
Even the joy o f  victory fa i le d  to put al-Mihallab o f f  
his guard. Just a f te r  h is  return to J ir a f t  his eye f e l l  
on some people -#ho were unfamiliar to him. At once he put 
on his coat-of-mail and then called the strangers to h is  
presence, the men revealed that ^hey had os me to surprise  





(1 ) .  I t  i s  obviously wrong to say that the campaign la s te d  
19 years as in 115. 109.
C H A P T E R  XXIV.
CALIBRATION OF VICTORY.
Al-Mihailab’a keen sense of propriety and hi3 fine  
appreciation of the true worth of each individual w§re 
amply proved when he took particu lar  care to s e le c t  a 
'learned, in t e l l i g e n t ,  and eloquent man1 to carry the 
news of v ictory to al-Haj jaj (1 ) .  The happy choice f e l l  on 
Ka<b b. Ma<dan a l-^ sh qari, the notable poet and warrior* 
and Mirra b, Talid al-^Azdf, a well known orator(2). 7?hen 
the two entered the presence o f  al-Hajjaj Ka<b stepped 
forward and rec ited  the opening verse o f  an Ode composed 
by him in eulogy o f  al-Muhallab:-
c ; S a A j j j
Al-Hajjaj exclaimed: * Are you a poet or an orator?" 
Ka<b replied  that he was both and then went ahead with 
the rec ita l  o f  the re s t  o f  the Ode. The Ode con sist in g  
o f  83 verses i s  preserved in Tab.(2/1008 seq) and fragments 
of i t  are al3o to be found in Agh.(13 /55). Yaq. also
quotes i t  a t  various p laces .  I t  i s  a beautiful Ode as
(1 ) .  Mas, 5/350.
( 2 ) .  Thu3 in Kam. 694 and Agh* 12/54-55. The name of
Ka<b al-^shqari is  also confirmed in Tab. 2/1007.
In Iqd. j/201 ; 297 and IKh.2/149, however, these
two names are substituted  by the name
with the addition that a l-H ajjaj drew a good' 
augury from i t  as presaging .M as.(5/350)
gives the name as j
regards l i t e r a r y  excellence and eloquent eulogy o f  a l -  
Muhallab's q u a lit ie s  o f  generosity and leadership but 
tne most remarkable thing about i t  is  that i t  contains 
vivid  a llu s ion s  to the whole course o f  the canpai^i 
during the fourth and the l a s t  period of al-Muhallab'3 
cotanand. I t  was w e ll-su ited  for  being recited  on the 
occasion, the more e sp e c ia l ly  so because a few verses in 
i t  are also devoted to a vindication o f  al-Muhallab’ s 
cautious and restrained po licy .
The passages referring to the course o f  war and al - 
Mihallab’ s strategy  are inportant enough to deserve a 
mention here.
Having devoted the f i r s t  nineteen verses to the 
conventional e r o t ic  prelude and a panegyric of al-M ihallab,  
with particu lar  reference to h is  quality of generosity ,the  
poet comes to a description of the panic-stricken town of  
al-Basra at the time of al-Mahal lab 's  assumption of command:-
A/;
t  J s -  > u j >
V ^  lA'tr w \ ^  \Lo.Ai>
>y x  O V V  y  O W j J j .  j - i  “s
Further, the poet continues to trace the progress o f  
the campaign and refers in order of occurrence to the 
a a lien t  events, namely, the canq? a t  HamaHunmiz* the death 
of Bishr and the mutiny of the troops consequent upon i t ,  
the frequent engage man ts in Sabur where the contending 
p arties  skirmished for  three years and then the f in a l  
encounter in Karman #-
-e.v
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Referring to al-Mihallab* s watchful waiting game, the 
poet sa y s i-  > ,  ^ .
^  yy ] &  ^ J ^  ^
j> j  ^  v  \ o  i  t y  Wj ^'>*->
t/ 3C V>\^ \ ^>“ )
Ihen the poet tum3 to the final encounter in Karman 
and also refers to the serious d isa s ter  at Jaruz which had 
roused in the troops of al-Mihallab a keen passion for  
vengeance:- _ ___—~ , w
^ \ j  jv/y) y » y ^ >  ^ y S ^\y c y ~ y 6 }  f
\ j  < y < y ^ ^ \a^ -> V >
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Hhe rest of the verses are devoted to a description  
of  the grim and viru lent nature o f  the f in a l  struggle . The 
poet also takes the opportunity of exu lting  in the glory of  
al-?Azd, h is own tribe as well as that o f  al-Mihallab and 
in conclusion sums up the achievement o f  al-Mihallab thus
u>j Ouy J\y) \&>yj l$1a \ ) yy
When Ka<b had recited  the Ode al-H ajjaj turned to him 
for  a ta lk  and put him a ser ies  of questions about a l -  
Muhallab and h is  conduct of the ^ax.In Inis rep lie s  ¥&<\) 
t e s t i f i e d  that the people were quite happy and contented 
under the just  and e f f i c i e n t  leadership o f  al-Mihallab  
which had brought them victory and rich booty. The people 
always received from al-Mihallab the kindness of a father
and in return gave him the f i l i a l  love and obedience of a 
son.Further he described the ruse eajjloyed against Qatari 
as a r e su lt  of which the Azraqite ch ief departed from Karman 
b e liev in g  a l l  the time that he was playing a tr ick  upon h is  
enemies thereby. In conclusion he bore witness to the 
important role o f  the son3 of al-Muhallab in the achievement 
o f  v ictory and bestowed the h ighest praise on everyone of 
them for  bravery and generosity . He described them a l l  as 
g a llan t  heroes both in defensive and o ffen sive  operations 
and asserted that they were a l l  of equal merit l ik e  a so lid  
ring of which the two ends were im perceptib le .(1)
Al-Hajjaj was 30 much impressed with the impromptu 
answers of Ka<b that he coa^limented him as a 'p erfec t  man' 
and even praised al-Mihallab for  having daosen him as h is  
messenger.
Al-Mihallab had also  written a l e t t e r  to al-Hajjaj in 
which he expressed gratefulness to *Allah for the successfu l  
conclusion o f  the campaign and mentioned how he had p a tien tly  
waited for  a long time t i l l  he could see a seasonable 
opportunity o f gaining the upper hand of the ^zariqa  despite
th e ir  immense might which had almost become a nightmare(2).
In reply al-Hajjaj wrote to al-Muhailab expressing h is
joy at the happy event and im p lic i t ly  acknowledging the 
rectitude of a l- lu h a lla b'3 strategy of war, saying ' You 
knew your circumstances b e t te r .'  Further, he asked al-E&ihallab 
on the rece ip t  of the l e t t e r  to d istr ibute  the ’fay' anong the
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(1 ) .  Agh. 13/55-56; Kam. 694-5 j la s .  5/350-1 , Iqd. 1/201,
IKS. 2/149.(2 ) .  For Arabic tex t  3ee Appendix f\ v
warriors, making awards proportionately with their  merits in  
h is  own judgment; to leave a foroe to stand against the 
rennants o f  the enemy, i f  there were any; to appoint a man 
of h is  choice as the Prefect of Karman and then to proceed 
to him with a l l  speed accompanied by the members of the army 
who were expressly  prohibited from v is i t in g  th e ir  homes 
before they wore presented to him (a l-H a jja j) (1 ) .
Acting upon this l e t t e r ,  al-Muhallab appointed his son 
Yazid to administer Karnian and himself proceeded to respond 
to the ca ll  of a l-H ajjaj. ’Ih i le  conferring this new appoint­
ment on Yazid, al-Muhallab reminded him that h is  position  
had changed from what i t  had been in the past; thenceforward 
he was to have only such amount out of the revenue of Karman 
as al-Hajjaj allowed him. He also warned him that he could 
maintain his position  only i f  he adopted the ways of his  
father and instructed him to behave gently  and kindly towards 
his  people and to send to him any one who may incur his  
disfavour.
Al -Bahai lab* s v i s i t  to al-Hajjaj wa3 the occasion of 
a great ceremony such as b e f i t te d  the r e c e p t io n  o f  a 
v ic to r io u s  general. Al-Hajjaj received him with every mark 
of  honour and respect and seated him beside h im self. He
2 4 9
(1 ) .  Kam. 695-6.
referred to the so ld iers  o f  al-Muhallab's army as ’men of  
great deeds' and 'defenders of the fron tiers '  and declared 
that the people o f  a l - <Iraq were ’ the slaves o f  al-Muhal lab,'
Then turning to al-Muhallab he said* * By>Allah, you are as 
Laqit al^Iyadl has 3a id ;-
)s*\ & ^> 3)
^  j I a o \ y V
\X ~*0 t r ^ \  J) lJu>
)> o V > )
(Kam, 696).
Thereupon a man stood up from the audience and reca lled  
that he had heard Qatari mentioning the same verses as a 
true description o f  al-Muhallab. Al-Hajjaj was mich delim it ­
ed at thi3 concidence that h is  lov ing  and gratefu l tribute  
to al-Muhallab should be confirmed by the testimony of h is  
enemy as w ell.
Naturally* a f ter  being so long reproached and 
p e r s is te n t ly  pricked by al-Hajjaj* al-Mahal lab* s f i r s t  care 
was to ju s t i fy  h is  ta c t ic a l  p o l ic y  by i t s  re su lts .  But he 
did so with due regard to p o liten ess  and decorum and without 
the l e a s t  siga of resentment at the i r r i ta t in g  reproaches 
and d is tru stfu l  accusations hurled at him in the paat. 
Speaking on th is  occasion, he remarked that th e ir  victory  
was due not to th e ir  superior strength but to the righteous­
ness o f  th e ir  cause inasmuch as i t  was a triumph o f
 
community over the forces o f  discord. Then he added, "And 
that which we d is lik ed  of procrastination has turned out to
be better  than that which we l ik ed  o f rashness."(1) "True, 
indeed”, exclaimed al-H ajjaj promptly because the lo g ic  of  
accomplished fa c ts  was stronger than the lo g ic  of reason and 
argumen t.
Al-Hajjaj then requested a l- l i ih a llab  to acquaint him with 
the distinguished warriors and the ir  heroic deeds. Al-Muhallab 
asked the people to record an account of the deeds o f  gallantry  
to be presented to al-Hajjaj and when the people had prepared 
i t  he did not f a i l  to reimnd them that the reward which *11 lah 
had in store for  them was far b etter  than that whi ch they may 
get in the present world. Then he presented the warriors to a l -  
Hajjaj in order of th e ir  merit and precedence as regards 
gallantry  and serv ices  in war. Foremost among them he placed  
his  own sons, a l - : u j i i r a ,  Yazid, ludrik , Habib, Qabisa, a l -  
Mifaddal, <kb& al-!Malik and Muhammad, and, in order to clear  
a l l  suspicion of nepotism, added the remark that he would never 
have given them the f i r s t  place of honour had they not rea lly  
deserved i t  and were i t  not a grave in ju st ice  to give them a 
place lower than that. Al-Hajjaj emphatically approved o f  a l - 
Mahallab’3 judgement and said that h is  sons were indeed the 
’ swords of ^Ulah’ and that he, though not an eye-witness to 
th e ir  deeds, knew them no le s s  than al-Mihallab himself.Next  
al-Muhallab mentioned li!a<an b. al-Maghlra b. ’Abl Sufra, 
al-Ruqad and th e ir  l ik e s .  Al-Hajjaj called al-Huqld to hia 
presence. When al-Riqad, a ta l l  and humpbacked man, was ushered 
in al-Mihallab introduced him with the words H This is  the
2,51
(1 ) .  See Arabic tex t  see Appendix p. ||
great warrior of the Arabs.” Al-Ruqad thereupon gave the 
cred it  for h is  own deeds to the leadership o f  al-Muhallab. 
He said to al-Hajj5j that when he fought under commanders 
other than al-Muhallab he fa i le d  to r ise  above the oommon 
s o ld ie r s ,  But when he was placed under one ' who imposed 
perseverance on him, treated him on an equal footing  with 
himself and h is  sons and rewarded him for  g a llan try ’ he as 
well a3 h is  companions could not but become prominent 
horsemsn. 7e cannot doubt the s in c e r i ty  o f th is  fine and 
gLowing tribute beoause i t  was well-supported by reasons 
the truth of which i s  estab lished  by what we have known o f  
al-Muhallab during the past.
Having heard from al-Muhallab, al-Hajjaj passed 
orders that the people be given precedence according to 
the ir  deeds and that the sons of al-Muhallab, the top-most 
warriors, be granted an increase of 2000 while al-Ifciqad 
and h is  associa tes  #10 came next in order of merit, should 
be given a someishat s im ilar  amount(l).
£ 5 2
(1 ) .  Kara. 698-99 I c f .  also Sh. 2/211*
G H A P T I  H IXY.
GOVERNORSHIP OF KHflRASAK*
I t  w ill  be remembered that the two border provinces 
of Khuraaan and S ij is ta h  had been excluded from the domain 
of al-H ajjaj at the time of liis appointment to the 
governorship o f  al-^Iraq. ihe prefeotship of these two 
provinces was held by^Jmayya b. ^Abdullah b. Khalid b. ^ s id  
d ir e c t ly  on behalf o f  "\Abd al-Malik and independently of 
al*Hajjaj. In the beginning of 78 A.H*(1), however,‘‘Abd a l -  
Mal ik passed ordsrs deposing^mayya b. ^Abdullah and 
extending the supremacy of al-Hajjaj over Khurasan and 
S ij i s ta h .  Al-Hajjaj had not yet appointed any Prefect  
when there arrived al-Muhallab a f ter  the successful  
termination o f  his campaign against the ^Azariqa. Al-Hajjaj 
forthwith bestowed the two provinces upon a l- lu h a llab  but 
al-Muhallab himself pointed out to him that ^Ubaidullah 
b. A^bi Bakra was mo re worthy of the prefectship of 
S ij is ta n  by virtue o f  h is  previous lo ca l  experience there. 
Al-Hajjaj thereupon passed on the prefectsh ip  of S i j is ta n  
to^Ubaiduir&h b. >Abi Bakra. This is  the report of >Aba 
‘ ikhnaf in Tab. (2/1033; cf. also Anon.310). But i t  seems 
rather improbable that al-Muhallab should be so anxious 
to be relieved of S i j is ta n  just because there was another 
man who was more conversant with loca l a ffa irs  than himself. 
After a ll*  a l- lu h a llab  was an experienced and tr ied  general
( 1 ) . Tab. 2/1034, 2.
and there was no reason why he should iiave f e l t  so 
d if f id e n t  o f  su cc ess fu lly  governing S ij is ta n  in addition  
to Khurasan p art icu lar ly  when he himself had once been so 
far  as Kabul and the Indus ( during the .^Dvemorship of  
*Abdur Hahman b. Samira in the years 43-44). Ko doubt* 
^Ubaidullah b. ’Abi Bakra had had a longer and more varied 
experience as m i l  of 3i j i s ta n (  1) but such re la t ive  
difference is seldom a s u f f i c ie n t  motive for prompting a 
great* capable and p articu lar ly  se lf -co n f id en t  man such 
as al-Muhallab was, no matter however generous he may 
have been, to shrink from an extension of the boundaries 
of h is sway. In view of th is  the report by *A1I b. uhammad 
in Tab. 2/1034 seems more p lausib le . According to i t ,  
there never occurred any question o f  al-Mihallab being 
appointed to both the provinces; he was to have only one 
of the two while the other was to go to ^Ubaidullah b. *AbI 
Bakra. In the f i r s t  instance al-H ajjaj appointed a l -  
Muhallab to S i j is ta n  and ^Ubaidullah b. ^b i Bakra to 
lOiurasan. Al-’iuhallab f e l t  a d is l ik e  for 3 i j i s ta n  in 
comparison with Khurasan and wished that the la t t e r  province 
be a l lo t te d  to him. That al-Mihallab should have preferred  
Khurasan to S i j is ta n  is  quite natural and understandable 
because o f  h is  very old and intimate connections with- the 
former rather than the la t t e  r.Hence, al-ftohallab worked
for  the desired change in he dispensation of the provinces 
and for th is  purpose found a convenient excuse in the 
fa c t  that he knew I&urasan better  than ' i i j is ta n  while
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( 1 ) . According to Bal-397, He was wall o f  S i j i s ta n  from 
51 to 53 a-H.
^TJbaidull&h b. A^bi Bakra was b etter  acquainted with 
S ij is ta n  than himself. Al-Muhallab did not make a d irect  
approach to al-Hajjaj but instead sought the intervention  
of *Abdur Rahman b.^Ubaid b. Tariq al-^b^haml, al-Haj j a j ’3 
Chief o f  P o l ic e ,  #io in turn also secured the support o f  
2adsnFarrakh( 1), the Persian clerk o f  a l-H ajja j , in the 
matter* ^Abdur Rahman put the case before a l-^ a jja j  and 
ZadanFarrukli seconded him whereupon al-H ajjaj reversed h is  
previous order and assigned Ifourasan to a l- lu h a llab  and 
M.jis an to <TTbaidullah b. >\bi Bakra(2).
Al-Muhal lab 's  appointmsnt to Khurasan is  by oommon 
agreement an event o f  the year 78 A.H. As i t  followed his  
return to al-Basra a f te r  the v ictory  over the ^Azariq3*, 
the assumption, on the basis of the chronology previously  
followed, is  that i t  must have come o f f  very shortly  a f t e r  
the middle o f  the year 78. Al-Muhallab him self did not 
proceed to Bhurasan immediately but instead dispatched 
his son Habib at the head of his vanguard. On reaching 
Khurasan* Habib made no attempt to disturb^Jmayya, who 
had not yet relinquished hi3 p ost ,  or h is  agents. He 
only waited qu ietly  t i l l  the arrival of al-Muhallab ten 
months la te r .
Al-Muhallab arrived in Khurasan in 79 A.H. when 
Habib had been there for ten months (3) and took over 
•
(1 ) .  A non. 343 * (S ’.&  ^  *
(2 ) .  According to Jain .289 al-Muhallab received the. 
governorship d irec t ly  on behalf of <Abd a l-B a lik .  
i t  was only a f te r  the death of a l^ ^ h a lla b  that  
Khurasan was placed under a l-H ajjaj.
(3 ) .  Thus in Tab. 2/1035,8* In Bal. 417,we have 99 which 
i s  undoubtedly a mistake for 79 .Yaq.(2/907) i s  *
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charge of  o f f ic e  from the outgoing prefe ct, >TJmayya b. 
Abdullah isho l e f t  the province thereafter*
I t  waa la te  in the same year that al-Muhallab, at 
the instance of a l-H ajja j ,  appointed one Vaki^b. Bakr to 
be the interim successor to^ b a id u llah  b. ^bi Bakra who 
had died in S ij is tan  a f te r  h is  disastrous canpaigi 
against Zunbil o f  Kabul and ZSbul(i). Not long afterwards,(2) 
*Abdur Rahman b. Muhammad b. al-^sh^ath, the 31 fan chief  
who on a forms r occasion wa3 sent to the help of a l -  
IAihallab, arrived in 3 ij i3 tan  as the new jsvem or o f  the 
province, Hbdur Rahn&n's f i r s t  anc fbremost task was to 
deal with 2unbil(3) for which purpose al-H ajjaj had 
strengthened him wi th a numerous and well-equipped army 
called  ■ the army of peacocks. * <‘.bdur ^hmah determined 
to proceed with the campaigi prudently and p a t ie n t ly ,  
consolidating the ground gained and ensuring the l in e s  o f  
comnuni cation behind. In accordance with th is  calculated  
p o licy ,  he a f te r  subduing a part o f  the country,decided 
upon a pause and informed al-H ajjaj that he had done so in
ZS6
* grossly  wrong in making al-iftihallab react Khurasan so 
early  as in 3a iar, 76 A.H. and in assertin g  'Gnat h is  
governorship’of that province la sted  3even ye ars. TT, 10/330 
even mentions that al-M ihallab1 s governorship o f  Khurasan 
la sted  nine years.This i s  obviously impossible.
(1)Thus in Anon. 317 where i t  i s  added that KaAb al^Ashqari 
denounced ?!-!2uhallab’ s choice of lax?  in one following verse
j  3*
In Jah. 3 /240,however, the above verses are ascribed  ^
to t h lb i t  Qutna and .Vaki* is  said to have been appointed wall 
of *10me part of Khurasan.1
(2 ) .>Ibn al^Asjj<ath arrived in S i l l s  tail in 79 according to 
Anon.320,and in £0 according to Tab,2/1044,16 i Dh.41.(3 ) .  A proper name as well as a t i t l e .  The orthography is  *
order that the so ld iers  may g e t  accustomed to the nature 
of the mountains, Al-Hajjaj was as impatient with Hbdur 
Rahman as he had been tilth al-Sfiihallab. Neither the success  
%
of al-Muhallab nor the calamitous fa ilure  of ^'Jbaidullah 
b, ^bl Bakra had taught him a lesson . With hi3 ch aracter is t ic  
inpe tuousity , he addressed *Abdur Halinian sharply and 
incrim inatingly exactly  a3 he had done with al-Muhallab, 
and even threatened him with supersession i f  he did not 
immediately rush headlong with the caa^aign. The reaction  
of  Hbdur Bah man to these reproachful massages which 
poured upon him one a fter  another in quick succession,was  
quite d ifferen t  from that o f  al-Iiuhallab. The contrast is  
very useful in throwing into bold r e l i e f  the s te r l in g  
q u a lit ie s  o f  the l a t t e r  which distinguished him c lear ly  
and unmistakably from h is  colleagues and contemporaries.
While al-Mihallab would exhaust a l l  means o f  proving 
and demonstrating h i3 om wi3dom and rectitude with 
admirably strong bub calm courage o f  conviction, <Abdur 
Bahman called t o o t h e r  the chiefs o f  his army and* having 
put the whole thing before them, declared that he would 
advance or pause according to the ir  advice. The men of  a l -  
*Iraq» who constituted the array of *Abdur Rahman, hated 
al-H ajjaj and were always anxious for an early return to 
the luxurious l i f e  at home. 3o they l o s t  no time in d i s ­
owning a lleg iance to al-Hajjaj and doing homage to <Abdur 
Rahman who promised to rid them of the fo rraer (1)*
* uncertain and frequently i t  i s  al3o written as Rutbll 
W ell.(231) adopts the pronunciation 2unbil.
26'7
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/1052 seq ; Anon. 320 seq.
No doubt al-Euhallab could far more e a s i ly  do -what 
*Abdur Heliman did because he canaaanded unbounded personal 
obedience from his army which con^rised sn overwhelming 
number o f  his own tribesmen, the^Azdites. hit, ?hile h is  
keen sense of honour and self-respect would not 1 o a s in g le  
affront of al-Hajjaj go unanswered, at the same tima h is  
sense of d isc ip lin e  and lo y a lty  would not allow him to go 
beyond the threat ’ to relinquish the coma and rather than 
act against his own judgment.’
On learning of *H» al-^sh^ath*s mutiny in 3 ij is tah »  
al-Muhallab*s sense o f  f id e l i t y  and, what i s  s t i l l  more 
remarkable, his concern for the larger  interests  o f  the 
unity ?nd the so l id a r ity  of the Muslim comnunity v is -a -  
vis the non-&uslinB, prompted him to ?/rite a l e t t e r  to 
^bn al-Ash<ath dissuading him from the perilous and 
unpatr iotic  path which he had se t  before him. 'She l e t t e r ,  
which must have been written very shortly  after  the out­
break of the m t in y ( i )  sought to impress upon>Ibn a l -  
>Ash<ath the serious in d ic a t io n s  of the revolt. F ir s t ,  i t  
involved renunciation of sworn a llegiance which in  i t s e l f  
was deprecable. Secondly i t  led  to sheer waste o f  much 
precious Muslim blood and dealt a heavy blow at the unity  
and s o l id a r ity  of the comnuni ty. The l e t t e r  concluded 
with an earnest appeal to turn a l l  the energies and 
resources against the in f id e ls  instead o f  f r i t t e r in g  them 
away in internecine warfare(S).
(1 ) .  For Arabic tex t  see Appendix p. ^  Sei-
(2 ) .  According to t e i o n . 3 3 2 , 1 1  the l e t t e r  was written from 
Khurasan i . e . , before al-Mahallab started  on h is  
caa^aign in Transoxiana about the middle of the year
zt rs
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A l i t t l e  la te r  >Ibn alAsh^ath wrote to al-Muhallab 
in v it in g  him to join hands in the rebell ion . Al-£Hhallab 
received the l e t t e r  in h is  camp at Kish and, having ;one 
through i t ,  remarked that he rould not be d isloyal after  
he was more than seventy years o f  age and that i t  simply 
made him wonder that he should be exhorted to rebellion  
by one who was even younger than some of his 3ons.He wrote 
no reply to >Ibn al-A&^ath but only sent a uord through 
the messenger who had brought the l e t t e r  ’ to be fearful  
of >Allah as regards the blood o f  the M uslins.1 Afterwards 
he sent t-he l e t t e r  of I^bn al-'>\s li<ath to al-Hajjaj in 
order to assure him of h is  f id e l i t y  in that c r i t ic a l  h our(l) .
an the army of >Iba^Ash<ath moved on towards a l -  
^Iraq in the year 81 A.H., al-Muhallab al3o volunteered 
a p ie c e  of advice to al-H ajjaj as to how to deal with he 
mutineers. He wrote to him not to try  to stem the on rushing 
tide o f the ^Iraqi troops but to l e t  them proceed unchecked 
to th e ir  homes where the luxuries of a comfortable family 
l i f e  were bound in course of time bo damp their enthusiasm 
for f ig h t in g  #iioh  w ill ultim ately  give rise to dissensions  
in th e ir  ranks and consequently to a considerable weakening 
of th e ir  strength.When the troops lo se  enthusiasm and 
strength i t  w ill  be no hard task bo deal with them as 
they deserved (2 ) .
(1).Anon. 329; Tab, ^ 1042 , 10.
(2 ) .  For Arabic tex t  see Appendix p. a •
This wa3* indeed, a very precious advice based on 
s tr a te g ic  wisdom, ripe experience and a deep i n s i s t  into 
the changed temperament of th e4Iraqi troops who had become 
enervated enough to be averse to f ig h t in g  and to do every­
thing and anything not to part with th e ir  homes where the 
vastly  growing resources o f  the State had provided them 
with a-mple luxuries. But i t  wa3 clear that only a p a tien t  
and ca lcu la tin g  mind l ik e  that of al-Muhallab h im self ,  
could appreciate and act upon th is  advice. Al-Hajjaj, 
quick and impatient as usual, was by his very nature 
incapable of adopting i t .  He not only rejected  i t  o u tr i^ it  
but even expressed doubts about the motive underlying i t  (1 ) .  
He chose for himself the same course that he had so 
vigorously sought to impose on al-Muhallab and >1 bn al - 
>Ash<ath. A rash attempt was made to check the advance of 
>Ibn al^Ash^ath with the re su lt  that in the f i r s t  encounter 
which took place on the Du ja i l  near Tustar the rebel army 
achieved a clear victory ( 10th Dhu *1-Hijja, 81 A.H)* The 
aray of al-H ajjaj f led  back to al-Basra and the victorious  
rebels marched unchecked into the town* This stunning blow 
could not fa i l  to drive home to worsted al-H ajjaj the 
truth o f  al-Muhallab*s advice. In a remorseful mood, he 
asked fo r  the l e t t e r  of al-Mihallab, read i t ,  and then rued 
his in|)rudence in the words, ■ What a great man of war he 
(al-M ihallab) is* He gave the right advice to us but we
did not adopt it*  “(2)
(1 ) .  Tab* y i 0 9 9 , i i  ; Mon. 336, 11-12.
(2 ) .  Tab. 2/1061,16-185 Mon. 336, 13-14*
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0 H A P T 2 R X X 7 I .
CAMPAIGN IN TRAN30XIANA. ^
(£• a )) U ^ ^ z 5 >  d /^ C rfc j
Through already a septuagenarian, al-Mihallab wa3
s t i l l  active  and energetic  enough to embark on an expedition  
beyond the Qxus. in the year 80 A.H. he crossed the river  
near Bal&i and proceeded to Kish, the modem Sijahr S ab z(i) ,  
ishere he estab lished  h is  caop, At the time his vanguard 
was three thousand strong and was commanded by a reputed 
knight, ^bu al-Oldham Ziyad b. A^mr al-ZiwnanT ,who was 
generally  counted as equal to two thousand men in bravery, 
strategy  and sound judgment.
I t  w i l l  be remembered that Transoxiana was not an 
untraversed land for al-Muhallab. In his early  l i f e  he had 
more than once marched v ic tor iou sly  up to Samarqand and 
Bukhara. The country, ho we ver, was yet far  from being 
permanently subdued and had to be conquered again and again.
From his  base at Kish al-Mihallab dispatched two 
expeditions, one against the king o f  a l-K hutta l(2 ) ,  a 
mountainous region ly in g  between the a&ishab and the Jaryab 
( i . e .  the upper course o f  the Oxus), and the other to 
Rabinjan, a 3mall town in the country o f  3ugWSamarqand.
The expedition against the king o f  al-Khuttal was under­
taken a t  the in v ita t ion  o f  a disgruntled oousin of ;.is who 
personally v is i te d  al-l&ihallab at Kish and offered h is
help and serv ices  in the venture. Al-Muhallab accepted the
(1 ) .  Le Stra 469.
(2 ) .  Le Stra .438.
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suggestion end appointed h is  son Yazid to lead an 
expedition in company with uhe o f f ic io u s  v i s i to r .  Yazid 
la id  a siege to the castle  of a l-3abal, as the king o f  
al-Khuttal was ca lled , and forced him to sue for peace on 
payment o f  a p articu lar  sum*
The other exp ed itit ion  to Rabinjan was headed by a l -
Muhallab*s another son, Habib. Habib met with considerable% t
opposition from the king o f  Bukhara whose forces numbered 
forty  thousand. Although the enemy i s  reported to have 
retreated once or twice yet i t  i s  not d e a r  i f  the 
expedition achieved any conclusive r e 3 u lt s ( l ) .
Throughout the annals o f  al-M ihallab's two year 
canpaigp in Transoxiana, we always find him in h is  camp 
at Kish, sending out expeditions and d irec t in g  the 
operations from there. Only once, however, in the year
81 A.H. we see h is  camp sh ifted  to ^khrun ( near Shuman) 
where an incident involving the murder o f  Bahir b. Varqa> 
a distinguished warrior,took place. Baiiir was the person 
who on the orders o f >TJmayya, al-M ihallab'3 predecessor in  
o f f i c e ,  had executed an ambitious pretender, Bukair b. 
Wishah, with whom he al3o had a long-standing personal 
rivalry . The murder of Bukair roused one o f  h is  kinsmen 
3a<sa <a b. Harb al-^Aufi, to work for vengeance. In 
pursuance o f  the same object he proceeded to ^khrun and 
c lever ly  managed to obtain the h o s p i ta l i ty  of his intended 
victim. Further, he ingratiated himself so much into the
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/1040-42.
confidence of Bahir that the l a t t e r  even used to take him ^  
to the company of al-Muhallab* On one such occasion ^shile 
Bahir was s i t t in g  in the assembly of al-Muhallab, 3a<sa^a 
stabbed him in the b e l ly  with a dagger tempered in asses'  
milk. The treacherous assassin  was at once captured and 
brought before al-Mihallab who, ev idently  to ex to r t  the 
desired confession from him, said  to him that Bal^ir was 
unhurt. In reply 3a<sa^a rejoiced in the appeasement of 
his passion for revenge and boldly asserted that he was 
sure his victim was none other than Bahir and that the 
stab was so su ccess fu lly  administered as to make i t  
impossible for him to survive i t .  Thereupon, according to 
some narrators, al-l*uhallab sent the cu lprit  to Bahir who 
slew him ju st  before he succumbed to h i3 vsound he next 
morning According to another version, sl-Siihallab nimself  
had Sa^sa^ beheaded whereupon h is  tribesmen, .. <Auf and 
the >Abna>, raised a great uproar that the sentenoe was 
unjust and u n ju s t if ied  because, they asserted, Sa<3a<a had 
but taken his leg it im ate  revenge and sms not g u i l ty  o f  
an aggressive crime. The dispute soon threatened to assume 
the form of a tr ib a l s t r i f e  by reviving the o ld  animosities  
between the <Auf and the ^bna^on the one hand and the Butun 
and the Miqa<i s ,  the partisans o f  Bahir, on the other*But 
the ugLy s itu a t io n  was 3aved by prong? t ly  arranging a 
compromise according to which the ^bna^were paid blood- 
money for  3a<sa <a ( l)  while Bahir was held to counterbalance
(1 ) .  The blood-money was paid by the people according to Tab*
2/1051,13 and oy a l-m h a llab  him self according to
IKh.alaun 3/46.
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Bukair. Thus the episode was closed but al-Bih&llab  
re-^retted very nuda the lo s s  o f  a great knight l ik e  Bahlr* 
(Tab* 2 /1047-51). ' j K ]
In the year 82 A,'I* we again neet al-H ihallab at Kish 
which town he waa s t i l l  besieging* I t  was there &hat he 
received ’he news o f the death o f  h is  3on al*  u__iilra a t  
Sferv in the month o f Itajab, 92 A*fl. The p o s it io n  o f  a l -  
Ifti^Ira at l*erv i3 described by a few reporters as the 
Collector o f  Taxes o f  i&urasah while al-Mihallab* according 
to them# was only the head and the Corsraander o f  the 
m ilitary  forces ( Tab*2/1039*11-13 ; 1063* 9 -10), This 
obviously is  a misunderstanding which arose oa t  of the 
fa c t  that al-Muhallab waa during the major part of his  
governorship o f  Khurasan ( from the middle o f  80 A*H# 
onwarda) engaged e x c lu s iv e ly  in m ilitary  operations while 
a l - ’-o^Tra attended to the c iv i l  administration of the 
province at Msrv. That the above report i s  only a la t e r  
in terpretation  o f  thi3 s ta te  of a f fa ir s  i s  proved by the 
fa c t  that there i s  no mention o f  a l r a  in the reports  
of a l-H ihallab’s appointment which e x p l ic i t ly  describe 
the l a t t e r ’s designation as the ‘wall* o f  Khurasan* Nor 
is  i t  s p e c i f i c a l ly  mentioned as to when at a subsecjuent 
date did the appointment of a l - . i i^ i lr a  on behalf of a l -  
Ijajjaj take place* Thus the correct statement seems to be 
that al-lAighlra only acted as :i3 fa th er’ 3 deputy at -<rv 
during the l a t t e r*s absence from j& urasan(i).
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( 1 ) .  Tab. 3/1077112 i I&th. 4 /228 I IKh. ^ 1 4 7 .
The news of al-LSigfelra*3 death was for  some time 
withheld from al-Mihallab and was broken to him only when 
Yazid allowed the woman to cry out the customary lamentation. 
Al-Mihallab was so overwhelmsd with g r ie f  that he could 
not control him self.Yet with tears flowing down his beard , 
the g r ie f -s tr ick en  father dispatched Yazid to f i l l  the place  
of  al-Mo^hlra a t Lsbtv and even in h is  agony did not f a i l  
to in struct the new incumbent a3 to what to do. The 
bereavement weighed heavily  upon al-Mihallab in h is  o ld  
age and# perhaps* even hastened h is  d ea th (l) .
Not long a f ter  the death of al-Mighlra ’alien the 
siege o f  Kish had la s te d  for  two years, al-Mihallab agreed 
to re tire  in consideration of a money payment on behalf 
of the inhabitants of the town(2). Thereafter he departed 
for  Marv, leav in g  behind Huraith b. Qutba,a c l ie n t  of 
Khuza^a, with instructions to release the hostages as soon 
as fu l l  payment was made to him. On crossing the Oxus,however, 
he made a h a lt  at Balkh and wrote to Huraith not to release
• ■
the hostages immediately on rece ip t of the money but to 
detain them t i l l  he reached Bal&i because i t  was feared l e s t  
the natives should attempt a raid when the hostages were 
handed back to them. Huraith informed the king of Kish of
(1 ) .  Bal. 417,10.
(2)» The conclusion of an agreement with the inhabitants o f
Kish i3 mentioned in Tab. both under the year 80 
(2 /1^ 2$Q )  and the year 82(1080).I t  i s ,  however, clear  
that i t  i s  an event of the l a t t e r  year and that i t  i s  
referred to under the former year ju st  to complete the 
account. The narrator in both the places is  tne same 
b. Mihammad and i t  i s  e x p l i c i t l y  mentioned that  
the s i e g e ‘la s te d  two years (1041,14).
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al-l&thallab1 s fresh orders with the o f fe r  that he was 
prepared to contravene them and to release the hostages 
immediately provided the money was paid without delay so 
as to make i t  possib le  for  him to t e l l  al-Muhallab that  
he had already released the hostages before the rece ip t  
of the l e t t e r .  The king of KigJi promptly availed him self  
of the o f fe r  and Huraith released the hostages immediately 
on payment of the money and then started for Balkh. On the 
way, he was intercepted by a band of Turk brigands which 
had already done the same with Yazid b. al-Muhallab on his  
way from Kish to iferv in order to succeed al-Hi,;hlra.The 
brigands confronted Huraith with a demand for money payment 
on behalf of himself and h is  party, saying that Yazid had 
also submitted to such paymont before. Huraith rejected  
the demand outright and the reference to the example o f  
Yazid evoked from him the derogatory remark that i f  he 
were to do likew ise  he w i l l  expose himself to the contempt 
o f  being 'bom of YazTd's mother. *(1)
The s l ig h t in g  ^ord3 of Huraith_ concerning Yazid had 
preceded him to al-SSihallab who naturally  took strong  
exception to them and was indigaant that * the slave' 
should deem i t  a dishonour to oe bom o f  Yazid*s mother*
.Tien Huraitti joined al-Mahal lab at Balkhthe l a t t e r  asked
him as to where the hostages were who, according to la te r  
in s tru c t io n s ,  were not to be released t i l l  h is  arrival a t
Balkh. In reply, Huraitii put forward the sane excuse that
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(1 ) .  Yazid's mother was a captive from Kabul. Kam. 523 
note a.
he had already cooked for the occasion, adding that there 
happened no such incident as al-Muhallab was apprehensive 
o f .  Al-Muhallab refused to accept the excuse which he 
declared to be fa lse  and accused Huraith, probably on the 
basis of some seoret reports previously  communicated to him, 
of seeking favour with the king of Kish and d isc lo s in g  the 
contents of h is  l e t t e r  to him, Al-Mihallab m s t  also have 
had the disparaging words o f  Huraith in mind vJhen he 
proposed for him the punishment that he be stripped of h is  
clothes and then whipped th ir ty  timea.Huraith considered i t  
a matter o f  great shame to be stripped of h is  clothes and 
took the disgrace so much to heart that he vowed to k i l l  
al-Mihallab, Henceforth Huraith was always on the lookout 
for  an opportunity of f u l f i l l i n g  h is  vow. One day udiile 
al-Muhallab was rid ing, with Huraith follow ing him behind, 
the l a t t e r  ordered h is  two accompanying slaves to s tr ike  
at the former. Fortunately one o f  the two slaves refused 
to obey and went away while the other one dared not embark 
on the murderous act singLe-handed.
Afterwards Huraith discontinued his v i s i t s  to a l -
• ' 1
Muhallab on the p retext o f  i l l n e s s .  On learning that the 
i l l n e s s  was a mere f e in t  and that Huraith was p lo tt in g  
against h is  l i f e ,  al-Muhallab asked Tnabit b. 'Jitba,
Huraith’ a own bro ther, to bring him again to the c o u r  t..
He, with his ch aracter is t ic  kindness, further assured 
Thsbit that he treated Huraith as one of h is  sons and that  
he had punished him only with a view to teach him better  
way3 just as he often  punished hi3 3ons in their own 
in te r e s t .  Thabit adjured Huraith to accompany him to
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al-Mahal lab but Huraith proved unyielding* He declared 
that he could not reconcile himself to v i s i t in g  al-Mihallab  
a fte r  the l a t t e r  had treated him in  3uch a humiliating  
manner and further said  that be thought i t  even imprudent 
to go to one who was both d is tru sted  and distrustfu l.T he  
unabated rancour o f  Huraith disconcerted xhabit who
• - 
apprehended l e s t  h is  brother should in v ite  a disastrous  
retribution  upon the whole family by murdering al-Mihallab, 
Therefore he, along with h is  brother, slipped away to 
Tirmidh where he joined Musa b. Abdullah b. Khazim isho was 
s t i l l  defying the Umayyids and formed the c lustering-centre  
of  the d isa ffected  elements in the neighbourin ; country# 
Al-l&ahallab’ a attitude towards Musa, the son of  
Abdullah b. Khazim, provides us with a fine exanple of h is  
deep insight into the a ffa ir s  o f  the State.I.Usa s t i l l  
remained unsubdued when al-Muhallab assumed charge o f  the 
governorship o f  Khurasan. His predecessor,^Uraayya, had 
launched an expedition against him which, however, ended in 
fa i lu r e .  Al-Muhallab d e lib era te ly  l e f t  the rebel unmolested. 
His motive, as he explained to his sons (Tab. 2/1151,18-1152, 
2) ,  was h is  in te l l ig e n t  apprehension that as soon as IGsa 
was removed al-H ajjaj would deprive him and liis family of 
the governorship of Khurasan. The reason tor this apprehen­
sion was that al-H ajjaj was parvenu a Qaisite and would 
have very much l ik ed  to supplant the Azdite al-Mihallab  
by a Qaisite chief.The only factor  which made a Qaisite  
governor undesirable wa3 the continuance of the rebellion  
of Musa because Misa himself being a Qaisite had the 
sympathies o f  the Qais on h is  side and a Qaisite could
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not be trusted against a lign ing  himself with the rebel.This  
at l e a s t  was the assumption of the people and the subsequent 
events amply proved it* Yazid stuck to the p o licy  o f  h is  
father and spared Ms a as a usefu l foe. TIis brother and 
successor, al-Mifaddal b. al-Muhallab, hov/ever, departed 
from this po licy  and launched on active h o s t i l i t y  towards 
IKsa in 85 A#H. The resu lt  was that as soon as he had got  
the better  of Hasa he wa3 removed from h is  post  a fter  being  
in possession of i t  just  for nine months. Not only was i t  
a personal l o s s  to al-Mifaddal tu t  the fa te fu l  event a lso  
brought about the f a l l  o f  the whole family o f  al-Mihallabids 
as well as uhe end of the ascendancy of the ^Azd-Babl^a 
x  ( or the Yaman) confederacy v is -a -v is  the Tudarite Arabs 
in Khurasan.
\l-i3ihallab again received a reproachful l e t t e r  from 
a l - i a j j a j ,  who was 3 t i l l  as severe and haughty as ever, when 
upon his return a fter  the conclusion of the arm istice ,he 
ordered the release of a party o f  ilidarite suspects whom 
he had previously  kept in detention while at Kish. Al-Hajjaj 
wrote to al-l?uhallab c r i t i c i s in g  his action on the ground 
that i f  he wa3 right in ordering th e ir  detention , then he 
erred in releasing  them and, conversely, i f  he was right  
in re leasin g  them, then he was unjust in detaining them* 
Al-Muhallab's simple reply was that he detained the suspects 
so long as he apprehended danger from them and l e t  them 
free as soon as he f e l t  h im self secure against them(l).
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(1) .  Of. Tab. 2/1042.
The argument of al -Mill al lab w ell i l lu s t r a te s  the 3 p ir it  
behind the sev er ity  of h is  methods which was never excessive  
beyond the needs of the s itu a t io n .
The accounts of a l -Mihailab’a can$>aign in Transoxiana 
are very b r ie f  and inadequate for the purpose of making a 
comparison with h is  former can$)aigns. S t i l l  i t  appears 
from the e x is t in g  reports that the declin ing  age had to 
so me degree a ffected  h is  former energy and a c t iv i ty ,  we 
do not hear of any instance of  personal valour or any 
stroke of strategy  and leadership* For the greater part 
of the two years he only remained stationed in the camp at 
Kish and except on one occasion, seems to have moved ou : 
very seldom, Even the achievements were not of any great 
s ign if ican ce  nor did they leave any great l a s t in g  e f f e c t .
The prolonged siege of Kish ended only in acceptance o f  a 
mere money payment. Similar was the resu lt  of Yazid'3 
expedition to al-Xhuttal while Habib’s expedition toKabinjan 
seems to have returned without any achievement at a l l .
Other conquests mentioned in 3a l.(417) are the town of  
Khujandah, far o f f  on the Sir r iver , and the town of llasaf 
to the south-west of Kish.There i s  no doubt that u ltim ate ly  
the country proved a weariscme embarrassment for al-Mihallab. 
In reply to a suggestion to attempt a full-tfledged campaign 
in al**3u£jjid and the country beyond he is  repor 3d to have 
said that he would consider himself fortunate i f  his army 
could return 3afely  to 1-3rv a fter  the GGii^letion of the 
l im ited  operations already in hand. (Tab.2/1041,14-16).
Thus the governorship of Khurasan which lasted  4 years
(1) brought no fresh m ilitary  honours to al-Mihallab.
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Nevertheless his coming to Khurasan was o f  groat importance 
in another way. He brought with him the Azdite warriors, 
his own tribesmen;who had t i l l  then fought with him against  
the ^zariqa. The arrival of the ^zd in I&urasan was as 
important an event in the h istory  of  tr ib a l  re la t ion s  as 
th e ir  immigration in al-Basra. Here in Khurasan too they 
entered into an a llian ce  with the Bakr and the Eab^a and 
so a ffected  the balance of power and strength as to make 
an end of the supremacy of the Madarites (TamTm and Qais). 
Henceforth the *Azd played an important role in the tr ibal  
a ffa ir s  of Khurasan.
%7i
Naw.582, f ive  years on the assumption that al-Mihallab  
died in 83 and not in 82 as we have assumed.
QSATH OF fllrMl/HALLAB.
Having stayed in Balkh for  a while, al-Muhallab resumed 
his  journey to Merv. On the way* however, he was overtaken 
by death. He died of 'al-sthausa or al^shauka*(1) a t  Zaghul,
a v i l la g e  in Fanjadeh (2) which was a sub-division  of the 
d i s t r i c t  of Iferv a l-H u^  and was s ituated  along the river  
l&rgb&b* The death occurred in the l a s t  month of the year
82 A.H. although some authorities  have also placed i t  in 
the same month of the following year(3). The l a t t e r  year 
i s ,  however, improbable because i t  i s  undisputed that he 
died on h is  way back from Kish tc Hferv. He mast have l e f t  
Kish not long a f te r  the death of al-Ma^Tra (I?ajab,82 A.H.) 
and there is  no reason to suppose that the stay at Balk^ 
should have prolonged for more than a year. I t  ia,however, 
commonly agreed that the age of al -Mahallab was 76 at the 
time of h is  death.
(1 ) .  Tab. 2/1082, 11-12. Bal. 417,9 al3o mentions .
4 ^ > = gross f la tu s  in the sides causing acute pain
or an inflammation of the membranes o f  tne riba. 
a}J^ ) s a certain disease analogous to plague and also  
a redness that spreads over the face and the 
body. (L is in ) .
According to Yqb. 2/330 the death was caused by gangrene 
in the leg .
(2 ) ,  Also PanjdehrLe Stra. 405; Yaq. 1/743.
(3 ) .  3se Tab. 2/1083 ; Isa. 3/536; Is t .4 /1 1 0 ;  T - 10/330!
Yan. 2/907 : IKh. 2/146. Year 82 xa a lso  oonfirmad 
in Dh.42 and 11.322.
0 H A P T S R XXVII.
Shortly before hi3 death, al-Iiuhallab i3 reported to 
have called together HabTb and a l l  the other son3 who 
happened to be with him on the 3pot and to have addressed 
a valedictory speech to them. J ira t  ho presented them with 
a number of arrows and questioned i f  they could be broken 
singLy or c o l le c t iv e ly ,  hen the sons replied  hat i t  was 
only possib le  to break the arrow3 sing ly  and not c o l l e c t iv e ly ,  
he urged that the 3ame was equally true o f  the oomnunity 
o f  men. Than he enjoined upon them a few rule3 o f  conduct, 
v i z . ,  to keep un ity  among themselves and to maintain good 
relations with other kinsmen, tG be careful that th e ir  
deed3 should always be in excess o f  the ir  ,vords, to give  
everybody h i 3  due, to practise  -generosity, to learn the 
Qur’an and to show love to the Araba and to do gpod by 
them in recognition of th e ir  specia l virtue of loyal  
service f id e l i t y .  Adverting to h is  cherished p r in c ip le  
of warfare he exhorted them to practise  patience and clever  
strategy which proved o f  more avail than mere dash and 
bravery. He further explained that these methods warded o ff  
a l l  blame from the commander, no ma fc to r wh ci L6 vc t  th© resul t.
I f  the r e su lt  \?ere favourable the cred it  went to his wisdom 
and prudence and i f  i t  were adverse then i t  was attr ibutable  
only to the supreme dispensation of Providence because h is  
excuse stood m anifesto .).
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(1). For Arabix text see Appendix p. II Sel-
7/ith these words al-L&ihallab announced h is  decision to 
appoint Yazid as h is  successor and to commission Habib to 
command the army t i l l  he joined Yazid. The re are reasons to 
believe that al-Uuhallab1 s choice of Yazid was not a whole­
hearted one because the l a t t e r  was haughty, arrogant (1) and 
even p ro fliga te  as his subsequent conduct showed. Habib, 
indeed, deserved the honour ouch more than Yazid and a l -  
Muhallab is  even reported to have said in h is  l a s t  ncments
that i f  he had free choice he would have se lec ted  Habib in
\
preference bo Yazld(2). He,however, concluded with an earnest  
appeal to a l l  the brothers not to defy Yazid whe re up on a l -  
Mufaddal assured him on behalf o f  a l l  the brothers that i f* %
the choice o f a head were l e f t  to them they themselves would 
have chosen none other t-han Yazid.
The funeral prayer was led  by IiabTb in accordance with 
the wishes of the deceased father. Later on he proceeded 
to Merv al-3ijahjah ab the head of the army where a l l  the 
brothers acimowledged Yazid as the head of the family. The 
succession o f  YazTd to the ^ vem orsh ip  o f  Khurasan was 
l a t e r  on confirmed both by al-H ajjaj and ^bd al-Malik.
3h. records that 430 years a f ter  the death o f  a l -  
Muhallab ( i . e . ,  in the year 512 .A.H,) a scholar of Fanjadeh 
dreamt him requesting that his body be renoved from his  
old grave on the bank o f  the fiudij Msrv because the water 
had already penetrated beneath i t  and was about to submerge 
his body. Thereupon the scholar proceeded uo the spot
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(1 ) .  Yqb. 2/330.
(2 ) .  Tab. 2/1083, 17-18.
indicated to him in the dream, dug out the skeleton which 
was found ho be in tac t  and sh ifted  i t  to the ceraetary o f  
Maduna, a quarter in Fanjadeh.
Ilian y poets are reported to have composed e le g ie s  on 
the death o f  al-Mihallab the best known o f  -which is  that 
by Nahar b. !ausi<a
•  *  ___________*
* /  • y
• ^  • • , **
- -- .)»J f* ^ .^-J \ -^->
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(Tab.2/1084 ; IKh.2/147 ).
C H A P T E R  X X V I I I #
Al-Mihallab's Strategy and Hi3 Qualities o f  Generalship.
Even when he was a mere lad , a l- lu h a llab  was promising 
enough to earn from Caliph ^mar the compliment that he was the 
prospective 'c h ie f  o f  a l l  the sons o f  ^bu Sufra#' S im ilar ly ( l)  
he a lso  evoked from the poet Bukair b. al-'Akhnas the verse:-
( Uyun 1/230; Jail, 3/138).
As the lad grew up snd advanced in m ilitary  career,tnese  
early  promises o f  leadership and gLory were more than f u l f i l l e d .  
Al-Muhallab i s  generally remembered as the f i r s t  man to introduce 
two innovations in the Arab army; f i r s t ,  the cropping o f  horses' 
t a i l s  which he learn t  from the Turk' horsemen whom he encountered 
in Qlqan and, second, the substitu tion  o f  wooden 3tirrups by 
iron ones which was suggested to him by his own experience and 
ingenuity. Up to the time o f  a l- to h a lla b 's  campaign against the 
^zariqa the Arabs used to have only wooden stirrups ^ i c h  were 
often e a s i ly  cut by the opponent during the combat, thu3 leav ing  
the horseman without a necessary support which was almost 
indispensable for exertin g  force in a ttack (2). These innovations,
(1) .  Jah. (3/161) also records the followings- n
4 - 2?yjs) — oW-) <] Li 17
(2) .  Karn^  675# ^raran b# <133011 a l -% ia z i  eu log ist*  al-Muhallab 
for the same in the following versesj-
\ j& \ ^  W  ^
( I b i d ) .  v - f
See also Jah. 3/12.
though important enough in themselves, were s t i l l  more remarkable 
in that they symbolised the true s p i r i t  of the orig ina l mind 
which disdained to c lin g  to the old rut and was destined to 
make a worthy contribution to the prevalent mode o f  warfare.
The popular method o f  warfare during tiie time o f  a l -  
Liuhallab was the simple trad itional one o f  seeking a d irect  
encounter with the enemy and defeating him in a quick soldiers*  
war on the open f i e ld .  The expediency o f  avoiding a stra igh t  
combat for  some time was seldom ser iou sly  examined and delay 
was often held attributable  to hesitancy and lack o f  oourage. 
Certainly blockade and siege operations were not uncommon but 
a c loser  study w ill  reveal that in many cases they were only 
imposed by the enemy’ s desire to evade a s tra ig h t  fight.They  
rarely formed part o f  a commander’s predetermined s tr a te g ic  
plan and were seldom resorted to in the s p i r i t  o f  a preferrable  
expedient for exhausting the enemy without su ffer in g  the 
serious lo sse s  n ecessa r ily  involved in an open f ig h t .
I t  w ill  be observed that thi3 simple method of warfare was 
in i t s  very nature not conducive to accustom the Arabs to have 
a nice regard for the in tr ic a te  problems connected with the 
'meohanism o f  war’ -  i . e . ,  topography, movement and supply.
Hence administrative matters were often  neglected  even more 
than stra tegy . I t  i s  rea lly  amazing how such far-reaching  
expeditions a3 those to Constantinople and the eastern l im it  
of  S i j is ta n  were undertaken without an elaborate aonsideration  
of such v ita l  problems as the nature of the oountry, consolida­
tion  of p o s it io n s ,  safeguarding the l in e s  o f  comnuni cation and 
re tr e a t ,  regular maintenance of  supplies ,e tc .  The troops took a
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d ir ec t  route to their  d istan t objectives rely ing so le ly  on 
th e ir  fa ith  to move the mountains and th e ir  dash and tenacity  
to sweep a l l  before them, They continued th e ir  advance forward 
as far as the enemy retired  before them, pausing only for a 
clash o f  arms. In these circumstances d isasters l ik e  that which 
b e fe l l  ^baidullah  b, A^bi Bakra in S ij is ta n  were almost 
in ev ita b le .  The reason why the early  Muslim armies escaped 
such d isasters was that <Umar wa3 always far-sighted  enough to 
keep th e ir  enthusiasm in salutary check and to take every 
conceivable precaution to ensure th e ir  3afety. J^raar likew ise  
devoted due attention  to consolidation with the r e su lt  that 
the early  conquests were a l l  systematic. About the time o f  a l -  
Muhallab's generalship, however, there were few m ilitary  
commanders who showed prudence enough to take a l l  these 
important matters into consideration. Hence we come across 
examples o f  many years o f  unsystematic and wasteful penetrations,  
for example, into Transoxiana and S ij is ta n ,  Typical o f  the 
neg lec t  for strategy was the attitude of the gave mors o f  
Khurasan who fought assiduously against the h o s t i le  native  
chiefs but never thought o f  attacking them in th e ir  winter 
rendezvous ( vide supra p. 33 )• Leo VI, the wise Emperor, was 
not far  from truth in saying that the m ilitary successes o f  the 
saracens were due to * the fanatica l courage o f  the f a t a l i s t ’ (1)  
The aethods that he advised for counter-acting and harassing  
them were a l l  based on the primary assumption that they lacked 
in s tra tegy(2 ) .  That the counter-measures were not without 
e f f e c t  even at a much la te r  date shows that his assumption was 
not e n t ire ly  wrong.
1).  Prof. Oman: H ist ,  o f  the Art o f  warfare, p .206.
2). Ib id . ,  209.
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Al-^uhallab’ a coraaand o f  the cajupaigjrt against the 
^Azariqa began at a time when raor9 than one compandor of proven 
valour had met with to ta l  d iaaster , and waa further interrupted  
three times in order to divert him to other more urgent tasks. 
This circumstance although i t  put o f f  the extermination of  
the >Azariqa for a considerable fciiue and caused al-.;uhallab  
s ta r t  anew with h is  work a fter  every break, was yet helpful  
in bringing out by contrast the d is t in c t iv e  features o f  his  
own method o f  warfare. I t  i s  noteworthy that of a l l  the 
commanders other than al-Muhallab who were a t  d ifferen t  times 
dispatched against the >Aaariqa, <ITmar b. <Ubaidullah was the 
only fortunate one who escaped a fa ta l  d isaster . Why ? Because 
a l l  the r ivals  and colleagues o f  al-Muhallab, not excepting  
even ^timar b* ^Ubaidullah, were unimaginative adherents o f  the 
trad it ion a l method and lacked the o r ig in a l i t y  or courage to 
ex tr ica te  themselves out- o f  the old rut. They simply sought 
head-on clashes and received hard knocks from a mi $ity enemy 
o f  whose strength they never cared to have a r e a l i s t i c  view. 
They were so in d ifferen t  to stmdying the real nature o f  the 
enemy that even the successive fa i lu res  would not make them 
rea lise  th a t  the ^zariqa presented an en t ir e ly  new problem.The 
old method which depended for i t s  success merely on superior 
dash and tenacity , cc«uld have achieved conspicuous resu lts  
against an enemy lack ing  in that re lig ious fa ith  and missionary 
fervour which was the fountain head o f  ' the fanatical courage 
of the f a t a l i s t . '  But i t  was, indeed, quite f u t i l e  to expect 
the same resu lts  when the enemy was s im ilar ly  in3pired by a 
fanatic  miaaionary zeal which enabled him to put up an equal
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amount o f  courage and sacrif ice*  As a matter of fa c t ,  in the 
war between the Basrans and the ^zariqa i t  was the l a t t e r  who 
fought primarily, i f  not ex c lu s iv e ly ,  for the triumph o f  their  
fa ith ,  the main in te r e s t  o f  the former being the protection  
of th e ir  hearth and h o w .S iu s  they could claim to th e ir  
credit such astounding feats  as the triumph of  a band of forty  
Azraqites over a contingent of two hundred s o ld ie r s ( l ) .  The 
other commanders fa i le d  to appreciate th is  basic fact  which 
proved to be the secre t  o f  al-Muhallab's success.
Mo doubt, physical courc-t^e, dash and tenacity  were a l l  
important factors in those days o f  close-range f ig h t in g  and as 
such al-Muhallab i a^s as particu lar  about them as any o f  h is  
r iv a ls .  As a so ld ier  he himself gave ample proof o f  these 
q u a li t ie s  and even as a commander his own personal example 
was always there to serve as an insp iration  for h is  troops.But 
the chief credit of al-15uhallab was that he oould d istingu ish  
between bravery and rashness. He knew that bravery, i f  not 
used on proper occasion, wa3 a sheer waste. I-Iia bravery was 
complemented and tempered with prudence.
Al-Muhallab was a l l  alone in his days not to f a l l  a prey 
to over-drawn se lf -con fid en ce .  He made a fa ir  and exact  
estimate o f  the nature and the strength o f  h is  enemy. Further, 
i t  was he who for the f i r s t  time rea lised  the princip le  that 
when the enemy was impregnable to d irect  attack, as the ^zariqa  
were, there should be no head-on clashes except on particu lar ly
28o
(1) .  Kam* 587-8.
opportune moments when the enemy had been weakened by other  
methods o f  exhaustion. He not even once made the blunder that  
a l l  others, including <Uraar b. <Ubaidullah, did to attempt to 
annihilate the-Izariqa in one short decisive blow o r  even in a 
ser ie s  o f  desperate battles* Thus the princi l e  enjoined by him 
that ’ al-makidah1 was often more e f f e c t iv e  than ’al-rJajdah* 
represents hi3 most or ig ina l contribution to the a r t  o f  warfare.
Another important fa c t  which al-Muhallab*s r iva ls  equally  
fa i le d  to take note o f  was th a t  the menace o f  the 'Azariqa was 
not confined to a small compact l o c a l i t y .  I t  extended over 
Karman, “'ars and Khuzistan and at times even up to the l im its  
o f  al-Furat ch ie f ly  due to the ^Azariqa* s extra-ordinary powers 
of locomotion. This circumstance was the very negation o f  a 
necessary condition for  the e f f e c t iv e  use o f  the trad itional  
method which, in the very nature of i t ,  could only succeed in 
a lo c a l i s e d  a f fa ir .  Speaking in isodem terms, the momentous 
contribution of al-yuhallab was the tran sit ion  from the 
strategy of l igh tn in g  blows to one of exhaustion. He was indeed 
much in  advance o f  his time in discovering th a t  the Napoleanic 
method ( as i t  i s  called  in our days) o f  crusning the enemy 
by a s in g le  decisive b a t t le  was only possib le  where the forces  
are most unequal and a clash is  lo c a l ise d .  On the other hand 
when f i r s t  class opponents meet i t  is  impossible to achieve a 
solution at one blow. Then the war should take the form of a 
long and merciless contest desij iod  to t e s t  the economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  foundations of the enemy. This was indeed a pioneer 
method as evidenced by the fac t  that most people even those o f  
the calibre o f  al-Hajjaj found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to appreciate i t s  
true worth or even to understand it*
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No doubt# al-Muhallab from the very beginning foresaw and 
prepared h is  plans for  a prolonged war. But a prolonged war 
has problems o f  i t s  own and i t  i s  a 3t i l l  greater tribute to 
his m ilitary  «nius that he f u l f i l l e d  in ample degree a l l  
the conditions necessary for  i t s  successful prosecution. The 
conditions as deduced from al-Mihallab*s own words and deeds 
are the fo l io  wing:-
(1) The f i r s t  condition, to use al-Hahallab*s o m  word, i s  
• jk V ) i . e . ,  the necessary amount o f  s tead fast  patience
which may guard the commander and the troops aga in s t  y ie ld in g  
to ennui. I t  w il l  be rea lised  that a waiting game in a conti­
nuous s ta te  o f  a le r t  watchfulness i s  often  l i k e l y  to prove 
racking fo r  the nerves. I t  i s , th e r e fo r e ,  the supreme duty of  
the commander not to l e t  the morale o f  the troops deteriorate  
from in a c t io n .  I f  the commander i s  wearied into launching a 
premature attack then c learly  the very object of the prolonged 
war w il l  be frustrated. Al-Mihallab proved the capacity to keep 
s tead fastly  to the defensive for years together without le 'tting  
the enthusiasm o f  his  troops wane on that account. As a matter 
of fa c t  his troops showed remarkable understanding of and 
confidence in his p o l icy  which was always to compel the enemy 
to take the in i t ia t iv e  for an attack so long as the odds remained 
equal. In such a case, as he explained to h is  sons on one 
occasion, i t  was the aggressor who suffered the greater lo s s  
without being able to drive home the attack against equally  
strong and a l e r t  defenders.(1)
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(1 ) .  Kam. 677, 14-15. See also Appendix p. •
(2) No doubt, the leader o f  a prolonged cajnpaigi should 
be chary in coming to grips with his enemy so long as the 
l a t t e r  remained strong and resolute. But he should also be 
v ig i la n t  enough to take advantage o f  every moraent o f  weakness 
and unpreparedness on the other s id e . He should be able to 
act quickly and promptly to press an attack whenever the 
enemy betrayed the l e a s t  siga o f  relaxation and irreso lu tion .  
In this respect too, al-Muhallab never fa i led  to se ize  to 
the f u l l e s t  advantage an opportunity o f  s tr ik in g  at the enemy 
whenever he f e l t  confident that the odds in h is  favour were 
s u f f ic ie n t ly  reassuring. He knew when i t  was wise to stop 
but at the same time he also knew when i t  was opportune to 
s tr ik e .  He possessed a judicious judgment which took note 
o f  every circumstance favouring a change of  the waiting for  
a forcing gaiffi and with amazing a la cr ity  acted up to it .H is  
l ig h tn in g  blow which turned an accomplished defeat into 
conspicuous victory at 3 i l la -w a -S il l ib r a  i s  the nost  
i l lu s tr io u s  example of this  unique quality.Whenever he 
decided to launch an attack he did so with a l l  his might 
and main and staked his a l l  in i t .  His onslaughts were always 
delivered with such vigour and determination as to make i t  
v ir tu a lly  impossible for  the enemy tc survive them,In the 
wars against al-Mak^tar as well as on other occasions hi3 
action always proved to be the f in a l  blow. Last but not the 
l e a s t ,  the f ina l push against the Azarina provided a oonclu- 
s ive  proof^his mastery o f  sw ift  o ffensive  operations as w ell.  
Really* there can be no better  description and no greater 
testimony o f  the above two complementary aspects ol a l -  
Muhallab'3 ta c t ic a l  po licy  than that o f  his inveterate foe ,  
Qatari b. al-Fuja>a;-
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8 I f  you caugfct one end o f  a cloth he ( al-Muhallab) 
would hold the other end. He would draw i t  when you l e t  
i t  loose and uoiald l e t  i t  loose when you draw i t ."  (Supra p.112)
(3) Thirdly, io r  a prolonged war to have the desired  
e f f e c t  i t  i s  of very v ita l  importance taat i t  should be 
directed on a deliberate and system atic plan with a clear 
and d ef in ite  aim behind i t .  Ouaerwise i t  is  only l ik e ly  to 
add to the strength of  the enemy instead of  weakening him.
The aim should in the main be twofold; f i r s t ,  to 
undermine the economic p os it ion  of the enemy and, second, go 
subvert his p o l i t i c a l  organisation. These are the two points
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which are p art icu lar ly  assa ilab le  through a prolonged war
and are so v ita l  that a successful blow at them i s  v irtua lly
the same as hamstringing a camel. Further, the waiting game
is  a particu larly  helpful choice for the side which a t  the
ou tset  i s  handicapped by defic iency in economic and material
resources.Obviously, the supreme need o f  such a party i s
/
to conserve it3  present resources and to mark t i rno with a 
view in the meantime to achieve parity  with, i f  not  
superiority  over, the foe. For th is  purpose, the waiting  
game is  doubly advantageous. On the one naiid, i t  conserves 
the e x is t in g  resources and strength by avoiding the heavy 
lo s se s  inevitable  in  an immediate o ffensive  and affords 
the time and opportunity o f  augmenting them s t i l l  further.
On the other hand, i t  re lieves  considerable forct  ^ for  
hampering the means of supply to the enemy and a f fe c t in g  h is  
p osit ion  adversely. Thus the e f f e c t s  o f  a purposeful 
prolonged war are doubly enhanced because i t  detracts very 
greatly  from the strength of the enemy at a r e la t iv e ly  
very small expense of one's own resources.
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Improvement of h is  o n  economic p os it ion  and a
para lle l  depletion o f  the resources o f  his enemy formed a
very c lear  end d efin ite  object of al-Muhallab1 s plan from 
the very beginning. First- he, ~ith his ch aracter is t ic
resourcefulness, expanded the means at his disposal e . g . ,  by
obtaining credits from the traders, making the most 
advantageous use o f  stones, etc#Then he proceeded to spread 
h is  tentacles  p a t ie n t ly ,  system atica lly  and gradually round 
the posit ion  o f  the ftsariqa with a conscious design to wrest 
b it  by b it  the economic resources -shich the enemy had seized.
I t  i s  remarkable that he was always content with the resu lts  
o f  a battle  i f  the enercy -^ere forced to abandon a part o f ­
fals possessions to him. He never hastened to take a 3tep 
forward unless he had consolidated and exploited h is  previous 
gains to the fu l l .A  c loser  study w il l  reveal that al-Muhallab 
always made i t  a point to exhaust the economic strength of  
the enemy through e f fe c t iv e  s iege  and blockade operations 
before launching an o ffen s ive .
Al-Muhallab also made deliberate and systematic e f fo r ts  
to destroy the p o l i t i c a l  unity o f  the ^zariqa .  He spoke of
1 d is tr e ss in g  hunger’ and ' a s p l i t  in th e ir  views' (supra p. 134) 
in the san» breath. He know fu l l  well that internal discord 
was far more detrimental than externa! pressure.Thus ooncurrent- 
ly  with economic warfare he also launched a diplomatic 
manoeuvre to destroy the p o l i t i c a l  fabric  o f  the enemy.He 
displayed remarkable insight into the pecu liar  psychology and 
the genius o f  the ’’Azariqa in devising hi3 subtle mave3. The 
uniformity o f  the tenets o f  th s ir  fa ith  wa3 the cornerstone of  
+he p o l i t i c a l  unity  o f  the ^zariqa which was further cemented 
by th e ir  im p lic it  fa ith  in , and unquestioning obedience to ,
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th e ir  leaders. The mo763 of  al-Muhallab were directed against  
the san® two po in ts .  Shrewdly ex p lo it in g  the p ecu liar  fo ib le s  
of the >Azariqa he succeeded conspicuously in creating d issen ­
sions in th e ir  re lig ious fa ith  and sowing suspicion and 
d is tr u st  among them. The re3ult was that the p o l i t i c a l  
organisation broke down almost simultaneously with the lo3s  
o f  th e ir  economic superior ity .
The position  o f  al-Muhallab wa3 unique inasnaich aa he 
was not a mere m ilitary  oommander. In addition to the d irection  
o f  the campaign he al3o had to attend to the provision o f  
financial outlay on the maintenance and the equipment of h is  
troops. I t  w i l l  be realised that the magnitude of  the problem 
of finance i s  far greater in the case of a prolonged war 
than in the case o f  a short campaign such as al-Mihallab'a  
r iv a ls  were wont to.
Moreover the oost of a l-lahallab*s campaign was excep­
t io n a l ly  high because he had to make up the defic iency  in 
armour and equipment to which his predecessors had paid 
scant attention . Curiously enough even the resources were 
not ready at hand. Al-Mihallab had to wrest them from the 
grip o f  his enemy and then to marshal and e x p lo it  them for 
his own advantage. Thus i t  was an obvious n ecess ity  that he 
should devote p art icu lar ly  unusual attention to ta x -c o l le c t in g .  
That i s  why he often  paused a f te r  every engagement in order 
to levy  taxes from th9 land abandoned by the enemy. I t  ia  
indeed a his£i tribute to al-lfcihallab's capacity for planning 
that he co-ordinated in a remarkably successful manner the 
task o f  financial provision with other considerations o f  
consolidation and strategy . No doubt the princip le  that
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'whoever is  incompetent to o o l le c t  the taxes w i l l  prove s t i l l  
more incompetent to figfct the fo e ’ (1) ,T»hich he asserted in  
reply to a l - l la j ja j ' s  a l lega tion s  o f  a s e l f i s h  motive, represents  
a very in^ortant part o f  his orig inal contribution to the 
art of warfare. I t  shows what a great importance he attacned  
to economic factors in the general scheme o f  warfare.lt roust 
be remembered that the real crux o f  generalship is  the matter 
of administration and not ta c t ic s  and strategy  yiiich come 
only afoerwards,
Al-l/iuhallab’ s handling of the financed under his  
control can only be inferred from stray hints here and there.
As to what proportion o f  revenue he appropriated to h im self,  
the reports are not d e a r .  To a l l  appearances, he does not 
seem to have re str ic ted  himself to any s p e c i f i c  l im it  as 
evidenced by his words to Yazid to the e f f e c t  that with the 
conclusion o f  the caiqpaigji the p os it ion  had changed from 
what i t  had been before so that thenceforward he could have 
only such amount as al-Hajjaj was pleased to allow him(2).
There i s ,  however, not the s l ig h t e s t  evidence to show that  
he ever allowed his s e l f i s h  in te r e s ts  to a f fe c t  adversely  
the in terests  o f  the S ta te . He always proved that he treated  
the demands of the campaign as the f i r s t  charge on the 
revenue at his disposal; any amount l e f t  over must,of course,
(1 ) .  Supra p. 181 • 3ae also Appendix p.
(2 ) .  3ee supra p. 24-9.
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have gpne to his private purse, what i3 rea lly  important is  
that he had the sense o f  duty and honesty to subordinate 
every consideration to the supreme in te r e s t  of the successful  
prosecution of  war#
On one occasion,however, al-lixhallab appears bo have been 
guilty  ox dere lic tion  of duty i f  not of deliberate unlawful 
misappropriation. Al-Hajjaj i s  reported to have indemnified 
him with a m illion  dirhems on account o f  the arrears o f  the 
Xharaj of al-^Ahwaz to which ho had been appointed for a short 
period by Khalid b. Abdullah. Fere al-Muhallab i s  described 
as a man of extravagant habits who never cared to save anything 
for future contingencies and consequently had to resort to 
borrowing whenever he was thrown out of job. He had great  
d i f f i c u l t y  in paying o f f  ^ i s  indemnity. Half o f  i t  was borne 
by his son, a l - ’^ i^hira who had been entrusted with the taxes 
of >Istakhr during the same time that al-Muhallab was sent to  
al^ihwaz. The other h a lf  was made up by a loan of throe lakhs 
from ^ba Mawiyya, the znawla and treasurer of  Abdullah b. <hAt$ 
and the sale o f  the ornaments o f  al-Muhallab’ s well-known wife, 
Khaira al -  Tushairiyya (1). Al -Mahallab must re.ally have been 
remiss and neg ligent .^n his duty for ho appears to have 
submitted to the demand of al-Hajjaj without demur. Of course, 
al-Muhallab was not the man to have submitted to an unreasonable 
and u n ju st if ia b le  demand without a bold vindication o f  h is  
p osit ion .
( l ) r  Tab, &/1034-5. Similarly on ano ther o ceasion a l-  Juhallab 
was unabie to pay an inaemiity o f  two hundred thousand 
dirhems ^hich had to be borne by Talha on h is  behalf 
( Tab. 2/1119 ).
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Al-Muhallab'3 use o f  diplomacy as a weapon o f  war was 
as conspicuous as h is  attention to economic and administrative  
matters. Just as the l a t t e r  brought upon him the charge o f  
se lf ish n ess  s im ilar ly  the former earned him the sobriquet' 1
i . e .  a l i a r  or an inpostor (1 ) .  The falsehood o f  which a l-  
lluhallab i s  alleged  to have been g a i l ty  i s  said to be o f  two 
kinds; f i r s t ,  h is dece itfu l aove3 against the enemy and, 
second, his exaggerated and fa lse  promises to h is  own troops.
He is  said to have often  made fa lse  promises o f  help and 
succour to h is  troops in  order to inspire courage and confidence 
among them.
But a l l  the instances that have come down to us belong 
only to the f i r s t  category. We know that al-Mihallab often  
employed deceit  against the enemy yet  we never hear o f  his  
making any fa lse  statement to h is  troops# Thus i t  i s  more than 
probable that, as asserted by^bn Qutaiba ( l 3 a . 3/536; IKh.JV"146), 
the use of the sobriquet must have f i r s t  originated with h is  
opponents as an expression o f  anguish over the clever ruses 
o f  a l - ?*uhallab of  which they often f e l l  an easy v ic t im . l t  is  
p articu lar ly  p lausible  that i t  should have orig inated with the 
^zariqa who, by virtue of  th e ir  r ig id  puritanism, were incapable 
of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f r o m . But undoubtedly the
( l) .T h e  a l legation  of^u^V i3 referred to in xhe fo llow ing verses j
^   ^ j Vs
(Uyun 2 /26 . See also al-3ama&hs£ari: Mustaq^sa
'WAmthal under
( Anon. 106; Kam. 633).
(Kam. 632).
I t  i s  also reported that ' al-Nadab', a tribe o f  al^Azd used to 
s a y w h e n  ever they saw al-Muhallab coming to them (Kam.633,
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U3e of the sobriquet irnst have become widespread very soon,so  
much so that i t  has l e f t  us a proverb ' ^ ^ \ J o ’ (1 ) .
As a matter o f  fa c t ,  al-Muhallab was not .guilty of'^oOiVas 
such. On the testimony o f  al-Mabsrrad(2)» he only believed in 
and practised 1 i . e . ,  diplomacy which according to the
Prophet h io e e l f  is  the essence o f  war and h^e use o f  which is  
expressly allowed in dealings with the enemy. Such eminent 
authorities  as >Ibn Hajar and^fcn ‘‘Abd al-Bavr also declare 
him to be i re. ju s t  and trustworthy and expressly
exonerate him of ‘ u ’ in the manner o f  al-l&xbarrad*
As for his dealings with h is  own people, al-Muhallab 
does not 3eem to have gone beyond a shrewd and deliberate play  
upon th e ir  re lig iou s  and other sentiments. I t  i s  again one of  
the d is t in c t io n s  o f  al-Muhallab that he possessed a deep 
knowledge o f  humanity, which he brought to bear on the conduct 
of the war ( c f .  h is  valuable advice to al-Hajjaj during the 
revolt  o f  *Ibn al-'Ash^ath), He paid due regard to the psychologi­
cal and emotional factors which might be exploited in rousing 
in his troops a contempt for the foe. He irauld remind them that 
they were f ig h t in g  for the survival o f  th e ir  re l ig io n  and the 
protection of th e ir  homes, women and children; he would t e l l  
them that the ir  opponents were mere low class rabble and that 
the Khashabiyya had nc weapons other than wooden clubs; and 
he w u ld  assure them that they,despite th e ir  in fer io r  numbers,
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were strong enough to turn the tide o f  the b a tt le .  But we search
in vain for a s in g le  example o f  h is  having made any false  
promise^ of  help or any such thing, Surely, such a conduct would 
have shaken the fa ith  o f  the people in his words and would have 
ultim ately  defeated the very purpose which al-Muhallab had at  
heart. To appreciate the true merit o f  al-Muhallab one need only 
remember that the real secret of the success o f  an army is  not 
the fa c t  but rather the b e l ie f  that i t  i s  the stronger.Hence, 
al-Mawardi counts i t  srs one o f  the primary duties o f  a commander 
to rouse enthusiasm in his  troops and to make them fee l  the 
stronger o f  the two p a r t ie s .
Apart from the e ssen t ia l  q u a l i t ie s  mentioned above, a l -  
Muhallab possessed many other auxiliary q u a lit ie s  without the 
harmonious combination o f  which a prolonged campaign i s  only 
l ik e ly  to end in d isaster .  Two such q u a l i t ie s  %ere foresight  
and a le r t  watchfulness. We have evidence o f  al-M ihallab's  
fores ight at every step, the most s tr ik in g  example o f  which i s  
the agreement with al-Quba* end the 3aaran ch iefs .  The conditions 
demanded by him clearly  show that he had at the very 3tart  
foreseen the whole course o f  the campaign and had a vivid  
estimate of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  which might have hampered his 
plans. He could always prejudge the movements o f  the enemy and 
the direction o f  attack. I t  was the r esu lt  of in t e l l ig e n t  
anticipation o f  events that h is  enemy could never catch him 
unawares. The ^zariqa always found th e ir  moves foresta lled  
beforehand and were forced to call him the sorcerer o f  lusua  
which t i t l e  roust be regarded as the greatest  trioute to uis
fo re si ght.
Combined « ith  f o r e a i ^ t  al-Muhallab also posaeaeod an 
inexhaustible capacity for unrelenting t ig i la n ce .  ..ia acrupulo
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regard for defensive arrangements can be gauged from an account 
o f  his camp which is  recorded in Tab.(2/585). According to i t ,  
'whenever al-lftihallab s e t t le d  down for  a bivouac he carefully  
l a id  out and prudently entrenched his camp with a ditch. Troops 
were ordered to continue a l l  the time in th e ir  proper formations. 
Pickets and vedettes were 3et up at carefully  se lec ted  points  
and sp ies were dispatched a l l  around.'
No doubt, the use o f  ditches and trendies for the defence 
of citadels  and towns was al ready known to the Arabs. But the 
system o f  guarding tenporary c an $ )S  with such elaborate measures 
was perfected only by al-Muhallab.. Here again a contrast w ill  
show the true merit o f  al-M ihailab.^hile a l l  the ofc&er commanders 
had to pay dearly for  th e ir  criminal neg lect  coupled with 
fooli3h  arrogance, the 'Azariqa could never se ize  a single  
moment of unpreparedness on the part of al-Muhallab. I t  i s  
reported and i s  also bo me out by facts  that. al-Muhallab always 
took care to look to the defence measures personally and would 
not entrust them to anyone exoept to h is  sons and special  
confidan&s ( 1 ) .
Al-LiinallaD1 s extraordinary regard for vigilance could not  
but make him a great believer in the u t i l i t y  o f  an e f f i c i e n t  
in te l l ig e n c e  serv ice .  Both in peace and in war h is  3pies were 
alway3 active everywhere, in c i t i e s  as well aa in the oountry(2). 
Particu larly  in war time he maintained a constant touch with 
the enemy and kept himself informBd o f  a l l  the happenings in 
the opposite earap. That i s  #iy he could always ju d g e  with 
astonishing correctness the hourly changes in the strength of
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the enemy. The i n f a l l i b i l i t y  o f  al-Muhallab's calculations  
cannot but impress the reader of his e x p lo its .  All h is  forward 
plans and long-range schemes never suffered through the l e a s t  
m iscalculation. His counter-attack at 3 i l la -w a -3 i l l ib r a  was 
a very great r isk  indeed but i t  turned out exactly  according 
to his plans.
Although al-Muhallab was promoted to High Command 
at the ripe age o f  59, yet he had l o s t  nothing o f  the boldness 
and f ir e  o f  youth. Aided by superior knowledge and tried  
judgment* h is  mature mind s t i l l  had the capacity to originate  
bold and unorthodox desig is  and p ractica l sense and energy 
to carry them through. He was s t i l l  robust and had the a b i l i t y  
to withstand shocks o f war with s to l id  calm and obstinate  
determination. He refused to acknowledge defeat and played 
h is  best when things went badly e . g . ,  at S i l la -w a -S i l l ib r a .  
Moreover, al-Muhallab was possessed o f  unshakable confidence 
in h is  own independent judgement and had the courage to s t ic k  
to i t  even under the pressure o f  severe threats from his  
overlords. To him the protection o f  secret  was a s u f f ic ie n t  
advantage o f  independent judgement ( f a t . 77, See also Appendix 
p. \1 ), He s to u t ly  refused to submit to the anomaly that  
'the decision should l i e  with one who possesses superior 
authority rather than one who i s  competent enough to judge.* 
(See Appendix p. and supra p. 196 ), He had the touch
of a gambler in  him and refused to be bound by regulations  
and d ic ta te s .  But at the saias tin® his sense of d isc ip l in e  
and lo y a lty  was strong enough to hold him back from the 
other extreme o f  revolt  ih ich^ bn  a l - >Ash^ath. chose for  
him self. Al-Muhallab’ s sense of  resp onsib il ity  and obligation
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was proved by his refusal to take up the command of the 
campaigi against the ^zariqa without be in 3 absolved of his 
previous engagement by >Ibn a l - 2ubair and by his prompt action 
in paying the traders of al-3asra at the ea r lies t  possible 
opportunity. He served his masters, even those who were 
avowedly jealous of him like Khalid b. Abdullah, earnestly 
and faithfully  through thick and thin so long as he had the 
lea st  hope that h i3 services could help them. But when faced 
with a fa it  accompli he, in the true sp ir it  o f  a military 
commander, did not hesitate to swear allegiance to the new 
conqueror, all the time keeping himself scrupulously above 
a ll  temptations of material gain.
Al-lftihallab was very jealous of his honour and oould 
brook no affronts even from his superiors like al-Hajjaj.
With h i3 rivals he always behaved with perfect d ig iity  and 
even generosity and forgiveness except in case o f  “Attab 
whose open defiance was too detrimental and too hard for him 
to bear. l i t h  remarkable restraint he never stooped to seek 
glory at the expense of his rivals. On the other hand he was 
prepared to recognise merits in others as well.
As for his relations with his troop3 and subordinates, 
al-Mihallab always treated them firmly but 'kindly like a 
father.' His solicitude for the personal oomforts of the 
so ld ier, regular pay and rations, $jod b i l le ts  e t c . ,  wa3 not 
a whit le ss  than his earnestness in providing the necessary 
arm  and equipment. He showed himself to his troops as 
frequently and, we may believe, as imp res si vely as possible  
for he did not negLect to surround hi3 inposing personality 
with due ceremonial.There was no discrimination of any kind 
whatsoever.His own sons,nobles and 'mawali', Persians and the
2 9 4
Arabs, Basrans and the Kufans, -  a l l  o f  them 3tood on an 
equal footing* All had an equal opportunity to show their 
mettle and were given precedence according to military honours 
alone* A keen judge of character as he was, he had a fa ir  
estimate of the real worth of every individual and always 
chose the best man for a particular task#
Undoubtedly, al-Muhallab had a very severe code of 
discipline for his troops but he was always scrupulous 
enough to administer i t  fa ir ly  and reasonably* I t  was this 
iron discipline which, above a ll other factors, e .g . hope 
of loo t and glory, devotion to country e tc . ,  fostered a 
s p ir i t  of endurance and enterprise t i l l  i t  turned al-Ruqad, 
an ordinary soldier, into " the great warrior of the Arabs." 
Under al-Mihallab, a soldier f e l t  himself assured of personal 
safety; the cautiousness and the circumspection of the commander 
being a su ffic ien t guarantee that he shall be put into fight  
with as 0 3 od a chance as possible o f victory and surv iva l.lt  
was this assurance which inspired such immense confidence 
among the troops that they fought zealously and se l f le s s ly  
of their own free will whereas under other commanders they 
only obeyed under duress and often with strong suspicions as 
to the wisdom of their moves. Al-Jihihallab's commands were 
always executed without any question and in right earnest but 
at the same time he never allowed himself to be so haughty 
as to reject outright an advice from his lieutenants ( cf.h is  
acceptance of the suggestion of al-Harish b. H i l a l :  Supra p.81-2.)
He had no reason to be obsessed with any such d i f f i d e n c e  or 
doubt about the faith of his troops as was betrayed by 
^mar b, ^baidullah.
Prudence and restraint being the constant companions 
of al-Mihallab, he never practised violence for i t s  own sake; 
he was never ruthless beyond the needs of the situation. He 
would keep the prisoners in detention only so long as mischief 
was apprehended from them, - a course which al-Hajjaj was 
unable to understand* Similarly he would try every chance of 
reforming the miscreants while al-Hajjaj would only dispatch 
them to their doom, I t  will be noted that i t  was his aversion 
to use force where i t  was iifcpportune and unnecessary that 
led to his adoption of the new method of exhaustion*But,on the 
other hand, he carefully avoided the other extreme of indecision 
or weakness* He never showed any hesitation whatsoever in using 
firmLy and resolutely a ll the force that was absolutely necessary 
in order to achieve the desired victory.He dealt with the' 
^zariqa practically in the same manner as they were lont to 
treat their opponents and even justif ied  his action in making 
captives of them on the same ground.
Lastly, i t  mast be confessed that the motive of a l-  
Muhallab in the war against the ^zariqa was not mainly 
religious; i t  was primarily p o l i t ic a l .  But i t  must be recog­
nised that on many a critical occasion he gave ample proof of 
his genuine concern for the solidarity and the unity of the 
Muslim community* Hence i t  cannot be said that he was a mere 
henchman of the Umayyids. No doubt, he worked for the spread 
and the s ta b il ity  of the Umayyid rale but he did so with a 
fu ll  satisfaction of his conscience and religious scruples*
To him, peace, order and contentment of the Mislim community 
wore linked up with the established government of the 
Umayyids; hence he deemed i t  a religious duty as well to
crush the ^zariqa*
The governorship of Khurasan revealed al-Mihallab as an
eminent c iv il  administrator as well. As a matter of fact his 
successes on the battle -f ie ld  owed a great deal to his superb 
insight into c iv i l ,  p o lit ica l  and administrative problems.His 
considered attitude towards Uusa b. Abdullah b. Khazim was 
indeed a stroke of administrative wisdom which wa3 fully  
vindicated by subsequent events. During his tenure of o ff ice  
the province was singularly free from a l l  internal disorder 
such as marred the regime of his predecessors,The reason was 
that he, though strongLy attached to his own tribe, was never
unjust to any section of the people so as to give cause for
grievance and dissatisfaction,
Al-Muhallab i s  remembered in history not only as an able
commander and a successful administrator but also as an
eminently generous notable# His bountiful disposition would 
not allow him to entertain a minor request (IN.109. See also 
Appendix p. \v ) ^shile he lould fain f u l f i l l  the vows of tnose 
who had sworn to receive a particular sum from him on the 
occasion of his victory (Ibid). Deeds of gallantry and 
beautiful verses were rewarded by him with great sums which 
sometimes ran into tens of thousands. . Al-Mttjzjtiira b. Habna* 
returned from him with his hands fu ll  of riches, (Agh, 11/162), 




C H A P T E R  X X I I ,
Al-Muhallab And the Poets.
Al-Muhallab was endowed with a good taste for poetry 
which was shown in his ability  to c ite  verses most appropriate 
to the occasion (vide supra p . Z14-) and particularly in his  
l iv e ly  discourse with the warrior poets of his army, a typical 
example of which is  fortunately preserved for us ( vide 
Appendix p. \*\ ). A few verses ascribed to him are also 
recorded (1) which, though they do not warrant our attributing  
any great sk il l  to him, are yet sufficient proof of nis  
in terest in the art of poetry. At lea st  his appreciation of a 
beautiful verse was quick and spontaneous.
He was particularly generous with poets and made amijle 
rewards to them which sometimes amounted to thirty thousand 
dirhems (/U£. 14/103). But i t  was quite characteristic of h is  
personality that h is  patronage was chiefly confined to the 
warrior poets among his troops. Being essentially  a military  
chief, he never cared to purchase encomiums from those who 
would not serve him on the b a ttle f ie ld .l i is  panegyrists were 
also the veterans of  h is  a m y  who only spoke of tilings which 
they thanselveB actually experienced along with their patron. 
Thus we find that the p o e t s ,while urging their rival claims
n r  Besides the two verses on the loss  of his eye r su p r a p .2  9 ), 
the following verses are also attributed to al-Munallabi-
(IK. 110).. J . ... =
t f * \  ^  >> f /
o\fy» (Wat. ^ 07). ) *
on him,also thought i t  necessary to prove their  superiority  as 
regards deeds of  gallantry and su ff ic ien cy  in war ( cf. Agh. 11/159).
Apart from material g i f t s ,  al-xMiallab showed a very ni co 
regard for poets and was always very careful not to give them 
any cause for displeasure. He would take to task h is  own son, 
Habib, for having k i l le d  a particu lar  dove which had been 
assured o f  protection by Ziyad al-A<jam in h is  impromptu verses. 
The pledge o f ' ’Abu Lubaba (Ziyad) was as sacred as h is  own and 
he was not content t i l l  he debited one thousand dinars, equal 
to the blood-money of a free man, to the account of Habib and 
paid the sum to the poet as compensation for the dove (i) .O n  
another occasion he severely  reprimanded al-Mifad^al for having 
offended the poet al-ltigkira b, HahnU^  by a derogatory reference 
to the la tter*  s disease o f  leprosy and reconciled the poet 
with a g i f t  o f  ten thousand dirhems (2 ) .
The most prominent among al-Muhallab* a warrior poets were 
Ziyad a l - >A4jam, Ka*b al-^Ashqari and al-Mu^ilra b. Ha bn a*
Ziyad seems to have been attached to him at a very early  date*
An eulogy composed by him a t  the time o f  a l- lu h a l la b 's  f i r s t  
assumption o f  command o f  the campaign against the ^Azaziqa i s  
preserved(3). Besides a number o f  b r i l l ia n t  verses, Ziyad's 
elegy.on the death of al-14u;hlra b, al-Muhallab i s  particu larly  
well-known(4)*
(1 ) .  Agh. 14/100; Wat. 20.(2 ). wi. 11/1,59; Uyun 4/64.
?) * £, 1A* a if ^ \r^ ) 0 \
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Ka*b a l- lsk q a r i  and a l - lk d i lr a  b. HabnV al-Hanzall are
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heard o f  during al-Mahallab* s prolonged campaign in 3abur.
Ka<b’3 eulogies o f  al-Muhallab were of such a high order that 
some of  them are reported to have even roused the envy o f  the 
Caliph <Abd al-Malik ( c f .  Agh* 12/56; 60). Ka<b also proved 
himself a good orator in his w itty replies  to al-H ajjaj.
The rivalry between Ka<b and 2iyad once f lared  into open 
sa t ire  caused e ith e r  by the memory o f  an old feud between the 
>kzd and the^bd al-Q ais , the respective tribes o f  the two p oets ,  
or by al-Muhallab’ s special g i f t  o f  an eloquent slave to Ziyad 
in consideration o f  the l a t t e r ' s  physical drawback o f  incorrect  
pronunciation and bad d ia le c t .  I t  m s in  the heat of th is  
quarrel that 3iyad uttered the verses which are supposed to 
contain a disparaging reference to al-Muhallab himself (vide 
supra p< S' )* Eventually al-Muhallab exerted h is  influence to 
restore amity between the two poets (1 ) .
Al-’^a.Jnra’ 3 famous ode on the occasion o f  a ta r i ’ s retreat  
from Sabur for which he received a huge reward from al-Mihallab 
has already been noticed. At-Mu^ira wa3 treated with particu lar  
favour when al-Muhallab condoned a serious breach of d isc ip lin e  
on h is  part* ’Shile at Sabur al-Muhallab dispatched an 
expedition consaanded by one o f  h is  sons against the Haariqa in  
the direction o f  a l - ’Ahwaz* Al-Mighlra, #io was included in 
th is  expedition, slipped away without permission to hia home 
and stayed there for one month t i l l  the army returned to a l -  
Muhallab without him.In consequence his name was struck o f f  
the m ilitary  reg is ter .  On h is  return, however, al-;iu^iira
3oo
( 1 ) . Agh. 13/56-57; cf. also Ibid. 11/159.
tendered his apology to al-Muhallab in the form o f  an ode in 
which he sa id :-  ,
Al-liihallab accepted the apology and also ordered that 
al-IIu^Ira be given his regular pay 7«hich had previously been 
stopped ( Agfc. 11/158).
Among other poets in the army o f  al-Mihallab v?ere a l -  
Nu<man b# *Uqba al-^Atakl* Habib b. *Auf, al-Salatan a l - <AbdI and 
Baihas b. Suhaib whose quality  o f  prudence and cautiousness was 
so highly prized by al-:aihallab( 1). Hamza b. JTd had also had 
association  with him(2). Similarly Nahar b. Vansi^a1 s famous 
elegy shows that he must have had son© contact with al-Mihallab  
during the l a t t e r ’ s l i f e - t im e .
Al-Farazdaq was an exception inasmuch as h is  relations  
with al-Muhallab were o f  a d if fe r e n t  kind. He was w n t  frequently  
to s a t ir i s e  al-Muhallab and the ^zd^ilman which tribe had long 
been opposed to the Tamm^-Farazdaq’ s otbl tr ib e .  Ultimately  
al-Muhallab was compelled to ban the admission o f  the poet to 
his  presence. The ban»however, only provoked al-Farazdaq to 
compose another lampoon against him(3). Towards thn time when 
al-Muhallab was to s ta r t  for hi3 campaiga against the ^Az&riqa# 
al-Farazdaq made a move to obtain the former's favour through 
the mediation o f  Jarir. Al-Muhallab was ready to 'purchase h is  
honour' from the s a t i r i s t  but Judai* » a prominent kinsman,and
3o i
D.Kaa# 673.
2 . , \± .  15/14.
3). Diw. 10*
Khai ra, al-Muhallab'a w ife, were strongly opposed that the 
blackmailer should be allowed any app roach. Thereupon al -  
Farazdaq gave further offence to the Ifcihallabids by s a t i r i s in g  
Judaic and Khai rah (1) the l a t t e r  o f  whom also forms the 
subject of two other sa t ir e s  (2 ) .  In l a t e r  days the Mihallabids 
continued to be the butt o f  al-Farazdaq's sa t ires  t i l l  Yazid 
b. al-lfahallab was entrusted with the governorship o f  a l - <Iraq 
and 0iura3an on behalf of Sulainian b. <Abd al-Malik when the 
blackmailer's unscrupulous opportunism impelled him to la v ish  
encomiums on the sons o f  al-Mihallab and th e ir  i l lu s tr io u s  
father (3 ) .
3 o 2
( 1 ) .  Agh. 19/28 -29.
(2 ) .  Diw. 149 and 609.
(3 ) .  Agh. 19/29; cf. Diw. 374,
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Ihe dynasty of Al-Muhallabids.
The greatness of al-Muhallab does not l i e  only in h is  
personal achievements. He i s  also ranembered as the father of 
a galaxy of  noble and eminent d ig n ita r ies  and the progenitor  
of a numerous and i l lu s t r io u s  dynasty which, desp ite  the 
v ic i s s i t u d e s  of i t s  fortune, survived and upheld i t s  trad itions  
of honour and glory for many a century afterwards.
Al-Muhallab must have had an exceptionally large number 
of issu es  for according to one statement (1 ) ,  exaggerated thougjh 
i t  may be, h is  progeny iras as numerous as tnree hundred. 
Anyhow, there c#i be l i t t l e  doubt that ne must have had many 
more iihan the twelve sons and three daughters to uhom our 
knowledge i s  confined.
I t  i s  indeed a p ity  that the Mahalifca should have 
remained a dry h is to r ic a l  anecdote while the ir  counterpart in 
l a t e r  time, the Baramika, should have become the kernel o f  popular 
legend and romance.As a matter of fa c t ,  the position  of a l-  
Mahaliba under the Umayyids was in many respects almost id en tica l  
with that of al-Baranlka under the Ahbasids.Sven the scanty 
records that have survived to us contain ample evidence to show 
that in the ir  own days the Liahaliba enjoyed the same popular and
(1) Mrf, 204; c f .  cl so Ikh. 2/147.
universal reputation for  deeds of glory, prowess, munificence 
and patronage o f  poetry and learning as i s  commonly associated  
with the Baramika. As we have seen, most o f  the sons of a l -  
Muhallab had already estab lished  th e ir  fame before the death 
of th e ir  worthy father. They had to th e ir  cred it a glorious 
contribution to the astounding v ic to r ies  o f  al-!izhallab and 
th e ir  unrivalled claims to be the foremost warriors were 
acknowledged by a l l .  Hence, they were most aptly described as 
'the noble descendants o f  a family o f  figjhters, i f  not o f  
prophets'(1 ) .  Their deeds o f  gallantry*ih ich were quite 
proverbial (2 ) ,  were already on the tongae o f  contemporary 
bards when the death o f  al-Muhallab afforded them a greater  
opportunity o f  showing th e ir  bounty and munificenoe.Soon the 
poets thronged round them and spread the son^s o f  th e ir  praise  
far and wide. Here are a few eian^les o f  verses t e s t i f y in g  to 
the unrivalled eminence and the universal popularity enjoyed 
by ' >alu ' 1-MuhallabJ- .
c h  j
(Al-Tabri. zi j / i 60; Iqd. 2/284).
t v  o l
(Jah. 3/138: Uyun 1/342).
)  Lj) 1 (J 1 las' O 1 fV ^  1 Cj )
(Al-Tabriz! 4/147; Uyun 2/9; Iqd  ^j /232).
The odes o f  innumerable poets in enlogy o f  individual a l -  
Mihallabids as well as h is to r ica l  trad itions are rich in 
examples o f  the ir  glory and benevolence. Yazid b. al-Mihallab  
in particu lar  i3  renowied as one o f  the most munificent men
r r j t  m r w r n i  Jah. > , , ;  . ,  „ nu( 2 ;# Of. the woras o f  al-Hariri * (ah. 210)*
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in Islam. I t  i s  reported that the poets aougfat and received  
large bounti©3 from him even when he waa confined in the priaon 
of al-Hajjaj and could only show l i b e r a l i t y  at the coat o f  
prolonging hia travail(  1 ) . Thua the analogy between the 'ahaliba 
and the Baramika was strong enough to str ike  the h istor ians  
* who are a l l  agreed that under the Umayyida there was none 
more benevolent than the sons o f  al-Mahallab ju st  as under the 
Abbasida there waa none more benevolent than the Baramika. (2)
The following i3  the l i s t  o f  al-Mihallab*s aon3 and 
daughters 80 far as they can be traced in the annals:-
1* Habib, >Abu Biatam. He was o lder than Yazid in age(3)»
2. Yazid, ^bu Khalid, bom in 53 A.H.(4 ) .  His mother waa 
called ’ Dahma* (5)* Judai< b* 3a<id  b. Qabisa b. ’Abi Sufra is  
mentioned as h is  maternal uncle (6 ) .  He m s the moat beautifu l,  
the most sagacious* and the most eloquent o f  a l l  h is  brothers(7).
3. Al -MughT ra ’Abu Hatim.
4. Al-Mufaddal )) The two were fu l l  brothers,Their mother
5. <Abd al-Malik )
was called Bahia described aa Hindiyya (8 ) .  
Al-^ufaddai waa n ex t  to Yazid in the leadership o f  the family#
5 0 5 "
1).See lad* 1/154-56; Uyun 1/82; Ikh. 2/265-6;  a t .  204; 221.
2).IKh. 2/266.
, 3)*IKh.2/266*
*4). IKh. 2/276. , ,
5 ) . Said to have been a captive from Kabul (Kam.523 note a).
6 ) . Tab. 2/856.
7 .Dain. 289.
8 ) . Bahia or Buhalla or Bahula or Bahaia (T a b ,2 / l l4 i;  1142:1210). 
In Agh. l l /1 5 9 (  cf. a lso  Uyun 4 /6 4 ) ,  ’ al -  KAwaa ’ o f  Yashkur 
are described as a l-J ifa d d a l1 s re la tions on the laother’ 3 
aide.
6. 3abisa»said to have been regarded as one o f  the fo o lish  
men of al->Azd(l).
7. i'arwan ^bu Qabisa. His generosity i s  also celebrated by 
al-Farazdaq (2 ) .
8 . ^bu^yaina. He was bom o f  al-Mihallab’s best known wife* 
Khai rah b. Qaara al-Qujymiriyya, who gave to a canal o f  aL-Basra 
the nan© 'Khairatan’ • Sim ilarly al-Muhallaban, obviously so 





N>B* Da>ud b. al-Muhallab i s  a lso  mentioned in Iqd.
1/129; ?at. £19 but h is  id en tity  i s  not estab lished  elsewhere.
13. Hind bint al-Llihallab. She was married to al-Hajjaj and 
must have been o f  a very youthful and playful nature.Once a l -  
Hajjaj i s  reported to have said  that he enjoyed h is  company 
with Hind in the manner o f  a youth whiling away his time l ig h t -  
heartedly among hi 3 friend3 (4)*
14* U^mme Malik* She was promised to Ma<an b, al-Mig[iira b.
*AbI Sufra as a prize for  h is  deeds o f  gallantry in war (5 ) .
15. Nafi3a. She was taken into marriage by Muhammad b. Jar ir  
b. Abdullah a l-B aja li  a f te r  the massacre of the Mahaliba.The 
IS win o f  al-Farazdaq contains a few verses on the occasion of  
her marriags(6).
(1).{Jyun 2/45.
( 2 ) . Diw. 107; 192. , « „ . .(3 ) .  Bal. 360; Yaq* 1/645* According to Agh. 3/20, Khai ratan 
(Khairafan i s  obviously a misprint) was the name o f  an 
es ta te  which was managed by mrd, father o f  the poet Bashshar 
who was a 3lave o f  i&aira from among the captives o f  
Tu^haristan. May be The land owed i t s  name from the canal 
whi ch passed through i t .
3o6
C^urO dvi/j rc^> ^  ^3 ^MJoluu j^*£*V
Unfortunately, the services o f  the Mahaliba to the empire
o f  the Umayyids were frequently interrupted due to personal and 
tr iba l jea lou sies  and were eventually cut short by a tragedy 
which cannot f a i l  to re ca l l  to mind the calamity that b e fe l l  
the Bar&raika at a l a t e r  date. As i t  happened, Yazid succeeded 
his  father as the head of  the family and the nveraor o f  Khurasan# 
The ambitious and imperious nature of Yazid coupled with the 
fa c t  that he had behind him the support o f  a powerful and 
numerous tr ib e ,  soon aroused apprehensions in the mind of a l -  
Hajjaj who feared l e s t  Yazid should plan to overthrow hiowHe, 
therefore, deprived Yazid o f  h is  o f f i c e  in the year 85 A»H,and 
as a matter o f  expediency appointed al-Mufaddal, Yazid1 s h a l f -  
brother, to act in h is  place. Al-lJufaddal1 s term,however, la s ted  
only nine montha for no sooner had he made the mistake of dispos­
ing o f  Sfisa b. Abdullah b* Khazim than he was removed.The d is ­
missal o f  al-Mufaddal inaugurated for  the whole family a period  
of  downfall and severe disgrace at the hands of al-Haj ja j .  Yazid 
and al-M faddal were thrown into prison; <Abd a l- l 'a l ik  and Habib 
were also dismissed from th e ir  o f f i c e s  o f  the Jhief of Police  
and the governor o f  Karmin respective ly  and even lind bint a l -  
Muhallab, who had been married to a l-H ajja j ,  was divorced.In the 
year 90 the three brothers, Yazid, al-Mufaddal and^bd al-2ualik, 
mana^d to escape from al-Hajjaj and sought shelter  with 
Sulaiman b. A^bd al-Mal ik  who interceded on their behalf with the
If--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4 ) .  Iqd. 4/162.
(5 ) .  See supra p. 240-1.
(6 ) .  Diw. 131.
the fu g it ives  were overtaken by HilaL b. ^ w a z  al-Mazinl iho 
had been dispatched in th e ir  pursuit by Haalama b. *Abd al-Malik. 
Hil'fil b. ^ w a z  subjected the -Juhallabids to such wanton massacre 
that only a few could survive i t .  Al-Mufaddal« <Abd a l-I ia lik ,
Ziyad and Marwan* the sons o f  al-Muhallab are expressly named 
as having been k i l le d  on that occasion. Al-Minhal b. ^bl^Jyaina 
b. al-Muhallab, ^ r  and al-!5i^ilra* sons o f  Qabisa b. al-Mihallab  
and Mu<awiya b. Yazid b. al-2!nhallab are also reported among 
the victim s. A number of them were also made prisoners and were 
l a t e r  on ordered to be k i l le d  by Yazid b. *Abd a l- , ia l ik .  The 
women and ahildren were sold into slavery, from which they were 
only redeemed by the humanity o f  al-Jarrah o. Abdullah a l -  
Hakami. A^bu ^ y a in a  b. al-l^ihallab, <Umar b. Yazid o. al-Mihallab  
and <UthJKin b. al-Mufaddal b. a l- lu h a llab  are mentioned as 
— ■ * «
the fortunate survivors who saved themselves by taking s h e lte r  
with Zunbil(i).
The trag ic  end o f  the Mahaliba i s  noticed by most o f  the 
contemporary poets. Those attached to the Umayyids l ik e  Jarir(2)  
naturally  rejoice  in the successful crushing o f  a revolt . The 
diwan of al-Farazdaq i s  particu lar ly  rich in  references to 
almost a l l  the v ic is s itu d es  in the fortune o f  the Mahaliba rigfct 
up to the trag ic  climax (3 ) .  On the other hand, those who had 
been devoted to the Mahaliba l ik e  Thabit qutna (4) raoum the lo s s
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(1) The above account i3  taken from IAth.5/37-42. According 
to Yqb. ^373^11 thman was also k i l le d .
(2) Tide Diw. pp. 219 > 241; 390.
(3) Vide Diw. pp. 17;46; 106; 132; 187i266;332; 424; 434; 507;
548;599; 806. , , * *(4 )  His elegy on Yazid b. al-Muhallab i s  preserved in Tab.
2/1414 e t  seq*
then sovereign* al-Walld b. *Abd al-Malik t i l l  the l a t t e r  granted 
them and th e ir  family protection against al-Hajjaj# On the 
accession of oulaiman in 96 A.H. the family once again rose to 
power and prosperity for a short period. Yazid m s appointed 
governor o f  al^Iraq and Khurasan and he in turn distributed  
the high o f f i c e s  under his command among hi3 brothers and 
kinsmen. Habib b. al-Muhallab was also appointed to al-Sind#
In the year 99 Yazid wa3 again cast into prison by the Caliph 
U^mar II on account o f  h is  in a b i l i ty  to deliver to the s ta te  
the rich booty from Jurjan and Tabaris tan which he was in d iscree t  
enough to promise to Sulaiman in writing. When the Caliph^mar II 
was about to die in the year 101 A^H.Yazid dreaded l e s t  he 
should f a l l  into the hands of the succeeding Umayyid,Yazid b#
<Abd al-Malik; riio was avowedly antagonistic  to him because of 
h is  cruel and revengeful treatment o f  the family o f  al-Hajjaj  
with whom the prince was related by matrimony. So Yazid f led  
from the prison and reached al-Basra where he captured the 
governor KAdi b. ^ r ta t  al-Fazarl and in a short time estab lished  
his a sents a l l  over a!-Iraq* Fars and Karman. Later on he raised  
the banner o f  revolt  against Yazid b. 4Abd al-Malik ?lio had in  
the mean tine ascended the throne a f ter  the death o f  ^ Jmar II#
The new sovereign dispatched h is  brother Mas lama b. *Abd al-Malik 
and his nephew al^Abbas b. al-Walld b. <Abd a l - ' a l i k  in order 
to crush the rebellion . A severe battle  took place at a l - ^ q r  
(near Karbala5) in the month o f  Safar* 102 with the r esu lt  that  
Yazid bi al-Mahallab was k i l le d  along with h is  brothers 
Muhammad and Habib# After the defeat a t  al-^Aqr* al-l«Sifaddal * • * 
and his brothers f led  to al-Sind with a l l  th e ir  fam ilies in 
accordance with a predetermined plan. At Qandlbil, however.
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of their  patrons. I t  is,however* ju st  possib le  that the poets 
of the l a t t e r  category dared not express the ir  genuine sentiments 
for fear o f  repercussions on the Umayyid autftorities,Hence the 
volume of  th e ir  verses i s  not so great as could be expected.
Yazid b, <Abd al-Mal ik i s  reported to have expressly urged the 
poets to s a t i r i s e  the Mahaliba, Kufcbayyir was the only poet 
who refused to do s o ( l ) .  What may be regarded as an index to 
the popular fe e l in g  i s  the saying that * Bariu ^mayya murdered 
re lig ion  at Karbala* and generosity at a l-H q r .  *(2),
31 o
After the tragedy a t  Qandabil, the small redhants o f  the 
Mah&liba m ultiplied so greatly  and so quickly that they were 
often pointed out as an example o f  the saying that 'the rennants 
of sword grow the most'(3 ) ,  I t  i s  reported that the issues  
bom in their  family for the next twenty years were a l l  but 
males(4)r The rapid increase in numbers i s ,  however, not so 
remarkable as the recovery o f  th e ir  l o s t  p r iv ileg e  and gLory 
a f te r  a very b r ie f  period o f  obscurity , l i t h i n  only a few years 
of the trag6dy during the reiga o f  Hi sham b, <Abd al-Malik we
(1) Mas. 5/455. Of. Agh.4/52. The a ttitude  o f  al-Farazdaq as 
described in the l a t t e r  i s  contradicted by the verses 
included in h is  dlwan. 
fc) Al-Kalbi in al-Suyutij Tarikhu 1-Khulafa* (1351), p. 164. 
.3) Jah. 2/223; Uyun 1/130. 
k4 ) . i a s .  5/457.
heer o f  Mar wan, a 3on of Yazid b. al-Mihallab leading a revolt  
against the governor o f  al-Sind liiich eventually  oost him hi3  
l i f e ( l ) .  Under the Jmayyids, however, the Mahaliba oould make 
l i t t l e  headway in  reasserting  th e ir  foraer position  and prestige,  
I t  was during the period o f  p o l i t i c a l  ferment preceding the 
change o f  dynasty that the Mihallabids once again thrust them­
se lves  into prominence in s ta te  a f f a i r s .  About this time we 
find Sulainfin b» Habib b. al-Muhallab and Sufyan b« 2fiu<awiya 
b. Y&sld b. al-Muhallab (2) r is in g  to high o f f ic e s  and se iz in g  
important p os it ion s  for themselves which they maintained during 
the early days o f  the succeeding dynasty. A l i t t l e  la te r ,  the 
Mahaliba counted among themselves such able and famous adminis­
trators as Yazid b* Hatim ( b. Qablsa b. al-Muhallab), the 
governor of .nfrica, and h is  brother, 3auh b. Hatim who held 
o f f ic e  on behalf o f  a l l  the f i r s t  f ive  Abbasid Caliphs and was 
success ive ly  governor o f  al-Sind and Africa in yiiich l a t t e r  
place he died in 174 A.H.(3). Da^ud b. YazTd, sho had 
provis iona lly  succeeded his father in the governorship o f  
Africa, m s la t e r  on transferred to al-Sind where he died and 
was succeeded by h is  son Bishr during the days o f  al-ISrmn*
Among other notables were Nasr b. Habib al-Laihallabl and al - 
Fadl b, Rauh , ooth o f  whom success ively  held the governorship 
o f  Africa a f te r  the death o i Ifeuh. <AbbSd b* xAbbad was a
%
( 1 ) .  Yqb. 2 /& T -T 0 -----------
(2 ) .  Yqb* end Tab. Indez.
(3 ) .  IKh* 1/188
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great ju r is t  during the days o f  II a run while Muhatanad b.
Wobad al-Muhal 1 abiwas regarded as the ch ief  o f  the Basrans( 1) • 
Poetry and scholarship also received th e ir  due share.Marwan 
b. 3a<id  b. %b oad b. Habib b. al-Muhal lab i s  reoogaised as a 
learned grammarian and poet (2) and his oousins ^Abdullah and 
'Abu^Jyaina, (sons of  Muhanmad b. >Abu ^Jyaina b* al-Uiuhall ab 
who i s  also said to have been a poet, cf. Agh. 18/9)« were 
reputed p oets(3 ) ,  Another notable poet o f  a l a t e r  period was 
Yazid b. jj&iharamad al-Muhallabl whose elegy on the death o f  a l -  
Mutawakkil i s  so well-fenom(4). In the middle o f  the third  
century 9>l&tt '1 -Muhallab1 were 3t i l l  a dominant force in the 
body p o l i t i c  o f  al-Basra. Prominent figures of th is  period  
were Hasan b. ^Uthman, ^Ibrahim b. Yahya and ^All b. •'Aban vho 
took a prominent part in  the insurrection o f  the <.y.avl(5).
A very la te  but nevertheless the most i l lu s t r io u s  scion o f  the 
Muhal la  bids wa3 'Abu Muhammad al-M ihallabi (291-352 A. II.) ,  
the famous vazier o f  Mi<izz al-Daula A^hmad b, Buwaih a l -  
Dai 1 anil* He i s  a lso remembered as a man o f  cultural tastes  
and bountiful dispo3ition(6)*
3n
(1 ) .S ee  Yqb. and Tab. Index.
( 2 ) . Al-Marzubanis Mi^jaiai al-Shu<ara>, ed. P*Krenkow Oairo (1354), p. 398*
(3)^1 bn Qutaiba: Al-Sh^ru wa al-Shu<ara>, Leyden,pp.555-60.( 4 ) . Kam. 775; Iqd. 27186*
( 5 ) . Tab* See index.
(6)*IKh. 1/142.
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A P P S N D I X .
Letters of al-Muhallab, A - '
Speeches of al-Euhallab. |Y- ^
Maxims of al-Mihallab. \b-\Y'
- —  .— X#1) i ^
Mi s c e l l  an sous anecdotes about al -1'iihal lab.
A word about the l e t t e r s ,  speeches and the maxima o f  
al-Muhallab. I t  w ill  be observed that the s ty le  o f  a l -  
Muhallab, both in h is  writings as well as sayings, ia simple 
and d irec t .  Qgiite in conformity with his m ilitary genius, 
his words are just  equal to what he wants to say and yet  
the mode of expression, without the aid o f  rh etor ics ,  i t  
must be noted, — is  so pointed as to create an i r r e s i s t ib ly  
deep and vivid impression* This quality  i s  seen at i t s  best  
in h is  maxims som  o f  which are almost epigrammatic in 
character. Further, he always 3aid the right thing at the 
right hour with a fu l l  regard for the particu lar  needs and the 
exigencies o f  the s itu a t ion  aa well as the psychology of  
those to whom h is  words were addressed. His replies to a l -  
Hajjaj al3o reveal him as a master o f  poignant and witty  
retort  with a keen sense o f  propriety and deoorum.
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